IR 05000277/1980014
| ML19345B270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1980 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Greenman E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345B261 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-80-14, 50-278-80-12, NUDOCS 8011260446 | |
| Download: ML19345B270 (1) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:P h .* U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/80-14 Report No.
50-278/80-12 50-277 Docket No.
50-278 DPR-44 C Category C License No.
DPR-56 Priority -- Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: May 1-31, 1980 M[[ f'23-80 Inspectors: -r C. J. Cowgfll, III, Residenv Reactor Inspector date signed .- ' f-23 -80 A. R. Blough Res' dent Reactor Inspector date signed Y23h uw E. G. Greenman, Chief, Nuclear Support date signed ~ RO&NS Branch Section No. 2, h.
9/2.7/90 8 0. A 0JL Approved by: E. C. McCabe, Jh., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&,iS Branch . Inspection Summary: _ Inspection on May 1-31,1980 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/80-14 and 50-278/80-12 Areas Inspected: Routine onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspectors (27 hours Unit 2; 26 hours Unit 3). Areas inspected included plant opera-tions (operational safety verification) facility tours, control room inspections, non-routine event review, IE bulletin and circu.ar follow-up, radiation protection, physi-cal security, and review of periodic reports.
Results: Noncompliances - None in seven areas, one in one area (infraction - failure to maintain two fire stations unobstructed for accessibility, Detail 2).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77) 8011260446
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Persons Contacted C. E. Andersen, Operations Engineer M. J. Cooney, Superintendent, Generation (Nuclear) S. L. Daltroff, Vice President-Electric Production R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent J. W. Gallager, Manager, Electric Production N. Gazda, Acting Health Physics Supervisor F. W. Polaski, Reactor Engineer S. R. Roberts, Results Engineer J. Spencer, Maintenance Engineer S. Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent A. J. Wasong, Test Engineer J. E. Winzenreid, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These included engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor opera-tors, shift supervision, maintenance personnel, contractor personnel, health physics and security personnel.
- Denotes those present at exit interviews on site and for summation of preliminary inspection findings at the conclusion of the inspection.
2.
Plant Operations Review a.
Logs and Records 1.
Occuments Reviewed A sampling review of logs and records was made to: identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; to verify that operating and night orders con-form to Technical Specification requirements; check correctness of communications concerning equipment operating and lock-out status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were: a.
Shift Supervisors Log, May 1-31, 1980 b.
Unit 2 Jumper Log - Current entries c.
Unit 3 Jumper Log - Current entries d.
Reactor Engir.aering Log, Unit 3 - Current entries
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Refueling Floor Log Unit 2 (Sampling) May, 1980 f.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 2 - May 1-31, 1980 g.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 3 - May 1-31,1980 h.
AC0 Log Book - May 1-31, 1980 1.
iiight Orders - Current entries J.
Radiation Work Pemits - Various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 during May, 1980 k.
Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) Unit 2 and Unit 3 - . Sampling Audit - May,1980 1.
Ignition Source Control Check Sheets - Various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 m.
Operation Work and Information Data - May,1980 n.
Refueling Floor Fuel Status Board , , Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of Pro-cedure A-7, " Shift Operations".
Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision, and licensee onsite management constituted evidence of licensee review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions includ'ng abnormali-ties and significant operations were accurately and sompletely recorded.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.
Facility Tours During the course of this inspection, which also included back-I shifts, the inspector conducted daily tours of accessible areas and made observations of: Control Room - (daily) -- Unit 2 Refuel Floor -- -- Turbine Building Reactor Building -- -- Diesel Generator Building Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block --
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Security Building including SAS, Aux SAS, and entrance and -- exit control points to the power block Security Fencing -- Vehicular Control -- Badging and Escorting -- Portal Monitoring - -- ' Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas -- Personnel -- During routine tours the following observations were made by the, inspector: - Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed -- with control room operators and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed during the report period were: Rod With-drawal Block; Condensate Storage Tank, High-Low level; and Radwaste Tank Level High.
The operators were knowledgeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
Control Room Manning.
On frequent occasions during this ca -- inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the _ Technical Specifications = for minimum
j staffing requirements were satisfied.
No unacceptable con-I ditions were identified.
Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified -- which had not also been identified by the ' licensee or for a which necessary. corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unaccept-able conditions were identified.
Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or -- unusual conditions were identified.
Monitoring Instrumentation.
The inspector frequently con- -- firmed that selected instruments were operating and indi-cated values were within Technical Specification requirements.
On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control room indica- . tors and plant observations were verified.
In-plant instru- ' mentation was also frequently verified.
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, instrumentation observed included flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, nuclear instrumentation, radia-tion monitor readings, and SBLC parameters.
No unacceptable . conditions were identified.
' Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.
The inspector -- observed housekeeping conditions, fire hose station and , ! equipment status, and observed the licensee's fire protec-tion procedures and practices as well as the usage of firewatches.
During plant tours conducted on May 7 and May 15, 1980, the inspector identified that two fire stations in the Unit Two Reactor Building were' obstructed.
On May 7, fire station 135-30, located in the Recirculation Pump Room located on 135' elevation, was identified obstructed by a large portable tool cart.
On May 15, 1980, the inspector identified fire station 165-32, s located on 165 foot elevation obstructed by a large cable reel, a ladder and scaffolding material.
The presence of these mate-rials blocking the above listed fire stations could have pre-a vented immediate access in the event of fire.
The licensee inmediately removed the obstructions when informed by the inspec-i tor.
The obstruction of these fire stations is contrary to Technical Specification 6.8.1 and Philadelphia Electric Company procedure A-30, titled, " Plant Housekeeping Controls", dated . January 14, 1980 and constitutes an item of noncompliance (277-80-14-01).
On May 13, 1980 at about 10:00 p.m. there was a small fire in
the Unit Two Drywell. The fire was at the 130 foot elevation and occurred when welding sparks ignited trash.
The licensee imme-diately evacuated all workers from the drywell.
The fire was quickly extinguished and no damage or radioactive releases occurred as a result of this event.
The Shift Superintendent sub-
sequently suspended all work in progress in the drywell and person-nel were dispatched to remove trash from the drywell. Approximately twenty large bags of trash were removed.
Upon completion of trash removal, work was resumed in the drywell.
The licensee also began a safety department investigation of the circumstances surrounding the fire and indicated that this investigation would result in safety department recommendations to the station regard-ing further measures to prevent recurrence.
The inspector expressed concern to station management regarding housekeeping practices that allowed :such quantities of trash to accumulate in the drywell..This matter is considered unresolved pending completion of investiga-tion and NRC review of resultant corrective action (277-80-14-02).
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Reactor Water Chemistry The following surveillance tests wem reviewed by the inspector to assure that Technical Specification Limits were satisfied.
i (1) Conductivity and Chloride Ion on Content in Primary Coolant During Normal Operation and Time Conductivity and Chloride are i Above Specified Limits.
Surveillance Tests 7.2.3.A and 7.2.3.C and Peach Bottom Daily BWR Chemistry Analysis - May 1-31, 1980.
Technical Specification 3.6.B requires prior to startup and when operating at rated pressure, reactor water conductivity at 250C of less than or equal to 5.0 unho/cm and chirride con-centration less' than or equal to 0.2 ppm.
Reactor water quality
may exceed these limits for up to two weeks per year.. Maximum ' limits are established as 10 umho/cm conductivity and 1.0 ppm chlorides.
Inspection at Unit 3 for May 1-31, indicated that conductivitu and chloride concentration were maintained within limit thru ;,nout all periods of operation during the month with maximum values of 1.4 umho/cm and 0.155 ppm, respectively.
Unit 2 remained shutdown during the period reviewed.
(2) Determination of Dose Equivalent Microcuries/ Gram I-131 in the Primary Coolant Surveillance Test 7.2.1.A for the period May 1-31, 1980 was reviewed.
The licensee analyzes the following nuclides: I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 and computes dose equivalent I-131 -- that amount of I-131 which alone would produce the same dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture actually present.
The Technical Specification Limit is 2.0 microcuries per gram.
Increased sampling frequency is , required if any analysis exceeds 0.02 microcuries per gram.
The representative sample for Unit 3, analyzed on May 16, 1980, indicated dose equivalent I-131 concentration of 1.44 x 10-3 microcuries per gram.
Unit 2 remained shutdown with the core off-loaded and the reactor cavity drained -- a sample was not obtained throughout the period.
No unacceptable conditions are identified.
3.
Non-Routine Event Review The inspector reviewed the following non-routine events onsite and in office for safety significance and relationship to Technical Specifi-cation protective limits.
The licensee's PORC review, evaluation, and corrective action were also verified.
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LER Number Title 2-80/IP and 2-80-08/IP (update) Analysis of Pressure Profiles 2-80-09/1T within Isolation Valve Rooms following a Postulated HPCI Steam Supply Pipe Break Indicates Inadequate Safety Margin.
Preliminary calculations, resulting from environmental qualifications studies per IE Bulletin 79-01B, indicated on April 17, 1980 that a postulated guillotine failure of the HPCI steam supply in the outboard isolation valve room could result in peak pressures within the room in excess of the concrete block wall pressure capabilities.
Failure of the wall could affect the integrity of engineered safeguard cables, including HPCI System and 'B' Core Spray Loop Cables, contained in conduit supported on the face of the wall.
Similar concerns existed for both units.
Imediate corrective actions taken while operation continued included throttling of the isolation valves to a position which limited the postulated pressure spike but still allowed for successful quick start of the HPCI system, replacement of the isola-tion valve room's solid door with a grating to allow venting of the room, and daily piping inspections for early leak detection.
The inspector confirmed each of these licensee actions.
Additional licens-ee investigation indicated that, as described in the FSAR, additional restraints added during construction, upstream of the outboard isola-tion valve, precluded pipe failure upstream of the valve.
Updated analysis of a postulated break downstream of the isolation valve iadicated peak room pressures would not exceed ultimate wall pressure upability but that the safety margin was only about 1.4.
Based on data showing minimal impact of isolation valve position on peak room pressure, the licensee returned these valves to their normally-open condi tion.
The licensee's report indicated that final modifications to restore desired safety factors would be based upon material availa-bility for Unit 3 and would be completed prior to startup from the refueling outage for Unit 2.
This matter is considered unresolved pending completion and inspector review of the proposed modifications (80-14-03 and 80-12-01).
LER Number Title 2-80-9/IP Failure to Maintain Secondary Containment Integrity during Movement of Irradiated Fuel within the Spent Fuel Pool.
Technical Specificacions require secondary containmenu integrity to be maintained whenever irradiated fuel is being moved in the Reactor Build-ing.
On May-2, 1980, an irradiated fuel bundle was moved in the spent ,
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fuel pool. A secondary containment leak test performed on the same day indicated that the containment boundary passed flow in excess of the Technical Specification limit.
This test was performed to verify tht secondary containment had been re-established following the removal and replacement of an RHR pump room hatch on May 1,1980.
Licensee investigation revealed that the cause of the secondary containment leak rate test failure was the removal of steam and feedwater line reactor building penetration boots on May 1,1980.
The inspector verified that all fuel movement had been suspended upon discovery and that an administrative block had been placed on the refuel bridge to ensure no additional inappropriate fuel movement would occur.
The inspector verified that no abnormal release of radioactivity had occurred.
The licensee concluded that the cat.se was p acedural defi-ciencies, in that the conditions under which the penetration boots could be removed were not adequately specified, and in that the proce-dure for RHR pump removal did not properly address secondary contain-ment considerations.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had installed locking devices on secondary containment equipment hatches to aid in shift supervision's control over these hatches.
Subsequent to the inspection period, and prior to ' report issuance, the inspector reviewed procedure M-10.24, "RHR Pump Motor Maintenance", revision 2, dated June 26, 1980 to verify that it had been revised to properly address secondary containment co miderations.
The inspector also reviewed procedure M 7.6 " Outboard MSIV Room Penetrat%n Boot Seal Replacement", revision 2, cated July 7,1980 and verified that it had been changed to require specific permission of shift supervision prior to removal of the penetration boot seals.
The inspector stated that inclusion of secondary containment status on shift turnover sheet would provide supervisory control.
The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's comment and agreed to revise the shift turnover sheet to include secondary containment status.
The inspector will review the shift turnover sheets during subsequent inspections (277-80-14-04).
4.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup a.
IE Bulletin 3 Inspection was performed for the following IE Bulletin to verify that it was received by site and corporate management and to con-firm that the licensee was complying with Bulletin requirements.
IE Bulletin 80-01, " Operability of the ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply."
The inspector verified that the licensee's actions were as described in PECo response to IE Bulletin 80-01 dated January 18, 1980.
The inspector determined that the licensee had replaced hard-seated swing check valves.with appropriate soft-seated spring-loaded check valves in the ADS accumulater system to assure minimum
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leakage, had tested to verify acceptable leakage rates, and had added two seismic supports to meet seismic design criteria for the ADS accumulator systems.
The inspector noted that system operability is based upon accumulator system capacity and seismic qualifications only; ADS pneumatic supplies outboard the accumu-lator check valves are not seismically supported.
The inspector determined that the licensee had initiated a procedure to rou-tinely test for excessive ADS check valve leakage.
The inspec-tor had no further questions in this area at this time.
NRC:NRR is studying, on a generic basis, the qualifications of accumula-tors on ADS valves (reference NRC letter dated May 7,1980, titled "Five Additional TMI-2 Related Requirements of Operating Reactors"). b.
IE Circulars Which Require No Response Inspection was performed for the following IE Circulars to verify that the Circular was received by licensee management, review for applicability was performed, corrective action (if any) was ini-tiated and/or evaluated and supporting documentation evidencing licensee review was contained in PORC minutes.
Findings were as follows: IE_ Circular 79-19, "Ingersoll-Rand Pump Impeller Locking Devices".
The licensee investigated safety-related pumps and determined that the only one manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand, the emergency cooling water booster pump, was not of the type experiencing impeller lock nut problems.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
IE Circular 79-25, (including Supplement A), " Shock Arrester Strut Assembly Interference". The licensees review indicated the potential problem is not applicable to Peach Bottom but could affect the utility's Limerick plants, which are under construc-tion. Action was taken to ensure the Limerick station was aware of the problem.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
IE Circular 79-18, " Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves".
Review of PORC minutes indicated that the PORC had reviewed the Circular.
Licensee evaluations and inspection indicated that all relief valves insulation had been previously modified to meet the manufacturer's latest recommendations. The inspector had no further questions in this are _ _ _ _ =
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5.
Radiation Protection During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities.
Areas ' examined included: a.
Health Physics (HP) controls b.
Badging c.
Usage of protective clothing d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements J e.
Surveys f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials Additionally, inspections were conducted of usage of friskers and portal monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point.
In excess of 30 people were observed to meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month.
Sampling inspection showed high radiation doors were locked as required.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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7.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operatino Reports The following licensee report: have been reviewed in-office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
' April,1980 dated May 10, 1980 This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
Unresolve' Items
Unresolved items are items about which more informaticn is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items are discussed in Details 2 and 3.
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Management Meetings During the period of the inspection, licensee management was periodi ally notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspector (see Detail 1).
A summary was also provided at the conclusion of the inspection.
Addi-tionally, the resident inspector attended the exit interview on May 23, 1980 conducted by a region-based inspector regarding an inspection of the licensee's security program.
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