IR 05000186/1985003
| ML20215J343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1985 |
| From: | Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215J138 | List:
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| References | |
| FOIA-86-421 50-186-85-03-01, 50-186-85-3-1, NUDOCS 8610240399 | |
| Download: ML20215J343 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-186/85003(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Safeguards Group II Licensee:
University of Missouri Columbia, M0 Facility Name:
Research Reactor Facility Inspection At:
Columbia, MO Inspection Conducted:
March 4'-7, 1985 onsite March 11, 1985 at Region III O fice Type of Inspection:
Routine Physical Security Date of Last Physical Security Inspection:
Februa
, 1983 Inspector:
S w i,h Tnc.,9 37,\\ CSS G. L. PYrtle Date Physical Security Inspector N
s Approved By:
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3/II/8
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y'. R. Creed, Chief Date Physical Security Section Inspection Summary Inspection on March 4-7 and 11, 1985 (Report No. 50-186/85003(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Included a review of security plan and implementing procedures; Use and Storage of SNM; Detection Devices and Procedures; Access Controls; Administrative and Security Organization; Communications; and Tests.
The inspection' involved 23 inspect;or-hours by one NRC inspector.
The-inspection began during the day shift.
Results:
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined.
(Details - UNCLASSIFIED )
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R.
Brugger, Ph.D., Director, University of Missouri (Columbia) Research Reactor (MURR)
- D.
Alger, Ph.D., Associate Director, MURR
- A. Bolon, Ph.D;, Chairman of MURR Reactor Advisory Committee (University of Missouri (ROLLA) Nuclear Engineering Facility)
- C. McKibben, Reactor Manager, MURR
- R.
Hultsch, Reactor Physicist, MURR~
J. Watring, Major, University of Missouri (Columbia) Campus Police Department
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
2.
Entrance and Exit Interviews (MC 30703)
The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 above at the conclusion of the inspection.
The licensee representatives were advised of the scope of the inspection and inspection f,indings.
Thev wer advised that no violatinne w 4e noted but the issue of
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lbhould be resolved and that further
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researcn ano alscussion woula be needed.
The licensee representatives were also advised that some further i'nspection effort would be performed at the Region III office and they would be advised of any subsequent findings.
No written material pertaining to the inspection was left with licensee representatives.
The facility manager was contacted by telephone on March 12 and 14, 1985 nd advised that a revision to the security n was needed regarding nd reporting of 70 CFR 73.71 contingencies.
The licensee ay d to submit the plan revision within two months after receit of this inspection report.
Additionally, quantities of SNM allowed outside of a CAA, as identified in Table 1 of the security plan, exceeds regulatory limits (refer to paragraph 3.e of Report Details).
The licensee stated that 10 CFR 73.5
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exemption request would be sent to HQ, NRC within two months after receipt of the inspection report.
3.
General Physical Protection Requirements for Moderate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at Fixed Sites (MC 81480)
The inspector confirmed by observation, record reviews, and interviews that the licensee's physical protection system minimized the possibilities of unauthorized removal of SNM and facilities the location and recovery of missing SNM as required by Section 1.1,'of the licensee's approved Security Plan.
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Security Plan and Implementino Procedures-The licensee submitted a complete revision to the security plan to
.the NRC on June 10, 1983.
The security plan was approved and license Amendment 15, dated August 13, 1983, was published requiring the licensee to comply with the provisions of the new security plan.
No revisions to the security plan have been made since June 10, 1983.
During his-review, the inspector noted two sections of the security plan required revision.
First, Section 12 of the security plan requires 10 CFR 73.71 type of events to be initially reported to NRC Region III.
The requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 indicate that such reports are to be initially made to the NRC emergency operations Second, Section 11 of the security olan states, The
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are equipped wi a
,and damaging Revision to Sectior.
af the security p an is neea'ed to clarify how the will be tested to assure o rability prior to placin _in use wnen the ibuilding is nd in excess of
' grams of U-235 are within the uilding.
The Reactor Manager agreed to submit the required revision, under 10 CFR 50.54(p)
criteria, within two months after receipt of the inspection report.
(186/85-03-01)
The inspection also noted that Table 1 of the security plan allows SNM in excess of regulatory limits to be used or stored in areas outside of a Controlled Access Area (CAA).
Table 1 allows the following amounts of SNM to be stored outside of a CAA':
'* Plutonium 350 grams or less Uranium-235 350/ grams or.less of 20% or more enrichment in U-235 isotope.
' Uranium-233 350f' grams
J* Uranium-235, Uranium-233 350 grams or less according to the and Plutonium in formula:
grams = grams contained combination U-235 + grams U-233 + grams l
plutonium (U-235 portion enriched to 20% or more)
'500' grams or less of contained Plutonium I
neutron sources Although the security plan allows the above limits to be outside of a CAA, 10 CFR 73.67 allows only less than 15 grams of the above SNM to be in use or storage outside of a CAA.
Additionally, asterisked quantities exceed current license authorized limits.
It should be noted that all non self protecting SNM in excess of 15 grams was used or stored in CAAs regardless of the security plan criteria and no possessed SNM exceeded license. limits.
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The facility manager stated that an exemption undsr 10 CFR 73.5 criteria would be requested from HQ, NRC within two months after receipt of this inspection report.
This issue will be monitored by Region III.
(186/85-03-02)
b.
Use and Storage of Special Nuclear Material (SNM)
The inspector confirmed by observation, interviews, and document review that no SNM in excess ofs350' grams was stored or used outside of desianated CAAs SNM in excess of.350' grams was stored within the @ G M ' w h in accordance with Section 2.2 bf the licensee's security plan.
No use areas with over 350 cjrams of unirradiated SNM were established during this inspection period.
One use area containing approximately.27. grams of U-235 (> 20% enrichment) had been established as a temporary CAA and controlled in accordance with the security plan criteria.
The licensee har designated the dt h N A ' N.
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ty@gADWANW, as temporary CAAs when over 350 grams of unirradiated is within 'hese areas.
Smaller temporary CAAs can be established
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with use of permanent or temporary barriers.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's analysis to determine that fuel elements within the reactor and spent fuel pool were maintained at radiation levels that constitute self protection (> 100 R/Hr at three feet).
The licensee conducted an experimer.t in 1979 to deter-mine tne length of time that a fuel element must be operated at 10 MW before the element becomes activated so that exposure at three feet in air would be 100 R/hr and the length of time that the exposure level could be maintained before decaying below 100 R/hr.
The experiment concluded that a fuel element that operates for 5.3 minutes at 10 Kd is self protecting for a minimum of 13 days.
Further analysis concluded that fuel elements that operates for one week at 10 HJ would be self protecting for several years.
The inspector's review of the MWD log showed that all fuel elements in the reactor and spent fuel pool had been operated at 10 MW in excess of one week.
c.
Detection Devices and Procedures The inspector confirmed by observati,ory, interviews aqd record revic that the intrusion detection device C a n
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_syst.em controi _ unit was also avo6i gle.
Interviews with the campus La '
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%ere logged and responses were made False alwme, werginfrequent and ther thada listing of f '
3 personnel who were authorized to activate / inactivate the intrusion alarm system.
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The inspector also confirmed that the dedicated from
,the was by requesting a I to be disconnected.
The system functioned as aesignea.
The inspector also confirmed that weekly checks of the Mwere performed by reactor operatore and lo ged in their log book.
Monthly inventories of the were also performed.
A review of the reactor operator logs and campus police patrol records showed that periodic surveillances were per med bv the reactor operators and campus police.
Additionallv.
urveiljance can be maintained at the coor o f'
the building and the exterior and interior of the[
ystems were functional when checked by the inspector.
d.
Access Controls The as the only hat required access controls under security plan criteria at the time of the inspection.
The
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inspector confirmed that personnel authorized access to the @
$ were designated in writing and screening requirements required by Section 4.1 of the security plan were completed.
A review of visitor records showed that visitors are routinely escorted as appropriate.
The inspector also confirmed through interviews with the Reactor Manager that thef for the.
had been changed in April 1984, after an inaividual with knowledge of the[ 6 terminated employment at the Reactor Facility.
After discussions with the Reactor Manager, he agreeq +o document. tes of future hanges to CAAs in the log or other appropriate record.
Procedures for. random f
leaving'CAAs'had been developed and appeared adequate.
e.
Administrative and Security Organization The inspector confirmed through interviews that the existing admini-strative and security organization conformed to the organizational structure depicted in figure 5 of the licensee's approved security plan.
Durin0 interviews with Univegsity Police and_ Reactor personnel, the inspector verified that the nMSVWW-m jwould respond to the Reactor Facility in an expeditious manner., Additionally, other local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) suchastgeff M
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Support. agreements betweerkt.he campus police andf_ -
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l The University Police _ Department consists ofh}Section consists ull-time commis-sioned officers and
'ispatchers.
The Watchmen of watchmen and p upe rvi s ol".
The police department performs of the reactor f acility in addition to their response function.
The campus police department manning level appeared adequate to fulfill response and patrol commitments.
Interviews with the campus police 1showed that she was thoroughly familiar with response procedures for contingencies involving the Reactor Facility.
A current copy of response proce-dures for the Reactor Facility could not be located at the campus police dispatch office.
The Reactor Manager stated that copies of the current procedures (dated March and December 1984) were provided to the campus police but additional copies would be provided if necessary.
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Interviews with the assistant director of the campus police depart-ment indicated that the campus police receive the Reactor Facility orientation training on an annual basis.
Close and effective liaison appeared to exist between the Reactor facility personnel and the campus police department.
f.
Communications The inspector confirmec that the communications capabilities described in Section 6.0 of the security' plan were functional.
Section 15.af the previous inspection report (No. 50-186/83-01)
noted that the licensee was considering placement of The g.
Tests
During the time of this inspection, the licensee was implementing surveilla e procedurej as the p imary access controls for the g since the facility was normally continuously manned.
Intrusion detection equipment was also used as an additional level of secuy.jtv but did not require weekly testing.
Functional tests of the t%;M,e' w @ 'ntrusion detection equipment showed l
that the system tunctionea as designed.
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1/N Intrusion detection ecuioment for the yL % O.due to Tne oesign or tne syste?-C 1..
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licensee will address tnis issue in a security plan revision (refer to paragraph 3.a for related information)' 6 building has
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It should_fe noted that the intrusion detection equipment for the not had to be used due to no unirradiated3t4M in excess of 350 grams be i ng l e f t w i t h i n t hM.ii;.,7 f, ]M" p l d i ng.
The licensee has, on 3 b'
some occasions, used 'tle M UU -
building intrusion detection I
system as a redundant leCel of security when the % m W El building has oeen unmanned.
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ttAR 9 710!$
Docket No. 50-186 University of Missouri ATTN:
Dr. Robert M. Brugger Director, Research Reactor Facility Research Park Columbia, MO 65201 Gentlemen:
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This refers to the routine physical security inspection conducted by Mr. G. L. Pirtle of this office on March 4-7 and 11, 1985, of activities at the University of Missouri (Columbia) Research Reactor authorized by NRC License No. R-103 and to the discussion of our findings with you and members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations ~, and interviews with personnel.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
Our inspection did note that a security plan revision was needed to address three issues identified in Paragraph 3.a.
of the report details.
If our understanding of your actions in reference to those issues is incorrect, please advise us within 30 days after receipt of this report.
Areas examined during this inspection concern a subject matter which is exempt from disclosure according to Section 73.21(c)(2) of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 73, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
This information must be handled and protected in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21.
Consequently, our report of this inspection will not be placed in the Public Document Room.
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University of Missouri
WAR 2 71985 We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, b.
William L. Axelson; Chief Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. 50-186/85003(DRSS)
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(UNCLASSIFIED )
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