IR 05000220/1988081
| ML17055E473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1989 |
| From: | Harris R, Kerch H, Mcbrearty B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055E472 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-88-81, NUDOCS 8901260350 | |
| Download: ML17055E473 (42) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-220/88-81 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile
Inspection At:
Scriba New York Inspection Conducted:
December 5-15 1988 Inspectors:
H. Kerch, enior Reactor Engineer B. McBrearty, Reactor E
ineer date d te arri ngi e ring Technician te Oliveri, ngineering Technician Approved by:
J Strosnider, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, Division of Reactor Safety d te z
err S9 date Ins ection Summar and Conclusions:
A special announced team inspection was conducted at the Nine Mile 1 Nuclear Power Plant on December 5 through December 15, 1988 (Report No. 50-2220/88-81)
Sco e of Ins ection:
A special announced team inspection was conducted at the Nine Mile 1 Nuclear Power Plant using the NRC Mobile Non-destructive Examination"(NDE) laboratory.
The inspection team consisted of four NRC and two contract personnel.
The inspection focused on licensee activities to correct previously identified problems in the Inservice Inspection (ISI)
Program and verification that the new program is being effectively implemented with appropriate management controls to prevent recurrence of similar problems.
Selected safety related piping and weldments in the emergency core spray and condenser systems were re-examined.
A sample of weldments and supports were
selected from the DCA's for independent measurements by the NRC.
Licensee procedures and QA/QC documentation also were reviewed.
Management control systems such as the Nonconformance Reporting and Deficiency Corrective Action (DCA) systems and staffing and organization of the ISI program were reviewed during this inspection.
Ins ection Summar and Conclusions:. (Report No. 50-220/88-81)
In summary the following were reviewed during this inspection:
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Liquid Penetrant 22 pipe weldments were inspected.
Overall workmanship of welding and surface conditions was acceptable, no violations were
.identified.
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Ultrasonic - 18 pipe weldments were inspected.
Overall welding and surface condition of welds was good.
No violations were identified.
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Visual examination of pipe hanger/supports was performed.
An unresolved
,item regarding discrepancies between the "as-built" configuration of pipe supports and design drawings was identified (see Section 3.2).
Thickness measurements of three grid areas on piping for erosion/corrosion and three grid areas on the torus for minimum overall thickness were per-formed.
No violations were identified and no discernable change in the torus wall thickness occurred since previous NRC inspections were conducted in April 1988 (see Inspection Report 50-220/88-09).
R ISI procedures were reviewed.
No violations were identified.
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One violation and five unresolved items were closed during this inspection.
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Organization and staffing of the ISI program was reviewed and found adequate.
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The licensee's corrective actions regarding the first interval ISI program were reviewed and found acceptable.
Conclusion Based on this inspection, it appears that the licensee has corrected deficiencies previously identified in the ISI program and has established a
new organization staffed with appropriately qualified individuals to effectively implement the new program.
Independent nondestructive examinations performed by the NRC verified the acceptability of inspections performed by the licensee, and new management control systems appear adequate to preclude recurrence of previous deficiencies.
There are no restart issues remaining with regard to the ISI program.
However, the licensee did commit to submit a letter to NRC by the end of January-1989 defining their schedule for long term corrective actions regard-ing the torus wall corrosion issue and stating their intent to perform torus wall thickness measurements approximately every six months until the long term corrective actions have been implemente DETAILS Persons Attendin Exit K.
W.
G.
J.
J.
T.
p.
W.
R; S.
J.
J.
R.
A.
J.
J.
G.
M.
C.
G.
J.
K.
R.
K.
R.
R.
A.
S.
L.
C.
C.
G.
J L
B.
Thomas R. Yaeger R. Perkins Weber Swenszkowski Lee George Connoly Shecton Forrester Ba'zenas Forderkonz Ballard Smith Eonuadsen Roberts Beowell Doaley Beckham Doyl e Marshall Dahlgey Standford Swert Bough Coppal Smith Wilizer O'Hearn Grant Terry Gresock Shepherd Sanford Construction Superintendent NY State Regulation and Compliance Regulation and Com'pliance Manager QA Site QA Consultant Operations Structural Design.
Maintenance NMP Engineer Engineering NMP License Nuclear Technician NES Inservice Inspection Inservice Inspection V.P. Nuclear Engineering and Li Engineering Supervisor NDE Director, Nuc.
Reg.
Compliance cense ISI Coordinator Manager Special Pro'jects Consultant Mechanical Engineer QA Auditor Assistant Manager Mechanical Design Assistant Manager QA Program Manager Site Eng i neer/IS I Inservice Inspection Inservice Inspection Inservice Inspection NESS Site Manager Construction Superintendent NRC Attendees R
M H.
R.
H. Harr i s A. Oliveri Kerch A. McBrearty Jack Strosnider R.
Temps NDE Technician, Region I r
NDE Technician, Region I Senior Reactor Engineer, Region I Reactor Engineer, Region I Chief, Materials
& Processes Section, Region I U.S.
NRC, Region I
2.0 Inde endent Measurements NRC Nondestructive Examination and ualit Records Revie'w of Safet Related S: stems During the period of December 5 through 15, 1988 an onsite inspection was conducted at the Nine Mile 1 Power Plant.
The purpose of this inspection was to determine the adequacy of the licensee's Inservice Inspection (ISI)
program.
This was accomplished by sampling and reperforming examinations required by the applicable codes and regulations and evaluating the results.
Also, several engineering and quality systems and the ISI program staffing were evaluated during this inspections 3.0 Nondestructive Examinatons NDE 3. 1 Visual Examination 57050 Thirty-one (31) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material ( 1/2 inch.on either side of the weld) were examined in accordance with NRC procedure NDE-10, Rev. 0, Appendix A, and the licensee's procedure 80A7441, Appendix A.
The purpose of the visual examination is to provide a report of the general surface condition of the component being examined.
Included in the visual examination, but not limited to, was identification of conditions such as cracks or linear indications, gouges, arc strikes with craters, erosion/corrosion or other physical damage.
Used in the aide of the visual examination were mirrors, lights, welding gauges and associated guality Control documentation and drawings, supplied by the licensee.
Included in this examination sample were ASME Class 1 and 2 stainless steel weldments, selected from the Emergency Condenser (ECS)
and the Core Spray (CSS)
Systems.
The following is a list of specific weldments examined.
ISO/DWG CLASS WELD ID COMMENTS 1151-2
39-SW-26A All welds with the Prefix 39 are in the Emergency Condenser System 1151-2 1151-3 1151-3 1151-2 1151-3 1151-3 1151-4
2 2'2 2,
2 39-SW-28A 39"SW"6B 39-SW-6C 39-FW-44A 39-FW-40 39-FW-41 39-SW-15A
ISO/DWG CLASS Visual (57050)
WELD ID COMMENTS 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151"2 1151-2 1151-2 1151-1 1151-1 1151-4 1151-4 1151"5 1154-1 1152-1
2
2
2
2
2.
2
2
1152-1
1152-1
1152-1
1152-1
1151-2
1151-2
1152-1 1152-1 Results 39-SW-17A 39-FW-39A 39-FW-39 39-FW-42A 39-FW-42 39-FW"46A 39-FW-46 39-FW-44 39-FW-43 39-FW-45 39-SW-24D 39-FW"4 05-NES-01 42-1-2 40-SW-36A 40-SW-36B 40-FW-34 40-FW-55 40-FW-3A 39-SW-35A 39-SW-35B 40-FW"31 40-FW-32 All welds with the Prefix 40 are in the core spray system.
3.2 The inspector found the general condition of those pipe weldments examined to be adequate.
No violations were identified.
Han er/Su ort Ins ections Four (4) safety related pipe hanger/supports were selected for visual examination per NRC procedure NDE-10 (Revision 0) Appendix B, in conjunction with the licensees construction drawings.
Attributes looked for were evidence of cracking, corrosion, wear, misalignment, welding, loose or broken connections, missing or bent parts and improper installation.
Included in this sample were ASME III com-ponents selected from the Core Spray (system 40) and electromatic safety valve (system 66) systems.
These hangers were selected from
"Corrective Action Request" 88.2024 and were inspected to verify that corrective actions had been completed as identified in the Discrepancy Corrective Action (DCA) system.
The following is a list of specific items examined and the examination result ISO/SYSTEM HANGER/SUPPORT ACC/REJ System
System
System
System
H56 A 5 B
H52 H54 H521 REJ ACC NA ACC It was discovered in the field that hanger H54 had been removed to provide boat samples to Battelle North West Laboratory for "analysis of spider cracking."
(The issue of "spider cracking" is under review and will be addressed in a future report).
Several discrepancies between the "as-built" configurations of hanger H56 AKB and the design drawings were noted.
These included:
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A 5/16" fillet weld was welded on the top only but should have been welded all around.
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A 5/16" fillet weld was tack welded only, it should have been welded all around.
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A 3/16" fillet weld was undersized.
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A fillet weld had significant spatter and undercut.
The licensee was informed of the existing conditions on Hanger No.
40-H56 A 4 B and subsequently verified the results.
The NRC requested four additional hangers/supports be inspected.
The NRC selected hangers 40-H16, 40-H53, 40-H17 and 81-SC-34 from "Corrective Action Request" 88-2024.
The licensee performed inspections of these hangers and found similar conditions to these identified by the NRC inspection.
The NRC inspectors requested the data packages from the Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 inspections that were performed on these hangers in order to determine if the discrepant conditions had been identified and evaluated during those activities.
However, this request was made near the end of the inspection and the licensee was unable to provide the records before the end of the inspection.
None of the discrepancies identified appeared significant enough to impact the integrity of the supports; however, they do bring into question the adequacy of configuration control as reflected in lower tier drawings.
The licensee acknowledged a potential problem in this area and indicated they were developing a plan to address this concern.
The issue is considered unresolved (50-220/88-81-01)
pending licensee and NRC review of the Bulletin 79-14 hanger inspection data and review of the licensee's plan for addressing the configuration control issu.3 Li uid Penetrant 57060
,Twenty-two (22) safety related pipe weldments and 'adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were examined using the visible dye, solvent removable method in accordance with NRC procedure NDE-9, Rev.
0 and 'the licensee's procedure, Liquid Penetrant Examination 80A219, Rev.
10/FC
.1 8 2.
Included in this sample were ASME Class 2 piping weldments selected from the Emergency Condenser System.
The following is a list of specific weldments examined.
ISO/DWG CLASS WELD ID COMMENTS 1151-2 1151-2 1151-3 1151-3 1151-2
'. 1151-3 1151-3 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-4 1151-2 1-151-2 1151-1 1151-1 1151-4 1151-4 1151-5 1154-1 Results
2
2
~
2
2
2
2
2
2 39-SW-26A 39-SW-28A 39-SW-6B 39"SW"6C 39-FW-44A 39-FW-40 39-SW"41 39-SW-15A'9
"SW-17A 39-FW-39A 39-FW-39 39-FW-42A 39-FW-42 39-FW-46A
.39-FW-46 39-FW-44 39-FW-43 39-FW-45 39-SW-24D 39-FW-'
05-NES-01 42.1-2 Partial PT Exam of Butt Weld due to Lug Attachments, Approx.
12 in. not examined Same condition at 39-FW-44A Same condition as 39-FW-44A Same condition as 39-FW-44A 3.4 No violations were identified.
Thickness Measurements Six (6) grids were examined using a Nova-0100 digital thickness gauge per NRC procedure NDE-11 and the licensees procedure 80A2433.
These areas included the torus shell and balance of plant feedwater system Balance of Plant Three areas included in the licensees balance of plant,'on-safety related',erosion/corrosion monitoring program were selected for independent measurements by the NRC inspectors.
The areas selected are in the feedwater system and are identified in data packages 2433-88A-118, grid 5C; 2433-88A-7, grid 5B; and 2433-88A-001, grid 5D.
Results No areas of erosion/corrosion encroaching on minimum specified wall thicknesses were found.
However, a problem with the licensees acquisition of data was identified.
In accordance with the requirements in Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) procedure SI No. 1, Rev.
4; paragraph 6.2 "Grid Reference Location'Markers,"
a reference mark shall be made with a low stress "x."
The purpose of this reference mark is to assure that thickness data taken from the inspec-tion grid can be correlated from one inspection to the next to establish a rate of wall thinning.
Contrary to the above require-ment, no "x" was found on grids 5B and 5D.,
During the inspection on grid SC the inspector found that the elbow had been grided correctly but.the N.E.S. technician recorded his data 90'ff from the numbers and letters. previously established by CBI.
Nine Mile Unit 1 was informed of these discrepancies and r'esponded with the following corrective actions.
1.
The locations to be re-examined next outage will be identified and a surveillance on these locations performed this outage to verify that the current grid layout on the pipe agrees with the ultrasonic exam data package.
This work will be initiated and tracked via a NMPC "Problem Report."
2.
A statement will be incorporated in the ultrasonic exam procedure to assure that the UT exam is performed and documented in accordance with the standard. orientation and nomenclature of the grid layout on the pipe.
3.
Future erosion/corrosion inspections shall have an independent reviewer verify that the grid marking and UT exam procedures for the detection-of erosion/corrosion in piping are adhered to.
This review will ensure repeatabi3 ity and preci sion of exam locations and measurements for pipe wall thinning trending purposes.
While a QA surveillance audit was performed in April - June of this year, implementation of the above
independent review program will be utilized in the future.
This same issue was the subject of a previous violation (50-220/88-09-01)
regarding erosion/corrosion trending on safety related components issued by NRC.
This violation will remain open pending verifica-tion of the corrective actions described above.
Torus Shell Three areas were inspected by the NRC on the torus shell.
These areas were selected from the Niagara Mohawk Unit No.
1 suppression chamber thickness measurement stations identified in Traveler No.
RXRM-88-001.
The three 12 inch by 12 inch areas are designated 1 of 5,
2 of 5, and 3 of 5.
Grids 2 of 5 and 3 of 5 have been relocated from previously taken data.
Grid 1 of 5 was not moved'RC thickness data is presented in Attachment 1.
Results Two comparisons were made with the data taken during this inspection.
The first comparison was with previously taken NRC data.
This data was taken during Inspection No. 88-09 which was performed between April 4 thru 8, 1988.
Grid 1 of 5 thickness readings were within
.005 of previously recorded data.
Grid 2 of 5 and 3 of 5 were not in the same location and a direct comparison could not be made.
The second comparison was with the thickness readings taken on 11-14-88 by Nuclear Energy Services (NES).
Grid 1 of 5, 2 of 5 and 3 of 5 corresponds with data packages 2433-88-A-141, 2433-88-A-140, 2433-88A-139, respectively.
NES scanned each 1" block and recorded a high and a low thickness reading for each square.
NRC readings fell between NES thickness readings in a majority of cases.
The NES data appear to be accurate and repeatable.
3.5 During the inspection, the licensee committed to submit to the NRC by the end of January 1989 a letter defining their long term corrective actions regarding the torus wall corrosion issue and stating their intent to perform torus wall thickness measurements approximately every six months until the long term corrective actions have been implemented.
Ultrasonic Examination'7080 The inspector selected eighteen (18) safety related weldments for independent ultrasonic inspection.
Those welds selected were ASME Class 1 and 2 stainless steel weldments from the Emergency Condenser and Core Spray Systems.
The ultrasonic examinations were performed using a Krautkramer USL-48 flaw de'tector in accordance with NRC procedure NOE-1, Rev.
0 and the licensee's procedure, Ultrasonic Examination for Austenitic Piping, 80A2818, Rev.
8 and associated ultrasonic test data.
The instrument calibration (linear verifica-tion) was performed using NRC procedure NDE-2, Rev.
0.
A Distance
Amplitude Correction Curve (DAC) was constructed using the licensee's calibration standards, NMP1-,10-XXl-SS and NMP1-12-XXX1-SS.
To ensure repeatabi lity of the ultrasonic examinations, instrument, settings and search unit (transducers)
were matched as near as possible to those indicated by the licenses ultrasonic test data reports.
The following is a list of specific weldments. ultrasonicaly examined.
ISO/DWG CLASS 1151-2 1151-2 1151-2 1151-2 1151-3 1151-3 1151-3
,1151-3 1151-4 1151-4 1151-1
'1151-1 1151-1 1151-1 1151-1 1151-1 1151-1 1151-1 WELD ID 39-SW-26A 39-SW-28B 39-SW-35A 39-SW-35B 39-'SW-6C 39-SW-6B 39-FW-39 39-FW-40 39-FW-41 39-FW-42 39-FW-31 40-FW-31 40-FW-32 40-FW-34 40-FW-55 40-FW-3A 40-SW-36A 40-SW-36B
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COMMENTS.
Special Nozzle 6 625 "0 D
X 7.213'I O.D.
Seven of the weldments selected from the Core Spray System also were ultrasonicaly inspected with the NRC Testpro system.
The Testpro system is a general software and hardware package that uses a personal computer as a single data collection, recording, testing, analysis and reporting system.
Results The data collected by the NRC inspector was evaluated and compared with the licensee's data and was found to be acceptable.
No violations were identified.
4.0 Or anization and Staffin of Inservice Ins ection ISI During this refueling outage, Nine Mile 1 site engineering has the prime responsibility for coordinating and conducting the ISI program including establishing inspection schedules, developing procedures and providing qualified inspection personnel.
The Nine Mile 1 ISI examinations are
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performed by Nuclear Energy Services (NES) personnel.
The inspector reviewed a sample of qualification records for licensee and licensee contractor personnel.
Based on his review, the inspector concluded that the ISI staff has appropriate qualifications.
After this refueling outage there will be a major change in the ISI organization for Nine Mile 1.
A corporate ISI coordinator has been assigned for both units 1 and 2.
He will administer the ISI program for both, units.
The responsibility for the ISI program will be divided between Site Engineering and Nuclear gA Operations.
The new organization should provide better contractor controls.
Results The inspector concluded that the present Nine Mile Unit 1 ISI organization and staffing is adequate to perform the 1988 ISI refueling outage ISI activities.
IW~
The inspector expressed a concern in that Nine Mile 1 does not have a
system in place for marking welds (such as hard stamping for unique, identification) to ensure proper identification of welds for inspection.
The licensee stated they plan to have a system in place by the next outage.
6.0 ualit Assurance Surveillance's and Audits The inspector reviewed Nine Mile 1 Surveillance documents to ascertain that ISI activities were being observed during this outage.
Results The surveillance reports indicated that various aspects of the ISI program were being observed and the surveillance findings were properly closed out.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the quality organization for Niagara Mohawk's Nine Mile Point Unit 1 facility.
Discussions were held with site and corporate quality personnel as to audit responsibilities of the different divisions within the Niagara Mohawk quality organization.
After these reviews and discussions the inspector was satisfied that Niagara Mohawk had a comprehensive, objective system that should, provide an acceptable quality assurance revie.0
" Inservi'ce Ins ection ISI Pro ram Unresolved Item 88-09-03-Closed 73051 Based on licensee findings that the 1st 10-year interval ISI program was not completed by the end of the interval as required by the ASME Code,Section XI, the licensee's actions included the following:
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Identification of everything needed to close out the 1st interval program.
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Implementation of actions necessary to close out the interval program.
Elimination of the DCA form and replacement with the nonconformance report (NRC) form.
After the 1986 refueling outage the licensee requested Nuclear Energy Services (NES), its ISI vendor, to review the 1st interval program to ascertain that all required examinations were completed.
Based on that review the licensee notified the NRC that a
number of required items were not examined during the interval.
NES was requested to perform a more thorough review of the 1st interval program and identified additional items that were not examined during the interval.
A subsequent licensee review identified more missed examinations and also identified items which should have been included in the ISI program but were not.
Two separate reviews were performed in parallel by the licensee.
A group of reviewers at the site looked at the program with respect to ascertaining that examination data were available for all items which were listed on the 1st interval program plan and that the data verified that al'l code requirements were met.
The second group, working at the licensee's Salina Meadows facility, reviewed the program to ascertain that all required items were included in the program.
Corrective Action Request (CAR) 88.2019 was prepared to document scheduled examinations that were not performed during the 1st interval, and CAR 88.2025 was prepared to document the items that should have been included in the program plan and were omitted.
The CAR's list all items that the licensee's review identified as either not in the plan or in the plan and not examined'he licensee maintains the two CAR's in its controlled document system and has included them as additions to the 1st interval ISI program.
The items which were identified by the licensee are scheduled for examination during the 1988 outage and will be completed prior to the plant start-up.
The licensee performed the following actions to ascertain the ISI 1st interval program status:
Engineering performed a walkdown of various systems, Pump and valve manufacturers were contacted to ascertain the presence of pump and valve body welds, All available examination data representing examinations performed during the interval were reviewed,
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The disposition of inspected items was reviewed to ascertain'proper resolution, and
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Relief requests were reviewed.
The program review was performed using as-built drawings and NES ISI isometric drawings, and where discrepancies were found between the various drawings a system walkdown was conducted by the licensee.
In 1984 a portion of the program plan was updated to the 1980, Winter 1981 Addenda of Section XI.
The plan prepared by NES failed to include Subsection IWF, "Requirements for Class 1, 2, 3 and NC Component Supports."
Also, omission from the program of the instrumentation system welds was based on Section XI, paragraph IWB-1220,
"Components Exempt from Examina-tion."
The licensee's program review identified the omission of component supports, and additionally, determined that the supporting calculations required by IWB-1220 to justify exemption of the instrumentation system welds were not provided.
Based on the above, the licensee added those items to the 1st interval program and scheduled the appropriate examina-tions to be performed prior to startup from the 1988 outage.
The following systems were selected for inspection to verify the licensee's actions regarding ISI program completion:
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,
Reactor Sampling 8 Instrumentation System,
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Control Rod Drive System, and
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Core Spray System.
Licensee data and documentation associated with the following'ere selected for inspection:
Reactor Sam lin 8 Instrumentation S stem Welds 36-FW-1 through
Support 36-R12-A Support 36-R12-B Snubber 36-HS-l, -3, -4, -5 and -6
Control Rod Drive S
stem
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CRD¹ 06-27.
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CRD¹ 18-07
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CRO¹ 18-35
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CRO¹ 26-31
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CROP 30-11
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CRD¹ 34-15
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CRD¹ 38-31 Core S ra S stem
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Meld 40-SW-39D-U
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Meld 40-SW-45B-U
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-Weld 81-FW-48B
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Weld 81-SW-78B
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Weld 81-SW-87A
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Pipe Support 81-SC-23 The reactor instrumentation system was inspected with regard to items that were added,to the program as a result of the licensee's review.
Those items were omitted from the original 1st interval program plan.
The two other systems were inspected with regard to items that were included in the program but Were not examined during the interval.
All of the items that were either added to the program or missed during the interval were scheduled to be examined during the 1988 outage and are to be completed prior to 'plant restart.
A total of 14 welds on the instru-mentation system were added to the program and data for each weld were inspected to ascertain that each weld was examined in accordance with Section XI requirements, that results were properly documented and disposi-tioned, and that associated NCRs were tracked in accordance with the licensee's tracking system.
Because of the relatively small number of welds on the instrumentation system, the inspector's selection included data representing 100% of the welds.
A sample of items from the CRD and Core Spray Systems were selected for inspectio ~Findin s
The inspector determined that the licensee's review of the first inspection interval ISI'program was performed by two separate groups.
They were found to have experience in inservice inspection and quality assurance as evidenced by their resumes which showed that, collectively, the group had excellent qualifications to-perform their assigned responsibilities.
One instance was noted of a weld on the instrumentation system not being identified by the review process.
Examination data associated with. weld 36-FW-14 showed an additional weld on the system.
No similar instances were noted by the inspector and it was considered an isolated case and not evidence of a poorly done review by the licensee.
When the item was brought to the licensee's attention the weld was added to the program and scheduled for examination.
Core Spray System welds 40=SW-39D-U and 40-SW-45B-U were listed in the program as longitudinal seam welds.
Because longitudinal seam welds were not discernible on the core spray system piping, the licensee decided to perform eddy current examinations to determine whether or not long seams are present.
In several cases, including those.mentioned above, no seam weld was found.'he licensee stated that when the original program plan was prepared it was not clear from certified material'est reports if a seam weld was present.
In those cases it was assumed that a
seam weld was present, a number was assigned and the weld was entered in the program plan.
Eddy current examinations performed during the 1988 outage show that some of the longitudinal seams do not exist although previous NDE records indicate that examinations were performed during the interval.
The licensee stated that when the examiners could not positively identify the location of a
seam weld they were instructed to examined the pipe completely in the area where the weld was thought to exist.
All of those reports show that,no indications were identified.
The licensee stated, and the inspector agreed, that although it was unusual, the examination of the entire pipe at the assumed weld location was a conservative way to proceed.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this item.
The inspector found that nonconformance reports associated with the inspected items were all properly documented and tracked in conformance with the licensee's established system.
Dispositions and corrective actions were appropriate for the documented problems and NCR closeouts were based on all the appropriate actions being 'completed.
The licensee's system for tracking NCRs is capable of sorting NCRs by system, status (open or closed)
and by the area, such as inservice inspection, to which it applies.
Based on the above, unresolved item 88-09-03 is close.0 'Follow-u on Previous Ins ection Items Closed Unresolved Item 87-21-06 Deficienc Corrective Action DCA's During the 1986 refuel outage, ISI deficiencies were identified on NES Data Sheets and tracked through correction on a Deficiency Corrective Action Request (DCA).
As identified on LER 88-01, the use of the DCA circumvented the required nonconformance report process.
Defects identified by the OCA's were not adequately tracked and resolved prior to reactor startup.
Niagara Mohawk Engineering and Quality Assurance has reviewed all DCA's (217) in order to identify any required re-examination or rework and to establish the necessary tracking mechanism to finally close each DCA package.
To date, approximately half of the DCA packages have been reviewed completely with the balance awaiting final closeout-of ISI examinations and rework.
Each DCA package will contain a
summary of the events surrounding the identifications and resolution of the OCA; this summary will be signed by Site Engineering indicating that all required re-examina-tions/rework has been accepted and then the document will be signed by Quality Assurance indicating an independent verifications The DCA tracking system has been eliminated and deficiencies identified by the ISI program are now tracked by nonconformance reports.
The nonconformance report tracking system provides better management control.
In particular, operations management must confirm that all nonconformance reports are properly dispositioned prior to returning the plant to operation.
This should preclude the type of problem that occurred previously.
During this inspection, a sample of twenty-three (23)
DCA packages were reviewed to ascertain compliance with applicable sections of the ASME code, regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
This review consisted of reviewing quality documentation and reperforming ASME code inspections.
The following is a list of OCA's reviewed:
TI-20 TI-99 TI-73 TI-9 TI-58 TI-111 TI-112 TI-199 TI-17 TI-31 TI-153 TI-157 Accepted Incomplete withdrawn by licensee Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted TI-157 TI-82 TI-42 TI-50 TI-143 TI-20 TI-57 TI-150 TI-123 TI-121 TI-55 Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted
Resul ts Based on the above revision to the ISI deficiencies tracking system and the reperformance of visual and liquid penetrant examinations by the NRC, unresolved item 87-21-06 is considered closed.
Closed Unresolved Item 50-220/88-09-02 Acce tabilit of Dr well Wall Thickness Measurement The minimum thickness specified on the design drawing for the drywell wall is 1.090".
Readings of
F 087" were taken by the NRC and this item was considered unresolved pending Niagara Mohawk Nuclear Engineering review of the original stress calculations.
Results Niagara Mohawk's response stated there was a 1/16" allowance for corrosion of the drywell wall.
Therefore, the minimum wall thickness assumed in the calculations was 1.0275" which is less than the wall thickness measured by the NRC.
Furthermore, the 0.003" difference between the nominal wall thickness and the NRC measured wall thickness is within the accuracy of the U.T. measurement technique and does not indicate a
corrosion problem.
Based on the above, unresolved item 50-220/88-09-02 is considered closed.
Closed Unresolved Item 84-07-01 Ultrasonic Re ort Needed Examination Status and a Procedure for Dis ositionin Dendritic Weld Pro erties A review of ultrasonic examination data for weld SW-49B did hot indicate the acceptability of the examination.
This report did, however, accept a
condition referred to as dendritic properties; although no procedure existed describing how to evaluate and disposition this type of condition.
The following were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
~
NES procedure 80A7456 thru field change 001, Ultrasonic Technique of Identifying Dendritic Weld Nuggets,
~
Niagara Mohawk ultrasonic examination evaluation for weld no.
40-SW-49B dated August 13, 1987, that accepted this weld, and
~
NES ultrasonic examination for weld no.
40-SW-49B dated February 12, 1988, that accepted this weld.
Results Based on the above reviews the inspector considers this item closed (50-220/84-07-01).
Closed Violation 50-220/87-11-01 Visual Ex erience Re uirements During July 6-10, 1987, an NRC review of the ISI contractor Procedure No.
80A9069, Revision 10 in-use at Nine Mile 1, disclosed that the procedures required only six months of total experience rather than the ANSI N45.2.6 required four years.
The following were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
Niagara Mohawk corrective action, NCR ~evision of personnel records for visual.personnel, and Procedure 80A9069, Revision 12 dated November 16, 1987.
Results Based upon the above, the inspector found the.personnel certification records and procedures meet the ANSI N45.2.6 requirements.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 50-220/86-10-01:
Placing the Hydrogen Water Chemistry Sampling Line in service prior to performing the. required hydrostatic pressure test.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's correc-tive action regarding the item and found that the welding repair on the line was completed and that the completed line was pressure tested on July ll', 1986, subsequent to completion of the work.
Appropriate procedures were revised to 'include requirements which are intended to preclude similar violations.
Based on the above, this item is closed.
9.0 The following procedures were reviewed in the regional office during this inspection period for compliance to the licensee's FSAR commitments and applicable codes, standards and specifications.
Nuclear Ener Services Inc.
NES Procedure Title Liquid Penetrant Exam.
Proc.
Magnetic Particle Exam.
Proc.
Ultrasonic Exam. Proc. for Ferritic Steel Piping and Components Ultrasonic Procedure for Austenitic Piping Ultrasonic Exam.
Proc. for the Detection of Steam Erosion
Number 80A2819 80A2621 80A4014 80A2818 80A2433 Rev.
9
UT Procedure for signing/evaluation for flaws Visual Exam.
Proc. for Nine Mile Point Unit One Ultrasonic Exam.
General Requirements
~ for NMPC Units 162 Thickness Measurements Visual Examination Certifying NDE Personnel Certifying Visual Personnel 83A0293 80A7441 80A2308 80A2434
.
ISI-030 80A9068 80A9069
3 06.
Procedure Title Number Rev.
Trend Analysis, Restart. Requirements for Core Reloading ISI Program S-ISI-INST,"025 Nl-88-6. 1
0 Chica o Brid e and Iron CBI Procedure Title Digital Thickness Measuring Preparation and Gridding for Erosion/Corrosion Disposition Number TMIX 883050 Rev.
Results All the above procedures, were found to meet the requirements with the exception of NES procedure 80A2434',
Rev. 3, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5, that requires a revision to reference the CBI procedure 883050 for gridding requirements (see Section 3.4).
10.0 Attachments Attachment No.
1 is a tabulation of specific thickness measurements of the torus.
11.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or violations.
Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 3.2, 3.4, 7.0 and.0 Mana ement Meetin s
30703
Licensee Management was informed of the scope and purposes of the inspection at the entrance interview on April 28, 1988.
The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the exit interview (See paragraph 1 for attendees).
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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