IR 05000220/1985016
| ML17055B113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | Linville J, Stair J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055B112 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-85-16, NUDOCS 8601220422 | |
| Download: ML17055B113 (20) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-220/85-16 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
50220-850819 50220-850823 50220-850911 50220-850916 50220-850922 50220-850923 50220-850927 50220-851003 50220-851005 50220-851010 50220-851015 Category C
t Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
September 9 to October 26, 1985 Inspectors:
S.D.
Hudson, Senior-Resident Inspector C.S. Marschall, Resident Inspector Reviewed by:
. Stair Reac Approved by:
J.
L ville, C
roject Secti Ins ection Summar
r Engineer f, Reactor o.2C, DRP ate.
ate Ins ection'n Se tember 9 to October
1985 Re ort No.
~i Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (104 hours0.0012 days <br />0.0289 hours <br />1.719577e-4 weeks <br />3.9572e-5 months <br />).
Areas inspected included: operational safety verification, physical security, plant tours, safety system verification, Licensee Event Reports, Emergency Notification System Reports, surveillance testing, and periodic and special reports.
Results:
No violations were identified.
860i220422 860i09 PDR ADOCK 05000220
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Aldrich, Superintendent, Operations T.
Roman, Station Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, and contractor personnel.
2.
Summar of Plant Activities The plant was operated at power throughout the inspection.
No forced or scheduled outages occurred.
3.
0 era'tional Safet Verification
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Control Room Observation Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspectors indepen-dently verified plant parameters and equipment availability of engi-neered safeguard features.
The following items were observed:
Proper control room manning and access control; Adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; Proper valve and breaker alignment of safety systems and emergency power sources; Reactor control panel instrumentation and recorder traces; Reactor protection system instruments to determine that the required channels are operable; Stack gas monitor recorder traces; Core thermal limits; and Shift turnover b.
Review of Lo s and 0 eratin Records The inspectors reviewed the following logs and instructions:
Control Room Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book
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Station Shift Supervisor's Instructions Reactor Operation Log Book The logs and instructions were reviewed to; Obtain information on plant problems and operation; Detect changes and trends in performance; Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regu-latory requirements; Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs and instructions; and Determine that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifi-cations are met.
No violations were identified.
4.
Observation of Ph sical Securit The inspectors made observations to verify that selected aspects of the plant's physical security system were in accordance with regulatory re-quirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
The following observations relating to physical security were made:
The security force was properly manned and appeared capable of per-forming their assigned functions.
Protected area barriers were intact - gates and doors closed and locked if not attended.
Isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected ar ea-.
Vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted or con-trolled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring an escort were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were implemented during periods of equipment failur L~
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On October 11, 1985, one of the resident inspectors noticed a licensee employee inside the protected area pass an object through the protected area fence to an individual outside the protected area.
Both i,nspectors questioned the employee and learned that he had passed a credit card to his wife.
The employee stated th'at nothing had been passed into the pro-tected area.
The inspectors then notified the security department, which reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 and began an investi-gation of the events NRC, Region I conducted a special safeguards inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-220/85-21) of the event on October 16 and 17, 1985.
It concluded that no violations of NRC requirements had occurred.
No violations were identified.
5.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspectors made frequent tours of plant areas to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, radiolog-ical conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory 'requirements.
The fol-lowing areas were among those inspected:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms Cable Spreading Room Diesel Generator Rooms Reactor Building The following items were observed or verified:
Radiation Protection:
Personnel monitoring was properly conducted.
Randomly selected radiation protection instruments were cali-brated and operable.
Radiation Work Permit requirements were being followed.
Area surveys were properly conducted and the Radiation Work Per-mits were appropriate for the as-found condition I ll
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Fire Protection:
Randomly selected fire extinguishers were accessible and in-spected on schedule.
Fire doors were unobstructed and in their proper position.
Ignition sources and combustible materials were controlled in accordance with the licensee's approved procedures.
Appropriate fire watches or fire patrols were stationed when equipment was out of service.
c.
E ui ment Controls:
Jumper and equipment mark-ups did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements.
Administrative controls for the use of electrical jumpers and equipment mark-ups were properly implemented.
d.
Vital Instrumentation:
Selected instruments appeared functional and demonstrated param-eters within Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
e.
Radioactive Waste S stem Controls:
Gaseous releases were monitored and recorded.
No unexpected gaseous releases occurred.
f.
H~k Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were in accordance with ap-proved licensee programs.
No violations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Re orts LER's The LERs submitted to NRC, Region I were reviewed to. determine whether the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of the cause and adequacy of the corrective action.
The inspectors also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event warranted on site follow-up and whether the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been met.
During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
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LER No.
Event Date'ubject 85-12 September 16, 1985 Automatic isol'ation of the Reactor Water Cleanup System.
This event is also discussed in Section 7 of this report.
85-14 August 19, 1985 Reactor scram due to personnel error.
This event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report No. 50-220/85-12.
85-15 September 11, 1985 Failure to maintain cable separation for redundant safety-related components.
This event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report No. 50-220/85-17.
85-16 September 27, 1985 Inoperable Halon System Dampers This event is discussed in detail in Section 7 of this report.
85-17 August 23, 1985 Reactor scram due to low reactor water level.
The low reactor water level occurred when the ¹11 feedwater regulating valve failed closed with the reactor at full power.
The feedwater valve closed when the range spring locking screw in the valve positioner vibrated loose, which allowed the range spring to detach.
The valve was repaired and recalibrated prior to start-up.
The locking screw was also tightened on all other feedwater regulating valves.
No violations were identified.
7.
Review of Emer enc Notification S stem Re orts The inspectors reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The purpose of this review was to determine if the event was properly re-ported, if any generic implications exist, and if appropriate corrective action has or will be taken.
Additionally, the significance of each event was evaluated to determine if on-site followup may be necessary to ensure that the safety significance of each event has been properly determined.
During the current inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject September 16, 1985 Reactor Water Clean-up System isolation due to a steam leak on the non-regenerative heat exchange 'v I
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Although 2 individuals were in the heat exchanger room during the leak from a 1 inch vent valve,. no personnel were 'contaminated.
September 23, 1985 Failure to maintain cable separation for redun-dant safety-related components.
This event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report No. 50-220/85-17.
September 22, 1985 Inoperable Halon System fire dampers.
On September 22, 1985, the licensee discovered that the Halon System fire dampers for the auxiliary control room had been rendered inoperable for 4 days when a lead was lifted to perform modifications to non-safety related dampers in the same room.
The lead was not known to supply power to the Halon System dampers.
A continuous fire watch had not been posted while the dampers were inoperable.
The corrective action proposed in Licensee Event Report 85-16 has been reviewed by the inspectors and appears to be adequate.
October 3, 1985 and October 5, 1985 Automatic initiation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System due to an electrical spike on a radiation monitor.
October 10, 1985 Diesel Fire Pump Surveillance Deficiency.
A licensee g.A. audit determined that the licensee was not able to meet the intent of Technical Specifications Surveillance Test 4.6.7.b.4.
The test requires the manual star ting of the diesel fire pump by using the manual bypass of the solenoid on the starting air system.
This require-men't bec'arne effective December 20, 1983.
When the test was first performed in May 1984, it became clear that the intent of the Technical Specification could not be met since the diesel's fuel solenoid was not energized.
The licensee has sinced modified the system by installing a manual bypass valve around the fuel solenoid which allows the diesel to be manually started.
The system was successfully tested on October 1,
1985.
The inspectors reviewed Corrective Action Report No.85.2002 issued by the licensee's guality Assurance Department to determine if appropriate action had been taken to prevent recurrence of similar events.
It stated that the licensee has revised its administrative controls to require a spe-cial Site Operations Review Committee (SORC) meeting to review any newly issued Technical Specification amendment.
This will ensure that proce-dures are promptly prepared to meet any new requirements of the Technical Specifications.
These act'fons appear to be adequate to prevent recurrence.
October 15, 1985 Potential Degradation of Containment Isolation Valve t i,
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The licensee discovered that improper cabling was installed on the D AC:
powered Emergency Condenser Steam Isolation Valves.
The licensee is still evaluating the effects that the improper cabling may have on valve opera-bility.
Possible effects include slow closing times or failure to close under dynamic system conditions.
The normally open valves are required to automatically close in the event of a break in the tube bundle of the Emergency Condenser.
An A.C. powered valve in series with each D.C.
pow-ered valve remains fully operable.
The inspectors and NRC, Region I re-viewed the licensee's
CFR 21 evaluation which concluded that a
significant safety hazard did not exist.
This condition will also be ad-dressed in Licensee Event Report 85-19.
On November 1,
1985, the plant scrammed from full power.
One D.C.
powered Emergency Condenser Isolation Valve was repaired and the other Emergency Condenser was isolated.
A technical specification amendment was issued prior to startup on November 7, 1985 which authorized operation with one Emergency Condenser out of service until the next refueling outage (March 1986).
No unacceptable reports were noted.
8.
Safet S stem 0 erabilit Verification On a sampling basis, the inspectors directly examined selected safety sys-tem trains to verify that the systems were properly aligned in the standby mode.
This examination included:
Verification that each accessible valve in the flow path is in the correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication.
Verification that power supply breakers are aligned for components that must actuate upon receipt of an initiation signal.
Visual inspection of the major components for leakage, proper lubri-cation, cooling water supply, and other general conditions that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements'erification by observation that instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was operational.
During this inspection period, the following systems were examined:
Emergency Cooling Systems
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On October 25, 1985, the inspectors noticed that hydraulic snubber 39-HS-33 was low on oil based on observation of its oil reservoir indica-tor.
The licensee declared the snubber inoperable and replaced it with a new snubber.
The low oil level was caused by a leak from a vent fitting on the oil reservoir.
A visual inspection of all other Bergen-Patterson snubbers was performed to ensure that this was not a generic proble C e
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No violations were identified.
9.
Surveillance Testin The inspectors witnessed the performance of selected surveillance to veri-fy that:
Surveillance procedures conform to technical specification require-ments and have been properly approved.
Test instrumentation is calibrated.
Limiting conditions for operations for removing equipment from ser-vice are met.
Surveillance schedule is met.
Test, results met technical specification requirements.
Appropriate corrective action is initiated, if necessary.
Equipment is properly restored to service following the test.
The following test was included in this review:
Nl-ISP-3-1,
"APRM Instrument Channel Calibration" performed on chan-nel ¹18 on October 10, 1985.
No violations were identified.
10.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts The inspectors reviewed the following periodic and special reports to de-termine whether the safety significance of each event has been properly evaluated, to monitor plant operations, to determine if appropriate cor-rective action has been taken, and to ensure compliance with NRC reporting requirements.
During this inspection period, the reports were reviewed:
~Te Date Special
- September 9,
1985 Subject Non-functional fire barrier Periodic October 4, 1985 Monthly Operating Report, September 1985 Periodic October 8, 1985 Monthly Operating Report, October, 1985 No violations were identifie C
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Exit Interview
At periodic intervals throughout the reporting period, the inspector met with senior station management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restriction I C'
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