IR 05000277/1980020
| ML19332A143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1980 |
| From: | Bettenhausen L, Caphton D, Petrone C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332A142 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-80-20, NUDOCS 8009100861 | |
| Download: ML19332A143 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-4-
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/80-20 Report No.
0-277 Docke't No.
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C License No. DPR-44 Priority Category
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Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street i
Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: June 23 - June 25,1980 Inspectors:
M
/7/6d uw L. H. Bettenhausen, Ph.D., Reactor Inspector date. signed ehAt
, In ho C. D. Petrone, Reactor Inspector
'date signed
Approved by:
D. L. Capfsofi, Chief, Nuclear Support Section
/date' signed No. 1, R0&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 23 - June 25,1980 (Unit 2, Report No. 50-277/80-20)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of refueling activities.
The
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inspection involved 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> on site by two region-based NRC inspectors.
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Results: No items of noncompliance were identified during the conduct of this inspection.
Region I Form 12
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.(Rev.LApril 77)
800910'O O[
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DETAILS
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. Persons Contacted.
- F. Polaski, Reactor'. Engineer.
W. Tilton, Fuel Floor Supervisor
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- W. T. Ullrich, Plant Superintendent
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- C. Cowgill~, USNRC Resident-Inspector f-l'
ihe inspectors also contacted other maintenance, health physics, operations
and engineering staff members in the course of the inspection.
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- Present at exit interview on June 25, 1980.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Deficiency 78-26-01 Failure to complete procedure prerequisites.
Review of. completed procedures including their signoffs on this inspection and a previous inspection (5C 277/80-07) of Unit #2, revealed that pre-
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requisite steps are' presently being accomplished properly.
This item is
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considered closed.
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(Closed) Infraction 78-26-02 Failure of refueling grapple operator to observe fuel bundle while raising it out of the reactor core and moving it horizontally.
Observation of fuel movement operators during this inspection -
and a previous inspection-(50-277/80-07) revealed no recurrence of this
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infraction.~
This item is considered closed.
3.
Refueling Activities
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The inspectors verified by direct observation that fuel handling activities
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were being conducted in accordance with FH-6C, Fuel Movement and Core
Alteration During a Fuel Handling Outage, Rev. 9, January 14, 1980.
On June 23,1980, Refueling steps 191 through 200 were observed on the refueling floor.
Observation included removal of fuel bundles from the spent fuel pool and installation into the reactor core, accountability, housekeeping,
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and crew staffing. -The observations of fuel movements covered both day and-j evening shifts, in the control room and on the refueling floor and included the shift turnover, the Refueling Floor Log and the Unit 2 Control Room H
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j Log.
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At 1630 on June 23, 1980, refueling was suspended by the licensee when it
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'was discovered during a routine ultrasonic test that a defect might exist
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in an RHR pipe. -The licensee decided to begin defueling while the UT test results were further analyzed.
The defueling was completed on June 24, i
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During this period of observation the following specific items were noted:
I a.
During installation of one fuel bundle into the reactor's core the
operator lowered the mast until the nose piece of a fuel bundle contacted
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the reactor's upper support plate and noticeably tilted from the t
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vertical.
To correct the misalignment, the Senior Reactor Operator i
directed the operator to move the Refueling Bridge and trolley without
completely lifting the weigFt of the fuel bundle off the upper support
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plate.
Procedure FH-6C prr bits any movement of the refueling bridge
or trolley if a fuel bundit.s partially inserted.
Procedure FH-6C does not clearly define the point at which the fuel is considered
partially inserted.
These observations were discussed with the Plant
-Superintendent at the exit interview.
He agreed that 1) the event i
would be reviewed with the operators involved and 2) the procedure would be clarified if warranted.
This will be a subject for inspector i
followup on a subsequent inspection (277/80-20-01).
b.
Plant housekeeping on the refueling floor was visually observed.
Various items such as poly bags, tape, etc., were lying about on the floor in the vicinity of the open reactor and fuel storage-pools.
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guard rail surrounding the spent fuel pool was draped with poly sheeting that was torn in numerous places.
There was an unused contaminated
' area entry point that had several waste barrels containing used anti-
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contamination clothingfand trash.
Followup inspections on the two subsequent days revealed sone improvement in housekeeping.
These
observations were discussed at the exit interview.
c.
Radiation controls' were observed in the course of this inspection.
In one instance, it was noted that while installing the gates between the core and the spent fuel pool a worker put his gloved hand in the pool i
water and then continued to work without taking steps to control the potential spread of contamination (e.g. changing gloves).
Upon exiting the controlled area two of the workers were found to have facial
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contamination. Health Physics personnel took appropriate action,.
' logged the events, escorted the workers out of the area, and successfully decontaminated them.
These observations were discussed at the exit interview.
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d.
Visual observation of core internals indicated that they were properly stored and protected from damage.
e.
The inspectors verified by direct observation and discussions with licensee representatives that the fuel handling activities were being directed by a licensed Senior Operator.
A licensed Senior Operator was in the control room and observed to be in constant direct communication
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A records review verified that the Senior Operators were currently licensed.
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~The inspectors verified that the reactor mode switch was locked in the Refuel Position with the key removed as required.
i No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Procedure / Surveillance Test Reviews a.
Surveillance Tes't ST 13.9, Secondary Containment Capability Test, Rev. 6, results were reviewed.
The test was performed on June 17, 1980, with the wind recorded at 6.25 mph, a Standby Gas Treatment System flow rate of 6,600 cfm, and a ap of - 0.275 in. H 0.
.b.
A review of Surveillance Test ST 3.1.2 results for June 22, 23, and 24, 1980, indicated that Source Range Monitor surveillance was being performed satisfactorily.
t c.
Spent fuel pool level was verified to be satisfactory by, review of
Shift and Daily (S/D) logs for the period of June 9 through June 15, 1980, d.
A review of the records of Surveillance Test ST 7.1.1, performed on April 30,1980 and May 29, 1980, verified the SBLC Boron concentration to be within technical specifications.
. No items of noncompliance were identified.
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5.
Exit Interview On June 25 an exit interview was held with the licensee management personnel identified in. paragraph 1.
The inspe:: tors presented the inspection findings to the licensee's management.
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