IR 05000277/1980033
| ML19347E780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1981 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347E771 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-80-33, 50-278-80-26, NUDOCS 8105130384 | |
| Download: ML19347E780 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION g
~0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/80-33 Report No.
30-278/80-26 50-277 Docket No.
50-278 DPR-44 c
License No. CPR-56 Priority Category
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Comoany 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Celta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
November 8 - 30, 1980 Inspectors:
O O b4, h, h r l t1 Irl
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A. R. Blough, Resider.t Reactor Inspector date signed
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,lts ltt C. J. Cowgill, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed
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date signed.
Approved by:
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects cate signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inscection Summary:
Inspection on November 7-30, 1980 (Combined Inscection Recort Nos. 50-277/80-33 and 50-278/80-26)
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspectors (43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected included accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, radiation protection, physical security, operational safety, control room observations, LER review onsite, IE Bu~ iletin follow-up, review of periodic reports and NRR/ Licensee meetings.
Tnree non-ccmplainces were identified (failure to have off-gas monitors in service, Cetail 5; failure to follow posted radiation warnings, Detail 6; and failure to follow security procedures, Cetail 7).
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Region I Form 12 j
(Rev. April 77)
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OETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted W. Corse, Assistant Site QA Engineer J. K. Davenport, Maintenance Engineer G. F. Dawson, I&C Engineer
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendant A. Fulvio, Results Engineer N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager F. W. Polaski, Reactor Engineer S. R. Roberts, operr.tions Engineer R. J. Scholz, Chemistry Supervisor S. A. Spitko, Site QA Engineer S. Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
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T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent J. E. Winzenried, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were also contacted.
"Present at exit interviews.on site and for summation of preliminary inspec-tion findings.
2.
Previous Inscection Item Update (Closed) Unresolved Item (277/80-28-02 and 278/80-20-01), radiological aspects of scram discharge volume positive vents provided per IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 2 As discussed in Detail 4, the licensee determined that the system's original configuration provided positive vents meeting the bulletin supplement's requirements.
Consequently, the licensee capped the additional vents provided shortly after receipt of the supplement.
Spot-checks by the inspector verified this action.
(Closed) Infraction (277/78-12-01), failure to maintain Standby Liquid Con-trol Systec (SLCS) valve No. 41 locked, as required, in the closed position.
The inspector reviewed surveillance test procedure ST 6.1, " Standby Liquid Control Pump Functional Test," Revision 11, dated July 9, 1980 and verified that a system check-off list is required after each performance of the test.
Syster. procedure S.3.6.E, " Standby Liquid Control System Operability l
Test," Revision 6, dated July 12, 1978 was reviewed to verify that the valve is required to be locked closed after testing. The inspector veri-fied that system check-off list S.3.6. A, Revision 10, dated November 3, 1979 stipulates " locked closed" for valve No. 41.
Inspector spot-checks in plant, including a complete valve line up check of the Standby Liquid Control System during Combined Inspection 277/80-03 and 278/80-03, have not identified any improperly positioned SLCS valves.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed the most recent SLCS pumo functional test, ccmpleted November 5, 1980, and the associated #
.4-of f list and identified no unacceptable conditions.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/77-07-04 and 278/77-08-04) replacement of BF0 relays in the Diesel Control Circuits had not been completed.
The inspector reviewed licensee audit report A73-26PR, wnich indicated that relay replacement had been completed.
The inspector reviewed the file for Modification #289 (77-15) and verified that completion of all work was indicated.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (277/77-07-03 and 278/77-08-03) modifications to all STD relays in response to Bulletin 76-03, had not been completed.
The inspector reviewed Audit Report A79-26PR, which stated that Engineering and Research Department records indicated completion of the modifications.
Review of the onsite fiie for modification #293 showed that five Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) were still outstanding.
The Modification Coordinator had received verbal certification from a cognizant engineer that all work is done.
The inspector will review this item after the completed MRF's are located.
3.
Plant Operations Review a.
Logs and Records (1) Documents Reviewed A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; verify that operating orders and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check correct-ness of communications concerning equipment and lockout status; verify ;umper log conformance to procedural requirements; and verify conformance to Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Logs and records reviewed were:
(a) Shift Supervision Log, November 8 - 30, 1980 (b) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 2 - Current Entries (c) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 3 - Current Entries (d) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 2 - November 8 - 30, 1980 (e) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 3 - November 8 - 30, 1980 (f) CO Log Book - Noveo er 8 - 30, 1980 (g) Night Orders - Current Entries
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(h) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Various in both Units 2 and 3 during November, 1980 (1) Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3, Sampling Audit - November,1980 (j) Ignition Source Control Checklists - Various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 (k) Operation Work and Information Data - November,1980 (2) Facility Tours (a) During inspection, which included shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily tours to observe:
the Control Room
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the Turbire Building - (all levels)
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the Reactor Building - (Accessible areas)
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the Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power
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block, including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering tank construction the Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and
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control point monitoring Vehicular Control
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the SAS and power block control points
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Security Fencing
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Portal Monitoring
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Personnel and Badging
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Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including
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locked door checks TV monitoring capabilities
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Off-Shif t Inspections and the areas examined were as follows:
Date Areas Examined November 14, 1980 Control Room Observation, Tour of Turbine Building and Unit 2 Reactor Building November 17, 1980 Control Room Observations, Event Follow-up (Scram)
November 24, 1980 Control Room Observations November 26, 1980 Control Room Observations Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed curing the report period were: APRM High; Rod Withdrawal Block; Liquid Nitrogen Storage Tank Level Lew; Control Rod Drive Temperature High; and, Standby Gas Filter heater failure.
The operators were knowledgeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
Control Room Manning.
On frequent occasions during this
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inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), the Technical Specifications, and NRR letter " Interim Criteria for Shift Staffing," dated July 31, 1930 for minimum staffing requirements were satisfied.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified
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which had not also been identified by the licensee or for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unaccer'.-
able conditions were identified.
Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or
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unusual conditions were identified.
Monitoring Instrumentation.
The inspector frequently
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confirmed that selected instruments were operating and indicated values were within Technical Specification require-ments.
On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control room indicators and plant observations, were verified.
Examples of instrumentation observed included
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flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, process radiation monitors, area radiation monitors, and full-core display.
No unacceptab?? conditions were identified.
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b.
Reactor Water Chemistry The following surveillance tests for the periods indicated were reviewed by the inspector to assure that Technical Specification limits were satisfied.
(1) Conductivity and Chloride Ion Content in Primary Coolant During Normal Goeration and Time Conductivity and Chlaride are Above Specified Limits Surveillance Tests 7.2.3.A and 7.2.3.C and Peach Bottom Daily BWR Chemistry Analysis - November 10-30, 1980.
Technical Specification 3.6.8 requires, prior to start-up and
.whgn operating at rated pressure, reactor water conductivity at 25 C of less than or equal to 5.0 umho/cm and chloride concentra-tion less than or equal to 0.2 ppm.
Reactor water quality may exceed these limits for up to two weeks per year.
Maximum limits are established as 10 umho/cm conductivity and 1.0 ppa chlorides.
Inspections at Unit 2 for the report period indicated that during operation the maximum conductivity and chloride cancentrations were 0.9 umho/cm and 0.168 ppm respectively.
Through November 30, 1980 the total time above the 0.2 ppm chloride limit and the 5.0 umho/cm conductivity limit are 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> and 38.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> respectively.
Inspections at Unit 3 for the period indicated that, during operation, the maximum conductivity was 2.25 umho/cm.
Chloride concentration was above 0.2 ppm, with a maximum value of 0.66 ppm, but did not exceed the 1.0 ppm limit. Through November 30, 1980 the total time above the specific two weeks per year limit for conductivity and chlorides were 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and 224 hours0.00259 days <br />0.0622 hours <br />3.703704e-4 weeks <br />8.5232e-5 months <br /> respectively. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(2) Determination of Cose Eouivalent I-131 in the Primary Coolant i
Surveillance Test 7.2.1.A was reviewed.
The licersee analyzes
I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 and computes the dose
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equivalent concentration of I-131 which alone would produce the same dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture actually present.
The technical specification limit is 2.0 microcuries per gram (uCi/g).
Increased sampling frequency is required if any analysis exceeds 0.02 uCi/g.
The representative sample for Unit 2, analyzed on November 11, 1980, indicated an I-131 dose equivalent of 1.16 E-3 uCi/g.
At l' nit 3, a sample on November 11, 1980 indicated a dose eouivalent of 1.83 E-3 uCi/g.
The inspector confirm 2d that the required surveillance frequency was being satisfied.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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4.
IE Bulletin Follow-uo a.
IE Bulletin 80-17, S e plement 2 Supplement 2 to Bulletin !!0-17 specified a Scram Discharge Vent system positive vent path which did not depend on any component other than the vent valves.
The licensee provided an alternate vent path by installing a one-inch vent standpipe to each closed funnel at the 135 foot elevation in the Reactor Building for each unit.
The scram discharge vent system drains to a covered funnel which is a part of the Clean Radwaste System.
This system drains to a sump on the 91 foot elevation in the Reactor Building.
The sump is vented and cross-connected with a second sump on the same elevation.
The Clean Radwaste System drainheader has over 30 open funnels and is provided with a vent to ventilation exhaust ducts on three levels in the Reactor Building (135 ft., 165 ft., and 195 ft.).
The licensee recorded the time to drain the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) with the new vent standpipes both capped and uncapped.
There was no measurabla difference.
A licensee representative stated that, if the above information had been available when the bulletin supplement was received, no alternate vent (standpipes) would have been provided since the system as originally designed provides positive vent paths.
The licensee subsequently capped the standpipes. The inspector reviewed the licensee's piping diagrams, examined the SDV draining time information, inspected in plant piping configurations, and conducted discussions with both the NRR Licensing Project Managers and IE Headquarters technical staff.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Capping of the standpipes resolves a radiological concern regarding SDV venting (reference Detail 2).
5.
Non-routine Event Review The inspectt reviewed the following non-rcutine event on site for safety significance and relationship to Technical Specification protective limits.
l LER No.
LER Date Event Date Subject l
2-80-31/1P 11/26/80 11/23/80 Off gas radiation sample lines flooded
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f On November 24, 1980 the inspector observed that both channels of the Unit 2 off gas radiation monitor were reading abnormally low -- 1 to 2 millirad per hours (mrad /hr) instead of typical recent full power readings of 20-30 mrad /hr.
Review of the recorder traces indicated that the monitors had read low throughout the previous day after a load drop the night of November 22.
Review of the Unit 2 Reactor Operator's Log and discussions with operators indicated that operators had noticed the low readings.
Health Physics personnel had diagnosed the problem as water in tne sample lines, had attempted to clear the lines several times, and had been able to obtain normal sample flow rate indications; but normal readings were not attained.
At about 9:00 a.m. November 24, 1980 the sample lines were again drained, and the inspector noted that monitor read-ings on the two channels rose to 21 and 26 mrad /hr respectively.
Discussions aith the technician involved indicated that, when the sample lines had filled with water, that caused erratic flow indication.
Sample flow was apparently low all day, althoegh the technician believed some flow had existed.
The inspector reviewed recorder traces from main stack radiation monitors, which sense radioactivity in the gases exhausted from the off gas system, and verified that no abnormal release of radioactivity to the atmosphere had o' pred while the off gas monitors were functioning improperly.
Ma.n steam line radiation monitors were also observed to be normal on November 24, 1980.
The inspector conducted discussions with licensee personnel on November 24 and 25 and questioned the operability of the monitors.
Licensee investigation and testing indicated on November 26 that the monitors had been inoperable on November 23, 1980.
The licensee submitted a prompt notification of the occurrenct to the NRC.
The inspector reviewed the function and safety importance of off-gas radiation monitors.
No trip functions are provided by the monitors.
Readings are not representative of " release rates" to the environment since the monitors sample the gas upsteam of the hold-up volume and filters.
Off-gas monitor readings provide early indication of accelerated fuel rod failure. Technical Specifications cequire that ar. orderly shutdown be commenced within one hour if the off gas raciation monitors are inoperable.
Failure to take required action for inoperable radiation monitors is an item of noncompliance (277/80-33-01).
The inspector noted that a temporary monitor was installed, on the afternoon of November 24, to act as a backup for the installed monitor.
The inspector ><ill review the licensee's long-term resolution to this off-gas sample system problem.
(277/80-33-02 ad 278/80-26-01)
6.
Radiation Protection During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of Unit 2 and Unit 3.
Areas examined included:
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a.
Health Physics (HP) controis; b.
Badging; c.
Usage of protective clothing; d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements; e.
Surveys; f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials.
Additionally, inspections were conducted of usage of friskers and portal monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point.
More than 30 people were observed to meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month.
A sample of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required.
The inspector conducted independent measurements in plant on November 19, 1980 to verify radiation levels posted by the licensee; no inconsistcncies were noted.
A temporary modification to provide reactor water cleanup flow during maintenance on a section of Unit 3 piping was made on November 25, 1980.
When flow was established the radiation levels 18 inches from the piping, which is located on the 165 foot elevation in the Unit 3 Reactor Building, increased to 800 mR/nr.
A Health Physics Technician was in the process of establishing the boundaries of the high radiation area surrounding the piping.
He had initially established a "no entry" radiation area to prevent access until the boundaries of the high radiation area could be identified.
The area established was bounded on the south by the shield wall surrounding E Bus 234 and the wall directly across from the bus. The area was bounded on the north by the south end of the railing on the fuel floor access and the drywell wall.
The inspector toured the 165 foot elevation at about 2:30 p.m. on November 25, 1980 and noted that an individual could not pass on the east side of the drywell witnout entering the area described above.
The posting signs read " Radiation Area - No Entry - use West Side," where the high radiation was expected.
During the tour the inspector saw that three persons had entered the area.
Two individuals were contract Health Physics employees and the third was a contractor janitorial employee.
The individuals did not have instruments to measure radiation levels in the area and none had read the instructions regarding entry at the boundary.
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three individuals immediately left the area when advised of the requirements by the inspector.
This failure to obey Health Physics postings as required by licensee procedures is contrary to the Technical Specifications and is an item of noncompliance.
(278/80-26-02)
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THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEp7 g(pyg,
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8.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports The following licensee reports have been revieued in-office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for October,1980 dated November 12, 1980.
This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were con-tained therein.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.
NRR/ Licensee Meeting On November 13, 1980 the inspector attended an NRR meeting with the licensee onsite.
The post-fire shutdown capability and cable separation aspects of fire protection were discussed.
No noncompliances were identified.
10.
Management Meetings - Preliminary Inscection Findings A summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Station Superintendent at the conclusion of the inspection.
During the period of this inspection, licensee management was periodically notified c.r thh preliminary findings by the resident inspectors.
The dates involved, the senior licensee repre-sentative contacted, and subjects discussed were as follows:
Senior Licensee Date Subject Representative (s) Present November 25, 1980 Unescorted Visitor Assistant Station Superintendent (Detail 7)
November 26, 1980 Off gas Radiation Stat'an Superintendent Monitor (Detail 5)
November 26, 1980 Radiation area Radiation Protection Manager entry violation (Detail 6)
December 17, 1980 Summary of preliminary Station Superinterdent findings
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