IR 05000186/1999201

Insp Rept 50-186/99-201 on 990607-11.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations Program,Organizational Structure & Functions Program,Design Control Program,Review & Audit Program,Fuel Handling Program & Experimental Program

ML20196K449
Person / Time
Site:	University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date:	07/01/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196K419	List: IR 05000186/1999201 ML20196K417 ML20196K434
References
50-186-99-201, NUDOCS 9907080364
Download: ML20196K449 (14)

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-P U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Dock'et No: 50-186 License No: R-103

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Report No: 50-186/99-201 l l

Licensee: Curators of the University of Missouri- Columbia Facility: University of Missouri- Columbia Research Reactor Location: Columbia, Missouri Dates: June 7-11,1999 Inspector: Thomas M. Burdick Approved by: Ledyard B. Marsh, Chief Events Assessment, Generic Communications and Non-Power Reactors Branch Division of Regulatory improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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9907000364 990701 PDR ADOCK 05000186 G PDR

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j EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This routine, announced inspection included onsite review of selected aspects of the operations program, organizational structure and functions program, design control program, review and audit program, operator requalification program, maintenance program, surveillance program, fues handling program, experimental program, procedural control program, and emergency preparedness program since the last NRC inspection of this progra I

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS l J

The licensee has appointed a permanent Reactor Manager and selected a new Operations Engineer. Both the new Operations Engineer and the Reactor Physicist plan to obtain NRC licenses this yea The licensee plans to relieve all human resource management responsibility for the operations staff from the Shift Supervisors and assign them to the Reactor Manager, Operations Engineer, and the Reactor Physicist. Shift Supervisor positions will be renamed Lead Senior Reactor Operator OPERATIONS l The licensee has been routinely violating the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TSs) and procedure guidance regarding the use of high range scram and building isolation setpoints on the reactor bridge area radiation monitor (ARM). Other operations were conducted according to requirement ;

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l DESIGN CONTROL j Design change review and implementation were made according to requirement REVIEW AND AUDIT Reviews and audits were conducted as require OPERATOR REQUAllFICATION Training and examinations were conducted as require i MAINTENANCE Maintenance was effective and well documente Records of maintenance on the facility security system were not controlled as require l

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SURVEILLANCE Surveillance identified an out-of-tolerance primary flow scram setpoint which was correcte The' licensee also identified a failed solenoid operated valve that has been a recurring proble FUEL HANDLING New fuel receipt was observed to be in compliance with physical security and fuel handling requirement EXPERIMENTS Samples were observed being placed in and removed from the reactor with the proper

. precautions and procedure PROCEDURES

' Licensee procedures were generally acceptable although the licensee had not been in full compliance with one procedur ..

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS The licensee held a biennial drill with offsite support agencies and the observed critique l was conducted by the support personnel with the licensee facilitatin <

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Rooort Details Summary of Plant Status Since the last inspection the reactor has been operated continuously except for short interruptions for refueling and maintenance to support experiments, education, operator training, surveillance, and service wor . ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS Scope (39745]

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

e organization and staffing e qualifications e management responsibilities e administrative controls, Observations and Findinas The organizational structure and staffing had changed since the last inspectio The Operations Engineer, acting as the Reactor Manager, was appointed as the permanent manager and a replacement Operations Engineer was selected. The organizational structure and staffing at the facility and as reported in the Annual Report was as required by TSs. Qualifications of the staff met TSs requirement Both the new Operations Engineer, a previously licensed senior reactor operator at another research reactor facility, and the Reactor Physicist plan to obtain NRC licenses this year. Review of records verified that management responsibilities were administered as required by TSs and applicable procedure The licensee plans to relieve the Shift Supervisors of ali human resource management responsibility for the operations staff and assign management responsibility to the Reactor Manager, Operations Engineer, and the Reactor Physicist. Shift Supervisor positions will be renamed Lead Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). All SROs may be assigned to the position of lead SRO. This change does not require NRC approva I Conclusions The organizational structure and functions were consistent with Technical i Specification requirement I

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' L OPERATIONS  !

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..The inspector reviewed selected aspects of: l

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i operational logs'and records

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e staffing for operations j e ' selected operational, startup, or shutdown activitie !

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- Observations and Findmas l

The operating logs and records were clear and provided an indication of operational l activities. This included documentation of events, and resolution or tracking of

! events. ~ The logs and records indicated that shift staffing including on-call personnel was as required by TSs. Logs and records also showed that operational I

' conditions and parameters were consistent with license and TS requirements l

. except for the licensee's use of the TS provisions for setting higher scram and j building isolation settings for the reactor bridge ARM as described belo l

.TS 3.4.a requires that the reactor bridge ARM be operable anytime the reactor is );

operated. Foot note 2'of that requirement permits temporarily setting the scram I

and building isolation setpoint at a higher level during maintenance and sample handling. This is accomplished by positioning a selector switch to the high range !

from the normal position., A flashing amber light next to the switch is activated-when the switch is in the high range. The licensee's Standard Operating .

Procedure, SOP- Ill, ' Reactor Control and Instrumentation System," Pago 10, l

' Revision 7/29/93, Section 111.9, has established the normal setpoint at 50 millirem per hour and the high range setpoint at 10,000 millirem per hour. Additionally,-

there is an alarm at the high range setting of 300 millirem per hour. SOP 11 requires that the switch be returned to the normal range when sample handling is finishe i i On Monday, June 7,1999, the inspector observed the activities during sample !

loading, final reactor precritical checks and reactor startup to critical. During the

" entire period the reactor bridge ARM remained in the high range position. The A- inspector inquired with the operators what the flashing amber light meant and how d long the ARM remained in the high range. They responded that on Mondays, when i ;they shut down for refueling and maintenance, the bridge ARM would be switched

to the high range' when the reactor was shut down and then restored to normal l

when the reactor was returned to 10 megawatts. During reactor operation it

- would be placed in the high range for sample handling and returned to norrnal when finish'ed. Procedure guidance and TS requirements, do not permit the bridge ,

monitor to be in the high range mode for prolonged periods when sample handling i and maintenance are not being conducted. Failure to restore the reactor ARM

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-3-scram setpoint range switch to normal following maintenance and sample handling is a violation of these requirements (50-186/99-201-01). The apparent cause for this failure appeared to be the lack of explicit procedure guidance and a habit developed by the operators. The inspector periodically monitored the status of the bridge ARM range setting throughout the remainder of the inspection and noted that it was in the appropriate position for the observed conditions. The inspector also noted that the status of the reactor bridge ARM setting had not been recorded in the control room log boo Observation of operational activities further confirmed that conditions and requirements for operations were satisfied except for the violation noted abov c. Conclusions The licensee safely conducted most operations as required although ther failed to follow requirements for scram settings on the bridge AR . DESIGN CONTROL <

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l a. Scope (40745)

l The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

e facility design changes and records e facility configuratio b. Observations and Findinas Records and observations showed that changes at the facility were acceptably reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and applicable licensee administrative controls. None of the changes constituted an unreviewed safety question or required a change to the TS c. Conclusions The design change program satisfied NRC requirement . REVIEW AND AUDIT a. Scoce (40745)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of: i e safety review records e audit records e responses to safety reviews and audits e review and audit personnel qualifications

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-4- Observations and Findinas

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Records showed that the safety reviews were conducted at the TS required frequency. Topics of these reviews were also consistent with TS requirements to provide guidance, direction, and oversight, and to ensure acceptable use of the reacto The audit records showed that audits had been completed in those areas outlined in the TSs and at the required frequenc The inspector noted that the safety reviews and audits and the associated findings were acceptably detailed and that the licensee responded and took corrective actions as neede The safety review and audit personnel qualifications satisfied TS requirements and licensee administrative controls. Further, the number of personnelinvolved in the safety reviews and audits also satisfied TS and licensee procedural requirement c. Conclusions The review and audit program satisfied TS requirement . OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION a. Scope (69003)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

e the Requalification Program e operator licenses e operator training records e operator physical examination records e operator examination records e operator active duty status, b. Observations and Findinas The Requalification Program was maintained up-to-date. Operator licenses were also current. Records showed that operator training was consistent with the Requalification Program requirements. Physical examinations of the operators were conducted as required. Records showed that written and operating examinations of the operators were acceptably implemented. Logs showed that operators [

maintained active duty status as require '

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-5- Conclusions Operator requalification was conducted as required by the Requalification Progra . MAINTENANCE - Scoce (39745)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

o maintenance procedures e equipment maintenance record Observations and Findinos Logs indicated that corr.ective maintenance activities and problems were addressed as required by procedure. Records showed that routine maintenance activities were conducted at the required frequency and in accordance with the TS, applicable procedure or equiprnent manual. Maintenance activities ensured that equipment remained consistent with the Safety Analysis Report and TS requirements. Further, maintenance activities were consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5 The inspector noted that the licensee electronics shop personnel kept a detailed accounting of all maintenance conducted. One section of the records was associated with the licensee's physical security system. Within that section there were discussions regarding problems and solutions for a variety of components and the system in general. These record entries did not provide a comprehensive description of the entire system and its operation. The inspector confirmed that the licensee took immediate corrective actions to secure the information pertaining to the physical security system in a locked storage container as required by 10 CFR 1-73.24(d)(2). This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not I subject to formal enforcement action in accordance with NUREG/BR 0195, NRC Enforcement Manual, Section Conclusions ]

The maintenance program satisfied NRC requirements. However, security system maintenance records were not properly secure ry

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-6- SURVEILLANCE a. S_ cope (61745)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

e surveillance and calibration procedures, e surveil lance, calibration and test data sheets and records, b. Observations and Findinas *U Surveillance, test and Limiting Conditions for Operations verifications and calibrations were completed on schedule and in accordance with licensee procedures, All the recorded results were within the TSs and procedurally prescribed parameters. The records and logs reviewed were complete and were being maintained as required. Checks, tests, and calibrations were completed as required by TS The inspector followed up on a licensee report regarding an out-of-tolerance primary flow scram setpoint. It was discovered by the licensee in November 1998 when the reactor was shut down for weekly maintenance and refueling. The scram function was operable but at a slightly less conservative (98.5%) scram setpoint than TSs required. The licensee identified the problem during routine semiannual compliance checks and replaced the flow detector. Four redundant primary flow scram channels were still operable. The low flow scram occurs when any one channel of five reaches its scram setpoint. No further action was required for this event. On June 15,1999, the licensee notified the inspector that two of the five low primary flow scram compliance checks were found out of tolerance on June 14,1999, during their routine Monday shutdown maintenance period. A second compliance check was immediately conducted and both affected channels were above the TS limit although still slightly below the compliance procedure setpoint and required minor adjustment. The licensee intends to retest the affected channels on a greater frequency over the next calendar quarter. The licensee had historically adjusted the scram setpoint above the TS limit but is considering further increasing the setpoint margin above the TS limit. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection (50-186/99 201-02).

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-7-The inspector also noted in the licensee's surveillance records that a solenoid actuated valve that supplies air pressure to the reactor building ventilation backup doors had failed due to degraded seals. The licensee stated that the valve stuck shut rather than venting as designed when it was de-energized. The backup doors are redundant to the ventilation dampers. Failure of the solenoid did not prevent closure of the backup door since there are two redundant solenoid valves in the air line and the other valve functioned as designed. The inspector noted one other similar occurrence in the licensee's records. Although the licensee has no quality assurance program requirements, the inspector recommended routine replacement of the valves or their seal components to prevent recurrence. The licensee acknowledged that such a program would be considere The inspector noted that the licensee uses many jumpers and shorted relays during their instrument surveillance. The method of configuration control they use is very effective. It incorporates a central jumper panel that has an open door switch annunciator that alerts operators if a jumper is not removed after testing is completed. With jumpers in place, the door cannot be closed. However, one particular instrument jumper was not included in the central panel. During the last test of this circuit the jumper shorted across energized circuits burning out several components. The licensee has been considering rewiring the affected circuit into the central jumper panel to prevent recurrence of this event, c. Conclusions The surveillance program satisfied TS requirement . FUEL HANDLING a. Scope (60745)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

e fuel-handling procedures e fuel handling equipment and instrumentation e fuel handling and examination record .

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-8- Observations and Findinas Fuel-handling procedures provided a prescribed method to move and handle fuel consistent with the provision of the TSs and the licensee safety analyses. Fuel movement and fuel examination records showed that the fuel was moved and examined as required. Records also showed that fuel-handling and monitoring equipmen; and instrumentation were verified to be operable prior to use.-

Personnel were knowledgeable of the procedural and~ equipment requirements for criticality control and assurance of fuel integrity. The inspector observed that radiological and security precautions were also met in accordance with applicable procedures during new fuel receip l c. Conclusions i

The fuel handling program satisfied licensee TS and procedural requirement j i

9. EXPERIMENTS a. Scope (69005) i

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of: i e- experimental program requirements e procedures e logs and records o' experimental administrative controls and precautions, b. Observations and Findinas The experiments and service irradiations at the facility were conducted under routine procedures that had been in place for several years. No new or unknown-type experiments had been initiated, reviewed, or approved since the last inspection. The experiments and irradiations were completed with the cognizance of the Reactor Supervisor and a Senior Reactor Operator and in accordance with TS requirements (e.g., reactivity limitations). The results of the experiments and irradiations were documented in appropriate experimental logs, data sheets, or records. Engineering and radiation protection controls were implemented as required to limit exposure to radiation.

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c. Conclusions The program for experiments and service irradiations satisfied TS and procedural requirements.

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-9- l 10.' PROCEDURES l Scoce (427451 The inspector reviewed selected aspectr of:

e administrative controls I e records for changes and temporary changes e procedural implementation e logs and record Observations and Findinos i

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Administrative control of changes and temporary changes to procedures, and associated review and approval processes were as required. Training of personnel on procedures and changes was acceptable. Personnel conducted activities in accordance with applicable procedures except as described in the violation cited in paragraph 2 above. Part of the cause for that violation was insufficient procedure guidance as described. Records showed that procedures for potential malfunctions (e.g., radioactive releases and contaminations, and reactor equipment problems)

were implemented as required,

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I The procedural control and implementation program generally satisfied TS requirement . EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Scoce (82745)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of:

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• the Emergency Plan e implementing procedures e emergency response facilities, supplies, equipment and instrumentation {

e . training records e offsite support e emergency drills and exercise ,

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-10- Observations and Findinas The Emergency Plan (E-Plan) in use at the reactor and emergency facilities were the same as the version most recently approved by the NRC. The E-Plan was audited and reviewed as required. Implementing procedures were reviewed and revised as needed to employ the E-Plan effectively. Facilities, supplies, instrumentation and equipment were being maintained, controlled and inventoried as required in the E-Plan. Through records review and interviews with licensee personnel, emergency responders were determined to be knowledgeable of the proper actions to take in case of an emergency. Agreements with outside response organizations had been ,

updated and maintained as necessary. Communic ations capabilities were acceptable with these support groups and had been tested as stipulated in the E-Plan. Emergency drills had been conducted as required by the E Plan. Off-site support organization participation was also as required by the E-Plan. Critiques were held following the drills to discuss the strengths and weaknesses identified during the exercise and to develop possible solutions to any problems identifie The results of these critiques were documented and filed. Emergency preparedness and response training was being completed as required. Training for off-site and reactor staff personnel was conducted and documented as stipulated by the E-Pla The inspector observed a drill critique with offsite responders and noted that the licensee facilitated the meeting yet the responders seemed to lead the discussions as stakeholders and collaborators in the plan implementatio Conclusions The emergency preparedness program was conducted in accordance with the Emergency Pla . Exit Meeting Summary

' The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente ,

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l Partial List of Persons Contacted i Dr. Edward Deutsch Director, MURR Charlie McKibben Associate Director, MURR Tony Schoone Reactor Manager, MURR The inspector also contacted other supervisory, technical and administrative staff personnel as wel Inspection Procedures Used IP 39745 Class i Non-Power Reactors (NPR) Organization and Operation and Maintenance IP 40745 . Class i NPR Review and Audit and Design Change IP 42745 Class i NPR Procedures IP 69003. Class i NPR Operator Licenses, Requalificatiol, And Medicals IP 60745 Class l NPR Fuel Movement IP 61745 Class i NPR Surveillance IP 69005 Class l NPR Experiments IP 82745 Class l NPR Emergency Preparedness items Opened and Closed

,00en 50-186/99-201-01 VIO Failure to comply with TS 3.4.a, Reactor Bridge ARM 50-186/99-201-02 IFl Corrective action for low flow scram setpoint drif Closed None List of Documents Reviewed Safety Analysis Report Surveillance Procedures Emeigency Procedures Maintenance and Surveillance Records Reactor Operating License Training Program

. T echnical Specifications Emergency Plan Administrative Procedures Training Records

. Operating Procedures and Records Various Reports Maintenance Procedures

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I l-List of Acronyms Used

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ARM Area Radiction Monitor l- NPR Non-Power Reactor NRC . Nuclear Regulatory Commission MURR University of Missouri Research Reactor

.SAR Safety Analysis Report SRO Senior Reactor Operator TSs Technical Specifications i

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