05000395/LER-1991-006, Forwards LER 91-006 Re Inadvertent ESF Actuation of DG in Response to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/91-17. Corrective Actions:Operations Staff Briefed on Necessity of Attention to Detail

Forwards LER 91-006 Re Inadvertent ESF Actuation of DG in Response to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/91-17. Corrective Actions:Operations Staff Briefed on Necessity of Attention to Detail

ML20085G342
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	10/14/1991
From:	Skolds J SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9110240264
Download: ML20085G342 (1)

LER-2091-006, Forwards LER 91-006 Re Inadvertent ESF Actuation of DG in Response to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/91-17. Corrective Actions:Operations Staff Briefed on Necessity of Attention to Detail

Event date:
Report date:
3952091006R00 - NRC Website

text

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. . ;- So t Carolina Electric & Ono Company John ,$ ide Jenkinsvme, SC 290% Nuclear Operations (803; 345 4C40 SCE&G 00 141991 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen.

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC IN3PECTION REPORT 91-17 Attached is the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) Licensee Event Report No.91-006 which responds to the violation addressed in Enclosure 1 of NRC Inspection Report 50-395/91-17. SCE&G is in agreement with the alleged violation, and the enclosed response addresses the reason for the violation and corrective actions being taken to prevent recurrence. Additional corrective action items 1, 2, and 3 have been completed.

If you should you have any questions, please call at your convenience.

Very truly yours John L. Skolds RJB:JLS: led Attachment c: 0. W. Dixon Jr. '

R. R. Mahan R. J. White S. D. Ebneter G. F. Wunder General Managers C. A. Price NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Knotts Jr.

J. W. F11tter NSRC RTS (IE 911701)

File (015.01)

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10CFR50.73

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M Q 3 bd Document Control Oesk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, OC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER HUCLCAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LER 91-006 Attached is Licensee Event Report No.91-006 for the Virgil C. Sumer Nuclear Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours, l *

/

John L. Skolds DCH:JLS: led Attachment c: 0. W. Dixon Jr. J. W. Flitter

.R. R. Mahan L. J. Montando R. J. White NRC Resident inspector S. D. Ebneter J. B. Knotts Jr.

G. F. Wunder INPO Records Center General Managers ANI Library C. A. Price Marsh & McLennan G. J. Taylor NSRC F. H. Zander RTS ONO 910043)

T. L. Matlosz File 818.05 & 818.07)

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Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 170.014,' Fire Switch Functional Test for XPP-00438.

CHG/SI Pump B, and 170.015, Fire Switch Functional Test for XPP-0043C. CHG/SI Pump C, are performed every 18 months and verifies the fire switch capability to isolate the "B" and "C" Train Charging (CHG)/ Safety Injection (SI) pumps from their control circuitry in the control room. Part of the test involves actuating a relay that sends an emergency start signal to the "B" and "C" CHG/SI pumps as well as the "B" emergency diesel pnerator (EDG). Because the scope of these procedures does not involve starting the EDG, the procedure directs the EDG mode selector switch to be placed in the maintenance mode (this prevents the EDG from starting).

On August 4,1991, during the performance of these STPs, the Operations crew had completed the functional requirements of the tests and was in the process of restoring the plant equipment from its test condition. The operator at the EDG was directed to restore the "B" EDG to "as found" conditions prior to the procedure step which called for the emergency start signal to be reset. This caused the EDG to start at approximately 2246 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.54603e-4 months <br />. The diesel generator was monitored and verified to achieve proper speed and voltage as required from an auto start. Also, all support systems were verifh to function properly.

The operations staff was briefed on the necessity of attention to detail and the consequences which might ensue due to an error. Also, specific guidance to increase shift supervision's involvement with new or infrequently (six months or longer) performed tests will be implemented by April 1, 1992.

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Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor E0VIPMENT IDENTIFICATION:

Emergency Diesel Generator EIIS-DG 10ENTIFICATION OF EVENT:

A personnel error in procedure performance caused the inadvertent start of "B" train Emergency Diesel Gererator.

EVENT TIME AND DATE:

August 4, 1991, at 02246 hours.

REPORT __ D ATE:

September 3, 1991 This report was initiated by Off-Normal Occurrence Report 91-043.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Mode 1, 99% power. _

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 170.014, Fire Switch Functional Test for XPP-00438. CHG/SI Pump B, and 170.015, Fire Switch Functional Test for XPP-0043C.

CHG/SI Pump C, is performed every 18 months and verifies the fire switch capability to isolate the "B" and "C" Train Charging (CHG)/ Safety Injection (SI) pumps from their control circuitry in the control room. Part of the test involves actuating a relay that sends an emergency start signal to the "B" and "C" CHG/SI pumps as well as the "B" emergency diesel generator (EDG). Because the scope of these procedures does not involve starting the EDG, the procedure directs the EDG mode selector switch to be placed in the maintenance mode (this prevents the EDG from starting).

On August 4, 1991, during the performance of these STPs, the Operations crew had completed the functional requirements of these tests and the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) was in the process of coordinating the restoration of plant equipment from its test condition. The CRS's concerns throughout the test was focused on minimizing the time the EDG was inoperable. Thus, in an effort to restore the EDG, he reviewed the procedure bu'. overlooked the step which directed him to reset the emergency start signal prior to restoring the EDG . Therefore, f ailing to realize that there was an emergency start signal present, he directed the operator to return the EDG to operable conditions. When the EDG mode selector swi tch was taken out of the " maintenance" position, at approximately 2246 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.54603e-4 months <br />, the EUG started due to the emergency start signal present. This start constitutes an inadvertent ESF actuation.

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The diesel generator was monitored and verifieo to achieve proper speed and voltage as required from an auto start. Also, all support systems were verified to

-function properly.

CAUSE OF EVENT:

The personnel error in directing the EOG be restored out of sequence with the procedure scheme caused the EDG to start inadvertently.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT: -

The diesel generator was aligned to standby conditions with the exception of the ,

mode selector switch and.all Support systems were operable. When the mode selector switch was'taken out of thu maintenance position, the diesel as well as all required support systems started normally. Therefore, no safety consequences occurred as a result of tnis event.

1MMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTlqd: ,

'The diesel generator was immediately monitored to verify proper operation.

The diesel generator was then shut down and placed in standby per the applicable System Operating Procedure.

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ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACT!Q3:

1) The control room supervisor was counseled on the importance of attention to.

detail and-procedural compliance.

'2):A review.of this event.will be implemented to identify if any procedural changes might enhance the performance of the involved STPs. This review will be completed by; September--30, 1991-and any changes as a result of the review will be incorporated prior to-the next scheduled test performance.

3) Operations _ management has discussed the need for attention to detail and the consequences:of errors with all operating shifts.

4).As a result of the review of this event by the Management Review Board on August 30, 1991, specific guidance will be-developed in an effort to increase the involvement of. shift supervision in the review and performance of new or

. infrequently-(six months or longer) performed tests. This guidance will be L implemented by Apri.1 1, 1992.

PRIOR OCCURRENCES:

o_ ~See LER 90-002._

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