IR 05000220/1988008
| ML17055D904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1988 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055D902 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-88-08, 50-220-88-8, 50-410-88-07, 50-410-88-7, IEB-79-01, IEB-79-1, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, NUDOCS 8806080240 | |
| Download: ML17055D904 (30) | |
Text
U
~ S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
88-08/88-07 Docket Nos.
50-220/50-410 License Nos.
DPR-63/NPF-69 Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 301 Plainfield Road Syracuse, New York 13212 Faci 1 ity:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and
Scriba, New York April 1, 1988 to May 5, 1988 WE A. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector A.
G. Krasopoulos, Reactor Engineer R. A. Laura, Reactor Engineer W.
L. Schmidt, Resident Inspector A
ro edb pp v
y J.
R. John n, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2C, DRP 4/a/8 s Date INSPECTION SUMMARY Areas
~Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of station activities including Unit 1 refueling outage activities and licensee action on previously identified items, plant tours, surveillance testing review, maintenance review, safety system walkdowns, physical security review, LER review, NRC Bulletin and Notice review, and a review of the licensee's Fitness for Duty Program.
This inspection involved 376 hours0.00435 days <br />0.104 hours <br />6.216931e-4 weeks <br />1.43068e-4 months <br /> by the inspectors which included 58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> of backshift inspection coverage.
Results:
Three UNRESOLVED items were identified dealing with numerous improperly sealed and survei lied fire rated penetrations, missed hydrostatic tests on sections of main steam piping, and missed LLRTs on containment penetrations.
These are discussed in Section 1. 1.
A VIOLATION due to failure to prevent recurring missed fire watches is discussed in Section l.l.b.
Two instances of failure to comply with TS surveillance requirements are noted as a VIOLATION and are discussed in Section 1.2.a.
Licensee action to address Unit 2 core flow being higher than 100% rated is reviewed in Section 1.2.c.
Licensee action to resolve the commercial grade dedication of safety related components is reviewed in Section 2.2.a.
The licensee fitness for duty policy is discussed in Section 10.
8806080240 880525 PDR ADOCK 05000220
DETAILS 1.
Review of Plant Events (71707, 93702, 40700, 86700)
1.1 UNIT 1 During this inspection period, the unit remained shutdown for the 1988 refueling outage.
Core reload has not yet begun due to contin-uing Inser vice Inspection (ISI) Program implementation evaluations (see Section 2. l.a below).
On March 26, while performing a modification to replace DC cables in Battery Board Rooms 11 and 12, the licensee determined that existing penetrations on the fire rated floors were not sealed properly and were not listed in the Penetration Survei 1-lance List.
The improperly sealed penetrations consisted of wooden plugs cast in the concrete floor to provide a future spare opening.
The deficiency was not easily detectable since the floor side of each penetration was grouted level with the floor and the. underside was covered with "flamastic" material, making it appear as a properly sealed penetration.
The licensee promptly initiated a review of the fire barrier penetration surveillance program to evaluate the potential for other unsealed penetrations.
Since this review effort began, the licensee has identified other areas where penetrations were either improperly sealed or not sealed at all.
The problem with the improperly sealed barrier s is thought to have been caused by an inadequate fire barrier walkdown conducted in 1984.
This walkdown failed to identify all of the penetrations in each fire barrier because, in many instances, it surveyed only one side of the barrier.
Thus, if a floor penetration was obscured by equipment or covered with grout, the penetration was not listed on the Penetration Surveillance List (PSL).
The principle reason that this problem remained undetected until now was the method by which the licensee performed the survei 1-lance of the barriers.
This method would inspect the adequacy of a type of penetration specifically identified in the PSL throughout the plant rather than inspect for total barrier integrity.
Thus, if a penetration was not identified in the PSL, that penetration would not be inspected or found during the surveillance.
To address this concern, the licensee is evaluating the necessity to resurvey all TS fire barriers prior to restart to assure that all penetrations that exist in the plant 'are listed in the Penetration Surveillance List and are properly sealed.
In addition, as a conservative interim compen-satory measure, the licensee has established a roving firewatch to inspect once per hour all fire barriers that, to date, have
e
not been reinspected.
The inspector also determined that the method of performing penetration surveillances will be changed.
From now on, the procedure wi 11 require the verification of total barrier operability rather than checking on the oper-ability of the individual fire barrier penetrations.
The inspector will review the licensee corrective action in a subsequent report.
This item will remain unresolved.
UNRESOLVED (50-220/88-08-04)
On April 27, the licensee missed a firewatch surveillance required by Technical Specifications (TS) as an interim compen-satory measure for a degraded fire barrier.
The apparent cause of this incident was inadequate oversight by Fire Department supervision.
In three separate occasions prior to this event ( February 22 and June 18, 1987 at Unit 2 and on October 27,'987 at Unit I) the licensee has missed firewat'ch patrols due to personnel over sights.
The corrective actions for these earlier events were documented in Licensee Event Reports (Unit I No.
87-20 and Unit 2 Nos.
87-15 and 87-35).
The recurrence of mi ssed firewatches is indicative of ineffective corrective actions and is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
VIOLATION (50-220/88-08-01)
On April 6, the licensee declared the following systems inoper-able:
emergency batteries, core spray, high pressure core injection, reactor vessel isolation, shutdown cooling, emergency condensers, electromatic relief valves and containment spray.
These systems were declared inoperable due to the installation of improperly dedicated commercial grade components in these systems.
The inspector verified that the licensee made appro-priate Equipment Status List entries for the affected systems.
Operability of these systems is dependent upon resolution of the specific commercial grade dedications.
The concerns involved in the commercial grade dedication process are discussed in section 2.2.a of this report.
Two events, both of which will be considered UNRESOLVED, occurred late in the inspection period.
These items wi 11 remain open pending inspector review of the licensee's resolutions'n April 22, based on an Engineering review of previously completed reactor vessel hydrostatic test procedures,'he licensee determined that the piping up to and including the vessel electromatic relief valves has not been fully tested during required periodic hydrostatic tests.
This occurred because blocking valves upstream of the relief valves were normally closed per the hydrostatic test procedure.
This isolated the downstream sections of piping and the relief valves from test pressure.
The licensee believes that these sections of piping were tested during the initial plant hydro-static test, but is reviewing test records to confirm this
information.
Licensee representatives'opine that the blocking valves were shut because the relief valves leaked at test pressure, making it difficult to maintain pressure control.
UNRESOLVED (50-220/88-08-02)
On May 4, during performance of primary containment penetration Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRTs) IBC technicians noticed three penetrations that were not in the TS penetration LLRT survei 1-lance procedures'he station manageme'nt has asked Technical Support and guality Assurance Departments to review this issue in conjunction with I&C to identify the cause and whether any other LLRTs were potentially over looked.
UNRESOLVED (50-220/88-08-03)
1.2 UNIT 2 During this inspection period the unit operated at near full power.
A unit shutdown was commenced on April 29 to begin a three week planned outage.
The inspector reviewed two events involving missed Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements.
On March 18, 1988, a
TS surveillance was missed when containment air was not sampled and analyzed prior to initiating a drywell purge for primary containment nitrogen inerting.
This sample is required by TS
~ 11.2. 1.2 and Table 4. 11 '-1 to calculate the allowable purge rate from containment based upon the concentra-tions of iodine-131, iodine-133, tritium, and all particulate nuclides with a half-life greater than 8 days.
The purge was secured when this oversight was discovered by the licensee.
The inspector determined that this surveillance was missed, in part, because the operating procedure for inerting the drywell, N2-0P-61A, did not specify that the requi red sample be taken and analyzed prior to starting the purge.
Another factor is that the Chief Shift Operator (CSO)
and Station Shift Supervisor (SSS) did not realize that the sample was required by TS, when-ever a release was planned.
This event was reviewed and documented by the licensee in LER 88-16.
Failure to perform this sample is a violation of TS 4. 11.2 '.2 and Table 4. 11.2-1.
On April 6, a plant shutdown was commenced to comply with TS 3.6'. 1 which required that the plant be in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, if the primary containment is declared inoperable.
The containment was declared inoperable because a
TS required Type B
surveillance test was missed on a spare containment penetration (Z-74).
The inspector determined that the primary reason for this missed surveillance was a poorly designed data base for tracking Type B leakrate testing.
The data base incorrectly included the
+25% time interval on the surveillance frequenc Contributing to this oversight was the reliance of the IEC Department on a manual surveillance tracking system and insuf-ficient oversight of this system.
The missed surveillance was identified when transferring data to the new computer tracking system.
The inspector also determined that the potential for error was identified by the licensee several months earlier; h'owever, no action was taken to promptly correct the surveil-lance frequency interval error.
Failure to perform the Type B
penetration test is a violation of TS 4.6. 1.2.d.
As noted in previous Inspection Reports (Nos. 50-410/87-20, 87-32, 87-37 and 87-39) implementation of the Surveillance Testing Program at Unit 2 has not been fully effective as represented by the numerous missed surveillance tests.
Although some of these problems may be attributed to familiarization with new and complex Technical Specifications, the primary cause appears to be inattention to detail and insufficient oversight of the program.
Although these events were licensee identified, a Notice of Violation is being issued in accordance with the Enforcement Policy Guidance of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.
VIOLATION (50-410/88-07-01)
On April 6, the licensee determined that commercial grade Locktite and RTV sealant used in several different components was not properly dedicated at the time of installation.
The inspector verified that these items were subsequently dedicated and that no component operability question exists.
This com-mercial grade dedication issue is discussed further in Section 2.2.a of this report.
On April 19, the licensee identified that the actual core flow was 103% of rated.
Computer printouts indicated core flow to be 100% instead of the actual 103% because of bad contacts on the jet pump flow summer card.
When the contacts on the summer card were cleaned, the problem was corrected.
The licensee told the inspector that during the Power Ascension Testing phase they
experienced the same problem.
At that time, they cleaned only the summer card edge.
This time, the instrument technicians troubleshooting the problem cleaned both the card edge and female card connector.
The licensee's initial response to the problem was to reduce core flow until all core flow indications read less than 100% of rated.
No TS requirements were violated.
The licensee is also presently pursuing resolution of this type of problem with GE.
No further problems were identified.
1.3 The inspectors verified that the licensee made the appropriate Emergency Notification System reports per
CFR 50.72 for the events-discussed abov.
~Foi1 own on Previous Identified Items (92702, 92700, 94702, 71707)
2.1 Unit
a.
(Open)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-220/87-21-06):
This item remains open pending the licensee review of the ISI Program and subse-quent review by the NRC.
The licensee is reviewing the ISI Plan for the first ten year period and the actual inspections conducted during,that period.
The present ISI Plan is based on the second ten year interval requirements and is also under review.
The scope of the ISI examinations required prior to fuel load was still uncertain at the close of this inspection period.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (No number assigned)
In Section 11 of the previous resident inspector report (50-220/
88-03) the stop work order issued by licensee gA for work by CBI on the RBCLC heat exchangers was discussed.
This issue has been further reviewed in this period.
The stop work order was issued because CBI was not performing work in accordance with the design documentation requirements and deviations from the design documents were not properly documented.
However, all work performed by CBI was per formed to higher standards than was required by, the design documentation (ASME Section III).
The review by licensee engineering did not identify any unacceptable conditions other than the fact that proper documentation of design changes did not take place.
The licensee has accepted CBI work as installed, with no rework required.
Based on the corrective actions taken by the licensee and CBI, the stop work order was lifted February 28, 1988.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEMS (50-220/85-21-01, 85-21-02, and 85-21-03):
Concerns with General Employee Training (GET)
relative to the need to add warning signs to keep away from protected area barriers and the need to increase the testing frequency of the perimeter alarms.
These concerns were identified when a relatively new plant employee was observed to approach the security fence and pass a. plastic credit card through the fence to a relative.
Following this event, the licensee committed to enhance GET and instruct employees to keep five feet away from the fence and not pass any objects through the fence.
The inspector verified that warning signs on the fence for people to stay away were added.
The,testing frequency of the intrusion alarm system was increased and a review of recently conducted survei llances of the intrusion alarm system did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
This item is close (Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (50-220/85-19-07):
Dose assessment printouts not easily interpreted by the Corporate Emergency Director (ED) and did not describe usable information on integrated dose and dose rates.
The licensee's procedures do not require that the ED be able to interpret the dose assess-ment printouts.
These functions belong to the Offsite Dose Assessment Manager.
However, the licensee revised the training lesson plan given to the EDs to include on overview of the dose assessment activities.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (50-220/85-19-08):
Licensee personnel did not discuss recovery plans in the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF).
This concern addressed the oversight of licensee personnel to meet and discuss recovery actions in the EOF prior to the conclusion of the drill.
To preclude a
reoccurrence, the licensee revised the training given to the recovery manager and EOF coordinators to emphasize the need to discuss recovery actions.
This problem was not observed in subsequent drills.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DEVIATION (50-220/85-01-01):
Lack of separation between diesel fire pump and electric fire pump control cables.
The NRC identified the concern that the control cables from both fire pumps were not separated, thus subject to damage by a single fire.
In response to this concern, the licensee wrapped the cables associated with the controls of the diesel driven fire pump with a 3-hour fire barrier wrap to provide the necessary fire protection.
The inspector reviewed the installation of this wrap and the associated modification packages to verify the adequacy of the wrap material and installation.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
This item is closed.
(Cl osed)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-220/84-06-01):
Procedures to include requirement for the fire brigade members to attend quarterly training.
The NRC determined that although the licensee's fire fighting personnel attend quarterly training sessions as required by NRC guidance, this requirement is not documented.
To address this concern, the licensee revised Site Administrative Procedure, APN-10P, Nuclear Fire Chief, Nuclear Fire Fighter, and Fire'rotection Staff Training Program, to include the requirement for quarterly training of the fire brigade members.
The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (50-220/83-04-02):
Licensee to include a location map of all sirens in the Emergency Plan.
The inspector verified that the current edition of the Emergency Plan contains a
map indicating the location of all sirens.
This item is close (Closed)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-220/82-09-03):
Additional fire brigade training required.
This item remained unresolved pend-ing a review of the training given to the fire brigade.
In a letter dated October 12, 1984, Subject:
Fire Brigade Training, the NRC informed the licensee that the fire brigade training was found acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-220/82-04-03):
The licensee to request an NRC review of the Fire Brigade Program to allow use of fire fighters in lieu of operators for fire brigade membership.
The licensee's fire brigade composition as orig-inally accepted by NRC consisted of a licensed Reactor Operator, two Auxiliary Operators, and two security guards.
The licensee opted to change the fire brigade composition to include, instead of operators, five systems trained fire fighters accompanied by a licensed operator to advise the fire brigade leader.
The licensee informed the NRC about this change and addressed the NRC concerns with the system training given to the fire brigade members.
The NRC reviewed the fire brigade composition and training of the fire fighters and informed the licensee via letter, dated October 12, 1984, that the composition was acceptable and the training concerns were adequately resolved.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-220/80-16-02):
Inadequate cali-bration on radiation detectors of the emergency condenser valve monitors.
This refers to the NRC concern that the radiation detectors associated with the emergency condensers were inadequately surveyed since the surveillance logs did not cross reference the detector serial number to ensure that calibration data were entered for the proper detector.
The licensee revised surveillance procedure Nl-RSP-9C, Routine Calibration of Emer-gency Condenser Vent Monitor, to include an entry for the serial number of the detector tested.
This item is closed.
2.2 Unit 2 (Open)
UNRESOLVED ITEM (50-410/87-45-06):
Licensee resolution of material control concerns.
This item was identified during the previous inspection period to track licensee progress in resol'ving control of commercial grade items procured for application in safety-related systems.
The following is a
'ummary of the material control issues at Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2:
Stop Work Order 88-001, issued on 1/19/88, is still in effect.
This order was issued by gA Operations because actions in response to Corrective Action Request (CAR)
87-3060 were not effective.
This CAR was issued on 5/1/87 to place a
HOLD on Unit 2 GE commercial grade items pur-chase by General Physics and Stone and Webster, which were
subsequently turned over to the licensee.
As of 1/18/88, gA Operations found that material which should have been on HOLD per the CAR was issued and that all the material that was subject to the CAR was not located, tagged and segregated.
Stop Work Order 88-002, issued on 1/29/88, is still in effect.
This order was issued by gA Operations to cover all commercial grade items at both sites and was later extended to all safety related components.
This order was issued based upon identification of similar dedication concerns with non-GE commercial grade parts.
CARs 86.3093, 86.3091, 87.3036, 87.3037, 87.3038 and 87.3039 were written to document problems with the pur-chasing of commercial grade parts.
These CARs deal with:
purchase orders that invoked
CFR 50, Appendix B for commercial grade items; nuclear unique items being purchased commercial grade; and critical characteristics not being properly identified on purchase orders.
The licensee has established a gA Operations check point for all material to be used in a safety related applica-tion, if it was purchased commercial grade or safety related.
This check verifies that the material purchase order was properly prepared and that any needed dedication of the components has been completed or identified for completion as a post-maintenance test.
A new Materials Engineering Group has been established to ensure that materials are being properly ordered, that critical characteristics are identified, and that any needed component dedications are proper and complete.
GE commercial grade parts have been segregated and tagged.
These parts are not issued until proper dedications are completed, on an as-needed basis.
Commercial grade parts which were purchased with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B specified on the purchase order are being dedi-cated in parallel with an effort to get the suppliers to agree that
CFR 21 was applicable if 10 CFR 50, Appendix B was specified.
The dedications are being conducted to ensure that the parts will be usable, even if the suppliers do not take the Part 21 responsibility.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's new program per revised procedure NEL-15.M, Procurement Requirements Evaluation and Dedication Planning.
The program appears to be well-structured and the Materials Engineering Group appears to be properly staffed.
The licensee is in the process of implementing a data
'i
base to track component purchasing requirements and any addi-tional related information.
Procurement Requirement Evaluation Forms (PREF) are being filled out for any safety related com-ponent bought as safety rated or commercial grade.
A PREF includes technical, quality assurance, and documentation requirements.
Also documented is the commercial grade evalu-ation and dedication plan, if the component is to be bought commercial grade.
The completed PREFs are reviewed by two technical specialists and a lead Materials Engineer.
If the component to be purchased requires environmental qualification (EQ), the PREF is reviewed by an EQ engineer.
Several PREFs were reviewed by the inspector for safety related equipment purchased as safety related and as commercial gra'de.
The PREFs were'found to be generally thorough and complete.
In some PREFs, component diagrams were included which showed the specific parts to be ordered.
In others these diagrams were not included.
This inconsistency in the PREF packages was not determined to be a significant concern.
Documentation of post-installation testing, for dedication of materials, was observed to be adequate.
The licensee's new program appears to be adequate.
Practical methods have been established to ensure commercial grade items are not installed prior to the performance of proper dedications.
However, this item remains open pending inspector review of licensee action to resolve the remaining outstanding issues discussed above.
3.
Plant
~lns ection Tours (71707, 71710, 62703)
During this reporting period, the inspectors made tours of the Unit I and 2 control rooms and accessible plant areas to monitor station activities and to make an independent assessment of equipment status, radiological conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following were observed:
3.1 Unit
The inspector conducted tours through major work areas, including under the reactor vessel and the area of the control rod hydraulic control units.
No adverse conditions were noted.
Plant housekeeping looked generally good, but at. the end of the inspection period there were still examples of protective clothing being left inside con-taminated areas rather than being properly disposed of.
This deficiency was brought to the attention of the licensee at the exit meeting.
No other discrepancies were observe.2 Unit 2 The inspector conducted tours of the control room, the emergency diesel generator, battery and switch gear. rooms, RHR pump room, service water bays and tunnels, as well as general walk-through inspections throughout the plant.
General housekeeping was adequate.
No unacceptable conditions were observed.
4.
Surveillance Review (61726, 72302, 72301, 86700)
The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance test procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly cali-brated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operations were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testings 4.1 Unit
The inspector observed main steam isolation valve leakrate testing per surveillance procedure Nl-ISP-R001-018.
4.2 Unit 2 The monthly valve operability check and system run was observed for Train B of the Standby Gas Treatment system per surveillance procedure N2-0SP-GTS-R001.
No discrepancies were noted.
5.
Maintenance Review (62703, 37700, 37701)
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or that the activity was within the "skills of the trade", that appropriate radiological controls were implemented, that ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
5.1 Unit
a.
LPRM connector work was observed under the reactor vessel.
The inspector observed no unacceptable practices. being performed and observed proper adherence to ALARA practices'
'12 b.
The inspectors observed valve work being conducted on the control rod hydraulic control units manual isolation valves (V-101 and V-102).
In order to isolate the valves from the primary,system liquid nitrogen freeze seals were formed between the control rod drive units and the isolation valves.
The inspector verified that the licensee was performing proper nondestructive testing after removal of the freeze seal jacket.
No discrepancies were noted.
5.2 Unit 2 Preparations for work on the Division I diesel generator to replace a
cabinet cable penetration was observed.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
V ii i
(77 On a
sample basis, the inspectors directly examined selected safety system trains to verify that the systems were properly aligned in the standby mode.
The following systems were examined:
6.1 Unit
a.
Emergency Batteries b.
Emergency Diesel Generators 6.2 Unit 2 a.
B Train of Residual Heat Removal b.
Emergency Batteries c.'mergency Diesel Generators d.
Service Water System No discrepancies were noted.
7.
~Ph eical ~Securit Review (71709)
r The inspector made observations to verify that selected aspects of the station physical security program were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and.approved procedures.
7.1 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Based on an internal licensee report of suspected drug use by station employees, the Security Department conducted surveillance of the after work activities of several suspected employees.
Based on these surveillance activities the vehicles of these employee's were searched while in the station parking lot.
In one of the vehicles a
small quantity of marijuana was found and turned over to the New York State Police, who issued an appearance ticket to the owner of the vehicle.
The five suspected employees were asked to submit to drug testing and all eventually complied.
Site access was denied these people until the test results were known.
Three of the five includ-ing the individual found to have drugs in his car, have not been allowed back on site and are expected to be terminated.
The two other individuals, who tested negative, have been returned to their normal duties.
The licensee also used local police drug dogs to search the in-plant IKC work areas of the suspected employees and the locker rooms to ensure that no drugs were stored on site.
No drugs were found.
The inspector had no further questions.
8.
Review of Licensee Event
~Re orts
~LERs (90712, 92700)
The LERs submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether the details were clearly reported, the cause(s)
properly identified and the corrective actions appropriate.
The inspectors also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly eval-uated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event warranted on site follow-up, whether the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 were applicable, and whether the requirements of 10CFR50.73 had been properly met.
(Note: the dates indicated are the event dates.)
8.1 Unit
The following LERs were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:
LER 88-03, March 21, 1988, Automatic initiation of Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation Oue to Personnel Error.
LER 88-04, March 23, 1988, Automatic initiation of Emergency Cooling Due to Procedural Deficiency.
LER 88-05, March 21, 1988, Liquid Poison System Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Failure.
LER 88-06, March 23, 1988, Main Steam System Isolation Valves Failed LLRT Due to Packing Leakage.
8.2 Unit 2 The following LERs were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:
LER 88-11, March 28, 1988, ESF Actuation Caused by Spurious Isolation Signal Due to Equipment Failur LER 87-24, Revision 1, Secondary Containment Isolation on a
Low Air Flow Signal Due to the Use of Too Conservative Trip Set Points for the Reactor Building Ventilation System.
LER 88-12, March 31, 1988, Special Report, Design Deficiency Results in the Actuation of Several Equipment Safety Features During Performance of Generator Load Rejection Test.
LER 88-13, March 31, 1988, Technical Specification violation due to.Personnel Error; Failure to Follow Procedure Resulted in Missed Surveillance.
No unacceptable LERs were noted.
9.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins and Information Notices (92701, 92703)
The inspector reviewed licensee records relating to the NRC Bulletins and Notices identified below to verify that: the NRC Bulletins and Notices were received and reviewed for applicability; written responses were provided, if required; and the corrective action taken was adequate.
9.1 Unit
Bulletin 79-01:
Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Class IE Equipment.
The EQ requirements imposed on the licensee by this bulletin have since been incorporated into 10 CFR 50.49, Environ-mental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants.
The licensee was inspected for compliance with these requirements, and Inspection Reports 50-220/85-13 and 50-220/86-05 document the NRC findings of the licensee's compliance in this area.
This bulletin is closed.
9.2 Unit 1 and
Bulletin 88-01: Defects in Westinghouse Series DS Circuit Breaker s.
The licensee has reviewed electrical systems at both units and has determined that the circuit breakers in question are not used at Nine Mile Point.
This bulletin is closed.
10.
Fitness for ~Dut The licensee's Fitness for Duty Program consists of an Alcohol and Drug Abuse Policy, an Alcohol and Drug Screening Program, and an Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
The licensee's policy prohibits employee's from working when under the influence of drugs or alcohol and it also prohibits employees from selling or possessing the same, on site.
The licensee has screened all prospective employees for drug use (pre-employment testing)
since August 1, 1985.
One thousand and thirty-nine (1039) job applicants were tested and forty-six were rejected upon testing positive for drugs, to date.
Similarly, the licensee screens all contractor personnel prior to site access authorization.
On November 1,
1987 the screening of
contractor personnel began.
To date, there have been six hundred and ninety-one (691) persons tested for site access and twenty-two (22) of these tested positive for drugs.
Contractor personnel are also tested annually during a scheduled physical examination.
The licensee was planning to screen for drugs annually, during employee's annual physical examinations, but this program was halted by an arbitrator who ruled that random and annual physical examination testing for drugs should not take place.
The licensee is reviewing the arbitration decision.
However, the licensee can test employees for probable cause.
If a supervisor suspects that an employee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the supervisor is responsible to see that the employee is taken to a medical facility for a determination by a doctor whether a
drug test should be administered.
If the suspected employee refuses to submit to the test, he will be disciplined accordingly.
With 'respect to
. testing facilities, the licensee is using a laboratory that uses methods and values similar to those proposed in NRC guidelines.
Recently one employee who had participated in the Employee Assistance Program for drug use was retested, per the program requirements, and the results were positive.
He was dismissed for not following the program rehabilitation requirements.
The licensee offers assistance to employees with drugs or alcohol problems.
This assistance is well publicized by various means and offers referrals to outside resources for treatment and assistance.
No violations were identified.
Review of this program will continue in future routine inspections.
11.
Assurance of ~ualit
~Summer (30702, 30703)
The missed surveillances involving the degraded fire penetration fire-watch, primary containment penetration leak rate testing, and containment air sampling are indications of inattention to detail and insufficient, supervisory oversight.
The actions taken by the Security Department with respect to alleged drug use were prompt and thorough.
The actions taken by the licensee QA organization with respect to the three stop work orders recently issued for deficiencies found during the routine surveillances represents good attention to detail and is commended.
Licensee actions to institute the new Haterials Engineering Group and their recent activities appear to have properly encompassed the scope of the material controls concerns.
12.
Exit ~Meetin s (30702, 30703)
At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this repo'rt does not contain Safeguards or
CFR 2.790 informatio P