IR 05000186/1990001
| ML20059N623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1990 |
| From: | Dunlop A, Michael Kunowski, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059N620 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-186-90-01, 50-186-90-1, NUDOCS 9010170031 | |
| Download: ML20059N623 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
e Report No. 50-186/90-01(DRP)
Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Licensee: University of Missouri - Columbia Facility Name: Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR)
Inspection At:
Research Reactor Facility, Columbia, Missouri
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Inspection Conducted: August 15 through October l',
1990 Inspectors:
A. Dunlop, Jr. gg'
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/ t-T- 10 Date
/0 /dkO M. A. Kunowski l
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Yt/LUd)[
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//-T-Y-M. M. Mendonca!
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L C. G. Jones
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L Date gcLg Approved By:
R. C. Knop,. Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch 3 Date Inspection Summary
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Inspection on August 15 through October 1, 1990 (Report No.
50-186/90-01(ORP))
L Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection to review actions on previous l
inspection items (92701); records, logs, and organization (39745); review and
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l audit' functions (40745);- surveillance (61745); fuel handling activities
(60745); requalification training (41745); procedures (42745); experiments l
(69745); transportation activities (86740); radiological controls (83743);
.special and periodic reports (90713); followup of licensee event reports (92700); and silicon irradiation program (83743).
Results: Of the 13 areas inspected, two violations were identified.
Consistent with the results-of the last two inspections, this inspection indicated that the licensee has a generally good radiation protection program
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In the area of transportation of radioactive l
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materials,.however, two violations (Severity Level'IV) were identified for
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preparation of a package of radioactive material for shipment with radiation levels exceeding 200 millirem / hour and for failure' te survey the bottom of a packageofradioactive'materialpriortoshipment'fSection11).
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The operational aspects of the reactor program imp);oved from the p evious inspection.
Identifiedconcernssuch'ashousekeeping,maintenanceand modification issues, and procedure control were ad(quately resolve'd
.The Reactor Advisory Committee and its subcommittee provide good management involvement in the facility's operation.
Modification and experiment packages contained detailed information and analysis allowing for indepth review of the issue.
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i DETAILS l '.
Persons Contacted University of Missouri-Columbia
- J. Sheridan, Vice Provost for Research
- S. Morris, Interim Director
%#* C. McKibben, Associate Director
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W. Meyer, Reactor Manager
- S. Gunn, Reactor Services Engineer
%#* S._Langhorst, Manager, Reactor Health Physics
- T. Seeger, Electronic Shop
- T. Young, Assistant Radiation Safety Officer
- M. Price, Sponsored Programs
- M. Carter-Tritschler, Reactor Services Supervisor i
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- A..Schoone, Operations Engineer
- J. Ernst, MURR Senior Health Physicist
- T. L. Pitchford, Director, Office of Research Safety-
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J. Schuh, Senior Research Specialist
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Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TMI)
D. Etheridge, Radiological Control Engineer R. Shaw, Radiation Protection Manger Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. Chawaga, Region I, Radiation Specialist Additional technical, operational, and administrative personnel were contacted by-the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on August 16, 1990.
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- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on August 17, 1990.
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% Denotes those presant at the telephone' conference exit meeting on October 1, 1990.
2.
General This inspection, which began on August 15, 1990, was conducted to examine the research reactor program at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) at Columbia.
The facility was toured shortly after arrival. The general housekeeping of the facility was adequate and improved.since the last inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-186/89001(DRP)).
The significant concerns identified in the previous inspection, such as l
fire hazards, inadequate lighting and replacement of burned out bulbs, and poor housekeeping practices were not evident.
The operations engineer performs a weekly walkdown of the facility to observe housekeeping conditions.
Problems identified are resolved by the operations staff or
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other appropriate MURR personnel.
In addition, the' operations' staff perform a monthly safety inspection checklist. This inspection is another
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means of identifying and correcting any poor housekeeping practices.
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- Campus personnel perform routine checks of the facilities fire
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extinguishers.
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The reactor operates on a weekly cycle, shutting down each Monday for refueling and/or maintenance outage. The facility is used primarily for irradiation services (e.g., gemstones, silicon) and research activities.
There were 54 unscheduled shutdowns (scrams and rod run-ins) in the last
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17 months from March 1989 through July 1990. Of these shutdowns, 27 were scrams; 16 were associated with equipment problems, 8 resulted from loss
'I of electrical power, and 3 involved personnel error.
There were not a significant number of scrams due to operators failing'to change the nuclear instrument range switch when increasing power as noted in-the previous inspection.
SOP A-9a, ' Unscheduled Reduction in Power Report,'
was revised to provide. additional guidance such that sufficient information is included in the report. The inspectors reviewed selected 50P A-9a forms and determined the operators were providing adequate information to understand the event and the corrective actions taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Action on Previous Insoection Items (92701)
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(Closed) Open Item (186/89001-01):
Three weaknesses in.the maintenance area were identified: (1) Preventive Maintenance (PM)
procedures have no. issuance date; (2) no individual component ht.' cry
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file assigned to machine shop; and (3) discrepancy logs not sequentially numbered. The licensee has adequately addressed each of these issues.
The licensee has incorporated acceptable procedure issuance and revision designations in the PM procedures.
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licensee has established an equipment history file for the machine shop and has updated the files for the electronics shop.
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i licensee maintains a log book of discrepancies that contains a list
' of sequentially numbered reactor-related discrepancies, reactor-related discrepancy forms, and other facility discrepancy forms.
The reactor-related discrepancies are resolved in a timely manner, however, facility discrepancies in some cases have remained open for l
a significant period of time. Although these discrepancies are not as significant or safety-related, the licensee should-resolve them in an appropriate time frame. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (186/89001-02): Three weaknesses in the modification process were identified: (1) no sign-out system to identify where modification package are located; (2) modification packages on file are copies; and (3)'no records documenting post
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modification testing for Modification No. 87-5.
The inspectors verified that the licensee has instituted a file sign-out policy.
Further, the inspectors selected several modification packages and
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i found them readily available in the licensee's files. The licensee's policy intends to keep original modification packages in their files.
for all new modifications and older modification packages were updated to original packages as much as practicable. The inspectors verified that an adequate post modification test was performed and included in Modification No. 87-5 package.
The actions taken by the licensee were adequate to resolve the inspectors' concerns._ This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation (186/89001-03):
This violation was withdrawn by the NRC in a letter from E. G. Greenman to Dr. J. S. Morris dated i
August 3, 1989.
The three issues the inspectors identified concerning the licensee's safety evaluation were addressed by the licensee in a letter from W. A. Meyer to E. G. Greenman dated June 7, 1989. The inspectors reviewed the response and verified
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that the emergency generator modification package safety evaluation-adequately addressed these issues.
This item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Open Item 186/89001-04(DRSS):
Licensee will try to develop a mechanism to ensure that radioactive material is not shipped to customers who have terminated their licenses before the expiration date.
Discussions between the NRC and the licensee since this open
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item was initially described have resulted in a determination that a change to the licensee's current practice is not necessary. The problem of individuals receiving radioactive material after.
termination of their license is a generic issue.
To date, the licensee has not experienced this problem.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 186/89001-05(DRSS): -Licensee agreed to initiate a comprehensive ALARA review to identify causes of exposure and to determine if further actions should be taken to reduce the magnitude of the exposures.
The licensee's review indicated that a fairly-active ALARA program already. existed, but that improved,= formal documentation of program activities was r.ecessary. The inspectors'
review indicated that the licensee improved program documentation; for example, a revised ALARA policy memo was issued by the interim director of the research reactor, and monthly written ALARA recommendations are required of researchers and other personnel who engage in work that may result in exposures above certain limits.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open' Item 186/89001-06(ORSS):
Licensee agreed to improve
access control for the high radiation areas around the beamports.
The licensee installed a fence with lockable doors on the beamport floor.
The doors are required by procedure to be closed and locked during use of the oeamports except when qualified personnel are in the area controlling access.
Unescorted access to the fenced area is restricted to individuals who have received specific training developed by the licensee. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 186/89001-07(DRSS):
Licensee agreed to review the need for hand-and foot.. monitors with greater sensitivity and to-install a hand-held frisker at the hand-and-foot monitor currently located at the exit from the basement.
The licensee recently.
t installed a hand-held frisker at the exit and purchased a beta and
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gamma radiation sensitive, state-of-the-art portal monitor to replace the hand-and-foot monitor currently used at the main facility entrance.
In addition, the licensee purchased an alpha, beta, and gamma radiation sensitive, state-of-the-art hand-and-foot monitor to replace the basement exit monitor.
This item is closed, h.
(Closed) Open Item 186/89001-08(DRSS):
Review the use of NBS-traceable sources for calibration of area. radiation monitors (ARMS). During the previous inspection, the licensee was unable to establish if-the sources used for calibration of the ARMS were-NBS-traceable.
Since then, the licensee has revised the calibration
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procedure and now uses an NBS-traceable source (1.2 Ci of cesium-137)
for calibrating the monitors. This item is closed.
Other concerns raised during the previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-186/49001) were addressed by the licensee and were reviewed during
the current inspection.
Regarding the possible need for a spiked dosimeter program, the licensee stated that its dosimetry vendor NVLAP is accredited in accordance with 10 CFR 20.202(c) and that the University does provide spiked beta badges to the vendor to develop correction factors for several beta emitters which the University is investigating for potential use in cancer therapy.
Regarding an environmental TLD (thermoluminescent-dosimeter) program, the' licensee reviewed the commercial products available.and selected one offered by their personal
-dosimeter vendor.
Recently, the licensee placed 40 TLD badges, each containing LiF and CaF, around the reactor facility at various locations and collected them after 3 months. The results of the processing of the badges were not available at the time of the inspection and the licensee has not yet determined if the program will continue..These. programs will be reviewed in the course of future routine inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Organization, Logs, and Records (39745)
-The facility. organization was reviewed and verified to be consistent with
.the Technical Specifications and Hazards Summary Report (HSR).
The minimum staffing' requirements were verified to be met during reactor
operation, and fuel handling or refueling operations.
- The reactor logs and records were reviewed to verify that:
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Records were available for inspection.
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Required entries were made, t
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Significant problems or incidents were documented.
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The facility was being maintained properly.
-The licensee's organization has remained constant since the last inspection. A new facility director has been named to replace the interim director and is scheduled to start later this year, j
The inspectors reviewed selected reactor operator log books and concluded
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they contained the appropriate amount of information.
The inspectors accompanied an operator on the. routine facility rounds. The operator was knowledgeable of the facility and the actions required to be performed by the checklist.
The inspectors witnessed the installation and removal of material being irradiated in the reactor pool.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Reviews and Audits (40745)
The licensee's review and audit program records were examined by the inspectors to verify that:
Reviews of facility changes, operating and maintenance procedures, a.
design changes, and unreviewed experiments were performed by a safety review committee as required by Technical Specifications or HSR..
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The review comm!ttee and/or subcommittee were composed of qualified members and that quorum requirements and frequency of meetings had been met, c.
Required safety audits had been conducted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and that identified problems-were resolved.
The-licensee's Reactor Advisory Committee (RAC) reviews actions taken by several. subcommittees.
These subcommittees include: safety, procedure review, services, and gemstone license.
The inspectors reviewed the meeting minutes for the safety and procedure. review subcommittees and the RAC.
There was good documentation of each meeting's discussion including packages of material that were sent to each member prior to the meeting for review.
Items discussed at the safety subcommittee included new experiments, NRC submittals and correspondence, reactor utilization requests, modifications, significant events, and other issues associated with the reactor.- The inspectors concluded that there is good management involvement in issues concerning the facility and the RAC and its subcommittees perform their functions in a professional and competent i
manner.
The Technical Specifications do not require the licensee to perform a periodic audit of the facility by an outside organization. The licensee in the past has had University of Missouri-Rolla reactor personnel perform
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audits of MURR, although none have been conducted recently in.the operations area. The licensee informed the inspectors that the Test, Research, and Training Reactors (TRTR) organization is discussing the merits of establishing a group of research facilities interested in performing these types of audits at other facilities.
The licensee has also discussed this with other facilities to perform reciprocating audits.
These independent audits should be beneficia', to the licensee and the licensee is being proactive in pursuing this issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Requalification Training (41745)
The inspectors reviewed procedures, logs, and training records; and interviewed personnel to verify that the requalification training program was being carried out in conformance with the facility's approved plan and NRC regulations.
The licensee's program ensures that each operator performs the required number of reactivity manipulations, accumulated the required number of hours on the control panel, reviews procedures and any changes that are issued, passes requalification examinations,.and that operator performance is evaluated by management personnel. The licensee has taken appropriate actions when operators do not meet the requalification requirements. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program documentation-and' determined it to be of good quality.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Procedures (42745)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine if procedures were issued, reviewed, changed or updated, and approved in accordance with Technical Specifications and'HSR requirements. This review also verified:
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That procedure content was adequate to safely operate, refuel, and
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maintain the facility, b.
That responsibilities were clearly defined.
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That required checklists and forms were used.
As previously mentioned, the licensee has a procedure review subcommittee that reviews and approves new and revised procedures to ensure procedures are of good quality. The inspectors determined that the required procedures were available to the operators and the contents of selected procedures were found adequate.
A concern identified in the previous inspection involved inadequate-tagging controls and system labeling.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's tagout procedure (50P I.4.11) and tagout log. The tagout log was maintained in accordance with procedural requirements. There was
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evidence of a monthly audit, sequential. numbering of tags, and review of tagouts. The inspectors verified that the tagouts and associated tags were properly installed and/or removed, reviewed, and dispositioned through direct: observation of selected equipment and its associated tagout documentation.
The licensee has instituted a valve labeling program.
The inspectors observed selected valves and determined that the labeling program was in progress and proceeding acceptably.
Another concern previously identified was that the control room procedures (SOPS) were not being properly controlled..The licensee revised the SOPS in May 1989 and placed the control room copy of the SOPS in plastic
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Jackets with reinforced holes which should prevent pages from falling out of the. books or becoming degraded.
The inspectors did not note any unauthorized pen and ink changes to the procedures as previously noted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance (61745)
The inspectors reviewed procedures, surveillance test schedules, and test records and discussed the surveillance and preventive maintenance program with responsible personnel to verify:
a.
That procedures were available and adequate to perform tests, b.
That tests'were completed within the required time schedule.
c.
Test records were available.
The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance procedures and verified the procedures were adequate to test the Technical Specification requirements, test results were within the acceptance criteria, and tes'.s
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were conducted as scheduled.
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CP-10 Rod Drop Times CP-16 Emergency Pool Fill Flow Test CP-17 Emergency Generator Load Test CP-19 Primary Relief Valve CP-25 Control Blade Inspection CP-24 Anti-siphon System Valves 543 A/B The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance and modification items:
Replacement of pool thermocouple millivolt to current transmitter; Replacement of primary pump 501B; Modification No. 88-6, Emergency electrical power upgrade that replaced the emergency generator and automatic transfer switch.
The inspectors reviewed the records associated with these items and verified that the licensee had controls on the process and equipment was tested prior to being returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Experiments (69745)
The inspectors verified by reviewing experiment records and other reactor
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logs that:
a.
Experiments were conducted using approved procedures and under approved reactor conditions.
b.
New experiments or changes in experiments were properly reviewed and approved.
The experiments did not involve an unreviewed safety question, i.e.,
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Experiments involving potential hazards or reactivity changes were identified in procedures.
Reactivity limits were not or could not have been exceeded during an e.
experiment.
The safety subcommittee reviews all new experiments and verifies the above mentioned items are performed and acceptable.
The inspectors reviewed several new experiment packages and concluded the licensee's review process and documentation was of good quality.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Fuel Handling (60745)
The facility fuel handling program was reviewed by. the inspectors. The
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review included the verification of approved procedures for fuel handling and their technical adequacy in the areas of radiation protection, criticality. safety, Technical Specification,- and security plan
. requirements. The inspectors determined by records review and discussions
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with personnel that fuel handling operations were carried out in conformance to procedures.
The reactor consists-of eight fuel elements and is usually refueled after each shutdown due to the buildup of xenon and the low excess positive
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reactivity of the core.
The licensee schedules a weekly refueling outage.
The-inspectors reviewed selected post refueling checks and verified they were acceptably conducted to assure compliance with Technical Specification requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Transportation Activities (86740)
As part of its commercial irradiation service, the licensee ships approximately 1000 curies of various isotopes each month. The majority of this activity is P-32 and Au-198 (e.g., 520 curies and 219 curies,
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- respectively, were shipped in July 1990).
In the past several years, these shipments have been made without major regulatory problems.
On August 10, 1990, however, several problems were identified with a shipment of 9.72 curies of antimony-124 (Sb-124) sent as a solid source to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TMI). TMI's survey of the
package surface, witnessed by an NRC Region I health physics inspector,
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identified the highest radiation level as I rem / hour at the bottom of the package. This was achieved by inserting the radiation detector between the horizontal surfaces of the aluminum pallet to which the package was bolted. This value was significantly higher than the 340 millirem / hour value recorded on a form sent with the shipment by the University.
The form did not specify on which surface this reading was observed, but University representatives indicated during the current inspection that it was a reading from the side of the package taken while the package and
pallet were sitting on the floor.
TMI's reading for the side of the package was consistent with the University's 340 millirem / hour value.
Similarly, for the transport index, TMI determined it to be 17, comparable to the 17.8 indicated on the University's form. A teview of the unexpectedly high radiation reading made by TMI around the bottom of the package indicated that University personnel did not survey the bottom prior to shipment. The technician who surveyed the package on August 8, 1990, stated to the inspectors that he inadvertently did not survey the
package bottom.
The bottom of the truck, however, was surveyed after the package was loaded and the 135 millirem / hour measured was within the 200-
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millirem / hour limit.
The failure to survey the bottom of the package is a violation to 10 CFR 71.87(j), which requires that prior to each shipment, the licensee determine that external radiation levels around the package are within regulatory limits (Violation No. 50-186/90-01-01(DRSS)).
The root cause of this violation is personal error through a failure to follow-requirements. As part of the corrective action for this violation, the-licensee stated that the package survey form used to document surveys will be revised to include specific instructions on the survey requirements.
In addition, the technician was counseled on the r.eed to follow requirements.
In addition to the unexpectedly high surface reading, TMI personnel observed that the tractor trailer used to deliver the source additionally contained items (paper products) that were not part of the University's-consignment.
10 CFR 71.47 (and 49 CFR 173.441) requires that a package with an external surface radiation level greater than 200 millirem / hour and a transport index exceeding 10 be shipped on an " exclusive use" vehicle.
10 CFR 71.4 (and 49 CFR 173.403(1)) defines exclusive use as
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the sole use of a conveyance by a single consignor and for which all initial, intermediate, and final loading are carried out in accordance with the direction of the consignor or consignee.
Licensee representatives indicated that when the truck arrived at MURR for loading
of.the package containing the source, the paper items were already on the vehicle. They stated that since-they provided written instructions to the vehicle driver prohibiting any intermediate loading or unloading until the source was delivered to TMI, and the vehicle was sealed by MURR personnel af ter the source was loaded and remained sealed until TMI personnel
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i entered the truck to remove the source, the shipment met the intent of the exclusive use requirement on August 8, 1990, when it left MURR.
Licensee representatives further stated that the driver told them that no intermediate loading or unloading was performed. The inspectors noted that because there was no intermediate loading or unloading of the truck, there was no unnecessary or unplanned exposure to the public.
However, the shipment of the package on a non-exclusive use vehicle with the package surface radiation level exceeding 200 millirem / hour and the transport index exceeding 10 is a violation of 10 CFR 71.47 (Violation No. 50-186/90-01-02(DR$$)). The root cause of this violation is personal error through a misinterpretation of the regulations.
Two violations of NRC requirements were identified.
12.
RadiationControl(83743J 03 anization_of the Health Physics Group The organization remains essentially as described in Inspection Report No.
50-186/89001.. The group has experienced some turnover in the technician staff and is actively recruiting; however, current staffing appears adequate.
Audits Routinely, audits are conducted of various aspects of the health physics program at the research reactor. The annual audit of the MURR health physics program by the University's Office of Research Safety was conducted in April, 1990. At the time of the NRC onsite inspection in mid-August 1990, the report of that audit had just been issued, and was not reviewed by the inspectors.
Licensee representatives stated that there were no significant findings in the audit. The delay in issuing the report was Wiefly discussed at the exit meeting (Section 16).
Training The inspectors briefly reviewed the radiation protection training program.
The licensee is adequately providing specialized and periodic basic training to employees, for example, training was given to several health physics (HP) personnel for the beryllium changeout outage in 1989, on mixed waste issues, and on radioactive material transportation.
requirements; and housekeeping personnel received periodic training in basic radiation protection matters.
Procedures The ' inspectors briefly reviewed selected HP procedures.
The review indicated that procedure 50P-HP-18, Revision 1, " Calibration of Geiger Mueller Survey Instruments," lacked information on calibration references
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and acceptance criteria.
This problem was previously identified during the 1988 NRC inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-186/88001), at which
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time the licensee agreed to revise the procedure.
Discussions with the licensee during the current inspection indicated a revision had been prepared, but had not yet been approved. The licensee agreed to promptly
issue a revision to the procedure.
Review of the licensee's calibration practices during this inspection and during the previous inspection
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(Inspection Report No. 50-186/89001) identified no problems in this area.
The review of procedures also indicated that procedure 50P-RC/II-2, j
Revision 3, " Pool and Primary Water Analysis," did not reflect a change made by the licensee in the frequency of tritium analysis from weekly to monthly. The inspector noted that this change was made in November 1989 after proper _ review and approval.
Licensee representatives agreed to revise the procedure.
This matter was briefly discussed at the
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exit meeting (Section 16).
External Exposure
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The inspectors reviewed selected surveys and personal dosimetry reports.
No major poblems were identified.
The licensee recently began tracking
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total annual exposure for the facility.
Recent totals are listed below.
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_ PERSON-REM 1986
1987
1988
l 1989
Licensee representatives stated that although the dose tota! has declined since 1906, the use of radioactivity at the facility has increased.
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Discussions with the licensee and a review of dosimetry records indicated that exposures have been well below regulatory limits, with a maximum
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whole body exposure for 1989 of 1.9 rem and a maximum extremity exposure
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per quarter for 1989 of 5 rem.
Internal Dosimetry i
The licensee's urinalysis program for internal exposure monitoring _ remains unchanged since previously reviewed (Inspection Report No.
50-186/89001(DRP)).
The inspectors reviewed selected urinalysis,results-
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for samples collected from MURR workers since the previous inspection; no problems were identified.
pool Water and Primary Water Analyses
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-The inspectors reviewed selected results of the weekly primary coolant and
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pool water analyses for gamma emitters.
In addition, the inspectors i
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reviewed results of the monthly tritium analyses.
Except for the need to
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revise the procedure, as discussed above, no problems were identified.
- The iodine-131 concentration in the coolant is typically less than 1 x-6
-10 microcuries/ milliliter, well below the limit in Technical
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The tritium concentration in the coolant and the pool water is typically 0.1 l
microcuries/ milliliter.
There is no Technical Specification limit for tritium.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713)
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The inspector reviewed the following annual reports for timeliness of submittal and adequacy of information submitted:
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Operations Annual Report 1988-1989
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Operatioas Annual Report 1989-1990
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The reports were submitted in a timely manner and contain the information required by Technical Specification 6.1.h(4).
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The licensee also submits a monthly operations summary.
The inspectors
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reviewed the summaries from March 1989 to July 1990. These summaries provide the Region with a brief account of events and maintenance
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activities for the previous month.
No-violations or deviations were identified.
14.
License Event Reports (92700)
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
(Closed) LER 89-02:
Reactor operation with one of two regulating blade position rod-in functions inoperable.
On June 3, 1989, with the reactor operating at 10MW, an operator noted on-routine rounds that the drive chain had fallen off-the drive gear for the regulating blade rotary limit switch assembly. The rotary limit switch assembly provides a 10% withdrawn rod run-in function that is required by Technical Specifications 3.4.c. -The reactor was immediately shutdown when this function was determined to be inoperable.
The licensee returned the chain to its drive gear and its tension was.
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adjusted.
The appropriate portions of CP-14, Regulating Rod 10% and Rod Bottom RRI,' was performed to verify-proper operation of the 10% withdrawn rod run-in function, as well as the independent rod bottomed rod run-in.
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The scheduled semiannual preventive maintenance on the regulating blade drive mechanism was completed on June 5,1989. This included checking and
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adjusting the drive chain tension and inspecting the condition of all drive chains and gears.
The licensee has added a quarterly visual
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inspection of the drive chains for the position indication transmitter and l
rotary limit switch assembly on the regulating blade drive mechanism.
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The inspectors performed a visual inspection of the drive chain and
reviewed the CP-14 test results and the quarterly inspection; no problems were identified.
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The licensee took prompt corrective action in shutting down the reactor when the condition was discovered.
The repair action and testing prior to
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recommencing reactor operations was appropriate.
The ad ion of the
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quarterly visual inspection should provide early indicat w if the drive chain's tension needs to be adjusted.
The written report was both timely and technically adequate to fulfill the requirement of Technical i
Specification 6.1.h(2).
This item is closed.
,
(Closed)_LER 90-01: Degraded operability of the mer.hanical equipment room exhaust system while the reactor was shutdown, but not secure.
On June 6, and June 14, 1990, with the reactor at full power, the facility
lost electrical power due to severe thunderstorms that resulted in reactor scrams.
In each case, the facility exhaust fans f ailed to operate (blown
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fuse) when the emergtncy generator began supplying electrical loads.
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Technical Specification 1.15 requires the mechanical equipment room exhaust system to be operable as one of the six conditions for containment integrity.
Technical Specification 3.5(a) requires containment integrity be maintained at all times except when the reactor is secured and irradiated fuel is not being handled.
Technical Specification 1.20 list five conditions for the reactor to be considered secured; one being the
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master control switch to be in the '0FF' position and the key properly controlled.
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On each occasion, when the exhaust fans did not start due to blown fuses, the reactor was shutdown (scram), but the administrative control mentioned above for securing the reactor was not met for approximately 15 minutes until the operators placed the master control switch in the off position.
In both cases, the licensee replaced the fuses and the exhaust fans returned to service after verifying proper operation.
The licensee
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per b rmed an emergency generator load test to determine if the transient created by the emergency generator picking up the loads caused the blown fuses, however, neither fuse failed during the test.
The licensee issued
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a Standing Order requiring the operators to immediately place the master control switch in the off position upon the loss of electrical power to minimize the time that a Technical Specification violation exists.
Subsequent analysis between the licensee and the controller vendor for the fans revealed two possible root causes.
The control power for both fans was being developed off the same phase.
A second cause determined that the rating of the 3 amp fuses was too low as they were carrying 2.5 amps steady state, thus not providing enough current margin to be sustained
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through this type of electrical transient (severe thunderstorm).
The licensee resolved the first concern with a modification to separate l
the voltage source for the control power to each fan.
Installation of this change allowed control power for each fan to be developed across a
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Both of these modifications have been installed and should eliminate the blown fuse problem.
Even though the events were administrative in nature and did not have any safety significance, the licensee implemented good corrective action to
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prevent recurrence.
The written report was both timely and technically adequate to fulfill the requirement of Technical Specification 6.1.h(2).
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Silicon Irradiation Program (83743)
The inspectors reviewed selected portions of the licensee's program for the irradiation of high purity silicon bars.
This program remains generally as described in Inspection Report No. 50-186/89001(ORP);
however, the quantity of silicon irradiated has increased from 8 metric tons per year to approximately 25-30 metric tons and the licensee has begun to irradiate bars with diameters of 13 cm, in addition to the 5-10 cm size, which MURR has irradiated for at least several years. The major radionuclides which may be present in neutron-irradiated silicon are i
short-lived, mixed beta and gamma emitters, such as Si-31, Zr-95, I-131,
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Ba-140, La-140, Ce-141, Nd-147, Gd-159, and Ho-166, and the pure beta emitter, P-32.
The irradiated bars are stored at MURR for approximately 9 days before a sample is analyzed on a germanium counting system to quantify the gamma-emitting isotopes. A review by the inspectors of selected germanium analyses of 5-10 cm bars indicated that the procedure MURR has inplace allowed the mixed beta and gamma emitters to decay to less than 10 CFR 30, Schedule A concentrations. Typically, the concentration is several orders of magnitude less than the Part 30 limits.
The 13 cm bars are also counted using the geometry used for the smaller bars.
Because of the high purity and uniform irradiat. ion of the bars, this practice, although less desirable than using a geometry based on the 13 cm bar, appears reasonably accurate for quantifying the mixed beta and gamma-emitters.
Licensee representatives and analysis records indicated that the concentration of these isotopes is also less than Part 30 limits.
!
For the relatively long-lived pure beta emitter, P-32 (half-life of 14 days), licensee representatives stated that they count one car from each lot on a gas flow proportional counter, which is sensitive to beta radiation.
If more than 1000 counts per minute are measured the lot is held for decay; if the counts are less than this value, the lot is shipped.
However, the licensee does not have procedures in place for this-l analysis with the proportional counter and does not maintain records of
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the analysis.
The licensee stated that calculations made several years
ago indicated that the concentration of P-32 in silicon was less that Part l
30 limits. The licensee stated that because the irradiation time of the
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silicon is administrative 1y limited to control the production of the desired doping element, P-31, the production of the undesired P-32, which is produced at a known rate by neutron irradiation of the P-31, is also limited. These calculations were not reviewed by the inspectors.
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The absence of procedures to measure P-32 is a weakness because it results in reliance mainly on administrative controls to limit radioactivity in the shipped silicon bars. However, it does not appear to be in violation of NRC requirements, because the bars are shipped overseas by the licensee and are not transferred by the licensee to any domestic receiver.
Licensee representatives stated that most of the irradiated silicon is exported to a Japanese company, Komatsu, with the
'
remainder being sent to a Danish company, Topsil.
The export of the potentially radioactive silicon is not governed by Part 30 limits, but by 10 CFR 110.23(a), with which the University appears to be in compliance.
The licensee has recently received inquires from an American firm in
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California regarding the commercial distribution of irradiated silicon bars in the United States.
NRC representatives stated to the licensee that if they intended to begin commercial distribution of silicon to
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non-licensed persons in the U.S., they would have to apply to the NRC for an exempt distribution license as they did for authorization to dittribute irradiated blue topaz gemstones.
The University currently possesses an NRC license, No. 34-00513-36E, allowing limited distribution of irradiated blue topaz gemstones.
Part 30 limits are applicable to this license.
The licensee's program for the irradiation of material in the reactor will be reviewed during future NRC inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
Exit Interview (30703)
'
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the onsite inspection of silicon irradiation activities on August 16, 1990, and of reactor operations and radiation protection activities on August 17, 1990 A subsequent telephone exit was conducted on October 1, 1990.
The inspectors summarized the scope and tentative findings of the inspection and discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report. The licensee did not identify any material discussed at the exit meeting as proprietary.
Specific items discussed during the exit meeting and subsequent telephone exit included, the intent to close several open items identified during the previous a.
inspection, b.
the delay in issuing the formal report of an audit conducted in April 1990 by campus radiation protection personnel of MURR radiation protection activities.
Licensee representatives stated that the formal report had been issued just prior to the exit meeting, and further stated that the findings of the audit had been addressed by MURR shortly after the audit was conducted (Section 12),
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the agreement by licensee representatives to expeditiously revise two radiation protection procedures (Section 12),
d.
the problems with the shipment to TMI (Section 11) and associated i
violations,
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