IR 05000410/1985043
| ML17055B137 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1986 |
| From: | Campbell R, Harris R, Kerch H, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055B136 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-85-43, NUDOCS 8601270104 | |
| Download: ML17055B137 (40) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-410/85-43 Docket No.
50-410 License No.
CPPR-112 Priority Category A
Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
'Nine Mile Point
Inspection At:
Scriba New York Inspection Conducted:
November
December
and December 9-19 1985 Inspectors:
Kerch, Lead Re ctor Inspector po date Tech 'cian date R.
M.
C bell, N
Technician te Approved by:
J.
.
>g ins, Mate 'als and ef, cesses Section da e
Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on November 25 - December 5 at Re ion I Office and December 9-19 1985 at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Re ort Number 50-410/85-43 Areas Ins ected:
A routine, announced NRC independent measurements inspection was conducted using the NRC Mobile Nondestructive Examination (NDE) labora-tory.
Selected safety related piping weldments fabricated to ASME Code,Section III, Classes 1, 2, and 3, were inspected.
Three region-based inspec-tion personnel assisted by two NRC NDE contracted personnel were utilized during this inspection.
The inspection involved 400 onsite hours and 83 offsite hours.
Results:
No violations were identified.
However, a review of previous licen-see corrective actions taken in response to NRC-identified instances of welds for which code-required radiographs had not been made were found to have not been fully effective.
Actions taken by the licensee immediately prior to and during this inspection eventually resolved the original problem.
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PDR ADOCK 05000410 6 'DR
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration NMPC
"G. Griffith, Licensing Engineer
- I. Weakley, Special Projects
~RE Matlock, Project Director R. Sallee, QA Engineer D. Hess, QC Supervisor
~J. White, Special Projects W. Hansen, Manager, Nuclear QA Operations
"C. Beckham, QA Project Manager
- G. Afflerbach, Startup Manager
"B. Morrison, Manager, Quality Engineering
"M. Ray, Manager, Special Projects
"W. Baker, Assistant Manager, Special Projects Stone 5 Webster En ineerin Com an SWEC
- R. Hyslop Jr., Site Licensing
"A. Roveth, Supervisor Engineering J.
Hughes, Construction N. Reichel, Project Management
- E. Diem, QA/NDT Engineer
"C. Terry, Project QA Manager
- R. Maxon, QA Supervisor B. Charlson, Materials Engineer
"K. McDowell, Materials Engineer
- E. Albee, QA Engineer ITT Grinnell
~E. Johnson, QA Engineer
- W. Vincent Jr.,
"M. Sipe, NDE Supervisor
- L. Pela III, QC Manager
"R. Berlien, VP, Director of Quality D. Walshe, Manager, NDE Level III USNRC R.
Gramm, Senior Resident Inspector Public Service Commission P.
Eddy, Site Representative
"Attended Exit Meeting
2.0 Inde endent Measurements NRC Nondestructive Examination and ualit Records Review of Safet Related S stems During the period of November 25 through December 5,
1985, quality records received from Nine Mile Point Power Station, Unit 2 were reviewed in the Region I office for completeness and for compliance to the licensee's FSAR commitments to applicable codes, standards, and specifi-cations.
Subsequen'tly, an onsite independent verification inspection was conducted during December 9 through 19, 1985 using the NRC Mobile Nondestructive Examination (NDE) laboratory.
This inspection was performed by NRC Region I personnel in conjunction with NRC contracted NDE personnel.
The purpose of this examination was to verify the adequacy of the licensee's welding Quality Control program.
This was accomplished by duplicating those examinations required of the licensee by regulations and codes, and evaluating the results.
In addition to those examinations, several other confirmatory examinations designed to verify conformance with material specifications were performed and compared to quality assurance records.
The NRC inspectors performed the examination on randomly selected weldments representing samples of piping systems, components, pipe sizes, shop and field weldments fabricated to ASME,Section III Code.
The items selected were previously inspected and accepted by the licensee, as indicated by vendor shop and onsite QA/QC records.
2. 1 ualit Documents Review Thirty-seven (37) safety related piping system documentation pack-ages, covering the items shown in Attachment P3, were reviewed.
The review also included other documents which provided background infor-mation and acceptance criteria necessary for the conduct of the in-spection.
The following documents were reviewed:
Document Attributes Reviewed Material Certifications (CMTRS)
(Base)
NDE Records Material chemical and physi-cal (Base) properties were compared to standards and code requirements.
Examinations were verified to
'eet codes and standard re-quirements, licensee proce-dures and other commitments.
Personnel were verified to be
properly quali fied.
Appro-priate examinations were performed.
Fabrication Records Drawings (Isometrics)
A review of travelers and fabrication records was conducted and these records were compared against other corresponding records and sign off sheets.
Drawings were reviewed for design of weldments, location and classification.
Procedures Procedures were reviewed for completeness, and to verify the implementation of the licensee's commitments to code requirements.
Welding Material Results:
No violations were identified.
2.2 Nondestructive Examination Material certifications for welding materials were re-viewed to determine if phy-sical and chemical proper-ties were as required by licensee's commitments to codes and industry standards.
Nondestructive examinations were performed using NRC procedures with addenda written specifically to comply with the licensee's PSAR com-mitment to the ASME BEPV Code.
The intent of these examinations was to duplicate, to the extent practicable, the techniques and methods of the original examinations.
The following nondestructive examinations were performed:
Radio ra hic Examinations Thirty-nine (39) safety related pipe weldments were radiographed using an Iridium 192 source.
The technique and procedure were in accordance with NRC procedure, NDE-5, Rev.
0 and addendum NMP-2-5-1, Rev.
0.
The weldments examined were ASME Class 1 and 2.
The resul-ting radiographs were evaluated per applicable code requirements and compared to the licensee's corresponding radiograph Results:
No violations were identified.
Li uid Penetrant Eleven (11) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (~" either side of weld) were examined using color contrast liquid penetrant techniques per NRC procedure NDE-9, Rev.
0 and addendum NMP-2-0-1, Rev.
0.
Samples included ASME Class 1 and 2 welds.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Visual Examination Fifty-four (54) safety related pipe weldments were visually examined per NRC procedure NDE-14, Rev.
0.
The examinations were performed using visual aids such as lights, mirrors and English welding gages.
Examinations were performed to determine the general condition of the piping weldment and the adjacent surfaces specifically checking for reinforcement, cracks, misalignment or other rejectable visual indications.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Thickness Measurements Thirty-four (34) pipe weldments and adjacent base materials were ex-'mined for wall thickness using a NOVA-0 100 digital thickness gage.
Examinations were performed per NRC procedure NDE-11, Rev.
0.
Minimum wall thickness was determined by use of ASTM standard pipe size and nominal thickness chart.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Ferrite Measurements Ten ( 10) safety related pipe weldments were checked for delta ferrite content using a Type II ferrite indicator (Severn Gauge).
This test was intended to verify that welding filler metal composition had achieved adequate as-deposited microstructure with delta ferrite content adequate to eliminate possible hot cracking.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Hardness Measurements Six (6) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material were tested using the Equo-tip hardness tester per NRC procedure NDE-12, Rev.
0.
Measurement values taken from the impact device were pro-cessed into "L" values as a digital read out; the numbers ("L" values)
were then converted to Brinell hardness values and approximate tensile strength by means of a conversion tabl ~,
i)
%i
~ I
Results:
No violations were identified.
Ma netic Particle Examination Fourteen ( 14) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base materials were examined by the magnetic particle method per NRC procedure NDE-6, Rev.
0 and addendum NMP-2-6-1.
Samples were ASME Code Class 2 welds.
Results:
No violations were identified.
3.0 Review of NDE Procedures The following NDE procedures were reviewed to verify their technical adequacy and conformance to code requirements:
ITT Grinnell 4.0 Visual Examination Visual Examination Radiographic Examination Radiographic Examination Radiographic Examination Radiographic Fxamination Liquid Penetrant Examination Liquid Penetrant Acceptance Criteria Liquid Penetrant Examination Liquid Penetrant Examination Magnetic Particle Examination Magnetic Particle Acceptance Criteria Ultrasonic Examination Radiolo ra hic Review FQC 4.1-4 FQC 4.1-4 RTA-1-1 RTA-1-1B RTP-3-1 RTP-3-C1 PTP-1-2 PTA-1-1 PTP-1-1A PTP-1-0 MTP-1-1B MTA-1-0 UTP-1-0 Rev.
Rev
~
10/8/76 4/9/84 2/3/77 1/4/84 6/5/85 6/19/85 7/19/83 8/12/76 3/14/84 8/17/76 9/2/76 A sampling of the licensee's radiographs were reviewed.
The inspector reviewed radiographs for twenty-eight (28)
shop welds and thirty-five (35)
field welds to verify compliance with ASME III Code requirements, accuracy of radiographic film interpretation and the adequacy of the licensee'
radiographic program.
Thirty-six (36) of the welds were re-radiographed by the NRC during this inspection and the NRC film was compared to site film to independently verify that the correct radiographic file film was on hand (see Attachment ¹2, line items with an asterisk).
Results:
No violations were identified.
5.0 Follow-u on Previous Ins ection Items Construction Deficienc Re orts and IE Bulletins (Closed)
CDR 50-410/84-00-39:
Duplicate radiographs.
Previous review of weld radiographs at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 by NRC revealed identical radiographs in the files for welds CS25-7FW015 and CS25-7FW017, however, both welds were signed off as acceptable to the ASME Section III Cod !
E t
This indicated that only one of the welds had been radiographed.
As a
result of the above condition, the licensee conducted an investigation and uncovered another case; line RHR-66-8 revealed that weld FW6 had been radiographed two times and FW7 had not been radiographed.
Both welds had been signed off as acceptable for radiography.
The licensee developed a radiographic sampling plan to provide assurance that the original weld radiographs on file reflect the actual welds radio-graphed.
A computer randomly selected 60 welds from the sample lot size of 691 welds, from over 137 isometric drawings for re-radiography.
A comparison of the the original radiographs and the re-radiographs was made in order to establish correlation of radiographed welds.
Positive corre-lation of fifty-nine (59) file original radiographs to the re-radiographs was verified by the NRC Inspector.
The sample radiography did, however, identify that one weld had been misidentified.
Consequently, the sample was expanded to a total of seventy-seven (77) weld radiographs with no further problems found.
The licensee was satisfied that there were no additional cases of misidentification or duplication of radiographs.
The NRC scheduled the Mobile NDE Van for its third independent inspection for December 9-19, 1985.
A selection of welds was made; eight welds of this selection were from the one radiographer who had been previously identified as the only one involved with the duplicate radiograph problem described above.
The licensee, in the process of compi ling documentation for the NDE Van Inspection, radiographed one of the welds selected by the NRC for re-inspection.
The licensee was unable to match this radiograph to the original site file film for the selected weld.
The licensee deter-mined that ISO 57-6 weld FW005 was erroneously radiographed and identified as ISO 57-6 weld FW006.
Weld FW006 had not been radiographed.
The licensee concluded that the duplicate radiographs were performed by an isolated single individual employed by ITT Grinnell on site.
A 100% review of ITT Grinnell radiographic inspection reports revealed, one hundred, seventy-one (171) welds were radiographed by this one radio-graphic technician.
Eighty-six (86) of these welds were either removed and/or re-radiographed by others.
One weld was determined to be uniquely identifiable, visually, not requiring re-radiography.
Eighty-four (84)
welds were re-radiographed and the film verified to agree with those original site radiographs in the files.
In summary, the licensee con-cluded that all welds radiographed by this one individual have been either verified correct, removed or re-radiographed.
The inspector concluded that the problem involving radiographic duplica-tion resulted from the fact that the welds at the facility had not been hard stamped for unique identification.
Additionally, a quality control verification of weld identification prior to radiography had not been performed.
Further, the inspector concluded that the licensee's correc-tive actions taken in response to the original instance of duplicate radiographs were subsequently shown not to have been fully effectiv J g t
ly I, )I Jl I
The inspector noted that for site welds included in the ISI program, the licensee had a hard-stamped metal band secured around the pipe adjacent to the weld for identification; with guality control personnel verifying weld identification prior to radiography.
This aspect of the welding NDE program had been implemented since January 3,
1984.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken for this problem.
Based on this review, and the results of the two NRC NDE Yan Inspections which had been performed, the inspector concluded that adequate corrective actions had been taken.
Consequently, this item is closed.
(Closed)
CDR 50-410/82-00-16:
Enhanced radiographs.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's data concerning the reported instances of enhanced radiographs.
The licensee had performed a
100% review of all ITT Grinnell radiographs performed between March 30, 1981 and August 15, 1981.
This review disclosed that fourteen (14) welds involving 35 film areas had been artificially enhanced by ITT Grinnell (Kernersvi lie) personnel at Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 Station.
In addition, a sample of fifty (50) ITT Grinnell radiographs (outside the dates shown) were reviewed by the licensee and no artificial enhancement was found.
Based on the results of this latter (50) weld sample, instances of enhanced radiographs by ITT Grinnell were isolated to the originally specified time period and to a
certain individual employed by ITT Grinnell.
The licensee re-radiographed all ITT Grinnell radiographs that were found to be enhanced.
Based on the review of the licensee'
data, the results of two NRC NDE Yan Inspections at the site, a review of licensee actions regarding IE Bulletin 82-01, and on a review of a sample of seven (7) weld data pack-ages involved, the inspector had no further concerns and considered this item closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved item 50-410/84-08-03:
PSI reference datum starting points'.
Inspection Report 84-08 revealed a concern by the NRC as to how radiographic reference starting points and ISI ultrasonic datum points would be identified.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's Procedure 83A1757 (dated December 4,
1985) for weld datum points and identification markings.
This procedure outlines the method of how datum reference points would be referenced.
The inspector determined that this procedure acceptably addressed the concerns, and had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
IE Bulletin 82-01:
Alterations of Radiographic Film by ITT Grinnell at Kernersville, North Carolina.
This bulletin concerns altera-tions found on piping weld radiographs performed by ITT Grinnell on welds with wall thickness less than > of an inch.
Licensee initially completed a
100% review of those ITT Grinnell radiographs performed by Kernersville personnel on those spool pieces which had been received at the job site.
Forty-two welds involving seventy (70) radiographic film areas showed evidence of enhancement.
Thirty-nine (39) of these welds were re-radio-graphed and found to be acceptable.
The remaining three (3) welds were
I'K
determined to be inaccessible and were identified on SWEC NED No.
4674 and.
subsequently dispositioned.
As described in the NED, welds CHS ISO 25-3 Reg ¹ NM 25-17X and CHS ISO 25-3, Reg ¹ NM 25-12X were dispositioned as
"accept as is".
The spool piece containing weld RHS 130 66-11, Reg
¹NM 66-39X was sent back to Kerner svi lie, North Carolina for rework.
In addition to the above, the licensee performed a
100% review of radio-graphs of welds for those spool pieces which were still located at the Kernersville facility.
Two additional welds with enhanced radiographs were thus identified (total of 44).
Subsequently CDR 82-00-16 was issued by the licensee, reporting an additional fourteen (14) welds involving thirty-five (35) film areas that showed evidence of enhancement.
Thus a
total of fifty-eight (58) welds had been identified to have shown evidence of enhanced radiographs.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's data which. indicated an adequate disposition for all fifty-eight (58) welds.
Based on this review, with the results of two NRC NDE Van Inspections, and upon a review of welds CHS-ISO-25-3 NM 25-17, CHS-ISO-25-3 NM 25-12X and RHS 130 66-11, NM 66-39X, the inspector had no further concerns.
IE Bulletin 82-01 is considered closed.
(Closed)
CDR 50-410/83-00-02:
Alterations of radiographic penetrameters.
The licensee reported, on January 10, 1983, a problem associated with an enhanced ITT Grinnell weld radiograph on T-quencher No.
255 W Diff 127.
One weld was enhanced on an ASME Code Class 3 pipe with a wall thickness of ~" inch, (which is greater than specified in IE Bulletin 82-01, Revision 1,
Supplement 1).
As a result of this finding, the licensee expanded its review and subsequently identified a total of fifty-three (53) welds as having been enhanced.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's data on enhanced radiographs.
The inspector noted that 37 out of 53 welds were re-radiographed, and found to be acceptable.
Ten of the remaining sixteen (16) welds were eliminated due to design changes.
The remaining six welds were cut out, rewelded, radiographed and found accept-able.
The inspector randomly selected radiographs of the following welds for his review:
FWR NM 47-74X FWS NM 47-59 SW PNM21-379 S'W IIB II ISO 47-10 SW "AII ISO 47-08 SW "20II ISO 21-48 No problems were identified.
The inspector had no further concerns and considered this CDR closed.
(Closed)
CDR 50-410/84-00-50:
Violation of minimum wall requirements on Parker-Hannifin tubing.
Unacceptable linear indications were identified on fittings for instrument tubing supplied by Parker-Hannifin Company during penetrant testing performed by Johnson Controls Incorporated.
The indica-tions were removed by grinding and buffing.
However, Johnson Controls did not have a program in effect to assure minimum wall requirements were being met after grindin The NRC Inspector visually inspected eighty-five (85) instrument fittings for surface grinding and performed wall thickness examinations using a
NOVA D100 digital thickness gage.
NRC inspector performed thickness tests in conjunction with Johnson Controls Incorporated (JCI) Procedure JCI gAS 1101 Revision 10 and site EEDCR-¹C03343 acceptance criteria.
The following fittings were visually inspected with thickness readings taken:
LOWEST QTY HEAT ¹ TYPE SIZE (in) MRR NON TUBE Wall(in)
FITTING READING
9 278F
EL
. 500 83-19231
. 065
-.154 764F T
. 500 83-19231
. 065
.162 Per specification C081 A,Section II, the minimum wall thickness for tube fittings for safety class 2 and 3 is
. 110 for tubing having an outside diameter of.500 and a nominal wall thickness of.065.
No problems were identified.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's doc-umentation and Revision 10 to JCI gAS 1101, procedure, along with correc-tive actions completed.
Based on this review, and the results of the independent measurements completed on the eighty-five (85) tube fittings shown above, the inspector had no further concerns,and considered this item closed.
6.0 Attachments Attachment No.
1 is a tabulation of the specific items and results achieved.
Attachment No.
2 is a list of the specific radiographs reviewed.
Attachment No.
3 is a list of the specific document packages reviewed.
7.0 Exit Interview An exit interview was held on December 19, 1985 with members of the licensee's staff.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.
No written material was provided to the licensee during the course of this inspection.
r
Al,
DATE: 12-9 thru 12-20 INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 50-410 85-43 Page 1 of 5 WELD NUIRBER CLASS ALLOY iFERRITE SITE:
Nine Ni le g2 THICK N.T ~ I R AT.
USTA P.T.I HARDNESS VISUAL RENARKSI LINE ISO GPS 24-02 FW 003 CSL 26-02 FW 003 IIIIIIIIII ANAL I
I N/A N/A N/A ACC I
N/A IACC I N/A N/A N/A IN/A N/A I
ACC I N/A IACC N/A N/A ACC ACC CSL 26-04 FW 005 N/A N/A ACC i N/A ACC N/A IN/A N/A ACC IGS 57-03 FW 005 RHS 66-11 FW 010 IIIIIIIIIIII N/A N/A N/A I
ACC I N/A ACC N/A I
ACC I
ACC ACC N/A i
ACC N/A N/A I N/A I
N/A ACC ACC RHS 66-26 IFW 005 I
ICSH 25-03 IIIIIIII N/A N/A I
ACC I
ACC IACC N/A N/A I
N/A ACC SW 007 GSL 26-02 N/A N/A I N/A I N/A iACC H/A I N/A N/A ACC SW 010 N/A N/A I
ACC i N/A ACC N/A I N/A I
H/A ACC CSL 26-03 FW 009 GSL 26-04 SW 005 CSL 26-06 FW 003 Rl GTS 50-15 FW 010 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A IACC ACC i N/A iACC ACC I N/A I
ACC ACC I N/A I
ACC I
I N/A I N/A I
N/A N/A I N/A I
N/A H/A I N/A N/A N/A i N/A i
N/A I
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INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 50-410 85-43 Page 2 of 5 I
WELD NUMBER II CLASS LINE ISO SITE:
Nine Mile //2 I ALLOY IFERRITEI THICK I M.T.
I R.T.
ANAL.
U. T.
I P. T.
I HARDNESS I VISUAL REMARKS GTS 50-07 SW 018 HCS 49-01 FW 024R1 IIII
IIIlIIII
II N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC N/A N/A ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A N/A ACC ACC HCS 49-02 IIII
IFW 006 II ICS 57-03 IIII
ISW 002 II ICS 57-03 SW 003 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC ICS 57-05 SW 024 ICS 57-08 FW 019 RHS 66-12 II
FW 001 Rl
FW 008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC N/A ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A.
ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC RHS 66-24 FW 030 RHS 66-24 SW 004
II N/A N/A N/A N/A I
ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC Attachment gl
HI I
Page 3 of 5 INDEPENDENT HEASUREHENT PROGRAH SITE:
Nine Nile g2 50"410 85-43 II WELD HUHBER II CLASS LINE ISO RHS 66-36 IIII
FW 017 Rl I I H/A N/A ACC ALLOY IFERRITE THICK ANAL N/A ACC N/A IN/A I
R.T.
IU.T.
P. T.
N/A ACC HARDNESS VISUAL REMARKS RHS 66-36 IIII
ISW 001 II RHS 66-41 IIII
IFW 003 II RHS 66-41 IFW 004 N/A N/A H/A H/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A ACC IN/A IN/A I ACC IN/A IH/A ACC IN/A IH/A I
N/A N/A H/A ACC ACC ACC RHS 66-58 I FW 011 SLS 67-01 I FW 015 II
IIIIIIII
H/A N/A N/A N/A ACC H/A H/A N/A ACC IN/A IH/A N/A IN/A IACC N/A N/A ACC ACC SVV 73-15 II
ISW 002 II SLS 67-01 IIII
FW 013 II CSH 25-04 IIII
SW 002 II CSH 25-04 IIII
IFW 003 Rl N/A H/A N/A N/A N/A H/A ACC ACC ACC H/A N/A H/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC I N/A I N/Ai I N/A ACC IN/A IN/A I
N/A ACC IN/A IH/A I
ACC N/A IN/A IN/A I
ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC CSH 25-04 FW 029 Attachment gl H/A ACC H/A N/A N/A IH/A I
N/A ACC ACC
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Page 4 of 5 INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENT PROGRAM SITE:
Nine Mile g2 50-410 85-43 I
ISO CLASS I ALLOY ANAL FERRITE THICK M.T.
R. T.
I I
IU.T.IP.T.
HARDNESS VISUAL I
I REMARKS I
GSH 25-04 IFW 030 N/A ACC H/A N/A I
I N/A IN/A IH/A I
ACC ACC GSH 25-04 FW 011 N/A ACC N/A N/A H/A N/A H/A ACC ACC CSH 25-04 FW 016 ICS 57-03 FW 002 HCS 49-1 FW 025 CSH 25"04 FW 405 GHS 25-04 FW 004 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A N/A H/A N/A N/A H/A ACC H/A N/A N/A ACC H/A ACC ACC N/A IN/A N/A H/A IN/A IH/A H/A IN/A IN/A N/A IH/A N/A ACC IH/A IACC ACC N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC FW 005 N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A IH/A IH/A I N/A ACC SW 007 N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A IN/A IN/A N/A ACC SW 008 RHS 66-47 FW 009 CSH 25"04 S
Attachment g1 N/A N/A
.N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC N/A ACC N/A N/A N/A IN/A H/A ACC IN/A IN/A I
ACC IN/A IN/A I
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I
Page 5 of 5 INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENT PROGRAM SITE:
Hine MI le g2 50-410 85-43 WELD NUMBER LINE ISO I
CLASS I ALLOY I FERR I TE ANAL.
THICK M. T.
I I R.T.
I U. T.
P. T. I HARDNESS I VISUAL REMARKS I
HCS 49-02 SW 005 HCS 49"02 ISW 015 II
N/A N/A ACC ACC N/A H/A N/A N/A N/A N/A IN/A ACC N/A N/A IACC N/A ACC ACC HCS 49-02 II
ISW 018 II N/A ACC N/A N/A N/A IN/A ACC N/A ACC RNS 66-48 IIII
ISW 081 II RHS 66-47 IIII
ISW 026 IIII RNS 66-18 I III
I FW 007 R1 I I N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ACC ACC ACC N/A N/A N/A ACC IN/A IN/A N/A ACC
)N/A IN/A I
I N/A ACC IN/A IN/A I N/A ACC ACC ACC Attachment A/1
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P -
POROS I TY T - TUNGSTEN Page 1 of 3 LF - LACK FUSION IP -
INADEQUATE PENETRATION LI - LINEAR INDICATION Ul -
UNFUSED INSERT ARTIFACTS SURFACE CC - CONCAVITY CV - CONVEXITY SYSTEM LINE ICS 57-3 ICS 57"3 ICS 57-3 ICS 57-5 RHS 66-24 RHS 66-24 ICS 57-8 RHS 66-36 RHS 66-36 RHS 66-11 RHS 66-12 RHS 66-12 RHS 66-58 RHS 66"41 RHS 66-41 RHS 66-47 RHS 66-26 HCS 49-1 HCS 49-2 CPS 24-2 RHS 66-48 SVV 73-15 GTS 50-7 CSL 26-4 CSL 26-4 WELD IO ACC FW 005 SW 002 SW 003 x
SW 024 FW 030 SW 004 FW 019Rl x
FW 017R1 x
FW 014 FW 011 FW 003 FW 004 SW 026 FW 005 FW 024R1 x
FW 001 FW 003 SW 081 SW 002 SW 018 FW 005 SW 005 RE C SL T LF IP LI Ul S
CC CV COMMENTS
+Indicates film were verified to site file film 84.39 Attachment g2
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POROSITY T - TUNGSTEN Page 2 of 3 LF -
LACK FUSION IP -
INADEQUATE PENETRATION LI - LINEAR INDICATION UI -
UNFUSED INSERT RTIFACTS SURFACE CC - CONCAVITY CV - CONVEXITY SYSTEM LINE CSL 26-6 CSL 26"3 CSL 26-2 CSL 26-2 SLS 67-01 RHS 66-18 RHS 66-47 HCS 49-1 GTS 50-5 47-10 47-8 21-53 21-348 DFR 31-4F DFR 31-2F OFR 31-5F DFR 31-5F OFR 31 "2F FWS 47-6 RHS 66-6 MPL E22 C001 MPL E22 C001 RHS 66-30 47-13 WELD ID ACC FW 003R1 X
FW 009 SW 010 FW 003 FW 013 FW 007R1 X
SW A
YO/YI SW 017 X
SW 010 X
SW 011 X
SW 020 X
SW 007 X
FW 016 X
FR
S CC CV COMME TS 82-00
82-00
82-00
82-00
82-00
82-00
82-00
GE Pump GE Pump IE Bulletin I8201 82 0016 IE Bulletin 8201 82 0016 I
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POROSITY T - TUNGSTEN Page 3 of 3 LF - LACK FUSION IP -
INADEQUATE PENETRATION LI - LINEAR INDICATION UI - UNFUSED INSERT ARTIFACTS SURFACE CC CONCAVITY CV " CONVEXITY SYSTEM LINE RHS 66-25 IIE Bulletin 18201 82 0016 FW 004R2 X
T LF I P LI U I A
S CC CV COMMENTS 25-4 25-13 47-1 28-1F RHS 66-52 47-06 57-6 66-11 25-3 25-3 CSH 25-03 HCS 49-2 GTS 50-5 FW 004R6 X
FW 002R1 X
FW 007 FW 009 FW 001 FW 009 FW 006
12
SW 007 FW 006 FW 010 N/0 IG 6894 dated 4/16/85 was issued after the fact to inform site engineering 6 repairs were made NC 4272 NC 4272 NC 4272 Indicates film were verified to site file film 84-39
++ Comparsion from film from corrective action AA 007 to verify fi le fi Im ATTACHMENT g2
Page 1 of 2 REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION PACKAGES LINE ISO CPS 24-02 GSH 25-04 CSL 26-02 CSL 26-04 IGS 57-03 ICS 57-06 RHS 66-11 RHS 66-26 CSH 25-03 CSL 26-02 CSL 26-03 CSL 26"04 CSL 26-06 GTS 50-15 GTS 50-07 HCS 49-01 HCS 49-02 HCS 49-02 ICS 57-03 ICS 57-03 ICS 57-05 IGS 57"08 RHS 66-12 RHS 66-12 RHS 66-18 WELD NO FW 003 FW 008 R1 FW 003 FW 005 FW 005 FW 006 FW 010 FW 005 SW 007 SW 010 FW 009 SW 005 FW 003 R1 FW 010 SW 018 FW 024 R1 FW 001 FW 006 SW 002 SW 003 SW 024 FW 019 FW 001 R1 FW 014 FW 008 REVIE ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT COMME TS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ATTACHHENT g3
Page 2 of 2 REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION PACKAGES LINE ISO RHS 66-24 RHS 66-24 RHS 66-25 RHS 66-27 RHS 66-36 RHS 66-36 RHS 66-41 RHS 66"41 RHS 66-41 RHS 66-58 SLS 67-01 SVV 73-15 WELD NO FW 030 SW 004 FW 007 FW 008 FW 017 R1 SW 001 FW 003 FW 004 FW 020 FW 011 FW 015 SW 002 REVIEW ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT COMMENTS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ATTACHMENT IlI3
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