IR 05000277/1980035
| ML19345H017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1981 |
| From: | Bettenhausen L, Blough A, Cowgill C, Mcbrearty R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-80-35, 50-278-80-28, NUDOCS 8104300026 | |
| Download: ML19345H017 (17) | |
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b-50277-801113 50277-801229 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50277-801227 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT-Reg' son I-50-277/80-35
. Report No. 50-278/80-28
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50-277
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Docket No. 50-278 DPR-44 C
License No.DPR-56 Priority
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Category C-Licensee:
Philadelphia Electr.c Company
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2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,-Unit: 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
December 1-31, 1980, Inspectors:
8C C M.h, 6 nlfiti date signed C. J. Cowgill, Resident Reactor Inspector.
c. e, /L O L., b, h 2(flet A. R. Blough, Resident Reactor Inspector.
date signed-hk&f he W/f~d
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date signe L. H. Bettenhausen, Reactor Inspector (Dec. 6)
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~R. A. McBrearty, Readtor Inspector (Dec. 30)-
date signed-
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Approved by:
bO 1/ 6 bl
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed 4 Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Insoection Summary:
Inspection on December 1-31, 1980 (Combined Inspection Report No. 50-277/80-35 and 50-278/80-28)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspectors (58.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, Unit 2; 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />, Unit '3) and two region-based inspectors (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, Unit 2; 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, Unit 3).
Areas inspected included access-ible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, operational safety, radiation protection, physical security, control room observations, emergency drills, LER.
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review onsite, IE Bulletin followup, outstanding item followup, facility tours, and review of periodic and special reports.
Results:
Noncompliances - None in nine areas, two in two areas (Exceeding allow-able cool-down rate, Detail 5; and Failure to follow Health Physics Procedures, Detail 6).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77) 8104300026
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p DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Carolan, Instrument Technician M. J. Cooney, Superintendent, Nuclear Electric Production W. Corse, Assistant Site QA Engineer J. K. Davenport, Maintenance Engineer G. F. Dawson, I&C Engineer R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent A. Fulvio, Results Engineer N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager F. W. Polaski, Reactor Engineer S. R. Roberts, Operations Engineer R. J. Scholz, Chemistry Supervi u r D. C. Smith, Outage Coordinator S. A. Spitko, Site QA Engineer S. Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent J. E. Winzenried, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were also contacted during the inspection.
- Present at exit interviews and summations of preliminary inspection findings.
2.
Outstanding Item Update (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-277/78-23-01 and 278/73-28-01):
Review the licensee's angoing program for environmental qualification of safety-related electrical ecuipment.
Review is incorporated in the NRC's review of IE Bulletin 79-018, " Environmental Qualification of Electrial Equipment."
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-277/79-10-03 and 50-278/79-11-03):
Review of licensee's revision to administrative procedures governing shift operations with respect to overriding automatic actions of engineered safety features (ESF).
The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure A-7, " Shift Opera-tions", Revision 14, dated October 1, 1980 and verified that overriding automatic actions of ESFs is prohibited unless continued operation of the ESF will result in an unsafe plant condition.
Periodic discussions with operators have indicated they are aware of this provision.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-277/79-10-09 and 50-278/79-11-09): Accept-ability of the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 79-08.
The "NRC Staff Evaluation of Philadelphia Electric Company Responses to IE Bulletin 79-08 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station," dated February 14, 1980, states that the NRC staff considers the licensee's response acceptable.
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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-277/79-10-12 and 50-278/79-11-12):
Space available for incident response. NUREG 0578 and NUREG 0654 require-ments resulted in relocation and redesignation of incident response centers.
During tours of both the interim locations and the planned final locations of the Technical Support Center, Emergency Control Center, and Operational Support Center in October and November 1980, the inspector concluded that space considerations appear adequate.
Emergency response capabilities will be subject to additional review as part of the NRC's ongoing TMI Action Plan.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-277/80-04-06):
Review licensee's supple-mental LER for 2-80-1X.
The inspector reviewed LER 2-80-1X dated March 12, 1980. The inspector verified the accuracy of this report, submitted to resolve inadequacies noted in the original version.
(Closed) Infraction (50-277/80-24-05 and 50-278/80-18-04):
Failure to maintain isolation zone clear.
Based on information provided in the licensee's response, the item was withdrawn. The conditions noted, while not good practice, do not constitute an item of noncompliance.
During this inspection period; no similar conditions were noted by the inspector during tours of the protected area.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-278/80-21-02): Acceptability of three control rod operations was unresolved pending further review.
The inspector reached the following determinations:
a.
In the case where a fully inserted control rod could not be withdrawn, but could be moved from "00" to " overtravel in", rod motion with control rod pressure was shown.
The rod was not, therefore, inoperable in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
b.
In the specific case where four rods being exercised inserted normally but could not be withdrawn for several hours, the rods were not inoper-able in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Resolution of these items was discussed with the licensee.
This item remains open pending further review of the licensee's method of withdrawing a control rod with badly damaged seals.
3.
Plant Operations Review
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Logs and Records (1) Documents Reviewed A sampling of logs and records was made to:
identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made;
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verify that operating orders and night orders conform to Tech-nical Specification requirements; check correctness of communica-tions concerning equipment and lockout status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were:
(a) Shift Supervision Log, December 1-31, 1980 (b) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 2 - Current Entries (c) Reactor Engineer Log - Unit 3 - Current Entries
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(d) Reactor Operators Log Unit 2 - December 1-31, 1980 (e) Reactor Operators Log Unit 3 - December 1-31, 1980 (f) C0 Log Book - December 1-31, 1980 (g) Night Orders
. Current Entries (h) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Various in both Units 2 and
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3, December 1980 (i) Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3, December 1980.
(j) Operation Work and Information Data - December 1980 Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of Adminis-trative Procedure A-7, " Shift Operations".
Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision, and licensee on site management constituted evidence of licensee review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions, including abnormalities and significant operations, were accurately and completely recorded.
Logs were also assessed to determine that matters requiring reports to the NRC were being processed as suspected reportable occurrences. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.
Facility Tours a.
During the course of this inspection, which also included shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily tours and made observations of:
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Control room - (daily)
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Turbine Building - (all levels)
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Reactor Building - (Accessible areas)
Diesel Generator Building
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Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block, including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering tank construction Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and control point-
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monitoring Lighting
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Vehicular Control
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The SAS and power block control points Security Fencing
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Portal Monitoring
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Personnel and Badging
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Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including locked door checks TV monitoring capabilities
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Off-Shift Inspections during this inspection period and the areas examined were as follows:
Date Areas Examined December 4, 1980 Control Room Observations December 6, 1980 Witness Emergency Drill December 8, 1980 Control Room Observations December 10, 1980 Control Room Observations December 16, 1980 Control Room Observations December 17, 1980 Operational Safety Verification, Scram Discharge Volume (SDV)
Continuous Monitoring System (CMS)
Functions and Lighting December 18, 1980 Control Room Observations December 19, 1980 Control Room Observations December 20, 1980 Witness SDV CMS Testing December 21, 1980 Control Room Observations December 22, 1980 Control Room Observations, Unit 3 December 27, 1980 Witness SOV CMS Operability Testing December 29, 1980 SOV CMS operability Status December 30, 1980 Control Room Observations,
SDV CMS Compensatory Measures l
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Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed with
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control room operators and supervision to assure they were knowl-edgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed during the report period were:
Rod Withdrawal Block, APRM High, and Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Not Drained.
The operators were knowledgeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's ongoing progress in eliminating lit annunciators and maintaining valid alarm status.
The current Control Room Annunciator and Instrument Status indicated the following:
Annunciator and Instrument /
Problem Description-Resolution Panel DPI 20001, A emerg.
20C12 Reads "0.4" with Lab to investigate.
filter train off.
DPI 20002, B emerg.
20C12 Reads "0.2" with Lab to investigate.
filter train off.
MG supply fan
'00C133 TS-20425 will not Repair or replace 2A-BV44 low air temp reset.
TS-20425.
Clean-up non regen 30C204R Alarm up.
Outlet Calibrate TS-3-heat exch outlet temp approx. 100 12-115 (Awaiting hi temp deg. F.
Parts)
A recirc pump-motor 30C204M Alarm up level Investigation oil hi level normal.
required.
l A,B,&C Condensate 30C207L Alarm won't clear Investigation pump high vibration vib mod not done.
required.
Plant temperature 30C06A Bad readouts.
Investigation readout pts. 1, 4, required.
9,165,171,(TI-3100)
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l F1-30260, B recirc 30C12 Reads down scale.
Investigation pump chilled water SJAW B discharge Unit 3 Alarm will not Calibrate.
pressure hi-low 00C196 clear.
MG supply fan 2A-00C133 TS-30425 will not Repair or replace BV 44 low air temp reset.
TS-30425.
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Annunciator and Intrument/
Problem Oescription Resolution Panel
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TR-2402, Turb 20C08B No point indicator.
Lab to investigate.
lube oil temp TR-2401, Turb 20C088 No point indicator.
Lab to investigate.
bearing metal temp B Recirc pump 20C204M Both alarms up at Outage required.
motor oil hi the same time.
level /B recirc pump motor lo oil
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IRM 20C36 No response to Outage required.
neutrons.
Cleanup non-regen 20C204R Calibrate TS heat Exch. outlet 2-12-115.
hi temp G drywell cooler 20C212R Will not clear Outage required.
air hi temp at 67 deg. F.
B drywell fan 20C212R Fan is running Outage required.
failure but alarm is up.
Plant Temper-20'C06A Point 155, Bad.
Lab to investigate.
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ature Readout (TI-2100)
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Control Room Manning. On frequent occasions during this inspection, the inspector confirmed that reqr aments of 10 CFR 50.54(k)
l Technical Specifications, and the NRR letter of July 31 1980, for
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minimum sta.6ing requirements were satisfied.
The inspector frequently verified that a senior licensed operator was in the control room complex, in accordance with the licensee's commit-ment to the NRR letter.
No unacceptable conditions were identi-fled.
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Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified which had not also been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Piping Vibration. No significant oiping vibration or unusual
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conditions were identified.
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Monitoring Instrumentation. The inspector frequently confirmed
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that selected instruments were operating and indicated values were within Technical Specification requirements. On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control room indicators and plant obser-vations were verified.
Examples of instrumerdation observed included flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, radia-tion monitoring instruments, SBLCS parameters, and process computer printouts.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.
The inspector observed
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housekeeping conditions, fire hose stations and equipment status, and observed the licensee's fire protection practices. The l'censee's adherence to "no smoking" areas was also examined.
nuditionally, the inspector reviewed the completed fire extin-guisher checklist for November 1980.
On December 3, 1980 the inspector looked at all fire extinguishers located in the cable spreading room as well as a sampling of about 30 additional fire extinguishers in various other plant locations. He checked each extinguisher for:
an up-to-date monthly inspection, proper type and location, proper intact lead seals.
The inspector found a " purple K" dry chemical fire extinguisher located, in the cable spreading room, with a broken seal. A licensee representative opened the cap of the fire extinguisher to ensure that it was full and also showed the inspector the carbon dioxide cartridge used to propel the chemical to ensure that it was intact. The lead seal was then replaced. The inspector noted during this tour that some equipment was being temporarily stored near fire stations in the cable spreading room. A specific example was a portable tool cabinet near fire station location 150/13. The licensee immediately moved the equipment when informed by the inspector. The inspector will continue to observe plant housekeeping conditions.
b.
Reactor Water Chemistry The following surveillance tests for the periods indicated were reviewed by the inspector to assure that Technical Specification Limits were satisfied:
Conductivity and Chloride Ion Content in Primary Coolant During Normal Operation and Time Conductivity and Chloride Are Above Specified Limits
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Surveillance Tests 7.2.3.A and 7.2.3.C and Peach Bottom Daily BWR Chemistry Analysis - December-1-31, 1980.
Technical Specification 3.6.8 requires, prior to startup and when operating at rated pressure, reactor water conductivity at.25 degrees C of less than.or equal to 5.0 umho/cm and chloride concentiation less than or equal to 0.2 ppm.
Reactor water quality may exceed these limits for up to two weeks per year. Maximum limits are established as 10 umho/cm conductivity and 1.0 ppm chlorides.
Inspections at Unit 2 for the report period indicated that, during operation, the maximum conductivity and chloride concentrations were 2.05 umho/cm and 0.085 ppm respectively. The 1980 total time above the 0.2 ppm chlorides limits and the 5.0 umho/cm conductivity limits were 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 38.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> respect'vely.
Inspections at Unit 3 for the period indicated that, during operation, the maximum conductivity reached was 1.75 umho/cm.
Chloride concen-tration was above 0.2 ppm for 58.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />, with a maximum value of 0.272 ppm.
The 1980 total times above the specific "two weeks per year" limits for conductivity and chlorides were 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and 284.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> respectively.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
c.
Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection.
(1) Unit 3 Reactor Scram on December 17, 1980. At 8:24 p.m., with regeneration of a condensate system filter demineralizer in progress, a low suction pressure trip of two reactor feed pumps occurred.
This led to a reactor scram on low water level and a Main Steam Line isolation on low-low water level.
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems initiated to restore water level.
Safety relief valves were operated, automatically then manually, to control pressure until Main Steam Line Isolation Valves could be reopened.
The licensee informed the NRC Operations Center of this event at 8:45 p.m. via ENS. At 10:10 p.m.,
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reviewed plant conditions, verified that safety systems had l
operated normally and verified that no abnormal release of radio-
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activity had occurred.
No unsafe conditions or items of noncom-l pliance were identified. The inspector noted that the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Continuous Monitoring System (CMS) had not
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operated properly after the scram (reference Detail 4).
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the cause of
the event.
During the regeneration of the 'F' condensate demin-eralizer, the demineralizer was partially drained when low pressure air valves, used during the backwash cycle, stuck open.
This forced water into the precoat tank during the precoat cycle.
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When the demineralizer inlet valve opened automatically, con-densate was diverted to the partially-drained 'F' demineralizer, resulting in a momentary drop in condensate header pressure and low suction pressure trips of two feed pumps. The licensee's review of this occurrence is continuing.
Plant modifications may result. The inspector will further review this matter after the licensee's evaluation is complete (50-277/80-35-01).
4.
IE Bulletin Followup a.
IE Bulletin 80-17, Failure of 76 of 185 Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR.
(1) References:
(a) Confirmatory Order, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to Philadelphia Electric Company, dated October 2, 1980.
(b)
IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 4, dated December 18, 1980.
(2) Compliance with Confirmatory Orders Reference (a) required Philadelphia Electric Company to install a continuous monitoring system (CMS) that would provide indication of water accumulation in the scram discharge volume (SDV) headers.
This system was also required to have control room indication and alarm function.
These actions were required to be completed by December 1, 1980.
On December 1, 1980 the inspector reviewed licensee actions.
The licensee has installed a continuous monitoring system (CMS) con-sisting of two ultrasonic transducers to detect water on each scram discharge header. These transducers were connected to a pen recorder, in the control room, which provided a continuous levei indication. Additionally alarm lights for high water level (1.25" water level in the header) and loss of continuity were provided.
The inspector confirmed that the pen recorders were on and that no loss of continuity or high level alarms existed.
The inspector reviewed OT 13" Impending Loss of Ability to Scram",
Revision 2, dated November 26, 1980, to ensure that actions to be taken in the event of high water level in the scram discharge volume header were incorporated. Actions described in the pro-cedure included manually scramming the reactor if any two of our
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high level alarms were received or any two of four pen recorders showed 1.25" of water in the Scram Discharge Volume headers.
The inspector held discussions with several licensed operators to ensure that they had been instructed regarding the new require-ments.
The inspector identified no unacceptable conditions.
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(3) Operability of Unit 3 Equipment On December 17, 1980 a scram occurred at Unit 3.
The south header SDV did not respond to water in the header as a result of.
the scram.
Reference (b) was issued on December 18, 1980 and required that the SD',' CMS be operable prior to reactor startup.
The licensee corrected the cause of the failure on December 20, 1980 and the inspector witnessed the testing conducted to verify operability. This test consisted of injecting demineralized water into the SDV instrument volume with the drain valve closed and monitoring the response of the CMS to the presence of the water in the SDV headers.
Water levels were independently measured using portable ultrasonic (UT) equipment.
The inspector confirmed that the pen recorders showed water level increase, the level indicated corresponded to that seen by the portable UT equipment, and the high level alarms actuated at the correct water level.
The inspector identified no unacceptable conditions.
(4) Operability of Unit 2 Equipment On December 28, 1980, during a Unit 2 reactor scram at about 10:00 p.m. the SDV CMS failed to indicate water level in the SDV headers.
Subsequent checks of the headers by manual UT prior to scram reset, appeared to indicate empty headers.
Further investi-
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gation of the manual UT problem showed that there was water in the headers as expected and valid readings could be obtained.
The inability to obtain valid readings earlier was attributed to improper calibration and/or operation of the manual UT equipment.
The licensee, in consultation with vender personnel, attempted to troubleshoot and repair the SDV CMS in order to meet the require-
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ments of reference (b) to have the (CMS) equipment operable prior to startup.
On December 29, 1980, NRC:RI, with IE Headquaiters concurrence, based on generic problems with the SDV CMS equipment, granted the i
l licensee temporary relief from this requirement based on acceptable compensatory measures being in place. These measures included checks of the manual UT equipment at 30 minute intervals and
steps to ensure the validity of the manual UT reading. These steps were calibration and setup of the equipment by qualified ISI personnel; keeping the equipment energized between the 30-minute checks; recalibra-
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' tion before use after the equipment has been deenergized; and daily calibration, either by qualified ISI personnel or by HP Technicians retrained in the calibration procedures within the current week. With these measures in place, startup was commenced on December 30, 1980.
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(5) Monitoring System Reviews On December 30, 1980 a region based inspector reviewed various aspects of ultrasonic (UT) monitoring of water. level in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) headers. This review included-discussions with various licensee representatives and observing operation of the manual UT equipment in the Unit 2 Reactor Building and the continuous monitoring system (CMS) control room indicators.
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The licensee described the various systems as follows:
(a) Continuous Monitoring System. The CMS uses a 5.0 MH7 transducer rated for continuous service at temperatures to 400 degrees F and short term service to 500 degrees F.
The couplant is DOW 111 silicone grease rated for service to 500 degrees F.
The system was calibrated on a test pipe and calibration checked when attached to the SDV header. The transducer is attached to the bottom header using a specially designed mounting bracket.
(b) Manual UT System.
The Manual UT System uses one quarter-inch diameter, 5.0 MH transducers, DOW 111 couplant and 25
foot long search cables.
The inspector observed the Manual UT Sytem in operation in the Unit 2 Reactor Building.
The transducers were attached to the
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SDV headers and connected to sonic MK 1 flow detectors by the i
coaxial cables. The instruments were operating at 5.0 MH.
z The inspector held discussions with a licensee representative about transducer frequency and said that experiments conducted at the NRC:RI office showed frequencies lower than 5.0 MH could
improve system response. The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's statement and said that the CMS system manufacturer recommended 5.0 MH. He also said that the possibility of changing
the transducer frequency would be discussed with the manufacturer.
The inspector asked about repair efforts to date. A liceriee representative said that steps taken to correct the CMS system response included:
more precise transducer location, removing _
the paint from the header piping at the transducer location, repositioning the transducers to eliminate cross-talk, and ensuring that sufficient couplant was used.
The inspector asked how monitoring of transducer coupling was accomplished. A licensee representative stated that coupling was monitored by the off normal alarm ciruitry in that loss of the
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The inspector will review licensee actions to achieve reliable SDV CMS operation in a subsequent inspection (50-277/80-35-02, 50-278/80-28-01).
(6) Compensatory Measures Review On December 31, 1980, the inspector verified that compensatory measures for CMS inoperability were in place and conducted dis-cussions with ISI' personnel to verify that training sessions had included the significance of the inside pipe surface signal on the manual UT equipment. The inspector also asked to examine training records and materials associated with the manual UT equipment. These will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (50-277/80-35-03).
b.
IE Bulletin 79-08, " Events Relevant to Boiling Water Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident" The inspector reviewed "NRC Staff' Evaluation of Philadelphia Electric Company Responses to IE Bulletin 79-08 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3,"
dated February 14, 1980.
This report concluded that the licensee's responses met the requirements of tha bulletin.
The inspector reviewed Combined IE Report 50-277/79-10 and 50-278/79-11 and determined that each licensee action had either been verified or is being carried as an open item for further NRC:IE review. This bulletin is closed.
5.
a.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
LER No.
LER Dats Event Date Subject 2-80-27/IP Nov 6, 1980 Nov 6, 1980 Inoperable #3 Main Turbine Bypass Valve 2-80-29/IP Nov 14, 1980 Nov 13, 1980 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable 2-80-29/1T Nov 26, 1980 Nov 13, 1980 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable
- 2-80-37/IP Dec 30, 1980 Dec 29, 1980 Exceeded Allowable Cool Down Rate
- denotes reports selected for onsite followup.
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For the LER's selected for,onsite review (denoted by asterisks above),
the inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.
2-80-37/1, " Exceeding Allowable Cool Down Rate." While cooling the subcritical reactor using RHR shutdown cooling, the temperature of the
'B' recirculation loop indicated 310 degrees F at 4:30 p.m. and 280 degrees F at 5:30, a drop of 102 degrees F in one hour.
Technical Specifications allow a 100 degrees F cool down in any one hour period.
When the licensee discovered the excessive temperature change, shutdown cooling was secured for about one hour to allow for thermal, equaliza-tion of the vessel.
This failure to obey Technical Specification limitations on cool down rate is an item cf noncompliance (50-277/80-35-04). The inspector verified the accuracy of the report through review of logs; discussion with licensed operators; and review of ST 9.12, " Reactor Vessel Temperatures," Revision 3, dated April 6, 1977, performed December 29, 1980. The licensee's stated corrective actions, which included discussions with the responsible individual, were verified.
6.
Radiation Protection During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities. Areas examined includeQ a.
Health Physics (HP) controls b.
Badging c.
Usage of protective clothing d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements e.
Surveys l
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Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials.
f Additionally, inspections were conducted of usage of friskers and portal monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point. More than forty people were observed to meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month. A sampling of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required.
During a tour of the Unit 2 Reactor Building on December 27, 1980, the inspector observed two technicians performing maintenance on the north Scram Discharge Volume header Continuous Monitoring System ultrasonic probes. These probes are located on the 135 foot elevation in a posted high radiation area.
The inspector observed that the technicians did not have a l
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continuous monitoring radiation detector with them.
The inspector told a
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technician who was assisting from outside the high radiation area that the subject individuals did not have the appropriate radiation meters. He immediately directed the two individuals to leave the area until a radiation meter could be provided. The individuals were subsequently provided with portable survey meter.
The inspector then reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2-03-075 G and saw that an ion chamber was required for entry on that specific RWP. Additionally,
'the inspector noted that the survey for the area in question, which was performed on Ocember 22, 1980, showed that general area radiation levels were 50 milliren (mrem) to 300 mrem per hour. There was no qualified health ohysics technician present with a ponable survey meter who was performing periodic surveys.
The failure to take proper actions on entering a high radiation area is contrary to Technical Specifications and is an item of noncompliance (50-277/80-35-05).
The inspector noted during this review that the literal re'quirements of the RWP form, under " Monitoring Required" specified an ion chamber but did not specify portable survey instruments.
Tnis matter is unresolved pending licensee review and subsequent inspecticn (50-277/80-35-07).
7.
Physical Security The inspector spot-checked compliance with the Accepted Security Plan and implementing procedures, including operations of the CAS and SAS, over 25 spot-checks of vehicles onsite to verify proper control, observation of pro-tected area access control and badging procedures on each shift, inspection of physical barriers, checks on control of vital area access and escort procedures. A qualitative assessment of the adequacy of protected area lighting was made during darkness hours on December 17, 1980.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
'In-Office Review of periodic and Special Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite:
a.
Monthly Operating Report--Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for November 1980, dated December 10, 1980.
This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and
. verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported, and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Thermal Mapping Reports Report No.
Recort Date Isotherm Survey Date 80-12 December 5 November 7 80-13 December 5 November 13 80-14 December 19 November 21
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Environmental Technical Specifications require that, when less than three cooling towers are in operation and the flow of'the Susquehanna River through the Conowingo Pond (calculated daily) is less than 15,000 cubic feet per second, thermal plume mapping shall be. performed at least once per week and the results submitted to the NRC. The inspector reviewed the above reports and verified that the required data had been gathered and submitted to NRR.
No unacceptable con-ditions were identified.
9.
Annual Site Emergency Drill The inspector observed the licensee's annual site evacuation exercise, which was conducted Saturday, December 6, 1980. The drill was conducted pursuant to Procedure ST/EP-8, " Class IV Emergency." The resident inspector also participated in the drill briefings conducted by licensee representa-tives. Areas examined included control room response, Health Physics response, security response, Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center manning, offsite monitoring teams, and licensee notification of various state and federal contacts.
The inspector's observations indicated that the objectives of the drill had been met. Outstanding items from-the drill will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-277/80-35-06, 50-278/80-28-02).
10. Management Meetings a.
Prelimir--" insoection Findings A summ_
.. preliminary findings was provided to the Station Super-intendent at the conclusion of the inspection. During the period of this inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the i
preliminary findings by the resident inspectors.
The dates involved, the senior licensee representative contacted, and subjects discussed were as follows:
Senior Licensee Date Subject Representative Present
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l December 27, 1980 Radiation Engineer Maintenance Protection January 5,1981 Cooldown Rate Station Superintendent l
January 21, 1981 Summary of Station Superintendent j
Inspection Findings
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b.
Attendance at Mangement Meetings Conducted by Region-Based Inspectors The resident inspectors attended entrance and exit interviews by region-based inspectors as follows:
Inspection Reporting Date Subject Report No.
Inspector December 1, 1980 Annual Employee 277/80-34 L. H. Bettenhausen
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-(Entrance Inter-Training / Unit 2 278/80-27 view)
Post Refueling
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Startup December 5, 1980 Annual Employee 277/80-34 L. H. Bettenhausen (Exit Interview)
Training / Unit 2 278/80-27 Post Refueling i
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