IR 05000186/1987001

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Insp Rept 50-186/87-01 on 870630-0702.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection & Radwaste Mgt Programs,Including Qualifications,Audits, Training,Radiation Protection Procedures & RWP Program
ML20236B087
Person / Time
Site: University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date: 07/21/1987
From: Greger L, Slawinski W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236B031 List:
References
50-186-87-01, 50-186-87-1, NUDOCS 8707280332
Download: ML20236B087 (12)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-186/87001(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Licensee: University of Missouri Research Park Columbia, M0 65201 Facility Name: Research Reactor Facility Inspection At: Research Reactor Facility, Columbia Missouri Inspection Conducted: June 30 through July 2, 1987

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Inspector: W. J. S awinski J 2./-6 7 Date Approved By: . R. Greger, Chief 7-2/-87 Facilities Radiation Protection Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 30 through July 2, 1987 (Report No. 50-186/87001(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of radiation protection and radwaste management programs including: qualifications; audits; training; radiation protection procedures; RWP program; exposure controls; instruments and equipment; coolant chemistry; receipt and transfer of radioactive materials; and posting, labeling, and area control Results: No violations or deviations were identifie i

i 8707280332 870722 PDR ADOCK 05000186 G PDR .

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DETAILS 1. Persons Cohtacted'

  • Brugger,. Director, Research Reactor Facility

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Carter, Reactor. Services Technician R. Dobey,' Health Physics Technician

'J. Ernst, Health Physics Technician

  • S. Langhorst, Manager, Reactor Health Physics

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  • W.- Meyer, Reactor Operations Engineer
  • L. Pitchford, Associate Director, Office of Research Safety
  • J. Tolan, Director, Office of Research Safety

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The. inspector also contacted other licensee employees, including licensed operators, reactor. services personnel, and facility researcher * Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 2, 198 . Genera The inspection, which began with visual observation of facilities, equipment,' posting, labeling, and access controls at approximately 1:00 p.m. on June 30,-1987, was conducted to examine the routine, operational radiation protection and radwaste management program Areas visite'd during tours of the facility included all levels of the. containment.b'ilding, u the basement hot cell, solid radwaste compaction and storage areas, shipping and receiving area, an various rese&rch laboratories located throughout the research reactor facilit . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (50-186/86003-01): Extremity exposure exceeding !

10 CFR 20.101(a) limits. Review of personnel monitoring records did not. reveal any exposures approaching applicable 10 CFR 20 limit Except as noted in Section 9(a), no further problems were note ,

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(Closed) Violation (50-186/86003-02): Failure to adequately evaluate )

1 the potential exposures associated with the handling of curie quantities I of thulium pellets and properly evaluate extremity dosimetry placemen l The corrective actions described in the licensee's February 13, 1987 !

response letter were satisfactory 1y implemented prior to further handling )

of thulium pellet Corrective measures included a study to determine 1 appropriate survey instrumentation, tool and handling equipment i improvements, development of specific procedures, use of multiple extremity monitoring, and additional training. No further problems were note l

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(Closed) Violation'(50-186/86003-03): Adequate survey records were not maintained for certain thulium pellet operation The inspector verified that adequate survey records have subsequently been maintained for routine and special operations including a March 1987 thulium operatio (Closed) Violation (50-186/86003-04): 10 CFR 20.405 reporting i requirements were not met in an August 20, 1986 extremity exposure '

event. No additional events have occurred which warrant NRC notification pursuant to 10 CFR 20.405. Adequate administrative actions have been developed to prevent recurrenc (Closed) Violation (50-186/86003-05): The description on the shipping papers for a shipment of radioactive material did not comply with all applicable requirements of 49 CFR 172.20 Procedure 50P-HP-16 was amended to require written verification of activity for all radioactive materal shipment Inspector review of shipping papers for 1987 shipments did not reveal any further problem (Closed) Open Item (50-186/86003-01): Expand and improve documentation of training for reactor services personnel and health physics technician Topical training for reactor services and health physics technicians has been expande Improvements in training documentation were note (0 pen) Open Item (50-186/86003-02): Develop procedures for handling shipments of radioactive material to coincide with transportation QA-program requirements. Approximately 30% of the necessary procedures have been developed. This item remains open pending completion, approval, and review of implementation of the procedure (Closed) Open Item (50-186/86003-03): Initiate a routine maintenance and quality control program for respiratory protection equipment. Although the licensee does not take credit for respiratory equipment usage as defined in 10 CFR 20.103(c), the licensee began a program to visually inspect ru pirators on a routine basis and clean / bag used equipment in accordance with manufacturer's recommendation '

4. Organization The Health Physics staff for the research reactor facility consists of a newly appointed Health Physics Manager, three full-time Health Physics Technicians, and various part-time student technician helpers. Currently, one of the two student technician positions is filled by an individual working towards a Masters Degree in engineering, the remaining position is ope The previous Health Physics Manager retired in April 1987 and plans to provide occasional consulting services for the license The current Health Physics Manager has a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering, is Certified in Health Physics by the American Board of Health Physics, and has approximately seven years experience as a Research Scientist and Nuclear Engineering Program faculty member at the Universit _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Independent oversight of the reactor health physics / radiation protection program continues to be provided by the Univer.sity's Office of Research

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Safety. Mr. J Tolan is the Radiation Safety Officer for all NRC

. licensed' activities conducted under the university programs. Audits l l are discussed.in Section No violations or deviations were identifie S'. Audits l The licensee's Reactor Advisory Committee is the overall. governing body for the Research Reactor Facility and is comprised of. Isotope Use, Reactor Safety, and Reactor Procedure Review Subcommittee The parent committee is ultimately responsible for review and approval of changes to technical specifications, the license or equipment, safety significan procedures,10 CFR 50-59 safety issues, and experiments significantly different from previous ones. The Isotope Use Subcommittee's responsibility includes' facility radiation protection and the research and experimentation program This subcommittee is composed of members with expertise in health physics, reactor operations, and various scientific research disciplines; the subcommittee plans to increase it's membership and include another research' scientist and an Operations Engineer. The inspector reviewed the minutes of the Reactor Advisory Committee meetings conducted since December 1986. No problems were noted in the radiation safety issues discusse The Committee met at least quarterly, as-required by technical specificatio The University's Office of Research Safety typically performs an audit of the reactor health physics program on an annual basis. The last such

' audit was performed in April 1986 as described in Inspection Report No. 50-186/86003. The next audit -is tentatively planned for late 198 An internal audit 'of the' research reactor facility's transportation quality assurance program was last conducted by the former Reactor Health Physics Manager in June 1987. No significant findings were identified; the licensee's internal quality assurance program objectives are satisfied'and compliance with applicable portions of.10 CFR Part 71 was achieved. The audit report stressed the importance of maintaining proper ,

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emphasis on training of reactor services personnel primarily because of department turnove Training and staff stability of reactor services personnel will continue to be reviewed during future NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identifie . Training Orientation instruction and preinstruction remains essentially as described in Inspection Report No. 50-186/8600 The inspector selectively reviewed records of orientation instruction / preinstruction provided in 1987 to date; no problems were noted, j

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-Th'e licensee'has expanded the topical training program provided to various work groups within the facility. Five distinct training' sessions have been'provided.in 1987 through June by members of the Health' Physics Departmen The training is. tailored to suit specific work group needs and educational leve Formal training for' Health Physics Technicians is limited but recently included a week-long Beta Skin Dose Determination cours However, the licensee's Health.PSysics Technicians continue to attend'various-

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. university courses to enhance their health physics and engineering education. One Health Physics Technician tentatively is scheduled to attended an upcoming Radiological Emergency Response course in Las Vegas, Nevad The training provided to reactor services personnel was cursorily reviewe .This group is responsible for most shipments of radioactive material including packaging, labeling, surveying, and completion of appropriate documentation. .New and inexperienced reactor services personnel receive

' informal training from the licensee's health physics group on basic radiation protection practices and theories, use of survey instruments and survey methods, etc. Tests are not administered to determine the extent of an individuals' understanding. Subsequently, the trainee undergoes an on-the-job training program under the direction of the department's QA Supervisor and is required to complete a QA qualification program in accordance with the licensee's transportation quality assurance program. Individuals must be specifically approved (via

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demonstration or discussion) in various QA shipping. tasks prior to obtaining signature authorization for that tas Individuals also attend a limited hazardous materials shipping course offered by Federal Express. The licensee considers the training program for reactor services personnel to be adequate. This matter will be reviewed further during future inspection No violations or deviations were identifie . Procedures

.The licensee has developed 32 Health Physics Standard Operating Procedures (SOP-HP) to date. In accordance with technical specifications, these procedures are reviewed and approved annually; the last review was performed by the Health Physics Manager in July 198 The following new or revised Health Physics Standard Operating Procedures were reviewed:

50P-HP-16, Revision 11, " Surveying Containers of Radioactive Material for Transport by Common Carrier" SOP-HP-30, Revision 0, " Evaluation of Exhaust Gas Stack Monitor Filters in an Emergency"

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S0P-HP-32, Revision 0, " Thulium-170 Wafer / Pellet Transfer and Packaging" These procedures appear consistent with 10 CFR, 49 CFR, and good health physics practice No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Program SOP-HP-10, " Radiation Work Pertit," requires an RWP be generated for work not controlled by a standard operating procedure that could involve exposures. rates > 100 mrem /hr or has a potential to release unusual

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airborne contamination. All RWPs are initiated by and under the control of the licensee's health physics group. Twenty-nine RWPs have been -

generated in 1987 through July 1. The inspector selectively reviewed 1987 RWPs, including the RWP generated for a March 1987 thulium-170 pellet transfer operation; no problems were note Most RWP work is performed under direct health physics coverag No violations or deviations were identifie . Exposure Controls External The personnel monitoring services of R. S. Landauer, Jr. , and ,

Company continue to be utilized by the licensee on a monthly l exchange' basis. All permanent employees are provided with whole body film badges capable of detecting X-ray, beta, gamma, and fast ;

and thermal neutrons. Single chip TLD (TLD-100) extremity monitors

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(finger rings) are provided when extremity exposures are suspecte Self-reading dosimeters are provided to visitors, temporary workers, 1 and other personnel as warranted. Approximately 200 individuals are ]

film badged on a routine basi !

The vendor's dosimetry reports were renewed for the period August 1986 through May 1987. The highest whole body and extremity quarterly exposures noted were 780 mrem and 7,130 mrem, respectively. The licensee reported that no unplanned exposures exceeded their administrative action level of one-third of applicable 10 CFR 20.101 l

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l The official exposure record for the researcher who received an approximate 115 rem extremity exposure in June 1986 (Report No. 50-186/86003) has not been corrected to reflect the proper exposur Landauer exposure records through May 1987 continue ,

to list a lifetime 23.8 rem extremity exposure for this individua l The licensee indicated this oversight will be correcte This ,

matter was discussed at the exit meeting and will be reviewed during l a future inspection (0 pen Item 186/87001-01). )

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I Twelve instances of personnel contamination resulting from four separate incidents occurred .since the ' previous ' radiation protection inspection. Eight of the contaminations were caused by the event' ,

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described in Section 10. This event and two others producing i personnel contamination were reviewed by the inspector. Adequate- ,1

. dose evaluations were performed as appropriate; no significant '

exposures occurred. The events were. handled in accordance with-SOP-HP-20, " Report of Personnel Contamination." No problems were note Internal-The. licensee performs tritium analyses of urine samples collected monthly from at least one individual in each of the five major groups employed at the facility (health physics, reactor services, j operations, maintenance, and beam port floor researchers). The  !

licensee also' attempts to obtain a urine sample from every employee on a random basis. Sample results'for 1987 through June were reviewed; no results approaching the licensee's one pCi/L actions level were'noted.'

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Air samples are routinely taken in three areas where airborn effluents are considered most possible. Air samplers operate in ,

-room 245 of reactor services and at the basement of'the hot cell i

door'to coiricide with normal working hours. Continuous air l (particulate and gaseous) samples are taken on the beam port floo ;

Filters are changed weekly or as needed and analyzed if a problem is suspected. Daily grab air samples are taken in the reactor

. containment building and analyzed for tritium and argon-41. Records of.results of the' continuous'and grab air samples were' reviewed for 1987 through June. Maximum concentrations of tritium and argon-41 were less than applicable 10'CFR 20,' Appendix B, Table'1, Column I values (restricted area MPC).

Currently, the licensee does not have the' ability to'obtain a ,

containment air sample during containment isolation without re-entering containment. This weakness was identified by the licensee during a recent containment isolation event (Section 10).

The licensee is considering alternative methods of obtaining a representative containment air sample during isolations. The ,

desirability of developing remote sampling methods was discussed at the exit meeting and will be reviewed further during future-inspections (0 pen Item 186/87001-02).

No violations or deviations were identifie . . Containment Isolation Event On April 21, 1987,~ containment was manually isolated after the air monitor (CAM) on the beam port floor alarmed. The alarm actuates at about 5000 cpm, and was caused by elevated containment airborne activity i

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released when a' production system (Nuclepore) containing fission gases was opened-without proper purging.' The Nuclepore production system'

utilizes radioactive gases from reactor operation to produce very smal , holes-(from radioactive particles)..in plastic film which is subsequently commercially distributed as a filtering device._ The radioactive gases are subsequently exhausted through a charcoal bed prior to release out the stac The'Nuclepore system is routinely opened a few times per week for periodic maintenance without consequence, provided the system' has been

- properly purged with helium. Apparently, new reactor operators lwere unfamiliar with the Nuclepore-system operation and the necessity to properly-purge the system prior to its opening. The system was opened by-

- maintenance and health physics personnel assuming the system was-properly purged. No: requirement (formal procedure or mechanism) for verifying Nuclepore system purging prior to its opening existed. The licensee relies /primarily on verbal communication and knowledge of the system's operation. It~ appears the licensee should develop a formal method, such as procedural verification or RWP control, for assuring proper system

- purging prior:to any maintenance activities requiring system openin This matter'was discussed at the exit meeting and will be reviewed'

furtherfduring a future-inspection (0 pen Item 186/87001-03).

' To prevent recurrence, the licensee provided instruction to involved personnel to reinforce their understanding of the Nuclepore system's operation and the need to verify the system has been adequately purge The licensee has performed surveys, including air samples, during previous Nuclepore system entries. No significant contamination is

- released provided the system has been properly, purged. During the April 21, 1987 event, 22 individuals were evacuated'from containmen Eight individuals were found to be externa 11y' contaminated primarily with small amounts'of rubidium-88 and other short lived noble gas decay products. No significant external exposures were determined to have resulted from direct exposure to the airborne activity or_from skin / clothing contamination. Analysis of the CAM's filter and containment grab air samples showed maximum containment concentrations less'than one MPC. Stack sample analysis showed releases to the environment to be well below technical specification limit No problems were noted with the radiological evaluation of the even As a result of this event, the licensee questioned the appropriateness of their existing emergency procedures to the sequence of events. The licensee is considering revising their existing emergency procedures or developing new procedures to' address concerns which surfaced during this. incident. Further NRC review appears necessary to determine if compliance with emergency planning requirements was achieved. This matter was discussed'at the exit meeting and will be reviewed durin future inspection-(Unresolved Item 186/87001-04). In addition, operator performance associated with'this event will be pursued further (0 pen Item 106/87001-05).

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'11. Instruments and Equipmen Portable Survey Instruments l Portable survey instrument availability and calibration remain as described in Inspection Report No. 50-/186/86003. Records of instrument calibrations performed since July 1986 were selectively reviewed; no problems were noted. Calibration dates are listed on file cards maintained for each instrumen Hand and Foot Monitors Hand and foot monitor availability, location, use and operability checks remain as described in Inspection Report No. 50-186/8600 The monitors were last electronically pulse and source checked in April 1987. The monitor strontium-90 check source efficiency remains at about 7L The inspector observed personnel using the monitors; no problems were noted. The monitors are used after each egress from the hot cell (basement) area and prior to leaving the facilit The licensee has no immediate plans to upgrade or replace the monitor Area Radiation Monitoring System The facility maintains seven area radiation monitors which continuously monitor the reactor bridge areas, four other areas of containment, the fuel storage vault, and the vital equipment roo Also, a sample handling monitor is located directly over the reactor pool. The seven area monitors are electronically pulse checked and source calibrated on a semiannual basis and checked weekly for operability and alarm response using internal check sources. The monitors were reportedly last calibrated in June 1987. The sample handling monitor is source checked for operability and alarm response on a monthly basis in accordance with 50P-HP-5. Sample handling monitor checks were reviewed for 1987; no problems were identifie Technical Specification Radiation Monitoring systems The following monitors are required to be operable during reactor operations:

  • reactor bridge radiation monitor
  • reactor building exhaust air plenum monitor
  • stack radiation monitor These monitors are calibrated semiannually and operability tested with a radiation source at least monthl The calibration and operability checks on the bridge monitor are described in section (c)

above. The building exhaust air plenum monitor was reportedly last calibrated as part of a preventive maintenance program in June 198 >

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Particulate, gaseous (argori-41) and iodine monitors in the stack monitoring system were last calibrated in February 1987. This calibration data was reviewed; some problems were noted with stabilizing the voltage potentiometer.and with linearity in the gas monitor at high ranges (greater than technical specification $

monitoring requirements). However, the monitoring system appears to be functioning properly and is adequately calibrated over the necessary ranges. During the next scheduled calibration in August 1987, the licensee plans to evaluate the monitor capabilitie The particulate and iodine filters.on the stack monitoring system are changed and analyzed weekl The results of these analyses were selectively reviewed for 1987; no problems were note . Primary Coolant Iodine Analysis Records of primary coolant water sampling and iodine analyses were selectively reviewed from August 1986 though June 1987. The technical specification requirements for sampling frequency and maximum permissible concentrations were met. Samples are obtained and analyzed by the licensee's chemistry group. Records indicated maximum iodine-131 concentrations of 5 E-6 pCi/ml; this is 0.1% of technical specification limit No violations or deviations were identifie . Radwaste Management Liquid Radwaste The facility contains three liquid radwaste holdup tanks, each with an approximate 4600 gallon capacity. Isotopic analysis is performed on a one liter sample of liquid radwaste prior to each discharge to either the sanitary sewer or the cooling tower basi If the activity in the tank is less than 10 CFR 20.303 limits, it is release Records of liquid releases to the sanitary sewer made between July 1986 through May 1987 were selectively reviewed. During this period, approximately 0.12 curies of tritium were released to the sanitary sewer. The gross quantity of all other radioactive materials released was less than 25 millicuries. The alternate release pathway to the cooling tower was not utilized during this perio Gaseous Radwaste Daily grab samples taken from the stack are analyzed for argon-4 The gaseous effluent monitor strip chart indicates any significant trends in argon-41 concentration, from which an evaluation could be

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I determine gaseous releases continues to consist of multiplying the average daily argon-41 concentration determined from grab sampies by the total volume of air discharged from the stac i Daily grab air sample results were reviewed for 1987 to date. The l ma:'imum concentration of argon-41 discharged to the environment for that period was 4.8.E-6 pCi/ml, which is 34% of the technical specification limit. The technical specification instantaneous i maximum concentration limit of 3500 MPC was reportedly not exceede I Solid Radwaste A licensed contractor picks up the waste after being collected, packaged, and prepared for shipment by the Health Physics Offic The licensee continues to segregate and compact waste to minimize volumes. The research reactor facility has made two shipments of solid radwaste since the last inspection. The shipments were made to the Richland Disposal Site and totaled about 162 cubic feet and 316 millicuries. The inspector reviewed the records of these  !

shipments. The information on the shipping papers appears to satisfy NRC, DOT, and burial site requirements; no problems were note No violations or deviations were identifie . Receipt and Transfer of Radioactive Material Radioactive material receipt and transfer responsibilities remain as described in' Inspection Report No. 50-186/86003.

, Material irradiated in the reactor is transferred to both on and off I

campus users at a rate of about two to four shipments per day. Material for use in ' laboratories on the University campus are transferred to NRC Byproduct Material License No. 24-00513-32. The health physics office verifies that specific on-campus users are authorized to receive the material form and quantity transferred. The licensee verifies off-campus users have a valid license pursuant to 10 CFR 30.41. Records of all transfers are documented on individual " Material Transfer Forms," which were selectively reviewed by the inspector for 1987 to date. No problems were identifie No violations or deviations were identified.

l 15. Posting, Labeling, Control, and Independent Measurements l

l The inspector performed direct radiation and contamination surveys of

various areas in the the containment building, the hot cell area, and l laboratories throughout the facility. Direct surveys were performed l with an NRC PIC-6A; smear samples were counted on the licensee's

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equipme'nt.' Survey: results were.' consistent with posted licensee' result .During facility tours,.the, inspector observed.that the licensee appeared

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-10 CFR 19.11'and-10 CFR 20.203.-

No violations or deviations were identifie L1 Exit Meeting The: inspector met with licensee representatives-(denoted-in Section 1) at the' conclusion of.'the site inspection on July 2, 1987. The inspector

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. summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and discussed the

, likely informational content of the inspection report. The licensee did not indicate'that any of the information disclosed during the inspection was ' proprietary in. nature. In response to'the inspector's comments, the

'licenseet Stated they would update the official personnel dosimetry records to reflect a.115 rem extremity exposure for the individual involved in the June:1986 thulium operation (Section 9).

' Acknowledged the need to devise a' method for. remote sampling of containment air'(Section 9). Acknowledged the. inspector's comment ~concerning the desirability of developing-a formal method of verifying:"Nuclepore" system purging prior.to opening the system (Section 10).

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- Acknowledged that emergency preparedness issues related to the recent containment isolation event were unresolved and subject to further review (Section 10).

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