05000395/LER-2003-001, Re Steam Propagation Barrier Door Found Secured in Open Position
| ML031740178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2003 |
| From: | Byrne S South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RC-03-0124 LER 03-001-00 | |
| Download: ML031740178 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3952003001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Stephen A. Byrne Senior Vice President, Nudear Operations 803.345.4622 RC-03-0124 June 13, 2003 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir / Madam:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER 2003-001-00)
STEAM PROPAGATION BARRIER DOOR FOUND SECURED IN OPEN POSITION Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2003-001-00, for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). The report descrbes an event in which a steam propagation barrier door was found secured in the open position. This LER is being submifted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Mel Browne at (803) 345-4141.
Very truly yours, Stephen A. Byme AJC1SAB/dr Attachment c:
N. 0. Lorick N. S. Cams T. G. Eppink (w/o attachment)
R. J. White L. A. Reyes K R. Cotton NRC Resident Inspector Paulette Ledbetter D. L. Abstance EPIX Coordinator K. M. Sutton INPO Records Center J&H Marsh & McLennan NSRC RTS (0-C-03-1364-3)
File (818.07)
DMS (RC-03-0124)
SCE&G I Virgil C. Summer Nudear Station. P.O. Box 58
- Jenkinsvllle, South Carolina 29065.T (803)345.5209.www.scano.com A SCANA COMPANY
Subject:
- I 7e 0/-) fcA
Abstract
Limit to 1400 soaces. l.e.. anoroxinatelv 15 sinole-soaced tvoewriften [fiHes)
On April 22-23, 2003, steam propagation barrier door DRIB/1 07 was first discovered chained and strapped open and later found blocked open.
This event was caused by a lack of specific training for the Security Officers assigned to continuously monitor materials stored in the room behind the door. The door was being opened to provide cooling to the Security Officer on duty in the area. Upon first discovery, the chains and straps were removed and the door was secured.
Approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> later, the door was found blocked open by the Security Officer on duty by physically standing with his back against the door. At this time the door was secured again.
Investigation revealed the event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2Xi)(B).
Opening door DRIB/107 beyond normal ingress and egress impacted both trains of control room ventilation as a result of breaching the pressure boundary encompassing all three Heating, Ventilation, and Cooling Water (HVAC) rooms. Loss of both trains of Control Room Ventilation is prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.7.6.
(Ifmore space Is requre4 use additional copies ofNRCFonn 366A)
PLANT IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION DRIB/107 IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT On April 22-23, 2003, steam propagation barrier door DRIB/107 was first discovered chained and strapped open and later found blocked open. The door was in this configuration to allow cooling for the Security Officer assigned to continuously monitor two drums of refrigerant stored in the room.
The door was immediately returned to the required position and the Security force was trained on the proper control of doors/barriers in the plant.
EVENT DATE 04/22/03 REPORT DATE 06/13/03 CONDMONS PRIOR TO EVENT Mode 1, 100% Power
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On April 22-23, 2003 Security Officers were assigned to continuously monitor two drums of refrigerant while maintenance was being performed on "C" HVAC chiller, which is the swing component. After the maintenance crew completed work on April 22, the drums were continuously monitored throughout the night as required by station security procedure. Door DRIB/107 is a double door designed as a steam propagation barrier for protection of the HVAC chillers and pumps from harsh environment during a steam (ffnxre space Is required, use di copies of (Ifmore space i requd,ve use addional copies ofNRCForm 366A)
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
During the investigation of this event, it was discovered that a Security Officer had restrained DRIB/107 in the open position using a hoist chain and lifting strap in an effort to provide cooling to himself in a hot environment. Another Security Officer used his body to block the door for cooling.
While the door was opened beyond normal ingress/egress, both trains of Chilled Water were considered inoperable which resulted in both trains of Control Room Ventilation being inoperable.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The door was immediately returned to the required position when discovered open on both occasions. The Security force was trained on the requirements for steam propagation barrier doors in the plant. The event was documented in Condition Event Report C-03-1364 and root cause evaluation RCA03-1364 was performed. As an immediate interim measure, an information notice on Steam Propagation Barrier doors was provided to all personnel. Steam Propagation Barrier awareness training will be provided to all site personnel during initial and annual Station Orientation Training.
PRIOR OCCURRENCES In August 2002, a non-cited violation (NCV) evaluated as having very low safety significance (Green) was issued for failure to follow procedural controls for steam propagation barrier doors. During the post maintenance testing process for a diesel generator jacket water heater replacement, the water fill hose was routed through a steam propagation barrier (SPB) door. Operators performing the fill evolution did not understand that routing a hose through the door did not constitute minor maintenance. Procedurally, SPB doors could remain open for up to one hour for minor maintenance. After discussions with control room supervision the activity was suspended until the alternate method of supplying water was implemented.
In order to prevent recurrence Condition Event Report (CER) C-02-2704 was generated with the following
corrective actions
- Fire Protection Procedure, FPP-025, Revision 3, Change E was issued 11/20/02 to clarify that minor maintenance applies only to the respective door.
Station Operating Procedure, SOP-306, Revision 15, Change B was issued 11/11/02 to add mode requirements to which valve (or which door) is used to fill the expansion tank.
Enhancements to Licensed/Auxiliary Operator Initial and Requal programs are being made to include training modules consisting of Steam Propagation Barriers, Flood Barriers and Fire Barriers. This action is scheduled for completion in December, 2003.
A synopsis of CER C-02-2704 was included in the October 2002 Operator Required Reading.
SCE&G believes that completion of actions identified for the prior occurrence, supplemented by those for the most recent event, will ensure future compliance.
NRC Forn 366A (7-2001)
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