IR 05000280/1990033
| ML18153C439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1990 |
| From: | Decker T, Seymour D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C438 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-33, 50-281-90-33, NUDOCS 9011200217 | |
| Download: ML18153C439 (11) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES hlUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIGr,J
REGION II
107 MARIETTA STREET, ATLAr~TA, GEORGIA 30323
~ov i 3 1%u 50-280/90-33 and 50-281/90-33 Licensee:
Virginia Electric.and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Faci 1 ity Name:
Surry 1 and 2'
Inspection Conducted:
October 15 thru 19, 1990 Jl.pproved by:
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bate Signed
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Date Signed Radiolcgic2l Effluents and Chemistry Section Radiclogical Protection and Emefgency Preparedness Branch Divisi01, of Radiaticr: Safety and Safeguards SUfv\\V.ARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of radiological effluents, the Radiation Monitoring SysteIT1, and plant chemistr Results:
Surry liquid and gaseous effluents were well within Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 20, and 10 CFR 50 effluent limitations (Paragraph 3).
Surry has developed an ongoing program to update and improve their Radiatiun Monitoring System (Paragraph 4).
Surry experienced five apparent unplanned gas releases between the dates of July 26 and August 29, 199 Only two of these were actual releases. These releases did not exceed Technical Specification limits, and the calculated doses to the maximum exposed member of the public were negligibl The inspector considered the interdisciplinary Event Review Team, and the thorough investigation and documentation of these events, to be a licensee strength (Paragraph 5).
- ~. '.: ' -.....
Reactor Coolant System chemistry parameters were maintained well below Technical Specification limits. There were not indications of significant fuel leakagE.* problems (Paragraph 6). In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie *
REPORT DETAILS 1;
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. R. Benthal 1, Supervisor, L i-censir:ig
- R. C. Bilgeu, Engineer, Licensing
- M.A. Biron, Supervisor, Radiation Engineering
- P. F. Blount, Supervisor, Radiation Analysis
- D. L. Erickson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- B. A. Garber, Technical Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- o*: S. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- M. R. Kansler, Station Manager
- D. Noce, Senior Staff Engineer, Radiation Protection
- R. vJ. Orga, Quality Assurance
- J. A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. R. Smith Jr., Manager, Quality Assurance
- E. T. Swindell, Supervisor, Chemistry
- ~!. A. Thorton, Division of Health Physics & Chemistry Services O_ther licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspector
- J. York, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit int~rview Acronyms and Initial isms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspector Follow-up Items (92701)
(Open)
Violation 50-280/89-32-01, 50-281/89-32-01:
Modifications to Ventilation Systems Resulted in Inadequate Survey of Gaseous Effluent Back-pressure problems and general degradation of the auxiliary building ventilation system had caused unmonitored leakage to the environment, and had caused reverse flow out of laboratory fume hoods into areas outside the radiologically controlled area.
This item was also discussed in Inspection Report 90-1 During ~he current inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee 1 s progress in resolving this issue. This review included a walk-down of selected portions of the ventilation system, review o1 records, and discussions with cognizant licensee personne The walk-down of the ventilation system indicated that deg*raded portions of that system had been substantially repaired or replace The inspector determined that the plans to put Ventilation-Vent 1 back into service had proceeded. This is expected to be completed during the current outag The inspector ct*etermi ned, through conversations with the licensee, that back pressure problems have continued to occur in the ventilation system, apparently due to the system not being balance This back pressure caused some ventilation flow anomalies, -and caused, on at least two occasions, the portomor1ilors at the exit to the protected area to go into alar To correct the back flow problems, on May 8, 1990, the licensee had the honeycomb flow straightener in the Ventilation-Vent 2 stack cleaned of debri This significantly helped correct the back pressure problem in the syste Base~ en this selective review, the inspector determined that the licensee was proceeding with the long term corrective actions for this ite The completion of these actions will be monitored during s~bsequent inspection This item remains ope.
Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports (84750)
Technical Specification 6.6.B.3 requires the licensee to submit a Semi-Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report; within the time periods specified in Technical Specification 6.6.B.3, covering the operation of the facility during the previous six months of operation. The inspector reviewed the semiannual radioactive effluent release report for the first half of 199 This review included an examination of the liquid and gasecus effluents for the first six months of 1990 as compared to those of 1989 and 198 This data is summarized belo A comparison of liquid fission and activation products, gaseous fission and activation products, gaseous tritium, and gaseous particulate, for 1988, 1989, and for the first half of 1990 showed no significant trend Liquid tritium and gaseous Iodine did show an increase for the first six months of 199 The licensee indicated th~t, in part, this was due to the fact that as core life and plant run time increased, tritium and Iodine production increase Surry had multiple outages during 1988 and 1989, and the plant has been online for much of the time in 199 The licensee also indicated that a 1 gallon per minute (gpm) leak on a Pressurizer Safety Value on Unit 1 also ccntributed to the liquid tritium increas This water was collected in the Pressurizer Relief Tan Fluctuating tank conditions affected the leak rate, and in an effort to stabilize the leak, the licensee conducted 11 feed and bleedl! operations. This 11 bleed 11 was
- N transferred to the Primary Drain Transfer Tank, which is fed into the Boron Recovery System, which ultimately is fed into the the liquid radwaste st.rean,, through demineralizers, and release The 11feed and*
bleed" operation would cause increased levels of tritium to sho\\A_i up in this effluent strea The inspector reviewed a document which listed average monthly values for tritium in microcuries per milliliter (uCi/ml).
There was an increase in tritium values for 199 Unit 1 was shut down in October, and the l~aking valve was scheduled to be repaired during the outag The inspector discussed with the licensee the reasons for O curies of liquid gross alpha being released in the first half of 1990, a~ compared to measured amounts having been released in 1989 and 198 These measured an:ounts were based on *analyses that approathed the lower limit of detectio The inspector reviewed documents which listed sample analyses results for 1987 through the first half of 1990, and noted that all measured values fer 1990 were less t.han the lower limit of detection, which would allow the licensee to show a 0.0 Curie relea.se for this categor The inspector also discussed the sa~1plin9 process~ contributing effluent streams, and sample analysis methods with the license The inspector discussed with the licensee the appropriateness of including a liquid gross alph6 sample in their quarterly cross check program, or the use of a blind sample, in order to verify their sample ar:alysi-s capabilit All records revie\\':ed appeared to be in orde Rac:ioactive Effluent. Release Summary 1st Ha.lf 1989 1988 of 1990 of Unplanned Releases
0
Activity Released (
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cur1es1 Liquid Fission and 2.31F.+OO 4.05E+OO 2.41E+OO 11.ctivation Products Tritium 6.84E+02 4.29E+02 4. 94E+02
, Gross Alpha O.OOE+OO 6.98E-06 8.00E-05 Gaseous Fission and 5.34E+Ol 1. 37E+02 3.66E+02 A.ctivat.ion Gases
"
Iodines 3.47E-04 3.89E-04 9.58E-03
{.. Tritium 1.24E+Ol 2.75E+Ol 2.79E+Ol Particulate 1.17E-03 l.99E-03 1. 06E-02
- Volume of Liquid 9.11E+07 vlastes Released
- (prior to dilution)
(liters)
2.94E+09 2.58E+08 For the first half of 1990, Surry liquid and gaseous effl~ents were well within Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 20, and 10 CFR 50 effluent
. limitation No violations or deviations were identifie ~
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) (84750)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.20l(b), this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had a system sufficient to perform the surveys necessary to adequately evaluate the extent of radiation haz~rd Inspection Report 90-13 included information on a special subcommittee which
\\'1as established at Surry to identify and evaluate problems with their radiation monitoring syste A final report, titled Radiation Monitoring System Subcommittee Report" \\'Jas issued on March 15, 199 During the curient inspection the inspector reviewed the action items that were generated as a result of this study, and discussed the progress of each of these items with cognizant licensee personne The "Project Schedule Fer The RMS Subcommittee Action Plan" showed 3 short term items, 15 intermediate items, and 9 long term action item The short term items were to be completed within 60 days from the Staticn Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) approval of the RMS Subcommitee Repor The first item included the development of an integrated project schedule of SNSOC approved action items from this report, and the requirement for a monthly progress report to be provided to SNSO The second item covered the improvement and refining of several different daily Periodic Tests (PTs).
These included notes to operators, improved source check instructions, and the pro~ision of instructions for operators to ensure isokinetic sampling, and for setting different monitor parameter These two items were 100 percent complete at the time of this inspectio The third item involved the implementation of two Engi neeri r.g *Work Requests ( EWR) to ensure i soki neti c samp 1 ing of the plant's gaseous effluent stack, Ventilation Vent No. 2 (Vent-vent 2).
At the time of this inspection this item was 75 percent complet Several of the intermediate action items were to be completed before the end of the Unit 1 refueling outage, which was on-going at the time of this inspection. These items included: revisions to the FSAR to reflect existing configurations and operating practices; the installation of diaital ratemeters; chances in PTs; and the completion and implementation ofwseveral Engineering w6rk Requests (EWR).
Five of these items were 100 percent complete at the time cf the inspection.
Four of the intermediat~ action items were tentatively sch~duled to be completed prior to Cycle 11 startup on Unit One of the items in this
- category was the automation.of isokinetic sample flow for the Ventilation-Vent 1 monitor (Ventilation-Vent 1 has significantly lower flow than Ventilation-Vent 2, and doesn't need to be automated).
A Type 1 study was initiated for this item in January.199 The inspector briefly reviewed the final Type 1 report on this item dated July 3, 199 This item has a target completion date of June 1, 199 Another item concerned the replacement of the component cooling-service water monitor One of these monitors had been replaced, two more were scheduled to be replaced during the current outage on Unit 1, and the last was scheduled to be replaced during the Unit 2 refueling outage in the. spring of 199 Discussions with the licensee indicated that the installed monitor had operatea in a sat~sfactory manne There was not a scheduled completion date for the nine, long term action item These items \\'iere considered 11 as needed Project Activities 11 and would be reviewed under normal project processe The first long term action item involved the installation of a radiation monitor on Ventilation-Vent 1, a major step in bringing this stack back into servic The n1onitor had been received by the site, and installation was expected to be completed during the curr~nt outag Other items included: monitor replacements; an iodine plateout study; the replacement of 16-pin Victoreen recorders; and the review of training materials for Control Room and Radiation Protection personnel for accuracy, level of detail, and calibration information. One other item dealt \\'Jith evaluating the necessity of long term replacement of the RMS with a state-of-the-art system, in conjunction with plant life extension improvem~nt This project was started in February 1990, and had a target completion date of.June 199 The inspector also reviewed several recommended action iten1s that wer~
developed as a result of the five apparent unplanned gas feleases that occurred at Surry between July 26 and August 29, 1990. A discussion of these releases is presented in Paragraph The licensee pl~nned to include the action items associated with these releases with the SNSOC action item The inspector also reviewed the progress the licensee had made in returning the Waste Gas Holdup System Monitor to operability. This monitor had been inoperable since approximately 198 The licensee had made several attempts to bring this monitor online, but had encountered continuing difficulties with calibration, sample flow, spurious alarms, and maintenance of associated equipmen Further delays were incurred b~cause a reevaluation determined that the monitor system should be safety related; and a decision was made to include hydrogen monitoring capabilit Discussions with the licensee indicated that this monitor should be brought into service during the current Unit 1 refueling o~tag The inspector reviewed a schedule for the completion of this modification. This modification could only be completed during the outage, as the: modification required the availability of the Waste Gas Decay Tank The leaking Pressurizer Safety Relief valve discussed in Paragraph 3 meant all the Waste Gas Decay Tanks had to be in us *
In conclusion, the licensee has developed an ongoing program to update and improve their RM Although several of the action items have experienced some delays in completion and/or initiation of work, many items have been complete The progress of the remaining items will be followed by regional inspectors *during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identifie.
Radioactive Releases (84750)
As mentioned above, five apparent unplanned gas releases occurred at Surry between July 26 and August 29, 199 The inspector determined that the licens~e organized a interdisciplinary Event Review Team to investigate these release* The inspector reviewed a Surry Power Station Event Report which described the releases, listed root causes, and recommended corrective actions; and discussed the relea~es and recommended corr~ctive actions with cognizant licensee personne Tv10 of these re 1 eases, one on July 26 and one on August 29, were caused from a leak-by in a solenoid valve in one of the radiation monitoring systems during a monthly P As a result of the PT, negative pressure was created en the upstream side of the valve, while positive pressure was imposed on the downstream side of the valv This combination caused the valve to lift, and allowed 0aste gas to flow into the radiation monitor sample chamber, causing a spike, signaling an apparent releas This PT had been performed before, but until July 1990, there was not enough activity in the waste gas system to be detected by this monito The leaking pressurizer safety valve mentioned in Paragraph 3 was the source of higher radioactive concentrations in the waste gas decay syste The origin of these apparent releases was verified by the Event Tea This was accomplished by the introduction of a helium test gas into the system and by running the PT agai The presence of the helium gas was verified in the monitor chamber by the use of gas chromatograp Next, line pressures were manipulated to force the valve to stay closed against the downstream backpressur The helium test gas was ~ot detected in the monitor chamber under these condition These two releases were considered "apparent" releases since the gas causing the monitor to spike was only approximately one liter in volume, had already been accounted for by another monitor, and was not representative of vent flo Two of the events were determined to be actual release The first occurred on July 27 and originated from a pipe fracture en a pressure indicator sensing line in the Unit 1 letdown syste The exact cause of the sensing line failure had not been determine The failed end of the tubing was retained for analysi square feet of the auxiliary
- building was contaminated as a result of this release and subsequently was reclaime The release pathway was Ventilation-Vent 2, with the duration of the release less than 15 minute The s~ns1ng line was repaired on August 1, 199 The release was calculated to be 46.0 percent of Technical Specification (TS) limits (i.e., if this was a continuous release for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day for 365 days it would generate 46.0 percent of the ahnual Whole Body exposure limits (500 milliRem per year) for a member of the public).
The estimated, calculated dose to the maximum exposed member of the public from the actual release was 0.0065 milliRem (mRem).
The*second 11 actual 11 release occurred on July 28 and was caused by a packing leak on a line from the PRT to the Process Ven A leaking fitting on a flex hose used to vent the PRT to.the overhead gaseous waste system also contributed to this event. This reiease lasted less than 2 minute The faulty valve w~s repaired ori July 28, and the flex hose fittings were tightene The release was calculated to be 17.9 percent of TS limits for the same conditions as described abov The estimated, calculated d0se to the maximum exposed member of the public from the actual release was 0.00034 mRe The remaining event occurred on July 28 and was determined not to be a release, but an electronic spike caused by a circuit board failur The defective controller board was replace These releases did not exceed TS limits; and the calculated doses to the maximum exposed member of the public were determined to be negligibl The inspector considered the interdisciplinary Event Review Team, and the thorough investigatior1 and documentation of these events to be a licensee strengt No violations or deviations were identifie.
Reactor Coolant Chemistry (84750)
TS 3.1.D specifies the total maximum allo'tJable specific activity of the reactor coolant, and the maximum concentration of radioactive iodine in the reactor coolant in terms of Dose Equivalent Iodine-131 (DEI).
TS 3.1.F specifies the maximum acceptable concentrations of oxygen, chlorides and fluorides in reactor coolan TSs j.l.D and 3. also include specific action statements if the limits are exceede These parameters are related to fuel integrity and corrosion resistanc Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed chemistry logs, and graphs generated by the licensee for the purpose of tracking these parameters and identifying trend These documents revealed that DEI for Unit 1 for January 1990 through September 1990 ran approximately 3.0 E-02 uCi/m DEI for Unit 2 ran approximately 4.0 E-03 for the same time perio Gross activity for the same time period for Unit 1 was approximately 7.0 E-01 uCi/ml, and for Unit 2 was approximately 2.0 E-0 Tritium values for Unit 1 ranged from 2.6 E-02 to 2.3 E-0 I
"
Tritium values* for Unit 2 ranged from 9.8E-02 to 4.6 E-0 The~e values indicated no significant fuel leakage problem The Monthly Performance Data Fuel p'erformance Analysis Report indicated that there was only one confirmed defective rod.in Unit The inspector reviewed graphs for chlorides, fluorides oxygen and hydrogen for 1990 up to and including September 199 The graph for chlorides showed that the chloride concentration in the primary coolant for both units had been maintained at approximately 5 parts per billion (ppb),
with a range of Oto 11 pp The graph for.fluorides showed that the fluoride concentration had been maintained at approximately 1 ppb, with a range of Oto 10 ppbs, for both unit Oxygen concentrations for this time period averaged approximately 5 ppb for both tJnit Internal Surry Action Limits were not exceed~d for these parameter Hydrogen concentrations for both units ranged between 21 and 40 cubic centimeters per kilogram (cc/kg).
The internal Action Limit for Surry for this parameter was for values that were less than 25 or greater than 50 cc/k Surry had 3 values that were less than the acceptable range, these parameters were shown to have been brought back into the acceptable range vlithin two day Hydrogen concentration in the primary coolant is not a TS requiremen Because of reactor coolant system leakage into the component cooling water system (CCW), recent grab samples of the CCW had indicated radioactivity of 1.0 E-03 to 3.0 E-03 uCi/ml, and approxi~ately 150 parts per million boro The inspector determined that the licensee was making efforts tc idrntify and stop the leaks, and to clean up the CCW syste The inspector reviewed a preliminary schedule for this work which shm'led work starting ir, November 1990, and ending in February 199 The inspector determined that the parameters were maintained well below TS 1 imit No violations or deviations were identifie.
Radwaste (84521, 84523)
During this inspection the inspector was given an extensive tour of the radwaste processing facility that is currently being built. This facility was discussed previously in Inspection Report 90-13, Paragraph The licensee estimated that the facility was approximately 95 percent complet The inspector took the tour, and discussed facility operations as a precursor to preoperational inspections that have been schedule Hot testing of this facility is scheduled for April 199 No violations or deviations were identifie ll 9 Audits (84750)
TS 6.1.3.a.11, 12 and 13 requires that the Quality Assurance Department shall function to. audit station activities, and that these audits snall encompass: the radiological environmental program at least once per 12 months; the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months; and the Process Control Program and implementing procedures for processing and packaging of radioactive v,aste at least once per 24 month These audits verify that these programs are being effectively implemented and are in compliance with the requirements of Surry 1s TSs and the Quality Assurance Departmen Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed a copy of Surry Power Station Quality Assurance Audit S90-03, titled 11 Radiological Environmental Monitoring, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and Process Control Program," dated rt.arch 30, 199 The inspector discussed the audit*
findings with licensee personnel and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license The inspector noted that either corr~ctive actions had been taken or were in progress to resolve the items. of concer No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 19~ 1990 with those persons indicated in Paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results as listed in the sur:11:lar Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Cissenting comments were net received from the license. Acronyms and Initialisms cc/kg CFR DEI gpm mRem ppb PT RMS SNSOC TS
.uCi/ml cubic centimeter per kilogram Code of Federal Regulations Dose Equivalert Iodine-131 gallons per minute mi 11 i Rem part per billion Periodic Test Radiation Monitoring System Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee Technical Specification microCuries per milliliter