IR 05000220/1985024
| ML17055B195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | Linville J, Stair J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055B194 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-85-24, NUDOCS 8601310117 | |
| Download: ML17055B195 (20) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DCS Nos.
50220-851015 50220-851030 50220-851101 50220-851105 50220-851107 50220-851108 50220-851111 50220-851214 Report No.
50-220/85-24 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
November 1 to December 31, 1985 Inspectors:
S.
D. Hudson, Senior Resident Inspector C.
S. Marschall, Resident Inspector Reviewed by:
Approved by:
J J.
R. Sta r, Re o
Engineer inville, h ef, Reactor rojects Secti No.2C, DRP date
~ ///P ate Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on November 1 to December
1985 Re ort No. 50-220/85-24 Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br />).
Areas inspected included:
followup on previous inspection findings, operational event followup, operational safety verification, physical security, plant tours, Licensee Event Reports, Emergency Notification System Reports, surveillance testing, and periodic and special reports.
Results:
No violations were identified.
860i3iOiij 860i24 PDR ADOC)( 050002~0
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DETAILS Persons Contacted J. Aldrich, Superintendent, Operations T.
Roman, Station Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, and contractor personnel.
Summar of Plant Activities The plant was operated at approximately 100% power throughout the period, with the exception of an outage from November 1,
1985 to November 7, 1985 for maintenance.
Reactor scrams occurred on November 1 and 7.
Followu on an 0 erational Event
'On December 12, 1985, at 10:10 a.m.,
the reactor water clean up (RWCU)
system isolated due to high system pressure.
When attempting to return RWCU to service, the licensee observed an 0.4 psi increase in drywell pressure.
The licensee believed that this was caused by a packing leak on the RWCU isolation valve inside the drywell.
At 11:45 a.m.,
a normal reactor shutdown was commenced.
At 2: 45 p.m.,
whi 1 e r emoving the main turbine from service, one of the two 345 KV output breakers was damaged when an internal short caused its muffler cover to explode.
No personnel injury occurred.
An inspection inside the drywell with the reactor at pressure revealed no evidence of leakage from the RWCU isolation valve.
The increase in drywell pressure appears to have been caused by an increase in Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC) Water temperature when the RWCU was returned to service.
This system also supplies the drywell coolers.
The licensee found the temperature controller for RBCLC to be sluggish and repairs were made prior to start-up.
The inspectors witnessed a portion of reactor start up and heat up on December 12 and determined that they were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors also questioned the licensee about the reportability of the RWCU system isolation.
The licensee stated that the isolation had not been reported because it was not caused by a signal which was indicative of a break in the system.
Technical Specification Table 3.6.2.b,
"Instrumentation that initiates Primary Coolant or Containment Isolation",
list those signals that are required to be operable to protect the public
health and safety.
The licensee reports isolations of systems that are caused by these signals.
Other isolation signals are provided by design for system protection.
This was the case for the high pressure isolation of the RMCU system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's position and determined that it is acceptable.
No violations were identified.
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
VIOLATION (85-12-01):
Failure to lock open Core Spray topping pump ¹112 discharge valve.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's letter from T.E.
Lempges to S.J. Collins, dated November 19, 1985, in response to the Notice of Violation.
The response addresses operator training to ensure adherence to plant procedures.
The licensee's emphasis of this subject in requalification training and counseling by the Operations Superintendent of the operations personnel directly involved in the inci-dent appears to be an acceptable method of preventing recurrences.
Through discussions with Training Department personnel, the inspectors learned that this topic is being addressed in the current requalification cycle.
It is scheduled for completion on January 24, 1986.
5.
0 erational.Safet Verification a.
Control Room Observation Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspectors independently verified plant parameters and equipment availability of engineered safeguard features.
The following items were observed:
Proper control room manning and access control; Adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; Proper valve and breaker alignment of safety systems and emergency power sources; Reactor control panel instrumentation and recorder traces; Reactor protection system instruments to determine that the required channels are operable; Stack gas monitor recorder traces; Core thermal limits; and Shift turnove b.
Review of Lo s and 0 eratin Records The inspectors reviewed the following logs and instructions:
Control Room Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Instructions Reactor Operation Log Book The logs and instructions were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operation; Detect changes and trends in performance; Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements; Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs and instructions; and Determine that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifica-tions are met.
Ho violations were identified.
6.
Observation of Ph sical Securit The inspectors made observations to verify that selected aspects of the plant's physical security system were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
The follow-ing observations relating to physical security were made:
The security force was properly manned and appeared capable of per-forming their assigned functions.
Protected area barriers were intact - gates and doors were closed and locked if not attended Isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected are I 1y
~
.
Vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted or controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring an escort were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were implemented during periods of equipment failure.
No violations were identified.
7.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspectors made frequent tours of plant areas to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, radiolog-ical conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following areas were among those inspected:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms Cable Spreading Room Diesel Generator Rooms Reactor Building The following items were observed or verified:
Radiation Protection:
Personnel monitoring was properly conducted.
Randomly selected radiation protection instruments were calibrated and operable.
Radiation Work Permit requirements were being followed.
Area surveys were properly conducted and the Radiation Work Permits were appropriate for the as-found condition b.
Fire Protection:
Randomly selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule.
Fire doors were unobstructed and in their proper position.
Ignition sources and combustible materials were controlled in accordance with the licensee's approved procedures.
Appropriate fire watches or fire patrols were stationed when equipment was out of service c.
E ui ment Controls:
Jumper and equipment mark-ups did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements.
Administrative controls for the use of electrical jumpers and equipment mark-ups were properly implemented.
d.
Yital Instrumentation:
Selected instruments appeared functional and demonstrated par-ameters within Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
e.
Radioactive Waste S stem Controls:
Gaseous releases were monitored and recorded.
No unexpected gaseous releases occurred.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were in accordance with approved licensee programs.
No violations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Event Re orts LER's The LER's submitted to NRC, Region I were reviewed to determine'whether the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of the cause and adequacy of the corrective action.
The inspectors also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event warranted on site follow-up and whether the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been me During this inspection period, the following LER's were reviewed:
LER No.
Event Date Subject 85-19 October 15, 1985 Potential Condition not meeting Technical Specification closure time for Emergency Condenser DC MOVs Technical Specifications require that Emergency Condenser Isolation DC motor operated valves 39-07 and 39-08 close within 38 seconds.
On October 15, 1985, the licensee reported that the valves might not close in the required time under accident conditions due to under sized power cables.
The power supply cables for isolation valve 39-08 were replaced with cor-rectly sized cables during a forced outage from November 1 to 7.
After cable installation, closure time for isolation valve was verified and Emergency Cooling loop ¹12 was returned to service.
Redundant Emergency Cooling loop ¹11 was declared inoperable and isolated.
An emergency Technical Specification change permits operation with one loop of Emergency Cooling until the March 1986 refueling outage, when all four Emergency Condenser ioslation valve (39-07; 08, 09, 10) operators and the power supply cables for valve 39-07 will be replaced.
85-20 October 30, 1985 Automatic Actuation of Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System.
The actuation occurred when the output breaker for one of the reactor protection system (R.P.S.)
motor generator sets spuriously opened when a
relay erroneously sensed undervoltage on the R.P.S.
bus.
Testing by the licensee could not determine the cause of the fault.
The motor generator set was returned to service without further incident.
85-21 November 1,
1985 Reactor Scram on Loss of Instrument Air Failure of one Feedwater Flow Control Valve to lock-up "as-is" caused'a turbine trip on high reactor water level.
The turbine trip from 98% power, in turn, caused a reactor scram.
Transient analysis indicated that all six Electromatic Relief Valves should have been opened by the pressure spike which resulted from Turbine Stop Valve closure.
However, Electro-matic Relief Valve ¹113 failed to open due to a wear-related failure of the solenoid actuator.
The acturator was replaced.
Inspection of the solenoid actuators for the other five Electromatic Relief Valves revealed similar, less severe wear in the actuators for valves ¹112 and ¹121.
These actuators were also replaced and the licensee plans to replace the remaining three actuators during the March 1986 refueling outag November 7, 1985 Reactor scrams due to low level.
On November 7, 1985, at 6:38 a.m.
and 8: 16 p.m.,
two reactor scrams occurred due to low reactor water level.
The level oscillations were caused by the sluggish operation of a turbine by-pass valve while increasing reactor pressure during a start-up.
The licensee plans to inspect the by-pass valve operation during the March 1986 refueling outage.
85-23 November 8, 1985 Actuation of High Pressure Injection (HPCI)
mode of Feedwater The HPCI mode initiated due to a turbine trip signal while bypassing steam to the main condenser to allow for testing of. the Electromatic Relief Valves.
The turbine trip signal was caused by turbine exhaust hood high temperature while manually controlling the exhaust hood sprays.
No violations were identified.
9.
Review of Emer enc Notification System Re orts The inspectors reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The purpose of this review was to determine if the event was properly reported, if any generic implications exist, and if appropriate corrective action has or wi 11 be taken.
Additionally, the significance of each event was evaluated to determine if on-site followup may be necessary to ensure that the safety significance of each event has been properly determined.
During the current inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject November 1,
1985 Reactor scram on loss of instrument air.
This event wil 1 be described in LER 85-21.
November 5,
1985 November 7, 1985 Automatic initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System due to radiation monitor spike.
Reactor scram due to low reactor water level.
This event will be described in LER 85-22.
November 8, 1985 November 11, 1985 Actuation of High Pressure Coolant Injection mode of feedwater flow.
This event will be described in LER 85-23.
Automatic initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System due to radiation monitor spi k I ~
~
December 14, 1985 Loss of process computer while at 76% power necessita-ting extra surveillance of the reactor and turbine buildings, load reduction and core thermal calculations using BUCLE.
No unacceptable reports were noted.
10.
Surveillance Testin The inspectors witnessed the performance of selected surveillance to verify that:
Surveillance procedures conform to technical specification requirements and have been properly approved.
Test instrumentation is calibrated.
Limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service are met.
Surveillance schedule is met.
Test results met technical specification requirements.
Appropriate corrective action is initiated, if necessary.
Equipment is properly restored to service following the test.
The following test was included in this review:
Nl-ISP-NEU-2 "IRM Instrument Surveillance" performed on channel
&14 on November 1,
1985.
No violations were identified.
ll.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts The inspectors reviewed the following periodic and special reports to determine whether the safety significance of each event has been properly evaluated, to monitor plant operations, to determine if appropriate cor-rective action has been taken, and to ensure compliance with NRC reporting requirements.
During this inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
~
~
~Te Date Subject Special November 5, 1985 Administratively inoperable fire suppression system.
Special November 13, 1985 Inoperable containment high range gamma radiation monitor.
Special November 22, 1985 Inoperable channel of Containment Hydrogen-Oxygen Monitoring System.
Monthly December 10, 1985 Operating Experience for November 1985.
Special December 13, 1985 12.
Exit Interview Inoperable Channel of Containment Hydrogen-Oxygen Monitoring System, Supplement to November 22, 1985 Special Report.
At periodic intervals throughout the reporting period, the inspector met with senior station management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this repor-., it was determined that this report does not contain information subjec-. to
CFR 2.790 restrictions.