IR 05000277/1993006
| ML20044E505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1993 |
| From: | Anderson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044E497 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-93-06, 50-277-93-6, 50-278-93-06, 50-278-93-6, NUDOCS 9305250092 | |
| Download: ML20044E505 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION I
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Docket / Report No. 50-277/93-06 License Nos. DPR-44 I
50-278/93-06 DPR-56
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t Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
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Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
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P. O. Box 195 t
Wayne, PA 19087-0195
i Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 l
Dates:
March 30 through May 10, 1993 f
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Inspectors:
J. J. Lyash, Senior Resident Inspector
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M. G. Evans, Resident Inspector i
F. P. Bonnett, Resident Inspector i
R. K. Ierson, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
,1 A /4Q'?_
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C. J. Anderson, Chi Dat'e j
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%/ Reactor Projects Sbchon 2W[
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Division of Reactor Projects t
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i 9305250092 930518
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PDR ADOCK 05000277
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
h Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station l
Inspection Report 93-06 j
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Plant Operations
i During the period, the licensee manually scrammed Unit 2 in response to problems with portions
a of the reactor water level instrumentation system. The inspector concluded that the control room l
staff had identified the diverging level indications in a timely manner, and took appropriate
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actions. Licensee staff and management performed good technical follow-up investigations and j
reached an acceptable sesolution before plant restart (Section 2.0),
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Maintenance and Surveillance
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i The inspector identified a temporary change (TC) to a high pressure coolant injection system
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j surveillance test procedure that was not appropriately processed by the licensee. The technical j
aspects of the change were discussed in detail by the Plant Operations Review Committee before l
implementation, and no adverse effect on safety resulted. However, the TC represented a l
change of intent and should have been processed as a procedure revision, and the final TC did not adequately establish the needed testing sequence. The licensee initiated action to address I
these process implementation weaknesses. (Section 4.0, URI 93-06-01).
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The licensee replaced a leaking Unit 3 'D' residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger floating
l head gasket. They determined that relaxation of the floating head bolt torques was the cause of -
j the head leak.. The inspector reviewed the maintenance activity, and determined that the licensee l
planned, pre-staged, and conducted the work in a safe and organized manner (Section 5.0).
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Engineering and Technical Support
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i The inspectors performed system readiness inspections for the Unit 3 core spray, standby gas i
j treatment, turbine building closed cooling water, and isolated phase bus cooling systems. The l
l inspectors found that the licensee had maintained these systems in good physical condition,
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maintained the preventive maintenance and testing programs current, and had established
adequate operating and maintenance procedures (Section 3.0).
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Radiological Controls
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The licensee determined that a small amount of primary coolant had leaked past the floating ?
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gasket of the '3D' RHR heat exchanger into the high pressure service water (HPSW) systein.
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The leakage was detected during a routine chemistry sample of the HPSW system effluent to the
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j discharge canal. The licensee determined that the amount of potentially contaminated flaid j
released, and the projected dose were minimal (Section 5.0).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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i EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y.....................................
i 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW
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.I 2.0 FOLLOW-UP OF PLANT EVENTS............................ 1 l
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3.0 SYSTEM READINESS EVALUATION........................... 3
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j 4.0 SURVEILLANCE TESTING OBSERVATIONS..................... 6 l
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5.0 MAIN'IENANCE ACTIVITY OBSERVATIONS.................... 7
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6.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS............................... 9 t
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7.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY
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8.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT UPDATE......................... 9
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i 9.0 PREVIOUS INSPECTION ITEM UPDATE......................
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10.0 MANAG EMENT MEETINGS................................
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l DETAILS
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f 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW (71707)*
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t The inspectors completed NRC Inspection Procedure 71707, " Operational Safety Verification,"
'f by directly observing safety significant activities and equipment, touring the facility, and l
interviev.ing and discussing items with licensee personnel. The inspectors independently verified i
safety system status and Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO),
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reviewed corrective actions, and examhed facility records and logs.
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i Both units began the inspection period operating at 100% power. During the middle of the i
period, the licensee implemented a load drop on Unit 2 to facilitate maintenance o.1 the reactor
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recirculation motor generator (MG) sets. After both recirculation MG sets were returned to
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service, the licensee manually scrammed the unit because of a persistent divergence in reactor j
water level indication (Section 2.0). Unit 2 was returned to power on April 27,1993, and re-
- j mained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
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r The licensee operated Unit 3 at 100% power for most of the period. One significant power l
reduction was completed to clean the six main condenser water boxes. The unit was returned
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to, and operated at, full power for the remainder of the period. The inspectors observed that
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control room operaters and supervision maintained very good oversight of activities and i
responded appropriately to equipment problems.
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2.0 FOLLOW-UP OF PLANT EVENTS (93702, 71707)
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During the report period, the inspectors evaluated licensee staff and management response to
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plant events to verify that the licensee had identified the root causes, implemented appropriate l
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corrective actions, and made the required notifications. One of the events reviewed by the
l inspectors was considered significant, and is discussed below.
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On April 24,1993, the licensee manually scrammed Unit 2 following declaration of all reactor
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vessel level instrumentation served by the '2B' condensing chamber inoperable. Peach Bottom
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has two narrow range condensing chambers / reference legs ('3A' and '3B') that are used to
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generate level signals for feedwater control and the reactor low water level scram. In addition, there are two wide range condensing chambers / reference legs ('2A' and '2B') that are used to
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generate signals for emergency cere cooling system automatic initiation and primary containment isolation. The wide range variable leg tap enters the reactor vessel in the annulus area. Because
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of this location, the wide range instrument indications are affected by recirculation pump flow;
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the greater the associated reactor recirculation pump flow, the lower the indicated wide range I
level. The '2A' and '2B' reference legs also serve the fuel zone level instruments. The fuel j
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l The inspection procedure from NRC Manual Chapter 2515 that the inspectors used as Fuidance is l
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parenthetically listed for each report section.
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zone variable leg taps enter the vessel and terminate near the discharge of a jet puntp. When
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the associated recirculation pump ir running, the pressure at the jet pump discharge is higher
than that exe.ted by the reference leg, and the indication reads offscale high.
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Beginning on April 23, and continuing onto April 24, the licensee had implemented a load drop i
to facilitate maintenance on the reactor recirculation MG sets. The '2A' and '2B' MG sets were l
removed from service individually for lube oil cooler cleaning, tach-generator coupling change-l out, and inspection of the scoop tube mechanical linkage. The changing reeirculation pump i
status resulted in corresponding changes in wide range level indications, so that the instruments i
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on the '2A' and '2B' reference legs diverged. As previously stated, this was an expected l
response. However, late on April 24, after returning both recirculation MG sets to service, the
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control room staff observed a persistent difference of about 18 inches between instruments
served by the '2A' and 2B' reference legs. The instruments on the '2B' leg read higher than those on the '2A' leg. This divergence was identified during operator performance of the
routine channel comparison surveillance. The Shift Manager declared all instrumentation associated with the '2B' condensing chamber / reference leg inoperable and proceeded with a plant
shutdown.
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Extensive investigation by the hcensee identified that the divergence had been caused by a i
leaking instrument equalizing valve at fuel zone level instrument '73A.' Because the variable
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leg pressure at thejet pump was slightly higher than that exerted by the reference leg when the j
recirculation pump was in service, the leak had no impact on the instrumentation before j
l implementation of the MG set outages. However, when the '2A' recirculation pump was j
secured, the positive differential pressure exerted between the reference leg and lower vessel
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plenum caused the '2B' reference leg to slowly drain into the reactor. The decreasing reference
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leg inventory resulted in the falsely high reactor level indication. The licensee confirmed the
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i validity of this theory by observation that the equalizing valve was not tightly seated, and by i
isotopic analysis of the system fluid in the area of the equalizing valve and comparison with the reactor coolant. The licensee replaced the faulty valve, backfilled the reference leg, established
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system conditions approximating those that existed when the divergence occurred, and monitored
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instrument benavior for two hours. No anomalies were noted. Subsequently, the licensee l
restarted the plant with no further problems.
l The inspector reviewed all relevant control room recorder traces, process computer data,
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operator logs, and surveillance procedures and data. The inspector also interviewed the Shift
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Manager and Reactor Operators in the control room at the time of the event, attended the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting convened to discuss the event and its cause, and i
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observed the post-maintenance test performed following replacement of the valve. The inspector f
concluded that the control room staff had identified the diverging level indications in a timely
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manner, and had taken appropriate actions. Licensee staff and management performed good
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technical follow-up investigations and reached an acceptable resolution before plant restart.
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l 3.0 SYSTEM READINESS EVALUATION (71707,71710,62703,61726)
t During the period, the inspectors performed system readiness inspections of four plant systems.
l The systems selected for evaluation were the Unit 3 core spray, standby gas treatment (SGTS),
j turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW), and isolated phase bus cooling systems. The j
first two systems were selected due to their relative safety significance. The TBCCW and isolated phase bus cooling systems were selected because of the potential impact their failure
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would have on plant operation.
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The objective of the evaluation was to assess the physical condition of the system, the scope and l
status of the preventive maintenance (PM) program, the system maintenance backlog, the
adequacy of operating and test procedures, and the level of operator knowledge concerning this
equipment. To accomplish this evaluation the inspectors reviewed design documents, drawings, j
operating procedures and training materials, vendor manuals, and industry experience docu-l ments. The inspectors performed in-field walkdowns of the components, reviewed the status of
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corrective and preventive maintenance items and data associated with surveillance and perfor-
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mance testing. The details of the inspectors' reviews are discussed below.
i 3J Core Spray System l
The core spray system consists of two independent 10C% capacity loops. Each loop includes -
two 50% capacity centrifugal pumps. The core spray pumps and valves can be manually
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operated by control switches located in the control room, and will automatically initiate on either
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a low reactor water level condition, or on a high pressure in the drywell accompanied by low
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pressure in the reactor pressure vessel.
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Inspector walkdown of the system indicated that it had been maintained in good physical
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condition. The system was lined-up in accordance with the System Operating Procedures (SOPS)
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and operability requirements. The SOPS and Surveillance Test (ST) procedures were technically adequate and had been completed at the appropriate frequency. The licensee had maintained the
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equipment in good physical condition and the PM program was up-to-date.
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During a previous report period (Inspection Report 50-277/278 93-01), the inspector identified
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specific concerns with ST-I-014-100-2, " Core Spray Logic System Functional Test (LSFT),"
j regarding the operability status of core spray during performance of surveillance tests, and of l
the associated emergency diesel generators (EDGs) that derive a start signal from the core spray logic. During the time the LSFT is being performed, the loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) start
for two EDGs is inoperable. In response to those concerns, the licensee developed and issued l
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PORC Position No. 61, " Instrument Allowable Out-of-Service Time and Equipr it 0;x:rability
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During Surveillance Testing." In this PORC position, the licensee addressed the status of the (
core spray system and EDG operability while under test. The inspector observed the PORC
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meetings discussmg this issue, reviewed the PORC Position. The inspector also discussed the l
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licensee's position with the NRC Plant Systems Technical Staff. The inspector concluded that the licensee had adequately evaluated the issue, and implemented a set of controls that assure l
safety.
The inspector discussed the Plant Performance Monitoring Program (PPMP) with the System l
Manager (SM). The PPMP is a program that is to be used by the SM to collect and trend
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performance data, and to assist in identifying abnormal trends. Presently, this program is not i
being effectively used by the SMs. This is due, in part, to the cumbersome data collection
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requirements.
The licensee, however, is developing a new computerized system entitled
"TechDATA." TechDATA is a database system that will help to centralize compile system
information from the various testing programs. The database is being developed "in-house,"
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and will provide a statistical quality control tool for performance indicators monitoring. At
present, the licensee is building the database for the systems, and plans to have the system available for service about June 1993. The core spray system was loaded into the database and the inspector observed a demonstration of various graphic trend and analytical features.
Based on the observed physical condition of the core spray system, and the scope and status of the PM and ST programs, the inspector concluded that the core spray system was maintained
in a condition that assures high availability. The use of the new TechDATA system by the SMs
could enhance the trending of performance data significantly, and thereby improve system
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readiness.
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t 3.2 Standby Gas Treatment System r
The standby gas treatment system (SGTS) consists of two redundant filter trains, and three 100%
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capacity exhaust fans. Each unit has its own supply and return ducting, and secondary
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containment isolation dampers. When an automatic initiation signal is received, the affected secondary containment isolates, the SGTS inlet and outlet dampers open and two SGTS fans start (the 'A' and 'B' fans for Unit 2, and the 'B' and 'C' fans for unit 3).
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During the period, the inspector reviewed: 1) the status of outstandmg system corrective
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maintenance; 2) the scope and status of the preventive maintenance program; 3) system surveil-lance and operating procedures; and 4) the results of recent system performance testing for
SGTS. In addition, the inspector performed walkdowns of active system components, and
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inspected accessible portions of the supply and return duct to verify acceptable physical condi-tions. The inspector found that the system had been maintained in good physical condition, and that the test and opemting procedures were adequate.
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3.3 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water and Isolated Phase Bus Cooler l
Systems As previously discussed, non-safety related, balance of plant (BOP) systems can and do have a
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j significant impact on the reliable and safe operation of the facility. While BOP systems are not I
required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents, poor reliability of certain critical BOP systems can dramatically affect the transient arrival rate. During the period, the inspector i
selected two BOP systems, TBCCW and isolated phase bus cooling, for review.
l TBCCW serves to remove heat from essential turbine building auxiliary equipment, including i
i the isolated phase bus coolers, the station air compressor jacket and after cooler, the control rod
j drive (CRD) pump lube oil coolers and thrust bearing housings, and the condensate pump motor
and thrust bearing coolers. Isolated phase bus coolers provide clean dry air for main generator
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bus cooling. TBCCW consists of two redundant pumps, two heat exchangers, a head tank, and
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the necessary valves, piping and instrumentation. The heat exchangers are cooled by the service
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water system. One pump and one heat exchanger are maintained in service. The standby pump automatically starts if low discharge pressure is sensed. If both pumps are tripped longer than
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40 seconds, solenoid valves align the reactor building closed cooling water system to supply the
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station air compressors and the two CRD pumps. Since cooling for the condensate pump j
j bearings does not transfer, loss of the TBCCW would result in a loss of the condensate system.
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Also, if TBCCW is not restored to the isolated phase bus coolers in seven minutes, the current on the main generator should be reduced to less than 18,000 amps to prevent damage due to lack
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of appropriate coohng.
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I The inspector completed the following reviews and evaluations for TBCCW and the isolated
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phase bus coolers: 1) a walk down of system components to assess alignment and physical r
condition; 2) a sampling of system operating procedures, check-off lists, alarm response cards,
off normal procedures, and operational inspection procedures to assess their accuracy and
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completeness; 3) system design drawings and vendor manuals to determine critical components
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j and their function; 4) applicable preventive maintenance program requirements and status; and
5) observation or review of recent system maintenance activities. The inspector found that l
system operating procedures addressed all significant components and that the systems were j
aligned in accordance with these procedures. The licensee has maintained the equipment in good j
physical condition and the PM programs up-to-date. The inspector discussed the periodic system j
test procedures for both systems with plant operators. The operators were very knowledgeable
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of the systems, and the procedures were technically adequate and had been completed at the i
i specified frequency. The inspector concluded that the licensee had maintained the systems in good physical condition, and had established adequately detailed operating and inspection
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3.5 Conclusion j
The licensee has established acceptable maintenance, testing and operating procedures for the I
systems discussed above. Inspector walkdowns, interviews and documents reviews indicated that
the licensee had allocated adequate resources to maintain these systems in good operating condition, and ready for continuous or standby service.
v 4.0 SURVEILLANCE TESTING OBSERVATIONS (61726, 71707)
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The inspectors observed conduct of surveillance tests to verify that approved procedures were
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being used, test instrumentation was calibrated, qualified personnel were performing the tests, j
and test acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors verified that the surveillance tests had been properly scheduled and approved by shift supervision prior to performance, control room operators were knowledgeable about testing in progress, and redundant systems or components I
were available for service as required. The inspectors routinely verified adequate performance of daily surveillance tests including instrument channel checks and jet pump and control rod
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operability. The inspectors found the licensee's activities to be acceptable, except as noted
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below.
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On April 22, 1993, the licensee performed Unit 3 ST-O-023-301-3, "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Syntem Pump, Valve, Flow, and Cooler Functional and IST Test." The test
i was performed following a HPCI system outage to verify operability prior to returning the system to service. During the test, the air operated HPCI injection check valve (AO-3-23-018)
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did not indicate open, and Step 6.2.4 was signed off as unsatisfactory. Since operation of this
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check valve is required for system operability, the ST was signed off as unsatisfactory and senior plant management was notified. The licensee's PORC reviewed the test results and determined i
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that AO-3-23-018 was operable. The licensee wrote Temporary Change (TC)93-182 to change the acceptance criteria in ST-O-023-301-3, signed off the ST as satisfactory, and declared the i
On April 23, the inspector discussed the operation of the check valve with the HPCI System Manager. During the test, the valve disc received split indication, then the valve actuator
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received split indication as expected. However, while the valve actuator reached full open, the j
disc remained with split indication. Based on this sequence of actuator and disc movement, the licensee's PORC concluded that failure to receive a full open indication for the disc was due to
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a limit switch problem which did not affect operability of the valve. The licensee has, in the
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past, experienced limit switch problems with the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system injection check valve. The inspector found the licensee's technical basis for considering valve AO-2-23-018 operable to be appropriate.
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The inspector reviewed the completed ST and TC 93-182, and had several concerns. The inspector found that the TC allowed for either the disc or actuator to indicate open in order to verify valve operability. However, the actuator could indicate open without any disc movement, if the disc had become separated from the actuator. The sequence of actuator and disc
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movement as indicated by a prescribed sequence of changes in disc and actuator indications was f
necessary to ensure test validity. The inspector also questioned the acceptability of processing l
this change to ST-O-023-301-3 using a TC. Licensee's Administrative Procedure A-3, " Tempo-
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rary Changes to Procedures," allows for the use of a Temporary Change provided it does not
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change the intent of the procedure. If the intent of the procedure is changed, a procedure
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revision is required. In this case, the license changed the acceptance criteria in ST-O-023-301-3 using a TC. The acceptance criteria change can be viewed as a change ofintent. However, the-licensee did provide a complete PORC review prior to issuance of the TC. In addition, the inspector noted a weakness in the PORC review process, in that the PORC only reviewed and discussed the technical issues associated with operability of the valve and never reviewed the
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actual content of the TC. The TC was written after the PORC meeting. If the PORC had seen the TC, they may have noted the lack of specine instructions on the test sequence. It appears e
that lack of an efficient means to process limited scope intent changes, without issuance of a revision to the procedures, contributed to the questionable use of a TC in this case.
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The inspector discussed these issues with licensee Operations Management who agreed with the inspector. On April 29,1993, the licensee processed a procedure revision to ST-O-023-301-3 which appropriately changed Step 6.2.4 to ensure proper operation of AO-3-23-018 until the
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limit switch could be repaired. In addition, a PORC Open Item was created to review the
processes for temporary procedure changes and procedure revisions to ensure that procedure
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changes which alter the intent of the procedure are processed appropriately.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had adequately reviewed and demonstrated the
operability of AO-3-23-018, and initiated action to resolve the administrative weaknesses in their i
procedure change process.
The inspector found tae licensee's immediate actions to be acceptable, and will maintain this item open pending review of the response to the PORC open l
item discussed above (URI 93-06-01).
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5.0 MAINTLNANCE ACTIVITY OBSERVATIONS (62703)
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The inspectors observed portions of ongoing maintenance work to verify proper implementation
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of maintenance procedures and controls. The inspectors verified proper implementation of administrative controls including blocking permits, fire watches, and ignition source and radiological controls. The inspectors reviewed maintenance procedures, action requests (AR),
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work orders (WO), item handling reports, radiation work permits (RWP), material certifications, and receipt inspections. During observation of maintenance work, the inspectors verified
appropriate QA/QC involvement, plant conditions, TS LCOs, equipment alignment and turnover,
post-maintenance testing and reportability review. The inspectors found the licensee's activities
to be acceptable.
On April 5,1993, the licensee began a maintenance activity to replace the Unit 3 'D' residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger floating head gasket. The RHR heat exchanger was
removed from service on March 23,1993, after the licensee determined that a trace amount of
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primary coolant was leaking past the floating head gasket into the 'B' loop of the high pressure service water (HPSW) system. The leakage was detected during a routine chemistry sample of
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the HPSW system effluent to the discharge canal. Although the release was unmonitored, the
licensee determined that the small amount of potentially contaminated fluid released to the river i
was within allowable limits, and that the projected doses from the release were minimal. The
release will be addressed by the licensee in their Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release l
Report. The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's evaluation and, after discussions
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with a Radiation Specialist in the NRC Region I Office, determined that the licensee follow-up
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actions were acceptable.
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The licensee repaired the RHR heat exchanger using Maintenance Procedure M-010-002, "RHR Heat Exchanger Maintenance." During the disassembly of the RHR heat exchanger 00ating
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head, the licensee found the torque of the floating head bolts to be at a value less than the j
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required 970 50 foot-pounds. The licensee visually examined the floating head seating surfaces, the head gasket, and the tube sheet seating surfaces for excessive wear, cracks, pitting,
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and corrosion. No physical damage or wear were indicated on any of the seating surfaces or
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gasket. The licensee installed a new gasket and reassembled the heat exchanger. The licensee
ensured all bolts were torqued to the high end of the specified tolerances. The heat exchanger i
was satisfactorily leak. tested and then returned to service on April 8.
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The licensee determined that the relaxation of the torque of the floating head bolts at the flange
joint was the cause of the head leak. This determination was based on the design and Dow
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characteristics of the HPSW system through the heat exchanger. The RHR heat exchangers are
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vertically mounted shell and tube type heat exchangers that are manufactured by the PERFEX
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i Co. The tube bundle is bolted at the top flange of the heat exchanger and the tubes hang or float J
freely within the shell. The incoming HPSW flow, which is maintained at a higher pressure than the RHR system and on the tube side, reverses in the floating head and passes back through the tubes to the outlet nozzles. The reversing flow creates turbulent and high impact flow l
conditions, particularly at the floating head flange area on the inlet side of the tube bundle.
These flow conditions have caused corrosion and erosion of the floating head gasket and, head l
gasket seating surfaces, and relaxation of the head bolts in the past. As a corrective measure j
to reduce the occurrence of these problems, the licensee replaced the original asbestos filled
l double jacketed soft iron gasket supplied by PERFEX, with a soft iron, solid metal gasket in j
1986. Since the installation of the replacement gaskets the leakage at the floating head has been
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reduced significantly. Following the recent leak, the licensee verified that the torque value of j
970 i50 foot-pounds was sufficient by discussion with the gasket vendor.
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Tne inspector reviewed the overall maintenance activity including the maintenance procedure, I
work order, and the man-rem expended during the activity. The licensee effectively planned, j
pre-staged, and conducted the work in a safe and organized manner. Due to the high system
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internal contamination, the workers were forced to wear extra protective clothing and respira-j
- ors. One minor personnel contamination report occurred. However, the final man-rem l
expended for the entire job, was half that estimated in the planning phase. The inspector had no further questions.
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i 6.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
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r The inspectors examined work in progress in both units to verify proper implementation of.
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health physics (HP) procedures and controls. The inspectors monitored ALARA implemen-l tation, dosimetry and badging, protective clothing use, radiation surveys, radiation protection
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instrument use, and handling of potendally contaminated equipment and materials. In addition,
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the inspectors verified compliance with RWP requirements. The inspectors reviewed RWP line l
entries and verified that personnel had provided the required information. The inspectors j
observed personnel working in the RWP areas to be meeting the applicable requirements and
individuals frisking in accordance with HP procedures. During routine tours of the units, the i
inspectors verified a sampling of high radiation area doors to be locked as required. All
activities monitored by the inspectois were found to be acceptable.
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7.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY (71707)
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The inspectors monitored security activities for compliance with the accepted Security Plan and associated implementing procedures. The inspectors observed security staffing, operation of the
Central and Secondary Access Systems, and licensee checks of vehicles, detection and assess-
ment aids, and vital area access to verify proper control. On each shift, the inspectors observed
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protected area access control and badging procedures. In addition, the inspectors routinely inspected protected and vital area barriers, compensatory measures, and escort procedures. The i
inspectors found the licensee's activities to be acceptable.
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i 8.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT UPDATE (92702, 92701)
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During the report period, the inspectors evaluated licensee staff and management response to plant events which occurred, as discussed in Section 2.0 of the report. In addition, the inspec-
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tors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted by the licensee during the period for events which were of lower safety significance, and did not warrant immediate review and
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j evaluation by the inspector at the time of the event. The inspector reviewed the following LERs and found that the licensee had identified the root causes, implemented appropriate corrective actions, and made the required notifications.
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LER No.
EVENT DATE SUBJECT 2-93-007 4/3/93 Technical Specification Violation - The
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Drywell Atmospheric Radiation Monitor was
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Isolated From the Drywell for an Undeter-l mined Period of Time.
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3-93-003 4/7/93 Technical Specification Violation - The Reactor was Unvented and Temperature Data was not Obtained.
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9.0 PREVIOUS INSPECTION ITEM UPDATE (92702, 92701)
(Update) Unresolved item 92-32-02, Operability Determinations Durine Surveillance Testine.
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The licensee continues to review and implement corrective actions regarding the operability
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status of safety systems during performance of surveillance testing. The progress of that review, j
and the NRC follow-up inspection, are described in Section 3.1 of this report.
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10.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS (71707,30702)
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'l The Resident Inspectors provided a verbal summary of preliminary findings to the Peach Bottom Station Plant Manager at the conclusion of the inspection. During the inspection, the Resident Inspectors verbally notified licensee management concerning preliminary findings. The inspec-l tors did not provide any written inspection material to the licensee during the inspection. This
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report does not contain proprietary information. The inspectors also attended the entrance and
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exit interview for the following inspection during the report period-
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D2t..e Subiect Renort No.
Insnector i
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4/28 Fire Protection Program 93-09 Finkel
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