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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARDD-99-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9910281999-10-28028 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review DD-99-12 Has Expired.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 991028 ML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217G9491999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Exemption from Requirements of 1-CFR50,App E, Section IV.F.2.c,re Conduct of full-participation Exercise in Sept 1999,at Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20217D9671999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Transcript of Public Meeting Held by NRC Staff & NNECO on 990825 at Waterford,Connecticut on Decommissioning Program for Millstone,Unit 1.Without Encl ML20217D3011999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990118 Request for Amend to License NPF-49 to Allow full-core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offloads to Spent Fuel Pool During Core Offload Events ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC ML20217B4711999-10-0404 October 1999 Informs That Staff Did Not Identify Any Safety Concerns Re Licensee Proposals to Modify Commitments Made for Action Items 4.2.1,4.2.2,4.5.1 & 4.5.2 of GL 83-28 by Providing Addl Justifications or Safety Bases for Changes ML20212K1241999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to Chairman Jackson,Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performace of Millstone to Ensure That Public Health & Safety,Adequately Protected ML20212J3051999-10-0101 October 1999 Discusses GL 97-06 Re Degradation of SG Internals,Dtd 971230.GL Requested Each PWR Licensee to Submit Info That Will Enable NRC Staff to Verify Whether PWR SG Internals Comply & Conform to Current Licensing Basis for Facilities ML20212L2081999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance ML20212J9991999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Clinton,H Clinton, Chairman Jackson &/Or Wd Travers Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Plant to Ensure That Public Health & Safety Adequately Protected ML20212L1971999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Chairman Jackson & Commissioners Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance to Ensure Public Health & Safety ML20212J2451999-10-0101 October 1999 Informs That Util 980807 & 990629 Responses to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at NPPs Acceptable.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Units 2 &3 ML20212L1831999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Wd Travers Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Millstone to Ensure Adequate Protection to Public Health ML20212L2171999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners,Wd Travers & Ferc,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island ML20217A9271999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC OI Region I on 980319 to Determine If Contract Training Instructor Was Terminated for Raising Concerns About Quality of Training Matls ML20217B3221999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation Rept 1-1997-035 Conducted at Millstone Nuclear Power Station by NRC Ofc of Investigation Field Ofc,Region I on 970915 to Determine Whether Former Health Physics Technician Discriminated Against ML20212J6621999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Units 2 & 3 on 990916.Identified Several Recent Instances in Which Condition Repts Were Not Initiated,Resulting in Untimely or Inadequate C/As.Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer ML20216J1341999-09-28028 September 1999 Ltr Contract:Task Order 49, Millstone Units 2 & 3 Employee Concerns Program Insp, Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212F4961999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-245/99-08,50-336/99-08 & 50-423/99-08 on 990615-0809.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Ncvs,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 ML20212A9011999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Re Application for Exemption,Dtd 990803.Proposed Exemption Would Provide Relief from Requirement of 10CFR50 ML20212A3171999-09-10010 September 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-1998-045 Conducted on 981112 to Determine If Former Senior Health Physics Technician Being Denied Employment at Millstone in Retaliation for Having Raised Safety Concerns in Past.Synopsis Encl B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20212A7501999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Staff Requirements Memo Response,Dtd 990525,which Provides Actions NRC Plans for Continued Oversight of safety-conscious Work Environ & Employee Concerns Program ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211K5171999-09-0202 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Support Provided for NRC Public Meeting on 990825 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures ML20211H0741999-08-30030 August 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1, Rv Structural Integrity, Issued by NRC on 950519 & NNECO Responses for Millstone Unit 2 & 980715.Informs That Staff Revised Info in Rvid & Released Info as Rvid Version 2 Based on Response Review 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8261999-10-25025 October 1999 Discusses Errata Re 991021 Filing of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co Answer to Request for Hearing & Petition to Intervene B17886, Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 21999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Permission to Utilize Code Case N-623, Deferral of Insps of Shell-to-Flange & Head-to-Flange of Reactor Vessel,Section Xi,Div 1, for Millstone Unit 2 B17901, Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Statement of Personal Qualification (NRC Form 398) Along with Supporting Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee (NRC from 396) in Support of License Renewal for PM Miner.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) 05000336/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,re Unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 on 990917.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl B17900, Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 11999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Revised Assumptions Used in Fuel Handling Accident Analysis & Summary of Results.List of Regulatory Commitments Are Listed in Attachment 1 ML20217P1201999-10-0606 October 1999 Informs NRC of Proposed Acquisition of Parent Holding Company of Central Maine & Requests NRC Concurrence,Based on Threshold Review,That Proposed Acquisition Does Not,In Fact, Constitute Transfer Subject to 10CFR50.80 ML20217F0031999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Original Petition to Intervene Being Filed on Behalf of Clients,Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone & Long Island Coalition Against Millstone,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR2.714 B17892, Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC1999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests Withdrawal of License Amend Application Re 24-month SG Tube Insp Surveillance Extensions,Submitted in Util 950726 & s to NRC B17887, Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer1999-09-28028 September 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR140.11(a)(4) Which Requires Licensees to Maintain Secondary Financial Protection Beyond Primary Layer B17883, Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-62301999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6, IAW ASME Section XI,IWA-6230 B17890, Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-09-27027 September 1999 Provides Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal B17884, Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for Mnps,Units 2 & 3,per Administrative Ltr 99-03 B17888, Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 9909151999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That There No Longer Exists Need to Maintain Millstone Unit 2 SRO License for CA Hines,License SOP-10741-01,effective 990915 05000336/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Thermal Reactor Power Limit That Was Exceeded.Commitments Made by Util Encl B17867, Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports1999-09-17017 September 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g),IAW ASME Section XI for Millstone,Unit 3.Util Requests Relief from Performing Visual Exam of Reactor Pressure Supports to Extent Required by Code for Class 1 Supports B17876, Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant1999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That Util Will Adopt Last Approved Northeast Util QA Program (Nuqap) Tr,Rev 21,dtd 990630,as Unit 1 Nuqap,Per Decision to Permanently Cease Operations at Subject Plant B17865, Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal1999-09-16016 September 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Updated Proposed Rev of FSAR Section 14.6.3, Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure. Updated Proposed Rev Will Replace Info Provided in Attachment 3 of Initial Submittal B17881, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Le Olsen,License SOP-10398-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17880, Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 398 & NRC Form 396 for Rf Martin,License SOP-10397-0.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17859, Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 9801281999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards up-to-date Distribution Lists for NRC Correspondence to NNECO & NUSCO.Side-bars Indicate Changes from Previous Lists Provided to NRC on 980128 B17882, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 369 in Support of License Renewal for Bb Parrish,License SOP-10399-2.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) B17872, Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 11999-09-14014 September 1999 Informs of Election to Consolidate Previous Commitments Re Work Observation Program with Two New Programmatic Commitments Listed in Attachment 1 B17838, Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Revs 34 & 35 to Physical Security Plan.Explanation of Changes Provided as Attachment 1.Without Encls ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests 05000336/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 11999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,documenting 990804 Event of Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve Following Maint Activities.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment 1 ML20216H0591999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to Re Issues Submitted by Cullen on Behalf of Several Petitioners Concerning Offsite Emergency Prepardeness for Millstone Nuclear Power Station ML20211N9241999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Document Classification Form for Insertion Into Emergency Planning Services Department Procedures B17851, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 990101-990630 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2 & 3,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) B17855, Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of License Renewal for SRO TE Grilley,SOP-4053-04.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 B17849, Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Second Quarter Backlog Performance Rept for 1999, Which Represents Fourth Rept on Mnps Performance Since Restart of Unit 3 & First Status Update for Unit 2.No Regulatory Commitments Are Contained in Ltr B17854, Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings1999-08-14014 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,per TS 6.9.1.7.Revised Repts for May & June Also Encl Which Reflect Correct Faulty Printometer Readings B17850, Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards First Lhc Quarterly Assessment Rept for Assessment Performed 990621 to 990701.NNECO Taking Appropriate Actions to Address Observations in Rept B17837, Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl1999-08-0707 August 1999 Forwards COLR for Cycle 7, for Millstone Unit 3,IAW TS 6.9.1.6.Explanation of Changes to COLR Also Encl B17657, Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 19991999-08-0303 August 1999 Requests Schedular Exemption from Emergency Plan Exercise Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Part Iv,Section F,Paragraph 2.c.Requests That Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Be Conducted in Mar 2000 Rather than Sept 1999 B17845, Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Commitment for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking.Options for Surveillance Scheduling & Tracking Methodologies to Be Incorporated in Standardized Station Surveillance Program Are Currently Being Reconsidered B17831, Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap1999-07-26026 July 1999 Informs NRC Staff That Change 3 to Rev 25 of Mnps Emergency Plan Was Implemented on 990715.Change Removes Facility Organizational Charts from Emergency Plan & Identifies Relocation to Nuqap B17834, Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Revised NRC Form 398,which Certifies That SL Doboe Has Completed Eligibility Requirements for Sro,Per 10CFR55.31.Proprietary Info Withheld B17836, Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised NRC Form 396 & Supporting Physician Rept for Licensed Operator Restricted from Licensed Duties, Effective 990628,due to Medical Condition.Without Encl B17811, Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-20020 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,requesting That Licensees Provide Numerical Estimates of Licensing Actions to Be Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20210S9911999-07-18018 July 1999 Requests NRC Intervene for All Shareholders of New England Electric System & to Help with Merger with National Grid Group & That NRC Petition Security & Exchange Commission to Investigate Matter Relative to No Shareholder Options B17835, Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1)1999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Rev 33 to Millstone Station Physical Security Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Licensee Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(d)(1) B17818, Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.591999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides NRC Staff with Change to TS Bases Sections 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems for Info Only.Change Was Reviewed & Approved by Unit 3 Plant Operations Review Committee IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.59 B17824, Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 21999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Oeprating Rept for June 1999 & Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20212K1701999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Should Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident B17816, Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual1999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Certification That M Lettrich,Has Completed Eligibility Requirements,Per 10CFR55.31 for Operator License.Util Requests That Licensing Action Be Taken for Named Individual B17801, Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Various Changes That Were Initiated in Previous Yrs & Completed in 1998,also Incorporated Into Annual Rept B17819, Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to FSAR & Addendum 6 to Annual Rept.Nneco Recently Completed Review of Unit 2 Design & Licensing Bases Which Resulted in Changes to FSAR Provided in Encl 1.Encl 2 Includes Info Covering Changes Not Included in B17780, Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR, IAW 10CFR50.54(a)(3).Changes to TR Are Shown as Text in Bold Italics B17723, Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 2 & 3 Encl.Without Encl B17767, Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 12 to FSAR & Addendum 3 to Annual Rept, for Millstone Unit 3,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6). No New Regulatory Commitments Contained in Ltr 1999-09-03
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, Waterford, Ur W.E-0128 (N.0) 447 1791 Iat (860) 444 4277 W Nordet ti ilinet Symicia NOV l 31997 Docket No. 50 423 B16607 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisrion Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Deviation from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 The purpose of this letter is to notify the NRC Staff of a condition in the outer annulus region of the Millstone Unit No. 3 containment which deviates from Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b and 0.7a. This condition has been evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. In addition, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) is informing the NRC Staff that a change has been made to the shutdown methodology for certain fires postulated to occur inside containment for monitoring reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure.
In a letter dated December, 9,1985,' the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Supplement No. 4 to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Section 9.5.1 of this report (NUREG-1031 Supplement No. 4) documents the NRC Staff review and acceptance of the fire protection program at Millstone 3. Included in Section 9.5.1.4 is a discussion of " Fire Protection for Safe Shutdown Capability" which addresses, among other items, the safe shutdown pet.
capability for fires in containment. Section 9.5.1.4 includes an approved deviation from g Sections C,5.b and C.7.a of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 related to g-fire protection for safe shutdown capability in the containment electrical penetration g' area. Specifically, the electrical penetration area inside containment does not fully g, comply with section C.7a(1)(b) as redundant cables are not separated by the g, recommended horizontal distance of 20 feet, g.
As a result of recent design basis review for fire protection at Millstone 3, it was identified that some redundant cables and equipment in the outer annulus region, outside of the electrical penetration area, do not comply with Section C.S.b or C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. This condition has existed since original plant construction.
Although there is an approved deviation f,or,the electrical penetration area, which is inh
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' B. J. Youngblood letter to J. F. Opeka, ' Issuance of Supplement No. 4 to \ \
NUREG 1031 - Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 3," dated December 6,1985.
-9711210049 971113 I
PDR ADOCK 0500o423 P PDR
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607/Page 2 the outer annulus area, the record doe' s not discuss these additional cases. The review also identified that a modification implemented in 1993 detrimentally affected the shutdown methodology for certain fires in containment for monitoring RCS pressure.
This condition was evaluated and it was determined that mod!'ications could be made to provide added assurance that Millstone 3 could achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in the affected areas. These modifications were evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question. NNECO also evalusted the condition to the guidance provided in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and determined that, although the change is safe. It devistes from that guidance.
This change affects the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Safety Evcluation Report Section 9.5.1. The Millstone 3 BTP9.5-1 Compilance Report ir being updated to reflect those changes in accordance with procedural requirements.
Specific detail of this condition which deviates from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 is provided in Attachment 1.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. David A.
Smith at (860) 437 5840.
Very truly yours.
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Ab] h M. H. Brothers N \
Vice President - Millstone Unit No. 3 cc: H. J. Miller, Region i Administrator J. W. Andersen, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3 W. D. Travers, Ph.D., Director, Special Projects Office
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- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page 1 MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 3 CONTAINMENT-OUTER ANNULUS APEA Branch Technical Position BTP 9.5-1 position C.7.a(1)(b) states, inside noninerted containment one of the fire protect!on means stated in Position C.5.b.1 and C.S.b.2 or the following fire protection means should be provided:
separation of cables and e,quipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by noncombustible radiant energy shield having a minimum fire rating of one-half hour. .
Position C.S.b.1 and C.S.b.2 are stated below.
Position C.S bl Fire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
(a) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s)is free of fire damage; and (b) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Position C.S.b 2 To moet the guidelines of Position C.S.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be provided:
(a) Separation of cables and equipment and at,sociated circuite of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers should bs protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier; (b) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no
A '-4 4-A 4 > - -.- -a.. w-W--+= r- e 2-4.Ar 342 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page 2 Intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area; or (c) Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and automatic fire suppression should be installed in the firo area.
Fire Protection Features and Previousiv Anoroved Confiouration The containment is a large fire resistant structure formed from concrete and steel. Combustibles are limited to lubricating oil, charcoal filter, and cabling.
During power operation, access to containment is limited. Fire Protection features for containment consist of the following:
o a wet piped sprinkler system installed in the electrical penetration area to protect redundant cabling that enter containment, o smoke detection to provide early warning of a fire condition, o heat detection at the lower elevation of containment and at the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs),
o standpipe hose stations on all elevations, l
l o portable fire extinguishers at the containment entrance in the auxiliary building, o c seismically designed oil collection system for the RCPs.
Safe shutdown process monitonng instrumentation is routed below the 51' 4' l elevation in the containment outer annulus. The annulus is approximately 12 feet wide and extends through multiple elevations in wntainment. The -24'6",
3'8',24'6', and 51'4' elevations are separated primarily by steel grates, although some cont. rete platforms are used. Open stairs connect all elevations.
Automctic smoke Atectors have been provided in the annulus. The location of annulus smoke detectors was approved by NRC in Supplement 4 to NUREG-1031, dated December 1985.
In addition to the originally installed features, additional sprinklers have been instalKd in the electrical penetration area to extend the existing sprinkler coverage from the 37' elevation up to the 54' elevation. Tray covers and fire stops have also been insta!Ied in certain cable trays in the outer annulus to
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page 3 ;
reduce the possibility of fire spread in certain cable trays and to exclude cables as intervening combustibles.
Combustible Materials The combustible material on the elevations of concern in the annulus consists prodominantly of exposed cable insulation in cable trcys. The cable trays contain.lEEE 383 qualified cables previded with circuit fault protection. As a ,
result, the cables in the trays am n)t an ignition hazard. The cables do, however, represent a potential intervening combustible material between redundant trains of process monitoring instrumentation in the containment outer annulus.
The cable trays are routed primarily in a horizontal configuration. A stack of cable trays, two and three trays deep, is routed just below the 24'6" elevation.
Another Stack of cable trays, between five and eight trays deep, is routed just below the 51'4" elevation. Additional cable trays are routed above the 51'4' elevation. The trays are typically open ladder bottom trays with sheet metal ,
covers provided on top of the trays.
Vertical trays / risers are typically not used in the annulus. Short runs of vertical trays are located between column lines 18-19 that extend from the trays above the 51'4' elevation to just below the 51'4' elevation. Vertical cable trays, protected by sprinklers, are also located at the electrical penetration area between column lines 1 and 3 at elevations 24'6" and 45'6". Other vertical cable runs in the outer annulus are routed primarily in conduit. Therefore, vertical fire ,
spread via exposed cable insulation between elevations containing required process monitoring instrumentation is not considered credible.
Horizontal fire spread via cable insulation in cable trays has been pos.lulated even though the type and arrangement of cables require a significant exposure fire to cause ignition and horizontal fire spread. The lack of transient combustible materiah, in containment during power operation, plus the RCP lube oil coliection systems inside primary containment, limits the potential for the required type of exposure fire that could cause ignition of, and horizontal fire spread in, exposed cebles in the cable trays. No other significont fire sources exist in the containment outer annulus.
The potential for fires in containment has been addressed in NRC SER Supplement 4, which states:
" redundant cables are located within 20 feet of one another in the electrical penetration area. To compensate for the limited spatial separation,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\Alischment MPage 4 the applicant has installed an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system that protects the cables where they are vulnerable to fire damage."
The SER goes further to identify that:
'If a fire were to occur in these locations in containment [...), the staff expects the existing fira detection system to actuate early, while the fire is in its formative stages and before significant flame propagation or temperature rise occurs. An alarm would be sent to the control room. The fire brigade would be dispatched and would ext,.,guish the fire using manual fire-fighting equipment. Until the brigade arrivod in containment or if rapid fire propagation occurred, the staff expects the automatic sprinkler system at the penetration area to actuate and control the fire and protect the shatdown-related cables.'
The conditions identified in NUREG-1031, Supplement 4 still exist in the electrical penetration area based on the existin0 and modified fire protection features. The following mitigating features are also applicable to the separation of the redundant instruments between column lines 1 and 3 in the electrical penetrations area and other arear between column lines 20 and 9, and provide additional justification for the acceptability of the configuration:
- 1. The installed detection system, which was accepted in NUREG-1031, Supplement 4, provides appropriate coverage. Potential fires that occur in, or present an exposure ha7ard to, the electrical penetration area or other portions of the outer annulus will be detected in the incipient stage.
Activation of the detection system will transmit an alarm to the continuously manned control room, which will also result in prompt dispatch of the fire brigade for manual suppression activities.
- 2. The absence of transient combustible materials during normal power operations, along with the use of IEEE-383 qualified cables with circuit fault protection, provide reasonable assurance that a cable-induced fire l would not occur ir, the electrical penetrations area. The fire would have to originate from a heat source in the annulus away from the penetrations area and spread along the horizontal cable trays to the penetrations area.
- 3. The only intervening combustibles between the redundant trains of l
process monitoring instrumentation in the electrical penetration area l between column lines 1 and 3 are cables in the vertical risers that are l
used to route cables to the containment penetrations. Sprinkler protection has been provided for the vertical risers in accordance with the approved deviation request.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
B16607%ttachment 1\Page 5
- 4. Horizontal fire spread in the cable trays would be inhibited by both the fire retardant properties of IEEE-383 qualified cables and the use of sheet :
metal covers on cable trays in containment. Vertical fire spread in the electrical penetration area to the vicinity of the redundant circuits would also be inhibited by the sprinkler protection provided for the vertical risors. Additional assurance is also provided in that the installed detection '
system would activate prior to the fire spreading in the manner required to damage redundant process monitoring capabilities, and that the fire brigade would respond to control and extinguish the fire. Therefore, fire damage to both trains of process monitoring capabilities in the electrical penetrations area is not considered credible.
The use of fire stops and cable tray covers (tops and bottoms) in selected
- trays in the outer annu!us will assure that, if a fire were to occur in the cable tray system, or if an exposure fire were to occur that exposes the cable tray system, the fire would not progress down the tray system and damage redundant components. Fire stops consist of a fire retardant material (fire foam) sandwiched between metal tray covers (top and bottom). Fires that progress down a tray would not pass these stops due to the fire resistant nature of tne Pro stops The installe'.lon of metal tray i
covers (tops and bottoms) over cables assures that an exposure fira will not ignite the cable inside. This is due to the limited amount of other combustibles inside containment, if a fire did ignite the cables inside the metal covers, the fire would not be able to exit the covered tray exposing the required circuits 'below" the caole trays that are on fire.
Process Monitorina System Separ.g.t[9D This scction id(ntifies the process monitoring instrumentation inside the containment outer annulus which does not, in all caseh, meet the separatiori requirements of 3TP9.51.
Neutron Monitorina Neutron monitoring can be accomplished by ensuring the availability of one out of two instruments given a fire in the containment outer annulus. The instruments are NME*DET1 or NME*DET2. Cabling for these two instruments are located on opposite sides of column line 2, between column lines 1 and 3, in the containment outer annulus.
The junction boxes and conduit runs for the two instruments are located partially within and partially above the suppression area i hlch was depicted in the original deviation request. The deviation request only addressed the lower l
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page 6 elevation of the penetrations area with respect to the ability of the wet pipe sprinkler system to prohibit redundant cables from being damaged by a fire, in order to provide an equivalent level of protection to that recommended by BTP CMEB 9.51, NNECO has extended the existing wet pipe sprinkler system coverage to the upper elevation of the electrical penetrations area above the junction boxes. Extension of the suppression system to above the 51'4" elevation, in conjunction with the configuration of neutron monitoring cable separation and the other fire protection features, provides protection equivalent to the approved deviation for the electrical penetrations area.
RCS Temperature Monitoring capability of RCS temperature can be accor plished by ensuring the availability of one out of three methods of instrumentation given a fire in the containment outer annu'us. The instrumentation methods are RCS hot leg temperature (Tw) and the orange and purple trains of core exit thermocouples (CET (O)), or (CET(P)). RCS cold leg temperature indication is available outside of containment and is not impacted by postulated containment fires. For purposes of assessing the availability of RCS temperature, containment outer annulus has been divided into " north" and " south" halves. The electrical penetration area between column lines 2 and 3 is on the " north" half of the outer annulus. The penetration area between column lines 1 and 2 is on tho " south" half of the outer annulus.
Ts and CET(P) cables are routed clockwise in the south half of the outer annulus in conduits at about the 16' and 38' elevations, respectively. Tu passes through the " south" side of the electrical penetration areu prior to exiting containment through the " north" side of the penetration area. CET(P) exits containment on the " south
- side of the penetration area. CET(0) cables are routed counterclockwise in conduit on the north half of the outer annulus, primarily at about the 24'6" elevation. (The conduit initially ,nters the annulus at about the 3'8" elevation prior to rising up to the 24'6' elevation.) CET(0) exits containment on the north side of the panetration area.
Redundant RCS temperature circuits on the same elevatian are separated by a minimum of 30 feet with two trays acting as intervening combustibles for half of the space between the instruments. To address tne combustibility of the cables, metal cable tray covers (tops and bottoms) are installed. These covers enclose the cable insulation, eliminating the possibility of fire propagation in this ar9a.
The area is void of other combustibles.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\AttJchment 1\Page 7 Pressurizer Level & Pressure Monitoring capability of pressurizer pressure (narrow range) and pressurizer level can be accomplished by ensuring the availability of either the Train "A" transmitters and cables (PT456 and LT460) or the Train *B' transmitters and cables (PT4558 and LT459C). Each pair of transmitters and associated cab!es are routed immediately adjacent to each other below the 24'6" elevation until reaching the electrical pv.strations area.
The redundant trains of pressurizer level and pressure are routed in opposite directions and terminate on opposite sides of the electrical penetrations area.
The redundani transmitters and cables are separated by approximately 30' in the containment outer annulus. The only intervening combustible materials are the cables in tM cable trays located above the transmitters. The cable runs for both sets of transmitters rise vertically in the annulus, intersecting the cable trays that contain the intervening combustibles.
There is a large horizontal separation of over 80' between the points where cables for the redundant instrumeM trains vertically intersect the cabl9 trays running horizontally above the transmitters. Automatic smoke detectors are located in the intervening space. There is also a ne:;!igible amount of intervening combustibles for at least 20' of the distance between where the instrument trains vertically intersect the cable trays.
l In order to ensure that a single fire does not adversely impact on both trains of pressurizer level and pressure, it is necessary to ensure that fire will not spread down the cable trays (over 80') to the point whure both trains could be damaged by a single fire. Fire stops are being installed in the ceble trays that run horizentally above the transmitters.
1 RCS Pressure Monitoring capability of RCS wide range pressure can be accomplished by ensuring the availability of one of three instrument loops given a fire in the l
containment outer annulus. The instrument loops are PT49, PT405B or PT50.
The transmitters for PT49 and PT405B are adjacent to each other, with the transmitter for PT50 about 25' away. All three transmitters are on the 3'8" elevation. Prior to 1993, compliance was based on the use of a sample line to install a presaure gauge outside the containment, which has been subsequently eliminated. For purposes of assessing the availsbility of RCS pressure indication, the containment outer annulus ;3 divided into " north" and " south' halves, respectively. The electrical penetration area between column lines 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page 8 and 3 is on the " north" half of the outer annulus. The penetration area between column lines 1 and 2 is on the " south" half of the outer annulus.
PT49 and PT50 cables are routed clockwise on the south half of the outer annulus in conduits. PT49 is routed primarily on about the 16' elevation, while PT50 runs horizontally just above the 24'6" elevation before rising vertically and running at about the 38' elevation. PT49 passes through the south side of the penetrations area prior to exiting containment on the north side of the penetrations rea. PT50 exits containment on the south side of the penetrations area. PT405B is routed counterclockwise in conduit on the north half of the outer annulus below the 24'G" elevation. PT405B oxits containment on the north side of the penetrations area.
A fire on the " south" side of the electrical penetrations area will not damage the cable for PT4050, since PT4058 ! . not routed on or through the south side of the penetration area. A fire on the north side of the penetration area will not damage PT50, since PT50 !s not routed on or through the north side of the penetration area.
The transmitter for PT50 is separated from the other transmitters in the outer annulus by about 25', free of intervening combustibles. While the conduit for PT50 is routed in the immediate vicinity of the other two transmitters, the only intervening combustiblo materials are cables in trays located over 20' above the instruments and cables in trays located above the conduit run for PT49. To remove the intervening combustible from concern and to exclude the combustibles in the area of the instruments, metal cable tray covers (tops and bottoms) are installed. These covers enclose the cable insulation, eliminating the possibility of fire propagation in this area.
The conduit for PT405B is located about 15' above the transmitter for PT50 without intervening combustibles. From the transmitter, the PT50 conduit drops about 20' and the conduit for PT405B is routed in the opposite direction. While the conduit for PT50 is routed in the same direction as the conduit for PT49, it is located about 25' below PT49 for a distance of over 100'. There are no intervening combustibles in this horizontal and vertical separation between PT50 and PT49. PT50 rises vertically until it is about 25' above PT49 prior to continuing its run to the electrical penetrations area. While a fir's in this location could impact both PT50 and PT49, PT405B is routed in the cpposite direction over 100' away, and would not by affected by the same fire. Reasonable assurance is therefore provided that a single fire will not impact on all three transmitters given a fire in the outer annulus.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16607\ Attachment 1\Page g Steam Generator Level Monitoring capability of sham generator level can be accomplished by ensuring the availability of any two of four instrument loops given a fire in the containment outer annulus. The hstrument loops are LT501, LT502, LT503, LT504. The cables associated with these instrument loops are routed throughout the annulus, with the exception of routing between column lines 10 27d 12. .
LT504 and LT501 are ro!re . etween column lines 4 and 15. Therefore, a fire that is confined to the locaan between these two column lines will not impact LT502 or LT503.
LT501 and LT502 are rotted between column lines 15 to 20. Therefore, a fire that is confined to the location between these column linet, will not impact LT503 or LT504.
Cables for the four instruments, along with the Onsmitter for LT503, are located in the electrical penetration area between column lines 1 and 3. The penetrrbons area is provided with automatic sprinklers below ths 37'4' elevation. Modifications are underway that extend the sprinkler coverage vertically to above the 51'4" elevation. Extension of the suppression system to above the 51'4" elevation will bring the existing configuration of steam generator cable separation and the existing and proposed fire protection features, into compliance with the approved deviation request for the electrical penetrations area.
Conclygign NNECO has concluded that redundant process monitoring capabilities will not be damagw by a single fire and that reasonable assurance is provided that fire protection features in the containment outer annulus will limit the size and severity of postulated fires. The fire protection features (as modified) extend the cor ept of the previously appreved deviation to the balance of the containment outer annuluc. The bases for this conclusion are summarized as follows:
- 1. The installed detection system, which was accepted in SER Supplement 4, provides appropriate coverage.
- 2. The absence of transient combustible materials during normal pc,wer operations, along with the use of IEEE-383 qualified cables with circuit fault protection, provide assurance that a cable-induced fire would not occur in the containment outer annulus.
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- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
B16607%ttachment 1\Page 10
' 3. Fires, should they occur in or present an exposure hazard to redundant trains of process monitoring instrumentation, will be detected in the incipient stage.
- 4. Activation of the detection system will transmit an alarm to the continuously manned control room which will also result in prompt dispatch of the fire brigade for manuac suppression activities.
S. The only in'.ervening combustibles between the redundant trains of process monitoring instrumente%n are cables in horizontal cable trays.
- 6. Fire stops and metal cable tray covers have been installed in specific locations to preclude fire spread and reduce the exposure cable fires have on redundant circuits.
7 Sprinkler protection has been provided for the vertical risers in the electrical penetrations, including the addition of sprinkler protection for the upper elevation of the electrical penetrations area.
- 8. The majority of the required circuits are either in metal conduits or metal junction boxes. Exposed portions of these cables are at the electrical oenetration area, which is protected by an automatic wet-piped sprinkler system.
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. Docket No. 50-423 B16607 Attachment 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Commitments November 1997
U.S. Nuclear Regul tory Commission
. B16607%ttachment 2\Page 1
. Enclosure List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies t sose actions committed to by NNECO in this document.
Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance, Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 of any question regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.
Commitment- Committed Date B16607-1 Modifications will be made to the fire Prior to Mode 4 protection features in the outer annulus to provide added assurance that Millstone 3 could achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in the affected areas.
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