GO2-83-113, Final Deficiency Rept,Condition 302 Re Mods Covering HPCS Second Level Undervoltage Protection Producing Potential Conditions for HPCS Pump to Fail to Start on Valid Initiation Signal.Design Revised

Final Deficiency Rept,Condition 302 Re Mods Covering HPCS Second Level Undervoltage Protection Producing Potential Conditions for HPCS Pump to Fail to Start on Valid Initiation Signal.Design Revised

ML20083G688
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/09/1983
From:	Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 302, GO2-83-1138, NUDOCS 8401040310
Download: ML20083G688 (3)

Text

, l Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland. Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 December 9, 1983 G02-83-ll38 Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 4 Subject NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 - LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITION #302 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM (HPCS) P-1

Reference:

Telecon QA2-83-220, dated 11/30/83, R.T. Johnson to Bob Dodds, same subject.

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was notified by the reference of the subject Condition. Attached is the Project's final report on Condition #302.

If there are any questions regarding this subject, please contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager, at (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.

G. C. Sorensen Manager, Regulatory Programs JGT/kd

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10CFR50.55E, CONDITION 302 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM /(HPCS) UNDERV0LTAGE RELAY PROBLEM FINAL REPORT Description of the Deficiency:

The modifications covering HPCS second level undervoltage protection produced the potential under certain (power bus voltage) conditions for the HPCS pump to fail to start on a valid initiation signal. The condition was identified and confirmed through Startup Testing.

Safety Implicat' ions:

All the emergen:y core cooling systems including HPCS conforn to all licensing requirements and good design practices of isolatior, separa-tion and single failure considerations. Safe shutdown can therefore be accomplished without HPCS in service (Ref: Section 6.3.1.1.2, Page 6.3-2 of FSAR).

The condition does represent a deficiency in the final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does not conform to the criteria and basis stated in the Safety Analysis Report Section 8.3, Page 8.3-4a. Tne condition, therefore, per PMI-4-10 is considered a reportable deficiency.

Cause of the Deficiency:

The second level of UV protection was added by GE at the Supply System's request in response to new NRC requirements. The original modification was defined by GE FDI-TCKZ. As part of the design review and improvement process, FDDR-KK1-1214 Revisions 0 and 1, were issued to adjust dropout voltages and the timing sequence for tripping the main supply circuit breaker and starting the diesel generator. The modifications shown on the FDDR degraded the ability of the undervoltage auxiliary relays to reset on restoration of bus voltage by the diesel generator. This deficiency was identified during testing.

Corrective Action:

The deficiency documented in Startup Problem Report E-3798 has been dispositioned by Supply System Engineering in cooperation with General Electric Engineering, both site and San Jose. GE has issued Field Design Disposition Request (FDDR) KKl-1214, Revision 2 to rerise the design by inserting contacts from the normal supply breaker in series with the undervoltage relay contacts.

Page 2 The design revision has been implemented and tested and demonstrated to operate in a manner. which provides the required undervoltage protection and HPCS pump start on appropriate operational control signals.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:_

Startup testing is intended to provide functional verification of the design, and remains a principal tool in identifying potential probl ems.

The design is unique to WNP-2 and with both design ar.d ' testing nearing canpletion, no further action to prevent recurrence is considered necessary.

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