GO2-82-605, Final Deficiency Rept 179 Re Containment Penetration Piping/Valves.Initially Reported on 820218.Supply Sys Engineering Evaluation Rept Determined That Ae Properly Specified Temp for Piping & Valves

Final Deficiency Rept 179 Re Containment Penetration Piping/Valves.Initially Reported on 820218.Supply Sys Engineering Evaluation Rept Determined That Ae Properly Specified Temp for Piping & Valves

ML20063G884
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/13/1982
From:	Matlock R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, G2-82-605, GO2-82-605, NUDOCS 8207290236
Download: ML20063G884 (4)

Text

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e i Docket No 50-397

50. 55 (e) Report E/ pg Washington Public Power Supply System /R>

P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 N, /

'9 Docket No. 50-397 /// ,.

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Q July 13, 1982 G02-82-605 Mr. R. H. Engelken U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 10CFR50.55(e) P0TENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITION #179 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PIPING / VALVES

References:

a) Telephone conversation between R.T. Johnson (Supply System) and J. Elin (NRC) on February 18, 1982, Telecon

1. QA2-82-048 b) Letter G02-82-0331, dated March 19, 1982, R.G. Matlock to R.H. Engelken, same subject c) Letter G02-82-0407, dated April 30, 1982, R.G. Matlock to R.H. Engelken, same subject.

In the above referenced telecon the Supply System informed your office of a potentially reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e) and refer-ences b) and c) were interim status reports on the identified condition.

Attachment 1 to this letter provides the Supply System's final report on the above caption condition. The attachment includes a restatement of the problem and a description of the safety implications associated I with failure of a containment penetration. Attachment 2 depicts a typi-cal containment configuration for reference.

If there are any questions on this item, please contact R. T. Johnson

[ at (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.

l a

. Mctlock b .

ogram Director, WNP-2 LCF/kd Attachments: 1. Final Report

2. Typical Containment Configuration cc: W.S. Chin, BPA - Site R.A. Feil, NRC Resident Inspector - Site A. Forrest, Burns and Roe - HAP 0 N.D. Lewis, NRC J. Plunkett, NUS Corp.

R.E. Snaith, Burns and Roe - NY V. Stello, NRC -)

WNP-2 Files lC /

8207290236 820713 PDR ADOCK 05000397 L

S PDR ' b2 '/'H ,

ATTACHMENT 1 FINAL REPORT SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-387 - LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #179 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PIPING / VALVES Potential Problem The Architect Engineer may have incorrectly specified design temperatures for certain containment penetration piping and valves. Approximately 21 penetrations have been identified in which piping and/or valves, considered aspartofthecontainmentboundary,werespecifiedwithasystegdesign temperature lower than the containment design temperature of 340 F. for the drywell or 275 0 F. for the wetwell.

Because the process fluid temperature was used rather than the containment design temperature, the piping and valves serving as containment boundaries may not neet the post accident function requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NE.

Safety Implications A failure of containment piping or isolation valving in the post-LOCA contain-ment environment could result in the loss of certain ECCS functions, a re-lease of radioactivity to the environs in excess of 10CFR100 limits, as well as other implications dependent upon the particular penetration involved.

Action Taken The AE has conducted an extensive evaluation to confirm that the piping attached to containment penetrations was designed to the applicable Code requirements of ASME Section III. The evaluation indicated the following Subsections of ASME Section III were utilized for the design of containment i penetrations:

l e The Architect Engineer did utilize the applicable design rules of ASME Section III, Subsection NE-3620 for the design of containment piping pene-trations.

l e ASME Section III, Subsection NE-3620 requires NB-3600 or NC-3600 to be applied to the design of piping systems in the containment system.

e The above subsections of ASME Section III do require a stress evaluation for all various postulated combinations of normal and upset conditions, but do not require a stress evaluation for faulted secondary stresses (as in a post-LOCA condition). Additionally, the application of post-LOCA l environmental effects, as referenced in ASME Section III, Subsection NG-3213.9, is not expected to cause a failure.

With respect to the affected containment penetration isolation valves, the Architect Engineer evaluation of the seismic stress reports and/or valve code data reports for each containment penetration isolation valve, indicates the valves meet ASME Section III Subsection NB-3500 or NC-3500 requirements.

4 Final Report Page Two Current Status Supply System Engineering has completed an evaluation of the report submitted by the Architect Engineer and has determined that the Architect Engineer did properly specify temperatures for piping and valves attached to contain-ment penetrations for post-LOCA accident conditions.

Valves - All of the subject valves are ASME III, Class 2, only one of which is an active component inside containment. Valve suppliers were required to meet the pressure-temperature requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB-3500, NC-3500 or ANSI B16.5, as applicable, all of which exceed post-LOCA accident temperature requirements. Additionally, as required by the appli-cable contract specification, Seismic Class I valves were designed to with-stand minimum end loads of 750z foot pounds moments and 75z pound forces applied simultaneously in all three orthogonal directions. This resulting load is equivalent to a pipe stress of 15,600 psi. The above design require-ments provide assurance of valve operability under stress due to the conserva-tism used in the design and always results in a greater stress margin for valves as compared to piping.

Piping - All of the subject penetrations and piping are ASME III, Class 2.

In piping analysis, maximum stress generally occurs at points of higher stress intensified locations such as elbows or tees; a Stress Intensification Factor (SIF) of 2.5 is quite typical at such locations. The ASME Class 2 allowable thermal piping stress for carbon steel is 22,500 psi. This allowable divided by the typical SIF of 2.5 produces a pure piping stress limit of 9,000 psi, which is much less than the equivalent valve stress limit of 15,600 psi.

Therefore, the allowable stress for valves is much higher than the maximum allowable stress produced by the piping system; the piping system can not produce thermal stress on the associated containment isolation valves in I

excess of valve design loads. Consequently, piping loads will not affect valve operability during a post-LOCA accident condition.

l Based on the above, the Supply System has determined this item to be not l reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

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Temperature 3400F 2750 F i Accident Pressure 34.7 PSIG 34.7 PSIG ,

Design Pressure 45 PSIG 45 PSIG

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