IR 05000277/1980024
| ML19345E812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1980 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345E800 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-80-24, 50-278-80-18, NUDOCS 8102060187 | |
| Download: ML19345E812 (18) | |
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h U.S. fiUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0tt 0FFICE OF IrlSPECTI0ti Arid EtiFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/80-24 Report tio. 50-278/80-18 50-277 Docket tio. 50-278 DPR-44 C
License tio. DPR-56 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Facility flame:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
July 1-31, 1980 Inspectors:
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h f-Jg PO C. J. Cowgill, ResiE2nt Reactor Inspector date signed
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fh 9-2 4-PD A. R. Blough, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
@ C. ScOA-h.
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M to E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section tio. 2, RO&NS Branch
,e Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 1-31,1980 (Combined Inspection Repori, tios. 50-277/80-24 and 50-278/80-18)
l Areas Insoected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident
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inspectors and Region I management (64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> - Unit 2; 63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br /> - Unit 3).
Areas inspected included:
followup on prior identified itcas, operational safety verif-ication, facility tours, reactor chemistry, IE Bulletin and Circular followup, radiation protection, Physical Security, Training, Staff License Applications, Immediate Action letter followup, review of periodic and 3pecial reports, and tiRC meetings with Corporate Staff.
Results:
Noncompliances
' lone in ten areas.
Three in two areas (Infraction - Failure to initiate a shutdown with an inoperable snubber in accordance with Technical Spec-ification LCO, Detail 5; Infraction - Failure to maintain isolation zone clear, Detail 7; and Deficiency - Failure to report seismic restraint inadequacies in accordance with Technical Specifications and IEB 79-14, Detail 5).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8102060\\N
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. J. Costagliola, Quality Assurance General Sup*rintendent - Electric Production J. K. Davenport, Assistant Engineer - Maintenance R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent N. Gazda, Health Physics R. T. Hackett, Engineer in Charge, Maintenance - Electric Production D. Kenper, Maintenance Supervisor, Susquehanna Area Electric Production C. A. Mengers, QA Site Supervisor R. H. Moore, Superintendent, Quality Assurance Division - Electric Production J. O'Rourke, Mechanical Engineer - Engineering and Research R. Simpson, Outage Planning D. 9nith, Outage Planning J. Spencer, Engineer - Maintenance H. H. Trave, Superintendent, Station Section Maintenance
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent J. Winzenried, Engineer - Technical W. C. Whitfield, Superintendent - Maintenance Electric Production Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These in-cluded engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor operators, shift supervision, maintenance personnel, contractor health physics per-sonnel and security personnel.
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Previous Inspection Items The following were inspected during the month and an administrative review was performed to consolidate and close the following:
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (277/77-30-01 and 278/77-30-01): Health Physics Technician Training Program.
This item was inspected in a combined inspection report, (277/79-16 and 278/79-16), and further addressed in IE combined inspection report (277/79-07 and 278/79-06).
In the latter re-port, two unresolved items were identified (277/79-07-02 and 278/79-06-02).
l Based on these unresolved items, the original followup items are closed for
record purposes.
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(Closed) Deficiency (277/77-21-01 and 278/77-22-01):
Exceeding the Sus-pended Solids Discharge Limit.
IE combined inspection reports 277/78-17:
278/78-21, stated that several further instances of exceeding the ETS limit for suspended solids were found.
As a result, a further recurrent item of noncompliance (277/78-17-01 and E78/78-21-01) was identified.
Based on this item of noncompliance, the original deficiency is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Deficiency (277/77-21-02 sr.d 273/77-22-02):
Exceeding the pH Discharge Limit.
Combined inspec':. ion report.277/78-17 and 278/78-21 ideatified several instances of noncompliance with the ETS limits for pH as repe 5 to the NRC.
As a result, an item of iiuNompliance (277/78-17-02 and 278/78-21-02) was identified.
Based on the identification of this subsequent item of noncompliance, the original deficiency is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/77-21-04 and 278/77-22-04): Thermal Monit-oring of Discharge.
In combined inspection report 277/78-17 and 278/78-21 documents that "the adequacy of the thermal monitoring of discharges was still unresolved.
As a result, an unresolved item (277/78-17-03 and 278/78-21-03) was identified.
Based on the identification of this unre-solved item, the original item is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/77-21-05 and 27S/77-22-05):
Closed Cycle Cooling System.
Combined inspection report 277/78-17 and 278/78-21 documents the status of this matter as still in litigation.
As a result,
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an additional unresolved item (277/78-17-04 and 278/78-21-04) was identi-
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fied.
Based on the identification of the subsequent unresolved item, the original item is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/77-21-06 and 278/77-22-06):
Thermal Monit-oring System Calibration and Maintenance Procedures.
In combined inspec-tion report 277/78-17 and 278/78-21, the licensee stated in a followup inspection that resolution was pending a regulatory decision regarding the use of closed-cycle cooling vs. open-cycle cooling.
As a result, an unre-solved item (277/78-17-03 and 278/78-21-03) was identified.
Based on the identification of this item, the original item is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/77-21-07 and 278/77-22-07):
Milk Analysis for I-131 and Hater QC Analysis for gross Alpha.
Combined inspection report.277/78-17 and 278/78-21 documents that the I-131 QC analysis will be examined in subsequent inspections.
As a result, an additional inspector follow item (277/78-17-06 and 278/78 _ 06) was identified.
Based on the identification of that item, the original item is closed for record purposes.
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(Closed)
Infraction (277/78-01-02):
Contrary to procedures, the Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operator and Control Operators' Logs did not Contain Circumstances Surrounding the Increase of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Set Points.
Subsequent review identified no recurrence.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (277/78-01-03 and 278/78-01-01): Accept-ability of Changes for Radiation Protection Manager.
In combined inspection report 277/78-05 and 278/78-05 qualifications of seven members of the Health Physics staff, including the Radiation Protection fianager, were examined, flo unacceptable conditions were identified.
(Closed)
Infraction (277/79-03-03 and 278/79-02-03):
Failure to Load and Close Radioactive fiaterial Packages in Accordance tlith 1fritten Procedures.
During inspection 277/79-27 and 278/79-30 the inspectors reviewed radwaste facility operations, including the examination of a 55 gallon drum being filled with dewatered resin from the centrifuge, flo items of noncompliance were identified.
Also, there have been four radwaste shipment inspections at the waste disposal site with no items of noncompliance identified.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (277/79-03-04 and 278/79-02-04):
Review Licensee's Method of Placarding Trucks Carrying Radioactive !faste.
In inspection 277/79-27 and 277/79-30 a low-level radwaste shipment was in-spected as it was leaving the site.
flo items of noncompliance were identified.
i In inspection 277/80-13 shipments were inspected to detemine that the vehicle had proper placards.
fio items of noncompliance were identified.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (278/77-39-03):
Followup on Correction of Errors in Semi-annual Reports of Effluents.
Followup inspection (com-bined reports 277/79-02 and 278/79-02) also identified errors in the Semi-annual Effluent Release Report No. 2 and remains outstanding.
Based on the identification of this inspector follod item (278/79-02-02), the original item is closed for record purposes.
(Closed)
Inspector Follovup Item (277/77-38-02 and 278/77-38-01):
Licen-see Review of Junpers in Existence for Extended Periods of Tine to Deter-mine Jumper Necessity and/or need for Permanent Chang)e.
In a followup inspection (combined reports 277/78-15 and 278/78-19 an extensive review of the jumpers was conducted and the item remains unresolved pending further review by fiRC:RI (277/78-15-02 and 278/78-19-07).
Based on the opening of this unresolved item, the original item is closed for record l
purposes.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/78-23-02 and 278/78-28-Ot}:
Franklin Institute 2nvironmental Testing to Demonstrate Qualification of Splices and Terminal Blocks.
This iten was based on followup action taken in response to IEC 78-08.
IEB 79-01 and IEB 79-01A encompass the areas described in IEC 78-08.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (278/79-JS-02):
LER 3-79-20T, Release Above the Instantaneous Release Rate Due to Loss of Off Gas Recombiner and Subsequent Depressurization to RCS. This item was followed up and docu-mented in a later canbined inspection report (277/79-14:
278/79-16). As a result, an item of noncompliance was identified (278/79-16-01).
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (277/79-02-01 and 278/79-02-01):
Release Rate In Excess of TS 3.8.C.1.
In combined inspection 277/79-14:
278/79-16 this area was adequately investigated as a followup to a LER.
(Closed)
Infraction (278/78-03-01):
Failure to Properly Post Radiation Area on 195 Ft. Unit 3 RX Building Per 20203 and HP0/CO-10A and Deficiency (278/78-05-02):
Failure to Label Radioactive Material.
In combined inspection 277/79-21:
278/79-23 " Radioactive Material Labeling Was Examined Against the Criteria of 10 CFR 20.203(f) and Licensee Procedures." No items of noncompliance were identified.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/80-08-03 and 278/80-07-03):
Clarification of Onsite Implementation of Interim Compensatory Measures.
The inspector reviewed Physical Protection Procedure PP-31 " Functions of the CAS and SAS Attendants." Revision 1, dated June 30, 1980, and determined that the specified presence of a security personnel in the SAS meets requirements.
The inspector verified compliance with this procedure through frequent spot checks of SAS manning.
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4.
Plant Operations Review a.
Logs and Records (1) Documents Reviewed A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; to verify that operating and right orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; & ck correctness of com-munications concerning equipment operating and lock-out status; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were:
(a) Shift Supervisor's Log, July 1-31, 1980 (b) Unit 2 Jumper Log - Current Entries (c) Unit 3 Jumper Log - Current Entries (d) Reactor Engineering Log, Unit 2 - Current Entries (e) Refueling Floor Log Unit 2 (Sampling) July,1980 (f) Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 2 - July 1-31,1980 (g) Reactor 0'erators Log Book Unit 3 - July 1-31, 1980 (h) ACO Log Botk - July 1-31, 1980 (i) Night Orders - Current Entries (j) Radiation Work Permits - Various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 during July, 1980 (k) Maintenance Request Fonns (MRF's) Unit 2 and Unit 3 - Sampling Audit - July,1980 (1)
Ignition Source Control Check Sheets - Various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 (m) Operation Work and Infonnation Data - July,1980 (n) Refueling Floor Fuel Status Board
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Control room logs were reviewed pursuant is requirements of Pro-cedure A-7, " Shift Operations."
Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervisitn, and licensee onsite management constituted evidence of licensee review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions including abnormal-ities and significant operations were accurately and completely recorded.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.
Facility Tours During the course of this inspection, which also included back-shifts, the inspector conducted daily tours of accessible areas and made observations of:
Control Room - (Daily)
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Unit 2 Refuel Floor
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Turbine Building
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Reactor Building
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Diesel Generator Building
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Unit 2 Torus on July 9, 1980
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Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block
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Security Building including SAS, Aux SAS, and control points
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to the power block Security Fencing
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Vehicular Control
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Badging and Escorting
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Portal Monitoring
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Control of Radiation and Hich Radiation Areas
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Personnel
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During routine tours, the following observations were made by the inspector:
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Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed during the report period were: APRM Rod Withdrawal Block; Condensate Storage Tank, High-Low Level; Radwaste Tank Level High; Demineralizer Inlet / Outlet High Conductivity; SBLCS High Temperature.
The operators were knowledgeable of alam status and plant conditions.
Control Room Manning. On frequent occasions during this
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inspection, the inspector confimed that requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the Technical Specifications for minimum staffing requirements were satisfied. No unacceptable con-ditions were identified.
Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified which
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had not also been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated. The in-spector observed sump status, alams, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or unusual
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conditions were identified.
Monitoring Instrumentation. The inspector freq ently confimed
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that selected instruments were operating and indicated values l
were within Technical Specification requirements. On a daily i
basis when the inspector was onsite, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control roon indicators and plant observations dere verified.
In-plant instrumentation was also frequently verified.
Examples of instrumentation observed in-
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cluded flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, nuclear instrumentation, radiation monitor readings, and SBLC parameters.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
l Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection. The inspector observed
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housekeeping conditions, fire hose station and equipment status,
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and observed the licensee's fire protection proedures and practices as well as the useage of firewatches. The Unit 2 outage was continuing to impact negatively on housekeeping conditions. No specific unacceptable conditions were identified.
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b.
Reactor Mater Chemistry The following surveillance tests for the periods indicated were re-viewed by the inspector to assure that Technical Specification Limits were satisfied.
(1) Conductivity ud Chloride Ion Content in Primary Coolant During Nomal Operation and Time Conductivity and Chloride Area Above Specified Limits Surveillance Tests 7.2.3.A and 7.2.3.C and Peach Bottom Daily BWR Chemistry Analysis - July 14, 1980.
Technical Specification 3.6.B requires prior to startup and when i
operating at rated pressure, reactor water conductivity at 250C
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of less than or e;ual to 5.0 umho/cm and c'nloride concentration less than or equal to 0.2 ppm.
Reactor water quality may exceed these limits for up to two weeks per year. Maximum limits are established as 10 umho/cm conductivity and 1.0 ppm chlorides.
Inspection at Unit 3 for the period indicated that the maximum valve of conductivity was 1.30 umho/cm.
Chlorides were maintained less than.02 ppm.
Through July, the 1980 total time above the
.2 ppm chloride limits and the 5.0 umho/cm conductivity limits are 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> and 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, respectively. Unit 2 remained shutdown throughout the inspection period. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(2) Detemination of Dose Eouivalent Microcuries/ Gram I-131 in the Primary Coolant Surveillance Test 7.2.1.A was reviawed. The licensee analyzes the fol1% fng nuc?, ides:
I-131, t-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 and comcates dose quivalent I-131 -- that amount of I-131 which alone WSuld produce the same dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture
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l actually prsent. The Technical Specification Limit is 2.0 l
microcuries per gram.
Increased sampling frequency is required if any analysis exceeds 0.02 microcuries per gram. The representa-tive sample for Unit 3, analyzed on July 10, 1980 indicated a dose equivalent I-131 concentration of 1.85 x 10-3 microcuries per gram.
Unit 2 remained shutdown throughout the inspection period.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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IE Bulletin and Circular Followup Inspection was perfomed for the following IE Bulletin to verify that the l
Bulletin was received by site and corporate management and to confirm that the licensee was complying with Bulletin requirements.
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1 a.
IE Bulletin 79-14 - Seisnic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Realted Piping Systems The licensee's response dated June 13, 1980 reported that all inspec-
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tion, measurement and evaluation for Unit 3 safety-related piping and supports required by Bulletin 79-14 had been completed.
The response further reported that only one pipe support exceeded operability cri-teria and that the associated piping would not be overstressed if the support failed.
A licensee representative stated that operability was based on the support stresses being equal to or less than calcu-lated stresses utilizing Section 3 of the 1977 ASME Codes. This code specified a stress value of 2.4 Sh where Sh is stress in the hot con-dition.
The Peach Bottom design used the 1971 ASME code which does not contain an allowable stress value.
The facility FSAR canmitted to utilizino a stress value which did not exceed yield strength at the temperature
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analyzed.
There were 19 supports that required modification to re-duce existing stresses to within FSAR design conditions. The inspec-tor reviewed this letter and held discussions with cognizant licensee personnel regarding the information described therein.
During dis-cussions on July 17, 1980 the inspector noted that the inoperable support discussed in the June 13, 1980 letter was Snubber 3-10GB-S44 (pipe support on the RHR line located in the torus room).
The snubber installed was designed to support a load of 12.5 KIP (thousand pounds).
The snubber manufacturer indicated that the snubber would withstand 15 KIP.
The results of the seismic re-analysis per-formed in accordance with Bulletin 79-14 indicated that the snubber would be subjected to 21 KIP.
This load exceeded both the design and manufacturer information for the snubber in question and provided the basis for declaring the snubber inoperable.
The licensee's Engineering and Research Department was informed of
this condition by the architect-engineer on June 5, 1980.
Bulletin 79-14 dated July 2,1979 requires licensees to canply with applicable
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action statements in technical specifications including prompt report-
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ing requirements if applicable.
Technical Specifications permit con-tinued reactor operation for only 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> upon determination that j
certain snubbers on safety-related systens are inoperable and lists
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snubber 3-10GB-S44 as one of thr. pertinent snubbers (RHR system).
Inspectior, determined that plant operation was continued for a period of 43 days prior to commer. cement of any corrective action regarding the snubber.
This failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.11.D regarding snubbers on safety-)related systems constitutes an item of noncompliance (278/80-18-01.
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The inspector also reviewed the status of reanalysis and modification required by Bulletin 79-14 for Unit 2.
Reanalysis of nine supports identified stress conditions that exceeded operability criteria. The support and date that the licensee was informed of each overstressed condition is listed below:
Support Number Date Licenste Informed by the Support Number System Architect-Engineer M-295-61 Main Steam Sample June 16, 1980 6-HF-54 Feedwater Long Path Recirculation July 2,1980 M-295-76, PG-11 Reactor Pressure Vessel Drain July 2, 1980 l
and PS-104 Drawing Detail High Pressure Service Water.,
July 9, 1980 No. X System M-295-77 Reactor Pressure Vessel Drain July 2, 1980 CSP-H901 27HC-56 Condensate Transfer System June 30, 1980
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27HC-556 Condensate Transfer System June 30, 1980 Reactor Pressure Reactor Pressure Vessel Level June 30, 1980 Vessel Column B Instrumentation Bulletin 79-14 required the licensee to comply with the applicable Tech-nical Specification reporting requirements. None of the above were reported as required by Technical Specifications which require re-porting when the performance of structures systems or components requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the safety analysis report.
The failure to report the above listed conditions in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9) constitutes an item of noncompli-ance (277/80-24-01). The reactor remained in cold shutdown, however, for the entire period in question.
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representa-tives regarding completion of any required modifications on Unit 2 identified by analysis conducted in accordance with Bulletin 79-14.
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The inspector was advised that all modifications would be completed prior to a Unit 2 startup following refueling.
The inspector acknow-ledged the licensee's statement and will review status of Bulletin 79-14 modifications prior to Unit 2 startup (277/80-24-02),
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IE Bulletin 80-17 - Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert
During A Scram At A BWR (1) Verification that no significant amount of water was in the scram discharge volume.
The licensee radiographed the scram discharge volume piping and the two-inch lines leading from the scram discharge volume in five separate locations to determine tha' there was no significant amount of water. Additionally, the licensee performed radiographs on test piping containing known amounts of water to confirm that radiography would detect the presence of water. The licensee concluded, based on the results of the radiography, that there was no significant water in the scram discharge volume. The resident inspector and a region-based specialist reviewed the licensee's radiography results to confim the licensee's con-clusions. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(2) Verification that the scram discharge vent and drain valves are operable and drain systems are free of obstruction.
The licensee connected an air line to the piping between the vent valve and the drain line to the radwaste system.
The air line was used to pass air through the vent valve into the scrcm dis-charge volume for approximately five minutt-s and allow a slight pressure increase.
When the air flow was interrupted, air pres-sure quickly reduced to zero indicating an unobstructed vent path existed. Air was introduced into the drain system to radwaste in a similar manner.
When air flow was interrupted, air pressure dropped to zero, verifying a clear drain path. The inspector reviewed the test results with licensee representatives, discussed the air flow paths utilizing system drawings, and examined piping configuration in-plant.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(3) Operator Training.
The inspector reviewed training records to verify that required l
preliminary training had been provided to all licensed operators.
Discussions were also held with 5 licensed operators to confim that the following topics had been covered:
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Brown's Ferry occurrence of June 1980.
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Procedures for actuation of the Standby Liquid Control
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System.
Actions to be taken if daily scram discharge volume testing
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results are unsatisfactory.
The inspector noted that further training on procedure revisions was scheduled to be complete on August 1,1980 and indicated that further inspector review would be subsequently conducted (277/80-24-03 and 278/80-18-02).
(4) Licensee Bulletin Responses
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The inspector confirmed that the licensee provided the NRC with responses required by Section 8 of the Bulletin.
The inspector
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noted that licensee response dated July 14, 1980 did not address results of the 50.59 review to increase standby licuid control system flow.
Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors statement and submitted a supplementary response on July 17, 1980.
The inspector reviewed this response and noted that the evaluation of adequate Net Positive Suction Trend for two pump operations would not be complete until August 8,1980.
The inspector will review the results and disposition at the licensee's review upon completion of this evaluation (277/80-24-04 and 278/80-18-03),
c.
IE Circulars Ubich Require No Response Inspection was performed for the following IE Circular:
(1)
IE Circular 78-CI-08 - Environmental Oualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power PlantsBulletin 79-01 and 79-01A address the areas described in Circular 78-08.
Based on this information, the inspector had no further questions.
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Radiation Protection l
During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in access-ible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities.
Areas examined included:
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Health Physics (HP) controls b.
Badging l
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Usage of protective clothing d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements e.
Surveys f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials Additionally, inspections were conducted of employee usage of friskers and portal monitors by personnel exiting various RUP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point.
More than 30 people were observed to meet frisking requirements of applicable Health Physics procedures during the month.
A sampling of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
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8.
Training Staff License Applications The inspectors verified the status of license applications for training instructors as delineated by NP.R letter (H. Denton) of March 28, 1980 to all licensees.
The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives to check the status of licensee training staff instructors involved in training on systems, integrated response, transients, and simulator courses. The Philadelphia Electric Company uses instructors from General Physics Corporation for its Reactor Operator Qualification and requalification training programs. None of these instructors have previously held Senior Reactor Operator Licenses.
The licensee stated that General Physics had submitted Senior Reactor Oper-
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l ator (SRO) applications for the Limerick Station under construction for
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those instructors that will conduct training at Peach Bottom. These instruc-
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tors do not now have nor is it the licensees intent to obtain SRO licenses at Peach Bottom for these individuals.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.
9.
Imediate Action Letter Followup
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Reference: Letter NRC Region I to Philadelphia Electric Company dated July 23, 1980 On July 21, 1980 it was determined that the solenoid installed in the back-up scram discharge solenoid valves had a 250 volt DC rating.
Power supplied
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i to these components is 125 volts DC. The licensee stationed a dedicated operator to manually vent the air supply header to atmosphere in the event of a scram,. notified the IE Headquarters duty officer via the Emergency
Notification System, and reported the event via licensee event report 2-80-12/lP dated July 22, 1980.
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives on July 22, 1980 to determine the licensee planned action to correct the existing inadequacy and to identify compensatory measures to be taken on Unit 3 providing backup scram capabilities which would justify continued operation while repairs were in progress.
The licensee provided the following corrective actions to be taken:
A dedicated operator to be stationed at Unit 3 to initiate the backup
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scram function by manual valve manipulation.
Incorporation of requirements in the Unit 3 scram procedure for notifi-
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cation of the operator stationed in Unit 3 of scrams via PA system I
announcement and through a dedicated continuously open telephone line.
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Restoration of the backup scram capability would be completed prior
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to startup on Unit 2, which was in a refueling outage at the time this inadequacy was identified.
Restoration of the backup scram feature prior to startup after IE
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Bulletin 80-17 testing or startup from any earlier shutdown. Addi-
tionally, continued efforts to effect online repairs were to be vig-orously pursued.
These corrective actions were confinned in the refer-enced letter.
The inspector reviewed implementation of licensee compensatory measures on July 23, 1980, noted that Special Procedure 393 titled, " Venting CR0 HCU Air Supply Header" was in effect, and held discussions with the oper-
,
ator on duty at the control rod drive station on 135 foot elevation in the Unit 3 Reactor Building.
The inspector questioned the adequacy of the operator's procedural understanding and his preparation for entry into the radiologically controlled area _ where the manual valves were located (The operator was not wearing protective boots or gloves).
The inspector expressed his concerns to the Shift Superintendent, who inmediately took steps to ensure the readiness of the operator. These steps included a canplete walkthrough of the procedure by the operator in the i
presence of the shift supervisor and the donning of proper protective clothing.
i The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and had no further questions
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regarding compensatory measures in effect.
The backup scram capability was restored by replacing the 250-volt-0C solenoids with 125-volt-DC solenoids. Replacement was complete on Unit 2
,
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on July 25, 1980 and on Unit 3 on July 27, 1980.
Each of the solenoids was functionally tested after replacement. The inspector also witnessed the Unit 2 functional testing to verify operability. A review of the original design deficiencies and licensees corrective action will be con-i ducted following canpletion of the licensee investigation (277/80-24-06 and 278/80-18-05).
10.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operatino Reports (
The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for: June,1980 dated
July 10, 1980.
This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained there-
in.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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11.
NRC/ Licensee Meeting On July 10, 1980 the inspector and an NRC Region I management representative met with representatives from licensee Electric Production Quality Assurance regarding the finding of the recent Systematic Licensae Appraisal Board.
The inspector stated that increased NRC inspection effort related to Quality Assurance would be conducted and nrovided licensee representatives infomation regarding resident inspector findings and conclusions.
On July 24, 1980, the inspector and an NRC Region I management representative met with representatives of PECo Electric Production Corporate Maintenance and Quality Assurance.
The inspector stated that increased NRC inspection effort related to maintenance would be conducted. HUREG 1368 and 1369 were discussed.
Licensee representatives were provided sumary infomation re-garding prior resident inspector findings and conclusions.
12. Unresolved Itens Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascer-tain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
An unresolved item is discussed in Detail 7.
13. Presentation of Preliminary inspection Findinos During the period of the inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspector. A sumary of the items of noncanpliance were provided to site management prior to report issuance.
Additionally, the inspector attended the following exit interviews by region-based inspectors during the reporting period.
Date Suby2ct Report No.
' Reportina Inspector July 3, 1980 Emergency Planning 277/80-18 0. Donaldson 278/80-10 July 3, 1980 Containment Inte-(277/80-21)
W. Rekito grated Leak Rate (278/80-15)
Test July 24, 1980 ISI Program Outage (277/80-25)
E. Jernigan Modifications July 28, 1980 Containment Inte-(277/80-26)
W. Rekito grated Leak Rate (278/80-19)
Test a