IR 05000280/1990017
| ML18153C242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1990 |
| From: | Conlon T, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C241 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-17, 50-281-90-17, NUDOCS 9006070444 | |
| Download: ML18153C242 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company" Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
April 9, 1990 thru April 12, 1990 Inspector: f}.R. l1/<<J~
G. R. Wiseman, Reactor Inspector Approved B~;/L,h~
T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
s/B/c;z; Date 'Signed 5.q-Cfo Date Signed This ~pecial announced.inspection was conducted in the areas of fire protection/prevention; employee concerns regarding implementation of the Fire Protection Program; and,_ Halon fire protection system interaction events associated with the March 23, 1990 pipe ruptur Results:
The employee concerns were not substantiate /.:,070444 PDR ADOOO::
171 90051:::
0~50002:::0 F'DC Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- W.R. Benthall; Supervisor, Licensing
- M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager-North Anna C.R. Core, Fire Protection Specialist E. Furley, Quality Assurance
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- D.S. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. R. Kansler, Station Manager R. S. Lynch, Senior Fire Protection Specialist
- A. L. Meekins, Supervisor, Administrative Services B. B. McDuffie, Supervisor, Station Safety/Loss Prevention R. L. Morgan, Quality Assurance
- W. A. Robbins, Corporate Safety/Loss Prevention
- E. R. Smith Jr., Manager Quality Assurance T. Raspanti, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- L. C. White, Senior Fire Protection Specialist Other Licensee employees contacted during this inspection included, engineers, fire watches, technicians, and administrative personne Other Organiz~tions Dick Moisant, Phoenix Corporation of Tide Water NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. E. Holland
- S. G. Tingen
- Attended exit interview Employee Concerns Concern The NRC (RII) received an employee concern regarding maintenance and surveillance frequency of fire doors identified in the plant Safety Evaluation Reports (SERS) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R analysi I
( 1)
(2)
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Discussion The inspector reviewed the licensee 1s program for maintenance and surveillance of fire door The licensee has implemented surveillance procedures for non electrically supervised* fire door The licensee is ensuring fire doors are closed and operable by inspecting doors with self-closures and non-locked fire doors daily (Procedures OC-35 and PT-24.24); locked-closed fire doors weekly (Procedure 24.23); and other fire doors monthly (Procedure PT-24.llA).
The inspector also reviewed the plants Fire Protection Deviation Report Log for a one year period ending April 1990 which indicated a number of self-identified discrepancies with fire doors over the period; of which, most all have been corrected and/or the appropriate actions of the Technical Specifications (Fire watches were posted) had been implemente In addition, the inspector inspected fire doors to the Mechanical Equipment Room 3, Emergency Switchgear Rooms, Battery Rooms, Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms, Technical Support Center, and Turbine Buildin During the walkthrough it was noted that the fire door to the Technical-Support Center would not close to a latched positio The licensee took immediate corrective action to adjust the dual-closing mechanisms such that the door would close and latch properl Quality Assurance Triennial Fire Protection Audit S89-24 dated December 15, 1989, included a review of fire door surveillance program and identified no major weaknesses in the progra Conclusion The concern regarding maintenance and surveillance frequency of fire doors was not substantiated; in that, based on the inspector 1s review of plant procedures and visual inspection of fire doors, there are sufficient procedural controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that non-operable fire doors are identifi~d and repaired within the scope of NRC guidelines and licensee commitments regarding Appendix R fire barriers.
- 3 Concern The NRC RII received information on the possibility of inadequate fulfillment of a licensee commitment of a Halon fire protection system modification to have Halon cylinder heads replaced or reworked to ensure bottles will not leak and that seals are in good conditio The replacement parts may not have been installed as required by invoices submitted by an outside fire protection firm contracted to perform the wor (1)
Discussion (2)
On December 9, 1986 the Surry Nuclear Power Station experienced a feedwater pipe failure in the Unit 2 Turbine Buildin As a result of this event the Hal on Fire Suppression System pro-tecting the Units 1 and 2 emergency switchgear rooms on elevation 9 1-6 11 activate The licensee, as a result of the spurious system actuations proposed a number of Halon fire protection system modifications as documented in NRC Inspection Report 87-01, dated February 6, 1987, including a modification to replace or rework the Halon cylinder heads *
Discussion's were held with Safety/Loss Prevention personnel who coordinated the receipt of parts and replacement of the Halon cylinder valves*. Signed service receipt forms provided by the licensee indicate that 21 cylinder valves (Stock N ) were received by Virginia Power and Electric: The licensee representatives stated that the old cylinder valves were marked by' the manufacturer with a stamp series "E" and no manufacturers dat The new replacement cylinder valves have a 11 F 11 series stamp on the valve with stamped manufacturers dates either 10-86 or 12-8 These markings were confirmed by the service representative/technician presently contracted to maintain the Emergency Switchgear Rooms' Halon Fire Suppression Sys tern As further fo 11 owup to the concern, the inspector visually inspected each installed Halon cylinder for these sys terns and verified that the cylinder valves were indeed stamped with the appropriate manufacturers markings indicating the newer models were installe Conclusion The inspector agrees with*the licensee.that the subject Halon system cylinder valves were replaced after the 1986 pipe failure as committe *
4 Concern
- The NRC RII received information that in 1987 the Fire Protection Loss Prevention department was forced to perform testing and replacement of the Control Room Habitability Air Bottle Systems outside of their work responsibilit In addition, the employee indicated that no one cared if the work was done according to Virginia Power and El~ctric Company and NRC Regulation ( 1)
Discuss ion Interviews were held with several Loss Prevention Specialists, and the department superviso The Control Room Habitability bottle air system located in the Mechanical Equipment Room 3 was examined during this inspectio The following information was obtained:
- Loss Prevention Supervisor The Loss Prevention Supervisor provided the inspector with a copy of a follow-up memo of the Company's investigation into the employee's concerns. This investigation indicated that the decision to have Loss Prevention perform the test was based primarily on the fact that they had an existing contract with an outside vendor to perform pressure tests of bottles. According to the results of the investigation, the supervisor of Loss Prevention at that time ( 1987)
recalled discussing this issue with the Station Manage Loss Prevention The Loss Prevention Staff provided the inspector with copies of their review of hydrostatic testing records for the Contra 1 Room Habi tabi 1 i ty system cylinder These records indicate that Loss Prevention made the necessary arrangements with an outside contract service company to have the air system bottles hydrostatically pressure teste Copies of the Contractors Job Invoices were provided to the inspector and indicate that on December 1, 1987, 45 air cylinders were hydrostatically tested and recharged and on December 14, 1987, 37 additional cylinders were serviced as abov The Loss Prevention Personne 1 stated that they coordinated these activities with the operations shifts and did not violate Technical
. Specification requirements in the proces *
(2)
Conclusions From the inspectors interviews, along with the examination of the Control Room Habitability system, it is apparent that the Loss Prevention Department made arrangements with a qualified outside contractor to perform the necessary work and were not forced to perform work outside their work classificatio In addition, no violations of Plant Technical Specifications occurred as a result of this wor The concern was not substantiate Concern NRC (RII) received a concern regarding the use of plastic bag ljners for trash receptacles located within the plant in that they may be a fire hazar (1) Discussion:
The inspector reviewed site Fire Prevention Administrative Procedures (See paragraph 3) which establish plant policy for trash removal and control of ignition sources. These procedures require frequent trash removal and have estalished a No Smoking Policy for safety-related safe shutdown areas of the plan As further follow-up to the employee's concern, the inspector discussed housekeeping practices at the site with licensee Site and Administrative Services personne The licensee stated that new trash receptacles with liners were installed during a site Beautification Program established in late 1988 and, are equipped with covers and are emptied daily and monitored by the responsible Maintenance Services.organizatio During several daily plant walkthroughs, the inspector visually verified that the receptacles are emptied frequently throughout various shifts and there was no evidence of improper use of smoking materials to ignite the plastic receptacle liner As noted in paragraph 3.d the inspector also reviewed past plant fire event history which indicated that no major fire incidents have been reported involving trash receptacles or plastic liner In addition, no housekeeping deficiencies involving the receptacles were documented in the station Safety and Loss Prevention monthly Fire Prevention Inspection Reports since 198 In general, the inspector found the housekeeping in safety related plant areas to be very goo *
(2)
Conclusions The concern regarding the use of plastic bag liners for trash receptacles was not substantiate From interviews with plant personnel along with examination of the plant facilities, it is apparent that site housekeeping procedures and policy implementation provide sufficient controls to provide assurance that the use of plastic bag liners in trash receptacles pose minimal fire risk to the plan In addition the inspector found no documented evidence of fire hazard problems related to the trash receptacles which would jeopardize fire or plant safet. * Fire Protection/Prevention Program (64704) Fire Prevention/Administrative Control Procedures The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention Administrative Procedures.
Procedure N FPP ADM-56 Title Fire Protection Program dated April 5, 1988 Special Processes Involving Ignition Sources, dated April 26, 198 The procedures were found to comply with the NRC guidelines in the document entitled,
"Nuclear Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance," dated June 14, 197 Fire Protection Surveillance Inspections and Tests The inspector reviewed the following inspection procedures and test records for the periods indicated:
RIS 06-10 PT-24. llA Fire Protection Inspection Report (Monthly* Routine) January 1987 through December 198 Fire Doors (Monthly) April 1989 through December 1989.
- PT-24.44 PT-24.45
Emergency Switchgear Room Halon (Annually) Units 1 and 2 - May 1,
- 1987, May 9, 1988, and March 15, 198 Emergency Switchgear Room Halon Check (Monthly) June 1987 through December 198 The surveillance test data and testing frequency associated with above fire protection system surveillance test/inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the require-merits of the pl~nt Fire Protection Technical Specification Fire Protection Audits The most recent audit reports of.the Fire Protection Program were reviewed:
Fire* Protection Annual Quality Assurance Audit, March 20-31, 1989. ( S89-18)
0 Results:
5 findings; 2 observations 0 Status:
Two findings open pending QA effectiveness revie Triennial Fire Protection Audit performed by DJC Enterprises Inc. (S89-24)
0 Results:
6 Findings; 6 Observations 0 Status:
Five Findings open of which three are pending QA effectiveness revie The above Quality Assurance Department audits were thorough and effective as they related to the review of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R/Safe Shutdown compliance revie Significant audit findings related to Appendix R Emergency Lighting Systems initiated a more thorough surveillance program for eight-hour battery emergency lighting system A re.view of the Plant Fire Protection Deviation Reports identified numerous problems with emergency lighting systems during this period. The licensee has effectively initiated corrective actions associated with these fire protection audit findings and deviation report In addition, the QA department has initiated an effective Fire Protection Audit response and corrective action review and tracking system.
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8 Fire Reports The inspector reviewed the station fire reports for 1989 and 1990. These reports indicated that there were eight fire events in safety related areas in 1989 from a total of twelve for the site in that yea Most of those small fires in safety-related areas involved welding and cutting processes occurring in Unit 1; however, none were of a major significanc * Permanent Plant/Appendix R Fire Protecti.on Features A plant tour was made by the inspector. During the plant tour, the following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspecte Fire Area
4
7
31
Description Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room Emergency Diesel Generator Room 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 3 Turbine Building Walkway Area Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3 The fire/smoke detection systems, manual firefighting equipment (i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire area boundary walls, floors and ceiling associated with the above plant areas were inspected and verified to be in service or functional, except fire doors to the Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3 were administratively open due to ongoing maintenance work-being performed in the are The inspector verified that fire watches were posted in the affected area Interviews with fire watch personnel indicated that they are well versed in their responsibilities and requirements for identifying and reporting a fire even The CO? systems and Halon systems installed in the three Diesel Generator Rooms and Emergency Switchgear and Relay Rooms were inspected and found to be in servic The inspector performed a walkdown of the three-hour rated TSI Thermolag fire barrier installation around the fiberglass reinforced plastic piping routed through Fire Area 45 from the charging pump service water pump 1-SW-P-lOA to the Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room This fire barrier application appeared to be properly maintained *
. The following eight-hou_r. emergency 1 ighting units were inspected:
Uriit No*.
2ELT 848 Room lELT-125 lELT-120 lELT-126 2EL T-105 Location Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Emergency Diesel Generator Room 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 3 It was noted that lighting unit 2ELT~l05 was not operable but was properly tagged out for repair on Work Order WR-685280 dated February 14, 199 Review of the station Deviation Report printout indicated that Deviatio*n Report 2-90-0111 was written which identified that this lighting unit had failed Periodic Test 2-PT-47 Corrective Action for repair of the unit was assigned to the Maintenance Departmen *
Based on this inspection, it appears that the fire protection features associated with the above plant areas are
satisfactorily maintaine The plant tour also verified the licensee's implementation of the fire prevention administrative procedure The control of ignition sources, combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases, and the general housekeeping were found to be very good in.the areas inspecte * *Fire Protection System Spurious Activations On March 23, 1990, at approximately 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> the Surry Nuclear Power Station experienced a secondary pipe failure on the discharge piping of the Low Pressure Heater Drain Pump B (lSD-P-28).
Within minutes of the event two sprinklers in the turbine building actuate At approximately 2318 hours0.0268 days <br />0.644 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.81999e-4 months <br /> the Unit 1 Halon Fire Suppression System protecting the Emergency Switchgear room on elevation 9 1-6 11 actuate About" five minutes later the Unit 2 Halon Fire Suppression System spuriously actuate Spurious actuation of these systems is similar to those observed during a similar pipe rupture event which occurred on December 9, 198 System actuation of this nature discharges 7% to 10% Halon concentration into the emergency switch gear room Personnel who were performing period testing on Unit 2 and a firewatch left the emergency switchgear room because of the Halon discharg However, it should be noted that the concentrations of Halon as a result of the spurious discharges are sufficiently low so to not have created a life hazard to personnel in the area No personnel were injured by the piping failure or the Halon discharg At the time of this inspection the 1 icensee * had completed inspection, repair, and return-to-service -of the affected Halon system The Halon systems' vendor/contractor noted during their inspection that fire Halon cylinder safety burst disc (#7-061-0236, See Attachment Plate H-27E) on cylinders nearest the pipe rupture had relieved during the pipe rupture even These safety devices are designed to burst at 1000 psi cylinder pressure thus relieving internal Halon gas pressure to atmosphere preventing cylinder overpressurization or rupture of the Halon cylinde At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not ye*t *
completed their task team evaluation into root cause of the pipe rupture event or spurious actuation of the Halon Fire Suppression Systems~ Exit Interview Attachment:
The inspection scope and results ~ere summarized on April 12, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in this report and dissenting comments were not received from the license Chemetron Cylinder Valve 1-061-0934, Plate H-27E
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ATTACHMENT
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- cNEfflETROn.. fire extinguishing equipment....
OTE: INCLUDED AS PART OF THE VALVE IUT OT SHOWN IS A ~ VICTAUllC COUPLING 7-039-0JA3, A VICTAULIC CAP 3-061-1158 AND A ANTI-RECOIL PLUG 3*061-059 MANUA PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR CONNECTION CHECK VALVE ASS CHECK ASS PILOT VALVE ASS'Y OR
'GAUGE CONNECTION PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR CONNFCTION
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aocy-----
J-061-11so SPRING-----.
7-0A7-00A3 PISTON----
3-061-11A9
- o* RING------
-023-01.:>5 CHECK VALVE ASSY.---
BALL----.!~_-,;
7-~003 s:1L TE~~;;------:~rf}~~~~
i-086-0009
~0" RING----~~~~~~~~-
7-023-0159 SEAT----
7-061-0237 WASHER J-061-0SSA IHTAINING RING I *'*
5-037-0325 SEAT RETAINER --yi i J-061-11A7 DIP TUBE OUTLINE i !
i I TOP VIEW i)
PISTON ASS lOA
"'o* RING 7-023-0261 OUTLET FITTING 3-061-11'8 I*
CHECK VALVE ASS PLUG 3-061-l 15Q
~~t---BURST DISC 7-061-0236, WASHER 5-061-062 INSET SECTION TAKEN AT LOCATION OF BROKEN LINE CIRCLES-BEHIND PISTO CYLINDER OUTLINE CYLINDER VALVE HIGH FLOW-360 MODEL B HALON 1301 SYSTEM 1-061-0934 PLATE H-27E
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