IR 05000186/1975003
| ML20215J169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000270, University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1975 |
| From: | Carlson D, Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215J138 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-421 50-186-75-03, 50-186-75-3, 70-0270-75-02, 70-270-75-2, NUDOCS 8610240335 | |
| Download: ML20215J169 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITh3 STATES NUCLEAR RFGUIATORY COM'ilSS10N ' OFFI'CE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCI: MENT
REGION III
IE Inspection Report No. 050-186/75-03 IE Inspection Report No. 070-270/75-02 Licensee: Curators of the University of Missouri 309 University Hall University of Missouri Columbia, Missouri 65202 Missouri University Research Reactor License No. R-103 Columbia, Missouri 65202 Category: E License No. SNM-247 Priority:
Type of Licensee: Research Reactor Type of Inspection: Physical Protection, Announced Dates of Inspection: September 22-23, 1975 . / c /u: 1h' A' 1 /. u-- " ,/ -1- ,, ,, ,, Principal Inspector: D. M. Carlson /' ^ ^ (Date) Accompanying Inspectors: None Other Accompanying Personnel: None -,/. e .i ' d. (A.i,lind, Chief / _,(/_ 7J .- ' I Reviewed By: Materials and Plant (Date) Protection Branch Attachment: Findings (10 CFR 2.790 Information)
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, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22-23, (75-03 and 75-02): Determine if the licensee is conplying with commitments set forth in their Security Plan dated September 15, 1974, and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, as applicabic.
No items of noncompliance were identified during the inspection.
Enforcement' Items Violations None.
Infractions None.
Deficiencies None.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items None - This represents the first physical protection inspection conducted at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) at Columbia.
Other Significant Items A.
Systems and Components None.
B.
Facility Items (Plans and Procedures) The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (ONRR), by letter dated March 26, 1975, informed the University that their Security Plan was acceptable, as proposed, provided the plan was revised to include, conditions for continuous mar;- itoring/ surveillance of the' ) The criteria for the. monitoring / surveillance, system, as outlined in the letter, was that: 1.
The system must be in operation when the building la p $g p g and must .-g p rov i d e a n. a l a rm s i gna l., t orif t'wCIEA >
xy, geg % g,.for the detection of an intrusion.
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The syj; tem nrovided should be sufficiently indepondent - of the/2 lintrusion alarm system such that
a single act could not disable,both' systems simultaneously.
3.
The system should be installed and operating wJto appro-priate revisions made to their security plan as soon as practicabic but in no event later than 120 days following the receipt of the letter (dated March 26, 1975).
Inspection results deternined that Conditions No. I and No. 2 have been implemented and criteria established by ONPR have I been met.
A description of the); ~ W4,i3 int rusion alarm system in provided in the Detection Aids section of this report (Page No. 8).
With respect to Condition No. 3, the University notified ONRR, by letter dated August 8, 1975, that the installation of an intrusion alarm system was completed on July 18, 1975.
This was verified by this inspection.
C.
Managerial Items None.
D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by the Licensee None.
. E.
Deviations None.
F.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items None.
Management Interview Present at the exit interview were Messrs. P. Keenan, D. Alger and C. Julian of the Universitj's staff.
Representing IE:III was Mr.
D. M. Carlson. The University's rep resen t a t ives were in f o rmed that no apparent items of noncor.pliance with NRC requirements were identified during the inspection.
The following subject, which is not an item of noncompliance, was presented for considerat ion by the licensee-It appeared incongruous that the facility's intercom substation locap d on the exterior wall I of thc n ' ' Tlterminates only within ther" a i -C T At present, all other substations within the f acility terminate at thel /T g.. m,,*sk~~'"4l& 4 : o - .,,,.
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-;;rt-Me metsWMTmu u mm%55[hSl55Eh~Ef. 5.5h~ WWf n a _ _R_EPORT DETAILS . Scope This initial physical protection inspection was conducted on September 22-23, 1975, at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), at Columbia, to determine if the licensee is com-plying with commitments set forth in their Security Plan dated September 15, 1974.
Additionally,'the inspection covered the licensee's compliance with provisions of 10 CFR Parts 73.50 and 73.60, as applicable.
It should be noted that ONRR has granted the licensee certain exemptions from the provisions of Part 73.50.
Individuals Contacted P. Keenan, Assistant to the Vice President for Research D. Alger, Associate Director, Research Reactor Facility C.
Julian, Manager, Research Reactor Facility W. Gill, Shift Supervisor, Research Reactor Facility R. Moorehead, Shift Supervisor, Research Reactor Facility M. Spease, Senior Operator, Research Reactor Facility A. Gunn, Operator, Research Reactor Facility J. Marchand, Secretary to the Director, Research Reactor Facilit',, D. Jefferson, Receptionist / Tour Guide, Research Reactor Facility T. Stark, Captain / Shift Commander, Campus Police Department E. Burry, Captain / Shift Commander, Campus Police Department T. liatton, Patrolman, Campus Police Department M. Stubbs, Dispatcher, Campus Police Department W.
Latty. Watchman, Campus Physical Plant Introduction The University of Missouri's Research Reactor Facility is located in the Research Park one mile south of the Columbia campus.
The high powered (Ten-Megawatt), high flux reactor provides intense sources of neutron, gamma and neutrino radiation for research and other applications.
In addition to the reactor, the facility con-tains a hot cell and several laboratories, totalian 26,000 square feet, designed for work wi t h radionuclides and ionizine radiation.
Also, containedwithinah?'1 l.
- hre'~7.2Knofunirradiated
' high enriched U-2 M.
T h't-following sectionJ of the report a r4-descriptive narratives of security itens which were inspected-Physical Security Plan The licensee, by letter dated April 2, 1974, submitted a Security Plan to ONRR.
Upon review, ONRR found that the plan did not contain sufficient in f o rnit ion to provide a basis for de t e rm in i n,, it: acceptability.
Fy etter dated August 26, 1974, ONRR notifie.1 the l m7&. b TSh,, YT.M 1-y ,p y-~m .a .
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b$UdA@dEMMNhM['iDI$) licensee of this conclusion and attached, as an enclosure to ' the letter, " Interim Guidance - Organization and content of , Security Plans for llinh Power Research and Training Reactors."
This enclosure provides guidance in formulating a revised plan.
As requested by ONRR's letter of August 26, 1975, the Licensee submitted their revised Security Plan on September 20, 1974 Subsequently, on March 26, 1975, ONRR not if ied the licensee that the plan was acceptable, provided certain conditions were implemented.
These conditions are outlined in the Summary ef Finding in the "Other Significant Items" section, Paragraph B.
The licensee was in compliance with these conditions on July 18, 1975, as reported to ONRR by the licensee's letter dated August 8, 1975.
Security Organization Director, Research Reactor- - - - - - -Director, Security Office (Brugger) (Mason) Associate Director Shift Supervisor (Alger) (Mason) (Stark) (Burry) Reactor Supervisor (Julian) Associate Reactor Supervisor (Vacant) I t ' Shift SNM , Supervisors Custodian (Moorehead) (Schlapper) (Gill) (Walker) Note: Dashed line indicates coordination only.
The facility Director has overall responsibility for security matters pertaining to the University's Research Reactor.
Administrative responsibilities have been delegated by the Director to the Associate Director and Reac tor Supervisor.
Fhift Supervisors are - 5- , y ; g.. i. i c.,,. w~ tw,; a.m s. op~.-~ -~ ~~ ry;.m ry'.-~ ~ rmnW n #.g. t..e i d i u 9 - d uhJEJ=1.h la M W d**b W J1.t.it.As.5+d45 t"#E%__ FD2hUMdjb w - - - - - - - - . . -
- -*W @AEfff@ My6p %@3 responsible for day-to-day operatfons which include security checks
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of the nr ity during ormal, operations and access control for the and' 6 Security violations of major significance are processed by the University's campus security force. This force is on. duty twenty-four hours a day and is commanded by a Shift Supervisor with a rank of Captain.
Thus, it is considered that a supervisor of the security organization in on site,(campus) at all times.
All individuals of the campus security force are commissioned police of ficers according to the statutes of the State of Missouri.
n addition to the wea-g pon, officers carry handcuffs and a, when ever they leave the patrol vehicle. -Also, vanous ent orcement aids are kept readily available at the Police Department which is approximately one mile from the Facility.
Such aids include, but are not limited to, riot guns, high powered rifles and gas dispensers.
Physical Barriers The first barrier which protects vital:[raactor equipment and special nuclear material (SNM) is, afforded Iv a which t onelevelstructureof(oncreteand'brickwithnumerousexterior completely surrounds th building.
The laboratory is a c windows, four personnel entrances and one freight entrance.
It should be noted that ONRR notified the licensee by letter dated March 26, 1975, that the building had been adjudged as providing a level of security equivalent to the intent of 10 CFR Part 73. 50 (b) (t ) and (5) for isolation zenes, provided a reactor containment building monitor or surveillance system was installed.
During the inspection it was found that the licensee has conformed to the provision, as stated, and is therefore exempt from the above Paits.
See Detection Aids section of this report for details of the monitoring and sur- ) veillance systems.
l Thereacto[ building '.s the second barrier encountered prior to being attorced access to reactor equipment or SNM.
This building is considered a. vital area.
The facility is a five icvel structure with its base being one level belew grade.
Twelve inches of reinforced concrete form the exterior walls.
Norrul entry is through a personnel air-lock passage.
The two steel portals of the passage a re i-wwNa driven, five feet in width, seven and one-half feet iti' he i c h-andf The only other entrance to the I building is throuf,h the @ entrance located on the/ side of ti.e facility.
This portal is also fabricatedofs'teelandis.[
- nine feet wide, ten foot high structure.
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. A third barrier is provided for protecting S!N.
This is a( (j 'which, meets the provisions of 10 CFR 73.2(n).
The
m is of thet are constructed ofi thfck steel, plate To this'%)is and/or of concrete. Th also constructed of and is equipped withg locking bars and a The iis equipped with arf Access Controls Initial access during normal working hours is controlled at the east entrance of the laboratory building by a receptionist located inside the lobby area.
Upon entering the facility, visitors are required to identify themselves and then sign in on a register.
If access is required to the building, they are then met and escorted by a reactor staff member., Access to the(t M building is limited to authorized individ-N uals.
Certain individuals are authorized access to this building only during normal working hours. Their entry is controlled by a pushbotton, located on the control console which automatically unlocks the portal after audio and visual identification has been made by a reactor staff member in the Control Room.
Identification and authorization yo enter is accomplished by the use of an inter-comsubstationan( located within the air-lock entrance.
-Personnel who have been authorized unlimited access to the contain-ment building may be adpitted as above or by their enterin. the appropriate (hedoor.
in th{ pa g w g q q.,9 (,,q., located adj acent to t During weekends and when the facility is not occupied, an additional security device must be activated to gain entrance.
In addition to havinn knowledge of the - .A review of records and a check of specifi-m .g cally numbered issued to staff menhers reflected that they are being maintained in accordance with committed to procedures.
The only other entrance to the gpqy3 building is through a qw. --. - . g,, _ w; ypgg sy
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Access to the ,is limited to only those who have a need ta enter.
The names of persons authorized access and who have the( lare posted on a list on the exterior wall of the Taurs are given of the facility under the escort and direction of an authorized individual.
The tours are admitted to the' building by the same procedure as discussed in paragraphs I and 2 of t his section.
All visitors who enter this building are required to 1 cave any packages outside of the' ' building unless such packages are first searched by an authorized individual.
In addition to the above, searches are made of visitors.
As observed by the, inspector, tours appear to be well-managed.
Tours do not include ~ the 'which is a material access area.
Detection Aids - ) There ar btilized to protect sensitive components'of the MURR.
,used to detect intrusion into the fuel storage area.
,The intrusion alarm system for the.
.bu i l d in,t consists of ( located en the af the two steel pgrtals leading te'the building.
This system has beer. connected to the'~ tchich is described in ' ,the Access Control section ot this report on'Page No.
7.
Additionally, Jhasbeenplacedhorizontallyat ap p roxima t e 1y' /[ intervals on the interior of the two portals.
This ' system i s t ied int o, the ,Iand provides ' protection against' of the portal.
B th systems are con-Q ,structed to provide indications of' ,ind are continually f [ )Emergencyelectricalpowertobothsystemsis [provided by ar( generatint plant.
Baqically, the generator is a '- ) Design provides for voltage regulation of, ,t4 tween no load and full load conditions.
Stable generator output is established within i a [ /af ter a change of load.
/ - N , .The-is, monitored by an sensor Thir, ;t er ts The sysu n frequency of
- is ' designed to is designed to operate at a provide twenty four Qeurs of standby power and i s'
's All alarms at.nunci ate 10cally within th/ 'and at the / Inspection and test i tg of the alarms by the inspector revealed no inadequacies-8-m v, ; t n m,y- +no ; v. u em,< 7.%7%, -,3 e mw~. m e-1;,' j u s e; v _. > ty * u-g < - "i s
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. . , Unauthorized intrusion r g-also be detected through the use of the ,s y,s t em.
. onitoring of a specitic area is provided by a se ection switch i>n the' In addition to the above mechanic / electronic detection aids, reactor ataf f memb'ers co.nduct a patrol of facility at intervals of about ' ) Also, during other than normal working hours, ' a . watchman from the University k'atch Of fice patrols the facility ,' The later of these patrols are recorded' M , Interviews with personnel and a review of records reflected compliance with requirements.
Communications The primary means of external communication with of fsite agencies is via an inter and intra campus telephone system which is installed with underground lines to decrease the possibility of severing communications.
In addition to the telephone system, communications are internally supplemented by an extensive intercom syste:c-which runs throuchout buildines. A pQ[gY!l%% $fv'j y gv the laboratory and containment y ;.gh.in y 7,x_ g. ~.g(. ; g V,- -
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hich are utilized by reactor operators u u. ag routine patrols I l Security Training . I l Specific security training of each employee, experimenter, watchmen and other security ferce personnel (campus police) depends en l dut.~es assigned to that person.
l Each licensed operator is required to review the security plan and ' security procedures on an annual basis.
Evaluation of individual's knowledge is determined through the administration of a written ! examination which is part of the reactor operator requalification l program.
Examinations in accordance with the above have not been administered to date.
This is because the requalification program _9 "d2 Wku{l,w!G;i~hDX5WA5&p,;{;DW[G10) 'O WfW i t.w.wp A14.uW"s* dEG "ws A-3- . ,4,gg W* ?O $ lUMid h,h A-r l h l L _
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wi.u m , . was not concurred with by ONRR until December 30, 1974.
/s s indicate! by the Reactor Supervisor, plans have been tentatively made for the execution of the program during October, 1975.
During this inspection five operators were questioned by the inspector and were found to be knowledgeable of intern::1 security procedures.
Before being authorized unescorted access, experimenters are briefed on applicable sections of security procedures pcrtaining to their work area.
No experimenters were questioned during the inspection, and therefore, no appraisal of this procedure was made by the inspector.
University watchmen are briefed on their duties and spend a min-imum of three days in an on-the-job training program before they conduct unescorted patrols of the laboratory building.
One watchman was interviewed by the inspection and found to be cognizant of his duties.
. University police officers are briefed by reactor staff members in facility security procedures as part of their annual in-service training program.
Additionally, officers are debriefed by reactor personnel at the conclusion of intrusion alarm tests / drills.
Inter-views with two police shift supervisors, two patrol officers and one dispatcher were conducted by the inspector.
All individuals were found to be particularly aware of their responsibilities and duties.
Records Systems The following records for the period of March 26, 1975, (ONRR acceptance / approval date for the Security Plan) through September 22, 1975, were reviewed by the inspector and found to be maintained in accordance with applicable requirements.
Access rosters for the' vital area hgh.$ 'Og " . and A.
material access area g g t,c;yg % M 7 . B.
Visitorc register.
C.
Decumentation of routine security tours and records of tests, inspections and maintenance perf ormed on physical bar rie rs, intrusion alares and commu:ications equipment.
D.
Records of drills and unancicipated irtrusion alarm annunciaticas.
No shipments of SNM have occurred subsequent to the approval of the Security Plan, therefore, applicable records subject to the require-ments of Part 73 were not inspected.
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This period of time has not lapsed and the licensee has not deemed it necessary to perform this audit to date.
Emergency Response and Recovery Procedures Drills are conducted at least annually to assess the effectiveness of security. measures and to appraise the performance of employees and security force personnel.
Additionally, operability of equipment is demonstrated and evaluated.
Results of the drills are recorded and reflect alarm operation, response by reactor operators, response of the University's Police and an overall ev'aluation of the drill.
At about 3:00 p.m., on the first day of the inspection a telephone call was placed by the Reactor Supervisor to the Director of the University's Police Department for the purpose of informing him of a drill which would be executed within the hour.
The Director advised the Reactor Supervisor that information on the drill would not be passed below his Shif t Supervisor whom he wanted present at the reactor prior to the initiation of the drill.
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g s sq'. - wnere eney were met by the reactor's Shif t Supervisor.
Again they ere informed of the drill by the reactor's Shif t Supervisor.
IIe re, an explanation of the drill and a debriefing of the exercise was given by the Reactor Supervisor and the officer's Shift S up e rvi so r, . NRCinspectordisclo@ sed Interviews with the ifficers and their Shift Supervisor by the that t hey we re extremely knowledghle of their duties and responsibilities.
In addition to the i n t e rv i ews, the qW"'*pm n ;dnyu%Mpci+M WUTX77 7" W h k @ k Nny; W - 11 - . %ggzgg 7. ',.o_%wJ mm meQ3 - ewcr/- d_ V .- - --
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officer's M_.-"i from within the containment building. This was performed by con-tacting the officers outside the facility and with the Police Dispatcher who is located about one mile from the reactor.
No discrepancies were noted.
- . - Special instructions have been prepared for testing the[h i l. *,d.
Isi.IUrfg ' Reactor staf f members who are charged with testing the alarm are. required to call the Police Dispatcher and give his/her name, time of the test and( prior to opening the vault door.
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This procedure calls, for 'the use or an'{K[ Qi . Mandjy3 ;.W;, a:,,
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