IR 05000220/1985012
| ML17054B958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1985 |
| From: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17054B955 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.4.1, TASK-2.K.3.45, TASK-TM 50-220-85-12, GL-84-09, GL-84-9, NUDOCS 8510280348 | |
| Download: ML17054B958 (20) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DCS Nos.
50220-840220 50220-841016 50220-850610 50220-850621 50220-850522 Report No. 50-220/85-12 Docket No. 50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit
Inspection At:
Scriba New York Inspection Conducted:
Jul 1 to Se tember
1985 Inspectors:
S.D.
Hudson, Senior Resident Inspector C.S. Marschall, sident I spector Approved by:
Linville, Chief, R
or roject Section No.2 RP (v zià at Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Jul 1 to Se tember
1985 Re ort No.
50-220/85-12
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Areas inspected included:
licensee action on previous inspection findings, follow-up on operational event, operational safety verification, physical security, plant tours, safety system verification, Licensee Event Reports, TMI Action Plan Items and Emergency Notification System Reports.
Results:
One violation was identified.
This violation concerns the failure to lock open a manual valve in the core spray system when the system was restored to service after maintenance.
Although the valve was open (but not locked open) it did not render the system inoperable.
Details are provided in Paragraph No.10.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted J. Aldrich, Supervisor, Operations T.
Roman, Station Superintendent The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, and contractor personnel.
Summar of Plant Activities The plant was operated at power throughout the inspection.
Seasonably warm lake water temperature caused the plant to be operated at approximately 95% power during July and August.
Reactor scrams occurred on August 19 and 23.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Open) Violation (85-09-02):
Failure to remove mechanical jumpers from the control rod drive system.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's letter from T.E.
Lempges to S.J. Collins, dated August 20, 1985, in response to a Notice of Violation.
The response addresses a proposed administrative change to control the installation and removal of equipment including mechanical jumpers used to support long term equipment lay-up.
The inspector discussed control of mechanical jumpers during conditions other than equipment lay-up with the Station Superintendent.
He stated that each jumper would have to be processed as a system modification including the appropriate safety evaluation.
This appears to be an acceptable method of controlling mechanical jumpers.
The licensee's implementation of the administrative controls addressed in their response letter wi 11 be reviewed during a future inspection.
Followu on an 0 erational Event On August 19, 1985, at 8:03 a.m.,
the reactor tripped from 90% power due to an electrical ground on the generator field.
The event was promptly reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The generator field ground occurred when an electrician moved a brush wire (pig-tail) on the excitation motor generator set to examine it for worn insulation.
The pig-tail was then inadvertently shorted to ground.
All systems responded as designed except for ¹ll Reactor Feedwater Pump which started but sub-sequently tripped on low oil pressure due to either a broken wire on the oil pressure switch or an out of calibration pressure switch.
Both were repaired prior to start-up.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's post scram analysis and determined that it was properly completed.
It was noted that the post trip log was set to scan reactor pressure at one minute intervals.
A licensee
u,
representative stated that he intended to increase the frequency of this scan to provide more meaningful information for the post scram analysis.
The inspector reviewed the start-up checklist and witnessed the approach to criticality.
The licensee personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of
- the plant equipment and procedures.
The reactor was self substaining at 2: 13 a.m.
and the turbine was placed on line at 7:47 a.m.
on August 20, 1985.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
5.
0 erational Safet Verification a.
Control Room Observation Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspector independently verified plant parameters and equipment availability of engineered safeguard features.
The following items were observed:
Proper control room manning and access control; Adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; Proper valve and breaker alignment of safety systems and emergency power sources; Reactor control panel instrumentation and recorder traces; Reactor protection system instruments to determine that the required channels are operable; b.
Stack gas monitor recorder traces; Core thermal limits; and Shift turnover Review of Lo s and 0 eratin Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and instructions:
Control Room Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Instructions Reactor Operation Log Book The logs and instructions were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operation;
Detect changes and trends in performance; Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements; Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs and instructions; and Determine that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications are met.
No violations were identified.
6.
Observation of Ph sical Securit The inspector made observations to verify that selected aspects of the plant's physical security system were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
The following observations relating to physical security were made:
The security force was properly manned and appeared capable of performing their assigned functions.
e Protected area barriers were intact gates and doors closed and locked if not attended.
Isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area.
Vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted or controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring an escort were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were implemented during periods of equipment failure.
No violations were identified.
7.
Plant Tour s e
During the inspection period, the inspector made frequent tours of plant areas to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, radiological conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following areas were among those inspected:
A
Turbine Building Auxiliary Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms Cable Spreading Room Diesel Generator Rooms Reactor Building The following items were observed or verified:
a.
Radiation Protection:
Personnel monitoring was properly conducted.
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Randomly selected radiation protection" instruments were calibrated and operable.
Radiation Work Permit requirements were being followed.
Area surveys were properly conducted and the Radiation Work Permits were appropriate for the as-found conditions.
b.
Fire Protection:
Randomly selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule Fire doors were unobstructed and in their proper position.
Ignition sources and combustible materials were controlled in accordance with the licensee's approved procedures.
Appropriate fire watches or fire patrols were stationed when equipment was out of service.
C.
E ui ment Controls:
Jumper and equipment mark-ups did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements.
Conditions requiring the use of jumpers received prompt licensee attention.
Administrative controls for the use of electrical jumpers and equipment mark-ups were properly implemented.
d.
Vital Instrumentation:
Selected instruments appeared functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
e.
Radioactive Waste S stem Controls:
Gaseous releases were monitored and recorded.
No unexpected gaseous releases occurred.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were in accordance with approved licensee programs.
No violations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Event Re orts LER's The LER's submitted to NRC, Region I were reviewed to determine whether the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of the cause and adequacy of the corrective action.
The inspector also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event warranted on site follow-up and whether the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been met.
During this inspection period, the following LER's were reviewed:
LER No.
Event Date Subject 85-08 October 16, 1984 Failure to review jumper log within 14 days.
Technical Specifications require that temporary jumpers be approved by the General Superintendent within 14 days.
During a review in June 1985, the licensee discovered that a jumper had been issued on October 2, 1984 but not approved as required.
The jumper was cleared on October 5, 1984.
The licensee intends to implement a revised procedure to ensure that these reviews are promptly completed in the future.
Per NUREG-1022, Supplement 1, "Licensee Event Report System,"
Section 14.3, this LER should have been given a 1984 serial number since the event occurred in 1984.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment.
The inspector informed the licensee that the numbering error should not be corrected as further confusion may result.
85-11 June 10, 1985 Radiological Habitability of Technical Support Center (T.S.C.)
From subsequent discussions with the licensee, the inspector learned that the existing T:S.C.
may become uninhabitable after an accident due to high radiation level.
The inspector verified that existing procedures require
monitoring of the T.S.C.
when manned and provide for transfer of assessment functions if necessary.
85-13 June 21, 1985 Automatic Actuation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 84-19 February 20, 1984 Failure to Submit Special Fire Report On July 22, 1985, twenty-four occurrence reports involving fire protection equipment were discovered that had been written during February and April 1984.
In each case, appropriate compensatory action had been taken while the equipment is out of service.
However, the licensee failed to issue
day special reports when equipment was out of service for more than
days.
The licensee concluded that the administrative system for tracking of occurrence reports is adequate and that the cause of the missed reports was personnel error.
No violations were identified.
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Emer enc Notification S stem Re orts The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The purpose of this review was to determine if the event was properly reported if any generic implication exists, and if appropriate corrective action has or will be taken.
Additionally, significance of each event was evaluated and on-site followup may be necessary to ensure that the safety significance of each event has been properly determined.
During the current inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject July 6, 1985 Failure to take sample of service water within the allowed time limit.
August 15, 1985 Automatic initiation of Reactor Building Ventilation System due to a radiation monitor spike.
This event will also be described in LER 85-10.
August 19, 1985 Reactor scram due to generator field ground.
This event will also be described in LER 85-14.
August 17, 1985 Automatic initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System due to an electrical spike on radiation monitor.
August 23, 1985 Reactor scram due to low level in the reacto The reactor low level was caused by the failure of one feed water regulating valve when a
feedback spring came off.
This event will also be described in LER 85-17.
September 1,
1985 Automatic initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System due to an electrical spike on radiation monitor.
No unacceptable reports were noted.
10.
Safet S stem 0 erabilit Verification On a sampling basis, the inspector directly examined selected safety system trains to verify that the systems were properly aligned in the standby mode.
This examination included:
Verification that each accessible valve in the flow path is in the correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication.
Verification that power supply breakers are aligned for components that must actuate upon receipt of an initiation signal.
Visual inspection of the major components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling.water supply, and other general conditions that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.
Verification by observation that instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was operational.
During this inspection period, the following systems were examined:
Core Spray System ¹11 and
On August 29, 1985, the inspector noticed that the Core Spray topping pump
¹112 discharge val,ve (valve ¹81-30)
was open but not locked open as required by Operating Procedure Nl-OP-2, "Core Spray System" Revision 15.
The failure to lock open this valve did not cause this core spray train to be inoperable but is a violation of the written procedures required by Technical Specifications 6.8. 1. (50-220/85-12-01)
The manually operated valve does not have remote positiorl indication and is located in the main flow path for one of the four core spray trains.
All other valves in the other three trains of core spray were found in their proper position.
The licensee immediately locked the valve open.
The valve had been shut to perform maintenance on the core spray system and then opened, but not locked open on August 18, 1985 when the system was restored to the normal standby line-u A
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TMI Action Plan Re uirements The TMI Action Plan Requirments published in NUREG 0737 required specific actions based on the lessons learned from the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
The item numbers are those given in NUREG-0737.
Item II.E.4. 1 Dedicated Hydrogen Penetration This item was superseded by a change to NRC regulation
CFR 50.44 (c)(3)
issued on December 2,
1981.
This change required plants that rely upon purge/repressurization systems as the primary means of hydrogen control to provide a recombiner capability.
On May 8, 1984, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued Generic Letter 84-09't concluded that a
boiling water reactor'ith a Mark I containment does not rely upon purge/repressurization systems as the primary means of hydrogen control, if certain technical criteria are satisfied.
However, existing purge/repressurization systems must be maintained even though the plant does not rely on them as the primary means for hydrogen control.
On April 29, 1985, NRR issued a Safety Evaluation that concluded that Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 met the criteria specified in Generic Letter 84-09.
Therefore, a recombiner capability need not be provided.
This item is closed.
Item II.K.3.45 Evaluation of Depressurization with other than Automatic Depressurization System.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has reviewed the licensee's response dated December 15, 1980.
In a Safety Evaluation dated May 18, 1983, NRR concluded that alternative modes of depressurization would not contribute to plant safety and no modification to plant design or operations was required.
This item is closed.
The inspector also reviewed several previously closed TMI Action Plan Items to determine if the items had subsequently deteriorated to an inoperable state due to inadequate maintenance or a high degree of unreliability.
The licensee has been issued Technical Specifications which require that certain hardware modifications made as a result of the TMI Action Plan be maintained operable with allowable out of service times.
Additionally, the Technical Specifications specific surveillance requirements ensure that the operability of these components is periodically demonstrated.
Technical Specifications now address the safety and relief valves acoustic monitors, reactor vessel wide range level indication, drywell wide range pressure monitor, torus water level indication, containment hydrogen monitor, and containment radiation monitor.
The inspector verified that the licensee has an approved surveillance procedure to implement each of the surveillance requirements.
The licensee maintains a log of the daily availability and on-line time of the high range stack effluent monitoring systems.
The inspector reviewed the log from January to July 1985 and determined with the exception of a ten day outage in January 1985 for software repairs and testing, that the
system has been on-line approximately 95% of the time.
Even during these out of service periods, the licensee maintains that the systems could have been restored to service in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Technical Specifications currently do not address the high range stack effluent monitoring system.
The inspector also verified that appropriate training is provided to back-shift chemistry technicians to allow for its continuous use.
The licensee also intends to provide additional detailed training for the system to more technicians in October 1985.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
12.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals throughout the reporting period, the inspector met with senior station management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restriction I e
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