IR 05000186/1993004
| ML20058E518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1993 |
| From: | Cox C, Mccormick, Steven Orth, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058E516 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-186-93-04, 50-186-93-4, NUDOCS 9312070040 | |
| Download: ML20058E518 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-186/93004(DRSS)
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Docket No. 50-186 License No. R-103 Licensee: University of Missouri - Columbia
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Facility Name: Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR)
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Inspection At:
Research Reactor Facility, Columbia, Missouri
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Inspection Conducted:
November 1-5, 1993 l
N7//f7 Inspectors:
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Non-Power Reactor Inspector dam
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Non-Power Reactor Inspector Date
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Orth u /W!h)
Radiation Specialist Date'
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/d lT)h m[ck-fyv I
s Approved By:
.14. McCormick-Bargbr, hief
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Radiological Programs Section 1 Date'
Inspection Summarv
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Inspection on November I-5. 1993 (Report No. 50-186/93004(DRSS))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection to review actions on:
organization, logs, and records (Inspection Procedure (IP) 39745); review and i
audit (IP 40745); surveillance (IP 61745); procedures (IP 42745); experiments i
(IP 69745); requalification training (IP 41745); fuel handling activities (IP
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60745); emergency planning (IP 82745); radiation controls (IP 83743);
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environmental protection (IP 80745); transportation activities (IP 86740);
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licensee event followup (IP 92700); followup of previous inspection findings
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(IP 92701); corrective actions for violations (IP 92702); and periodic and i
special reports (IP 90713).
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Results: Of the 15 areas inspected, no violations or followup items were identified. The overall operation of the facility remained good. Operating
logs and records were very well kept. Meeting minutes were very good and l
reflected open discussions. Housekeeping had noticeably declined but mostly
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could be attributed to remodeling work on the beam port floor.
Two inspection -
i followup items and four licensee event reports were closed.
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9312070040 931124
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
University of Missouri-Columbia
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- B. Bezenek, Operations Shift Supervisor
- J. Ernst, Health Physics Manager
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- S. Gunn, Manager, Services Applications
- C. McKibben, Associate Director, MURR
- J. McCormick, Vice Provost for Research
- W. Meyer, Reactor Manager, MURR
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- J. Rhyne, Director, MURR
- J. Schuh, Health Physicist
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Additional technical, operational, and administrative personnel were i
contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
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- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on November 5, 1993.
2.
General
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This inspection on November 1-5, 1993, was conducted to examine the l
research reactor program at the University of Missouri-Columbia.
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facility was toured shortly after arrival. The general housekeeping of l
the facility was adequate, but there was a noticeable decline from
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previous inspections. Most of the deficiencies in housekeeping were due
to the remodeling work that was on-going in the Reactor Building and the i
beam port floor.
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The reactor continued to operate on a weekly cycle, shutting down each i
Monday for refueling and/or maintenance outages. There were 21
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unscheduled shutdowns (15 scrams and 6 rod run-ins) since the last
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inspection. This is an increase from the 19 unscheduled shutdowns
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reported in the last inspection period. The unscheduled shutdowns were primarily the result of equipment problems or spurious signals.
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shutdowns were from spurious signals associated with the process
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indication and alarm circuitry for the Reactor Loop B Flow instrumentation.
The problem with the Reactor Loop B Flow signals was
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eventually traced to an intermittent ground in the instrument chassis
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that housed the power supply and square root converter.
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During the course of the inspection, the inspectors observed a reactor
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startup, health physics surveys, a reactor coolant sample and analysis, l
and the stack filter changeout.and analysis.
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Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations (IP 92702)
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(0 pen) Violation (50-186/92002-01 and -02):
" Failure to follow shipping and labeling requirements."
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l As part of the response to the violations identified in the December 2, f
1992, NRC letter, a Shipping Task Force (STF) was established by the licensee.
The STF's charter was to conduct a global review of MURR's l
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shipping activities to determine if there were generic weaknesses'in the program that had contributed to the previous violations. The Irradiation Subcommittee (IS), a subcommittee of the STF, was formed in
December 1992 to respond to concerns raised by task force members about the accuracy of irradiation target identification and the accuracy of
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the shipping papers and package labels in identifying isotopes and curie
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contents of the packages.
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The inspectors reviewed the progress made by the STF and IS.
A new
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position was created in the Service Applications Isotopes (SAI) group for a supervisor to direct the group-reviewing irradiation requests. A person within the facility with previous shipping experience was chosen to fill the new position. The supervisor was responsible for developing
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and using the new target certification forms for vendors to certify their target material. As of October 1,1993,_ the facility no longer accepted target materials from vendors who had not complied with j
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providing target certification information, either using the Missouri
University Research Reactor (MURR) form or in another format that would
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provide the same information. Some problems were noted in handling in-house irradiation requests. As the size of research project samples increased for irradiation, new Reactor Use Requests (RURs) were normally
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generated to account for the change in geometry and radiological i
hazards. Since the original RUR had been changed, this sometimes led to
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researchers assigning incorrect RURs to irradiation requests. The Reactor Manager was working with the SAI group to develop better methods i
to handle in-house irradiation requests.
i Another new tool developed by the STF to identify and correct shipping i
problems was the Incident Report (IR) system. The IR system was i
designed as a corrective action program to document and track problems identified in the shipping process. An IR would be initiated describing-the problem, identifying corrective actions, and identifying a root ~
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cause. The inspectors reviewed selected irs generated. The system
appeared to be working well. However, some root cause analyses appeared to be superficial with the root causes simply being a re-statement of the problem the IR was identifying.
All outgoing packages were required to be screened by the NaI detector described in inspection report No. 50-186/93001(DRSS). The licensee stated that the Nal detector was performing better than expected.
However, test data demonstrating exactly how well ard with what degree of resolution the NaI detector was performing was not available to the inspectors. The STF was investigating other methods to improve quality control of target identification and other shipping areas. One method discussed with the inspectors was having the facility subject new
vendors to more stringent target verification methodology while using i
the Nal detector results to identify any problems with the target material supplied from vendors with previous good standing.
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Action on Previous inspection Items (IP 927011
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a.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item (50-186/93001-01):
" Control of l
RUR summary sheets". The f.eactor Manager reviewed all RUR summary sheets to determine if they properly reflected the RURs. A review j
date and the Reactor Manager's initials documented the review.
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The RUR summary sheets were then incorporated into a controlled.
document.
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(Closed) Open Item (50-186/88001-01):
" Assignment of byproduct
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material to broad-scope or reactor license".
A new broad-scope
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license was issued to the facility in 1993 that addressed the
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assignment of byproduct material. Byproduct material produced by
the reactor would be assigned to the reactor license.
Byproduct
material not produced by the reactor would be assigned to.the
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broad-scope license or other applicable material licenses.
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Licensee Event Reports (IP 92700)
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a.
(Closed) LER 92-03: Reactor operation with the regulating blade
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inoperative.
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On November 4, 1992, a "95% DOWNSCALE" annunciator alarm was received while the reactor was in automatic mode at full power j
operations. An immediate investigation by the shift supervisor
indicated that the regulating blade drive was not operating
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properly, and the reactor was promptly shutdown by a manual scram.
l Electronics technicians determined that a set screw had become i
i loose which provided the mechanical connection between the drive shaft and gearbox. The regulating blade drive was removed; the
drive repaired by filing a flat area on the motor shaft'to provide
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a better seating surface for the set screw, and the set screw was
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reinstalled with Loctite. The drive was reinstalled and tested-i satisfactorily.
V This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) LER 93-01: Reactor operation with an automatically
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closing reactor containment isolation door in a degraded
condition.
l The reactor was operated from 1604 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.10322e-4 months <br /> July 12, 1993, to 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> July 19, 1993, and from 2011 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.651855e-4 months <br /> July 19, 1993, to 0400
hours July 26, 1993, with reactor containment integrity in a state i
of reduced effectiveness. The seal on door 505, one of two redundant automatically closing doors in the ventilation system
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south plenum, did not inflate when the door closed. The backup
door to door 505 and the two doors in the ventilation north plenum i
(door 504 and backup) were operable during these periods.
j Therefore, the reactor isolation system was capable of performing
its function.
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The first period of reduced effectiveness.was detected on July 19,
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1993. The reactor isolation was initiated as part of the annual
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emergency preparedness drill, and door 505 did not indicate f
closed. Troubleshooting determined that door 505's seal failed to inflate because a rotary cam was misadjusted failing to engage a
microswitch that would have caused to seal to inflate. After re-
adjustment, both door 505 and door 504 were tested three times
satisfactorily.
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The second period of reduced effectiveness was on July 26, 1993,
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during pre-startup checks. Door 505, again, failed to indicate i
closed during a test of the reactor isolation system.
Troubleshooting determined the cause to be a loose sprocket that
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l failed to drive the rotary cam, identified during the first event.
l The sprocket had become loose as a result of a missing sprocket to
shaft woodruff key. The sprocket was modified to accept a set screw and realigned. Door 504-was inspected, and a similar problem was noted. However, the sprocket on door 504 was frozen-on the shaft in the correct alignment enabling the cam to actuate the microswitch. The sprocket was modified, as in door 505, and realigned.
Subsequently, both doors tested satisfactorily.
The_ facility reviewed both events with the operations and
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maintenance groups and recognized that thorough troubleshooting in
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the first event should had prevented the second event.
Discussions were conducted as a lessons learned and included the importance of root cause determination.
It was also determined
that the preventive maintenance (PM) procedure BCl-S3 was too
general and did not provide specific guidance for the semiannual
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inspection of the limit switches and drive mechanisms. The
procedure was revised to include a more detailed checklist for the
inspection. A general review of all PM procedures was conducted l
by the licensee to determine if other procedures should be
upgraded.
i This item is closed.
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(Closed) LER 93-02: Reactor operation with one of four primary coolant low pressure scram setpoints not within Technical Specification (TS) limits.
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On March 16, 1993, while performing low pressure scram compliance testing, the scram setpoint for Primary Coolant Low Pressure provided by pressure transmitter 944B (PT-944B) was found to be 2.5 pounds per square inch (psi) below the Limiting Safety System Setpoint (LSSS) of 75 psia required by TS 2.2.
The reactor safety system was still capable of performing its safety function if an actual low pressure condition had occurred, since there were three low pressure scrams remaining from two other pressure transmitters and a pressure switch.
i Troubleshooting indicated that the PT-944B meter relay failed to provide a trip signal.
The meter was replaced, and the low pressure scram passed the corpliance test. The apparent cause for the failure was slower than normal meter movement.
Based on a 27 year operating history of the meter relay trip units at the facility, no generic problem could be determined.
i This item is closed.
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(Closed) LER 93-03: Reactor operation with the low Primary Coolant flow scram setpoint of one of five safety system channels
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not within TS limits due to equipment failure.
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!o On September 7, 1993, while performing compliance testing of the l
Primary Coolant flow safety channel connected to flow transmitter
'7 FT-912E, the setpoint for the low flow scram for heat exchanger 503B was below the LSSS of 1625 gallons per minute (gpm) required
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by TS 2.2.
The reactor safety system was_ capable of performing.
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its safety function if an actual low flow condition had occurred j
while operating at full power, because the remaining four safety system channels that provide scrams for low Primary Coolant Flow
were operable.
Troubleshooting indicated that a feedback capacitor had failed in
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the alarm trip unit amplifier. A spare unit was installed and j
passed the compliance test. As a precaution, the licensee scheduled the replacement of the feedback capacitor in each of the i
three remaining trip unit amplifiers during compliance testing
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scheduled for December 1993.
j This item is closed.
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6.
Oroanization. Loos. and Records (IP 39745)
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No major changes were noted in the licensee's staff with the exception of the new supervisor's position created within the SAI group noted in Section 3.
One senior reactor operator transferred from the operation's shift crew to become the beam port floor supervisor, and two new reactor i
operators were hired since the last inspection. The organization was verified to be consistent with the Technical Specifications (TS) and Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The minimum staffing requirements were verified to be met during reactor operations and fuel handling or refueling operations by actual observation and log reviev s.
Selected reactor operator logs for 1993 were reviewed with no cor.cerns I
identified. The licensee records continued to be well-maintained.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Reviews and Audits (IP 40750)
The Reactor Advisory Committee (RAC) met on a quarterly basis as required by TS.
The Isotope Use, Safety, and Procedures Subcommittees meeting minutes and the progress of the STF were reviewed by the RAC.
The inspectors reviewed meeting minutes, which included candid discussions by the committee members and guests.
Several meeting minutes were revised to include concerns from various committee members.
A concern was raised by the Reactor Manager during the April 28, 1993,_
meeting regarding a possible TS violation. The meeting minutes indicated that an experiment carrier was used to contain several experiments. That raised a concern about a possible violation of TS 3.6 9 regarding a potential of one experiment causing another to fail (loss of encapsulation).
Further review indicated that the experiments
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on the carrier were double encapsulated and did not pose a violation of TS 3.6.g.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Reoualification Trainina (IP 41745)
The inspectors reviewed procedures, logs, and training records and interviewed personnel to verify that the requalification training program was being carried out in conformance with the facility's approved plan. The control room logs were also reviewed, which indicated that licensed operators had maintained their licenses. active for 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Procedures (IP 42745)
Meeting minutes indicated that procedure changes were reviewed and approved by the Procedures Subcommittee.
The inspectors reviewed the startup procedure during a reactor startup to verify procedure compliance.
Several minor discrepancies were noted.
The Reactor Manager stated that the startup procedure would be revised'
to provide clarification of the requirements for conducting a calorimeter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Surveillances (IP 61745)
The inspectors reviewed surveillance records and control room logs and verified that the required surveillances were completed.
Surveillance records were very well kept.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Experiments (IP 69745)
The RAC reviewed and approved all experiments through the Safety Subcommittee. The inspectors reviewed RUR 292 for a proprietary process and RUR 301 for chromium production. The RURs were well written and questions asked by the committee members were adequately addressed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Fuel Handlino (IP 60745)
The inspectors reviewed log entries for fuel handling activities and noted that the appropriate entries were made and that minimum staffing requirements were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Emeraency Plannina (IP 82745)
No changes in the Emergency Response Organization were noted.
The required annual training requirements were met. The annual exercise was
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held on July 19, 1993, and the scenario involved a simulated bomb threat. An additional drill was held on April 19, 1993, (at the request
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of the Columbia Fire Department) that involved a transportation accident
involving radioactive material. The emergency kits were inventoried
quarterly, and the emergency plan reviewed annually, as required.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Radiation Control (IP 837431
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The radiation protection program had not significantly changed since the
last inspection. Postings, labeling and surveys were reviewed during.
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tours of the facility with no problems noted. The inspectors performed
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confirmatory contamination-and dose rate measurements which agreed with
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the licensee's postings and surveys. Area radiation monitors tnd.
portable instruments were calibrated as required. -The licensee
maintained a computerized portable instrument' inventory which contained-p the frequency of calibration and indicated instruments that were in need of calibration.
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r The inspectors reviewed the performance tests and calibrations of the l
portal monitor and the hand and foot monitors.
The licensee weekly i
tested the alarm setpoints of the monitors with a suitable radioactive
source. The monitors were calibrated on a semiannual frequency and i
followed by a alarm test to verify the adequacy of the calibration.
The inspectors observed the collection of a pool water sample and the l
collection of the stack charcoal and air particulate filters. Overall, l
licensee personnel demonstrated good sampling technique; however, more
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care was warranted when changing the particulate filter to. ensure that
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loose particulate material was not removed through physical l
manipulations. Tne operator performing the pool water analysis -
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demonstrated adequate analytical abilities in the radiochemical
separutions with some minor exceptions. Additional emphasis was
warranted in radiological practices.
The licenste calibrated the high purity germanium (HPGe) detector with a i
certified calibration source in the pool water geometry,10 milliliter.
l (ml) liquid contained in a vial. The remainder of the licensee's
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geometries were prepared by quantifying A liquid via the pool wate" geometry and either diluting the liquid to the proper geometry or
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imparting the liquid onto a filter media, as'in the case of the air.
l particulate and charcoal filter geometries. The inspectors discussed.
the overall dependence of all the licensee's efficiency calibrations to the 10 m1 liquid geometry calibration. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' concerns and indicated that a new,. certified, 10 ml liquid standard would be purchased annually. The licensee also agreed that.the preparation of the charcoal filter standard would be proceduralized and -
the 10 mi vial efficiency calibration would be tested against the 10 ml l
vial standard prior to quantifying liquids for new geometries. The inspectors abc discussed with the licensee the practice of quantifying a gas using a liquid geometry. The licensee and inspectors agreed that the simulation should have introduced only a minor, conservative error.
The licensee had ordered a certified gas standard for use in future calibrations.
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The licensee conducted weekly performance tests of the HPGe detector
with a point source. The results were required to fall within a_three
standard deviation band to ensure proper performance.
If the results I
were outside of the band, the licensee would recalibrate the detector or
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take appropriate measures to resolve the problem.
The inspectors i
reviewed the licensee's control chart and noted that the three standard l
deviation limits appeared excessive for the plotted data. The licensee
indicated that the limits were not dynamic but agreed to calculate new
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limits, periodically, to ensure propec statistics.
j The proportional counters were calibrated on an annual frequency using i
alpha and beta emitting sources. Weekly, the licensee performed an efficiency test and a statistical test of the detectors. The counters
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were recalibrated when the tests indicated a performance problem.
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inspectors reviewed the results and no problems were identified.
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The inspectors reviewed external dose records with respect to the
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requirements of 10 CFR 20. All doses were within the 10 CFR 20 limits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Environmental Protection (IP 80745)
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Liauid Effluents i
The licensee discharged 0.215 millicurie (mci) (7.95 megaBequerels (MBq)) of activity in liquid effluents, including tritium, for l
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June 1992 through June 1993. The inspectors reviewed the i
licensee's liquid effluent calculation form, used for analysis and
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discharge of liquids, and noted one discrepancy concerning the activity units on one column. The licensee issued a standing order, correcting this during the inspection. Although the column was mislabeled, no problems were identified in the resultant.
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calculations.
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Airborne Effluents The licensee monitored stack effluents via a particulate, iodine, i
and gas monitor. The monitor was calibrated on a semiannual frequency using standards quantified by the HPGe spectrophoto-meter. During the calibration, the individual detectors were
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isolated, and known amounts of radioactivity were quantified.
Based on the measured activities of the standards, the licensee j
calculated and trended the efficiency of each detector to identify possible detector degradation. Overall, these trends did not exhibit any indications of detector problems.
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The stack monitor's air particulate and charcoal filters were collected weekly.
The licensee analyzed the activities of the filters and entered the results into a computer program which summed the activities. The inspectors reviewed the calculations and did not find any discrepancies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Transportation Activities (IP 86740)
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The inspectors reviewed the records of two spent fuel shipments made in 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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17.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports (IP 90713)
The inspectors reviewed the 1992 annual report and found the submittal to be timely and to meet the information requirements in the TS. Two
events identified in the annual report were reviewed. On July 6,.1993, l
an anti-siphon high level rod run-in occurred during a normal startup
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after a scheduled maintenance shutdown. With the reactor subtritical,-
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operators drained water from the anti-siphon system, reset the run-in, and monitored the system for leakage.
Leakage was indicated, and.the
reactor was shutdown to investigate the cause of the leak. The two
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valves were visually inspected while operated both pneumatically and
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manually and were found to be intact and operating. freely. The primary system pressure was increased to normal pressure, and no: leakage was
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indicated. This was sa isolated event where one or both of the valves did not seat properly.
Review of the maintenance machinery history
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identified routine maintenance on the valve linkage.
Valve repair was completed using the Special Maintenance Procedure No. 10.
Inspection of the typical valve's 0-ring seals indicated no procurement or material problems.
The second ever.t occurred on August 16, 1993. A rod run-in of an unknown origin occurred shortly after a normal reactor startup had been completed. No annunciation of the rod run-in occurred; all other reactor parameters were normal. The operators had just completed a
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routine potentiometer adjustment on wide range channel monitor Number 4.
Investigation-of the reactor systems did not identify ~ any problems with the reactor and auxiliary systems. Electronics technicians could not'
-i reproduce the malfunction or determine the cause of the rod run-in.
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Subsequently, the wide range channel tested satisfactory..
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No violations or deviations wera identified.
18.
Exit Interview (IP 30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in l
Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5,1993.
The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and
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discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee
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acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the
information disclosed during the inspection could be considered
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proprietary in nature.
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