IR 05000186/1976001
| ML20215J192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1976 |
| From: | Carlson D, Foster J, Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215J138 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-421 50-186-76-01, 50-186-76-1, NUDOCS 8610240342 | |
| Download: ML20215J192 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES NL' CLEAR REGULATORY C0:0:ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCl24ENT
REGION III
IE Inspection Report No. 050-186/76-01 Licensee:
The Curators of the University of Missouri - Columbia 309 University IIall University of Missouri Columbia, Missouri 65202 Research Reactor Facility License No. R-103 Columbia, Missouri Category:
E Type of Licensee:
Research Reactor Type of Inspection:
Unannounced, Special Physical Protection Dates of Inspection:
March 16 and 17, 1976
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Principal Inspector:
D. M. Carlson
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Accompanying Inspector:
J. E. Foster h/D/ '/4
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
None Reviewed liy:
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Safeguards Isranch (Date)
Atta'chment:
S-FS-76-251 Finding, (Part 2. 790 (d ) Information Copy 2~ o f 6 _ copies 12 Pages Tlli b DOCUMENT IS NOT '10 SE REPRODUCED WITil0Ul' SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF IE:1II 8610240342 861010 PDR FOIA DENNISH86-421 PDR l'
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SUM.iARY OF F_ISDISCFw r D3
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,e 1.nforcement Artien Deficiency Cor trary to Sec tion III, Part I, Pa ragraph A. 3. b. (1) of t he approved security plan, one staff member, as required, did not carry a A N 1.C:G E m (Report Details, Enforce-ment Action)
Other Significant Findi:.cs A.
Weaknesses in the Physical Security Procram Weaknesses in the Physical Security Program were noted in areas relative to essential equipment, security areas, security systems, procedures and security program review.
(Report Details, Weaknesses in the Physical Security Program)
B.
Vulnerability - External Threat With some limited,. knowledge of facility operations, an external force of',6
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, gain access into the vital area anc ut mately gain access.
to, vital equipment.
(Report Details, Vulnerability)
C.
Licensee's Response to NRC Recuest for Aurrentation of Security In response to the NRC's telephone notification of February 23, 1976, the licensee verbally informed the Campus Police as to the concerns of the NRC for security vigilance.
Reacting to this notification, the Police Department immedi-ately posted a notice on their office bulletin board requesting that all concerned personnel exercise "special watch" of the Reactor Facility and check identification of unauthorized persons in the area.
Additional action s.as initiated on the part of the Research Reactor Facility Director in the form of a r.emorandum to all utaff remberr and experimenters.
Thi' t.emaraadun reminded i n d i v i d u:.13 of their res;3ensibilit ies rer.arding security operations ef the facility.
See Attachment No. I which consists of two pages, for specific details of the memorandum.
Also, as determined through interviewr with managen.ent personnel,a management review of the security plan and its implementing procedurer was conducted and both were found to be adequate
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Unusual Occurrences
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None, j
Mana;;emen t Interview On March 17, 1976, the results of the physical protection inspection were discussed with licensee representatives.
Representing the University of Missouri were the following:
A. Emmons, Vice President, Research R. Brugger, Director, Research Reactor Facility D. Alger, Associate Director, Research Reactor Facility C. Julian, Reactor Supervisor, Research Reactor Facility G. Schlapper, Reactor Physicist / Security Officer, Research Reactor Facility Representing IE:III were the following:
D. M. Carlson, Physical Security Specialist J. E. Foster, Investigations Specialist.
During the meeting, the representatives were informed that ene item of noncompliance was identified during the inspection.
The represent-atives were also informed that satisfactory corrective actien had been initiated prior to the conclusion of the inspection and therefore, response to the citation would not be required.
No rebuttals were made to the citation at the time of the exit meeting.
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REPORT DETAILS
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University of Missouri A.
Emmons, Vice President, Research L. Maddox, Supervisor, Non-Technical Trades W. Yellon, Senior Research Scientist F. Tsang, Graduate Student 2.
University of Missouri - Research Reactor Facility R. Brugger, Director D. Alger, Associate Director C. Julian, Reactor Supervisor W. Gill, Shift Supervisor R. Moorehead, Shift Supervisor J. Jacovitch, llealth Physics Manager C. McKibben, Reactor Operations Engineer E. Edwards, Reactor Plant Engineer G. Schlapper, Reacter Physicist / Security Officer M. Spease, Senior Reactor Operator W. Meyer, Reactor-Operator L. Rentz, Reactor Operator J. Marchand, Secretary to the Director L. Duncan, Reactor Secretary.
3.
University of Missouri - Campus Police Department R. Mason, Chief of Police T. Stark, Captain / Shift Commander - T. Hatton, Patrolcan M. Deaver, Dispatcher s Scope A special unannounced physical protection inspection was conducted at the University of Missouri (Columbia) Research Reactor Facility on March 16 and 17, 1976.
The f011 ewing special inspection pro-cedures were utilized in the conduct of the inspection: l Procedure No.
Subject 81705B Physical Protection - Security Plan 81710B Physical Protection - Essential Equipment 81715B Physical Protection - Security Areas $$k f* w-4-l , me ve ;,, - .~a y m _
T"!!!!'Dyk.__. (U[hf$NNfshhMibbbi .- Procedure !;o.- Subj ec t . . 81720B Physical Protection - Security Systems 81725B Physical Protection - Security Organization 81730B Physical Protection - Access Control 81735B Physical Protection - Surveillance 81740B Physical Protection - Procedures 81745B Physical Protection - Security Prograr Review 81750B Physical Protection - Protection of S2i Time on Site Arrived: 1900 hours, March 16, 1976 __ Departed: 2245 hours, March 16, 1976 , Arrived: 0830 hours, March 17, 1976 Departed: 1830 hours, March 17, 1976 Enforcement Action DL/ Section. II, Part 1, Paragraph ' A.3.b. (1) of the Security Plan state s, in part, Contrarv to the above, the reactor secretary # P F x f % 4 % on her. person at the time when the inspector 4- . requested to see it.; Further, she said she was never issued cne.
With respect to this item, the ctaff membey immediately made arrange-ments to procure the N#eMi* tW > Prior to the~ conclusion of the inspection, togeYify' issuance,'thesecretaryshoweda[ to the IE:III inspector. Additionally, management personnel cstabu shed an administrative procedure which should preclu:ie a recurrence of this item of noncompliance.
Weaknesses in the Physical Security Program In addition to the item of noncompliance identified above, the following weaknesses were found to exist.
Security Plan Weaknesses in the Security Plan are discussed below under Essential Equipment, Security Areas, Security Systems, Precedures and Se:urity Prop, ram Review.
Essential Equipment bb 1.
The annroved Security Plan does not designate the Ias vital equipment.
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Additional equipment wl.ch should be des,ignated as vital
equipment includes the.
Security Areas Drawings or sketches for certain levels of the f acility were not included as part of the Security Plan.
Sec.. Attachment No. 2, which consists of three pages, for addition'al information regarding the floor plan.
Security Systems \\ ' There is no provision in the Security Plan for test.ing the.
> [ hystem at a frequency of at least s Access Control The Security Plan only requires f personnel.
Procedures The licensee's procedures do not include provisions and/or actions for security violations by authorized personnel.
Security Program Review The security program review section of the security plan titled " Audits" does not address the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
Vulnerability , The facility is well protected against the common break-and-enter form of surreptitious entry., llowever,, armed individuals,' with facility if some ' limited prior knowledge,'could gain entry (to the some, legitimate pretext for entry *was used.
A personnel searches, are not normally conducted prior to entry, an individual (s) armed with a, handgun'or othey'small weapon. cguld gain entry in this ma.ine r. Once inside,f and other security areas are open to the intruder (s).
Portal Monitors , There are no devices at the facility for the detection of weapons or explosives.
There are no devices utilized to detect the' theft'or Iemoval of SNM from the facility.
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Actual a."
Intrusion Alarm - On July 27, , 1975, and October 19, 1975, police responded to false alarms caused by a faulty door switch.
Only authorized personnel were involved.
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Intrusion Alarm - On May 22, 1975 and December ....), n /a, police responded to false alarms caused by faulty telephone line equipment and on May 6, 1975, police responded to a false alarm caused by an error on the part of an authorized person.
c.
Suspicious Persons - As requested by the Reactor Shift Supervisor on March 16, 1976, police responded to two suspicious persons, who through a graduate student, ' were requesting entrance to the reactor laboratory.
Involved in this incident were IE:III personnel beginning a physi al protection inspection.' S marked vehicles and( g nmarked vehicle responded within' , Responding police officers checked the inspector's hru, identification badges and verified validity of same with reactor personnel before departing.
2.
Drills / Tests A drill which included police response was conducted on September 23, 1975.
An evaluation of the adequacy of the alarm system, the response of the reactor operators and the response of the police was performed.
3.
Evaluations In each case of a security response, the adequacy of the response was evaluated and remedial action was taken when needed.
Attachments: 1.
Attachment 1 - Memo, MURR Staff and Experimenters from R. M. lirugger.
2.
Attachment 2 -. Floor Plan, Placement of Emergency Equipment, fk h bb _ [* -7-D*NiiN4@per41,% F .
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L- _ /ERSITY OF f/ilSSOURI nesearch Park CvumW tisscure M201 Tdephona (314) 6B2 4211
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- "JR7 STAFF AND EXPERlVEI:TERS j
To: . ,, .. b '2 ' ' hk # - ", d' FRO:4: Robert 14. Brugger ., ( r / SU3J: Safeguards and Security Policies of the 12JRR - Reminder Recently, the Ilational Resources Defense Council has filed with the Iuclear Regulatory Commission a petition requesting an increase in safeguards at nuclear facilities.
Although the primary tar 6et of this petition is the operation of fuel fabricatio_n and reprocessing facilities, it could, to some degree, effect 10JRR.
Past inspections of our security policies by the Nuclear Regalatory Commission have found our procedures to be adequate.
Therefore, a change to our policies is not anticipated at this tine; but an increased alertness in implementing present policies is appropriate.
A reninder on certain aspects of our p3an is the object of this letter.
It should be retenbered that security of the !?)RB is the rezpensibility of all staff and all experimenters.
Our jobs and research capabilities depend upon it.
Primary responsibility in security natters rests with reactor operatior.s.
If you have a security related question or feel that you have observed sone form of questionable behavior notify the chif t supervisor on dtity during the week or the University Police on l veekends.
Your cooperation and understanding is also requested.
For e m ple, operations personnel have been instructed to stop individuals l and request identification. This applies especially outside of norcal ! vorking hours.
If you, cs a principal experinenter, ellow someone to ! use your lab "after hours" to. conduct an experinent and that person has not been issued a filn badge for working at the facility, please notify t he duty shif t supervisor.
Tne janitorial staff h2s been instructed rat , '
- a ep - A arm for an,c3ne.
Please remember the following itecs: l 1.
Do UOT allow your key or magnetically encoded card to be used by another person.
. I l 2.
Da _I:0T ndnit personn to the building unlev the/ nor ally work in the buildir,, or you know th m per--onally and p1nn to escort !?m.
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~ _ - . . MURE STAFF AUD EXI'ERI!GUTERS l'a g e 2 IMrch 1, 1976
If you lose your key to the building notify Dan Alger immediately! h.
If you lose your encoded card to the contaire'.cnt building notify Caudle Julian or Jerry Schlapper i nediately!
Do I:0T bring any firearns or explosives into the building-6.
Insure that exterior doors are closed and locked when entering or leaving the building.
The east door vill only be open when the receptionist is on duty.
-7 Do NOT block open doors.
8.
Da UOT leave the freight door open and the crea unattended.
If you enter the airlock with a tour or visitor do not use the combination.
Request entry by calling the control root 10.
Insure that visitors you are escorting have signed the log in the lobby and have been issued a temporary film badge and dosineter.
11.
At all times insue that you have your valid staff or student identification card with you.
Anyone nay be stopped and challenged by operations staff or security force personnel.
Because of our limited tanpower the policy covering "valk-in" tours .is be*ng ar= ended until the situation changes.
Effective immediately requests for tours cust be filed a mininu of two days prior to the day of the tour.
If a staff member or experimenter wishes to escort a visitor through the facility, this vill still be pernitted as long as the visitor is well known to the staff nenber.
Eccall, however, that the visitor is the responsibility of the eacort.
The escort is charged . ith r=sransibillty for carryin:: cut a sear ? of W < nd all pacham to l La carried into the contair. cent tuilmn;. .d s a, th e carort nuat rt,n _ n ' with the visitor at all tices when within the containment buildinn.
R2 call that before you bring a visitor or tour into the containmeat building, you must obtain pernission from the Reactor Control Roon.
Continued interest on the part of the IGIRR staff and experimenters in the security of the l'URR uill ne c ts the need for r:are restricti'.e neasure: and greater costs.
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