IR 05000277/1993005
| ML20035G028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1993 |
| From: | Della Ratta A, Ervin N, Keimig R, Limroth D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G023 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-93-05, 50-277-93-5, 50-278-93-05, 50-278-93-5, NUDOCS 9304260041 | |
| Download: ML20035G028 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.: 50-277/934)5 and 50-278/93-05
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Docket Nos.: 50-277: 50-278
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License Nos.: DPR-44: DPR-56
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
.i 2301 Market Street Philadelphia. Pennsv1vania 19101
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Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Plant
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Inspection At:
Delta and Wayne. Pennsyhw1ia
Inspection Conducted:
February 22-25 and March 3.1993 Inspectors:
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M-MS.F j
.15ella Eftta, Physical Security Inspector Date l
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D. F. Lirnro'th, Senior Reactor Engineer Date
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Accompanied By:
N. E. Ervin, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved By:
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/ R. KeimikChie guards Section Date l
Division of Radiati afety and Safeguards
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Areas Inspected: Access Authorization Program Administration and Organization; Background
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Investigation Elements; Psychological Evaluations; Behavioral Observation; "Grandfathering,"
Reinstatement, Transfer and Temporary Access Authorization; Denial / Revocation of Unescorted
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Access; Audits; and Records Retention.
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Results: The licensee's Access Authorization Program provides reasonable assurance that =
individuals who are authorized unescorted access to the station are trustworthy and reliable, and
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do not constitute an undue ' risk to the health and safety of the public, as a result of their unescorted access to the station.
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9304260041 930416
PDR ADOCK 05000277'
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DETAILS I
1.0 Backcround
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On April 25, 1991, the Commission published the Personnel Access Authorization l
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Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants,10 CFR 73.56, (the rule), which requires that each licensee authorized on that date to operate a nuclear reactor pursuant to 10 CFR
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50.21 implement an Access Authorization Program by April 27,1992, to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, and that such program be incorporated into the
licensee's Physical Security Plan. The rule requires that licensees establish and maintain
I an Access Authorization Program with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustwonhy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public, including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.
This inspection, conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction 2515/116, Access Authorization, assessed thelicensee's Access Authorization
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Program and its implementation to determine if the regulatory requirements reflected in its Physical Security Plan, in response to the rule, were being met. The licensee's Physical Security Plan was previously reviewed by the NRC and was found to be
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acceptable (NRC letter dated May 19, 1992).
The licensee's program that was inspected is also applicable to the Limerick Generating Station; however, program implementation was only inspected at the Peach Bottom
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Atomic Power Station.
2.0 Access Authorization Procram i
2.1 Administration nnd Oreanization i
The Philadelphia Electric Company Access Authorization Program is prescribed l
by the Security Access Authorization Manual, SAAM-C, Revision 1.
Responsibilities for the implementation of the program are shared by the Manager, Nuclear Plant Security and Safety, who is responsible for ensuring that
the background investigation and suitable inquiry elements of the program are met; the Director, Occupational Health and Safety, who is responsible for
ensuring the administration of the psychological evaluation and fitness-for-duty
elements of the program, including drug and alcohol testing, are satisfied; the Director, Security, who is responsible for the conduct of interviews and related
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investigations when adverse information is developed during the screening process; and the Directors, Nuclear Security, who are located at the two nuclear
facilities and who are responsible for the granting or denying of access to the i
facility based on the Security Access Authorization Program.
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The access authorization program is implemented through a series ofinstructions with varying scope and applicability, the hierarchical structure of which parallels the administrative organization.
The licensee offices which are responsible for the various program elements enter appropriate data into the Plant Information Management System (PIMS) through security-protected terminals. It was noted that each program office has input accessibility only to those data fields for which it is responsible. The program also contains other pertinent personnel information such as status of General Employee Training; radiological protection qualification; fitness-for-duty training, etc. One weakness identified in this system is discussed in Paragraph 2.2 below.
Through interviews and inspection of documentation, the inspectors determined that personnel responsible for the administration and implementation of the program elements, including the Supervisor - Personnel Processing, who is responsible to the Director - Nuclear Security for ensuring that all elements for unescorted access have been satisfied prior to an individual being granted unescorted access, were familiar with their duties and responsibilities.
2.2 Backcround Investiention Elements The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of the program to verify the true identity of an applicant and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation of the applicant prior to granting unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The inspectors reviewed the results of 17 background investigations (bis) representing a cross-
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section oflicensee and contractor employees.
The licensee employs one contractor to conduct bis. The scope and depth of these investigations are prescribed in Philadelphia Electric Company Request for Quotation, Background Investigations.
This document was reviewed and determined to be comprehensive and to prescribe the requisites to satisfy the licensee's program commitments. The reports of the investigations which were reviewed were found to be in compliance with the Request for Quotation and provided background information on which to base a determination for access authorization.
In addition to the contractor, two analysts in the licensee's Nuclear Group conduct bis, producing reports in the same depth and scope as those of the contractor. (The 17 bis reviewed included reports produced by those analysts).
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Those 17 BI reports also contained the information on which temporary access was granted or denied. The records of these abbreviated scope and depth i
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investigations permitted by the rule contained information on which to base a
determination regarding temporary access pending completion of the full BI and
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fulfilled the program requirements to which the licensee had committed. It was l
noted that any matter of questionable or suspect information was promptly
reported to the licensee by the BI contractor with adequate detail to permit a reasonable determination regarding granting or denying of temporary access.
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Records of completed bis contained a summary of information developed during
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the conduct of the investigations. The inspectors determined through interviews i
J and reviews of records that these records were reviewed by responsible hcensee
personnel and, in those cases where questionable or derogatory information had
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been reported, that the licensee had adjudicated the results of those investigations.
The inspectors reviewed eight records of personnel whose access had been denied l
a and found no case where a temporary clearance had been terminated following i
j receipt of the final background investigation.
In one case, an individual had been granted unescorted access to the Limerick l
Generation station under the temporary access provisions. Approximately four
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months later and having been away from the station about two months following
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completion of the work assignment, the report of the criminal history check i
conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 73.57 was received. This report contained records of convictions not disclosed by the individual in the Unescorted Access
Authorization Affidavit submitted at the time of application for unescorted access.
While the time that had elapsed since the convictions and the nature of the i
convictions might not have resulted in denial of unescorted access authorization,
failure to report such convictions was a basis for denial and access was denied.
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This denial of access was appropriately documented in the records maintained by the Nuclear Access Authorization Group at the Nuclear Group offices and i
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reportedly documented in the files maintained at Limerick Generating Station;
however, the denial had not been entered into the PIMS database. Through
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j interviews with the Supervisor - Personnel Processing at the Peach Bottom facility, the inspectors concluded that the probability of improper entry to that site
subsequent to access denial, or to Limerick, was low. This conclusion was based on the fact that two months had elapsed from termination at Limerick to receipt j
of the derogatory information from the FBI. This time lapse would have required
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ascertaining of activities since termination, which would have involved the Personnel Access Control Group at the corporate Nuclear Group Headquarters
where the file with the access denial prominently marked was stored. Had a
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request for transfer of clearance been received at either facility, the lack of personnel identification date (height, weight, color of eyes and hair) in PIMS
would have required a check with the Personnel Access Control Group wi h a similar identification of denial. The inspectors determined through review of several files of persons denied access that this was an isolated instance.
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The inspectors determined that the Director, Security, at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station was preparing an administrative control regarding the authority and responsibilities of those parties who are responsible for the input of information into this database and for the use of such data that should provide permanent corrective action for this isolated instance.
2.3 Psycholonical Evaluations The licensee contracted with one consultant to perform the requisite psychological evaluations. All individuals seeking unescorted access to the licensee's nuclear facilities are required to satisfactorily complete the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) administered by an employee of the psychological consultant at one of the licensee's nuclear facilities. The answer sheets for these evaluations are electronically scanned at the site and transmitted to the consultant's office where the results are reviewed by a licensed psychologist. The results of that review are transmitted back to the nuclear facility and, if a clinical
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interview is indicated, a local state-licensed psychologist conducts that interview
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and recommends either access or denial to the licensee.
T The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures governing the administration of the MMPI and interviewed the person who administered and proctored the tests.
The procedures were clear and the proctor demonstrated a sound i
knowledge of her duties. The inspectors concluded that this aspect of the program was being effectively administered.
2.4 Behavioral Observation The licensee's behaviorni observation program (BOP) was inspected to determine whether the licensee had a training and retraining program to ensure that
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supervisors have the awareness and sensitivity to detect changes in behavior that could be indicative of adverse trustworthiness or reliability, and to report such to appropriate licensee management for evaluation and action. The program was instituted as part of, and is an element in common with, the licensee's fitness-for-duty program.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training program associated with the BOP.
All employees, both system and contractor, are provided training in behavioral observation as part of the escort training program. Licensee supenisors are trained to standards which meet or exceed the requirements of 10 CFR 26, the Fitness-for-Duty rule, prior to being promoted.
Licensee management stated during inteniews that contractors are provided the option to either comply with the licensee's BOP as part of the contractors'
approved unescorted access program or to submit their program for review and i
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approval by the licensee. To date, all contractors have elected to comply with the licensee's BOP.
The licensee provides training to contractor supervisory personnel at the nuclear facilities, including those contractor supervisory
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personnel who do not work at the nuclear facility but who have persons with unesconed access under tneir supervision at the nuclear facility. The licensee's
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initiatives regarding assuring the quality of contractor BOPS and the training of off-site contractor supenisors are considered a program strength.
t Interviews of nine personnel, including licensee and contractor employees, both supervisory and non-supervisory, indicated that the training program was effective. The inspectors also determined that these persons were aware of their i
responsibility to repon arrests to the licensee.
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"Grandfatherine." Reinstatement. Transfer and Temocrary Access
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Authorization
The licensee's records were reviewed to ascertain that personnel who did not
meet the criteria for "grandfathering," i.e., those who did not have uninterrupted unescorted access authorization for at least 180 days on April 25,1991, had not been granted unesconed access authorization without having satisfied the elements l
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of the program. No discrepancies were noted.
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The licensee's procedure for reinstatement of unescorted access authorization vm reviewed. The procedure provides for reinstatement if an individual's unescorted access has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days;
if the previous unescorted access was terminated under favorable conditions; if the Personnel Access Authorization Affidavit that addresses such issues as positive drug test results, denial of unesconed access authorization, convictions,
etc., has been completed and reviewed; and, a suitable inquiry has been initiated.
j If a person has not been outside a BOP for more than 30 days, no ascenaining l
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of activities or initiation of a suitable inquiry is required. For those personnel whose unescorted access has been interrupted for more than 365 calendar days and whose termination of access authorization was under favorable conditions, the
licensee's procedure requires verification of identity; an updated background
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investigation from the date of the previous investigation or when access was last
t held, whichever is shorter; a satisfactory psychological evaluation; submittal of a criminal history check; and pre-access drug and alcohol screening.
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I In the course of the inspection, through review of the licensee procedures and
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interviews, the inspectors determined that employees of contractors that do not
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have an approved BOP and who have been away from the licensee's nuclear
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facility for more than 30 days are not necessarily subject to ascertaining their l
activities prior to their access being reinstated, unless they have been away for l
more than 60 days. In that case, a Fitness-for-Duty Program provision flags their
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hadges. The inspectors found no examples of individuals in this category, however, they identined this situation as a potential weakness.
Licensee
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supervisory personnel estimated that the population of personnel in this category was about 20 people, it was explained that the intent of the rule, as stated in paragraph 3 of the Clarification to the Guidelines, Regulatory Guide 5.66, was that the licensee is expected to ascertain that whatever activities the employee engaged in during his or her absence from an approved behavioral observation program would not have the potential to affect the employee's trustworthiness and reliability. This position l
is also clarified in NUMARC 91-03, October 1992 (which has not been issued as a final document and to which the licensee is not committed). Part III, B.4 of NUMARC 91-03 states that the licensee must ascenain that the activities of the employee during his or her absence, if more than 30 consecutive days, would not
affect his or her trustworthiness, but if the individual has not been away from a licensee or approved contractor / vendor behavioral observation program for more than 30 consecutive days, there is no requirement to ascertain activities nor to do any suitable inquiry checks. Further, if a licensee chooses to accept portions of a contractor program approved by another licensee, or another licensee's audit of
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a contractor program, the accepting licensee has the responsibility to determine what portions of the contractor program were reviewed, approved and audited by
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another licensee.
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The Director - Nuclear Security agreed to examine this potential weakness.
l The inspectors determined that the licensee had established procedures to govern
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receipt and transfer of access authorization data from/to other licensees. The inspectors reviewed records of access authorizations transferred and received and
determined that the records of these transfers were complete, accurate, and indicated the transfers were conducted in accordance with licensee's procedures.
The personnel records of background investigations that were inspected also l
contained the records of the results of the limited scope background investigations
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on which temporary access authorization was based. The inspectors determined that these data satisfied the licensee's commitments for the granting of temporary _
access authorization. Other than the one instance of post-access denial incident
to the criminal history check discussed above, the inspectors noted no instances where temporary access was denied following receipt of the full background investigation.
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2.6 Denial / Revocation of Unescorted Access
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for revocation or denial of I
unescorted access for licensee and contractor personnel and determined that
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appmpriate measures were in place to satisfy program commitments with respect to appeals and review. The review process was being conducted at an appropriate l'
management level.
Records of two contractor personnel whose fingerprint records had been returned with derogatory information were reviewed. The inspectors concluded that adequate review and evaluation of these individuals' records had been conducted prior to granting unesconed access authorization.
i The records of four personnel denied access were reviewed. In all cases, the
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individuals had been notified of their appeal rights; however, neither availed themselves of this option.
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2.7 Audits
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i The inspectors reviewed the audit of the contractor that performed bis. This audit was found to be comprehensive, with appropriate inquiries to listed references having been made to provide assurance of the veracity of the investigations. The reports of two self-assessments conducted by the contractor in accordance with its contract were also reviewed. The assessments were comprehensive and had been reviewed by appropriate licensee management.
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The audits of the licensee's prograni conducted by the Qaality Assurance
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Department in compliance with 10 CFR 73.56 were reviewed and found to be of
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adequate scope and breadth to detect problem areas. These reports had been reviewed at appropriate management levels and recommendations had been
adequately addressed.
2.8 Record Retention
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's record retention activities to ensure that
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required records were being retained for the appropriate duration. The inspectors determined that records were retained appropriately and that the storage facilities l
provide adequate security to prevent. disclosure of personal information to l
unauthorized personnel.
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3.0 Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on March 3,1993, at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power l
Station. The below listed personnel were present. During this meeting, the inspectors
reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee agreed with the inspection findings.
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t In addition to the below listed personnel, other licensee and contractor personnel were contacted / interviewed in the conduct of the inspection. The licensee agreed with the y
inspection findings.
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Exit Interview Attendees:
K. P. Powers, Plant Manager
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G. A. Bird, Director, Nuclear Security G. B. Rombold, Manager, Nuclear Plant Security and Safety J. A. Slaymaker, Supervisor, Personnel Processing
P. Supplee, Supervisor Analyst - Security R. Smith, Regulatory Analyst
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J. J. Bemard, NQA Auditor
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H. R. Abendroth, Atlantic Electric Site Engineer
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