05000311/LER-1982-152, Forwards LER 82-152/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-152/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20064H781
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/1983
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20064H783 List:
References
NUDOCS 8301170411
Download: ML20064H781 (3)


LER-1982-152, Forwards LER 82-152/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982152R00 - NRC Website

text

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JO PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station January 5, 1983 Mr.

R. C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes :

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-152/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable j]

Occurrence 82-152/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

i 4

Sincerely yours, L

WY b H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC:

Distribution z

. M i

8301170411 830105 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR The Energy People I60 I

W 21t3 f 2CN: 11 91

l j

Report Number:

82-152/03L e

i Report Date:

01-05-83 i

Occurrence Date:

12-07-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation - No. 23 Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel II - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-507.

CONDITIONS PRIOIL_TQ lCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82 % - Unit Load 900 MWe.

DESCRIPTIQLQF OCCURRENCE:

On December 3, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed that No. 23 Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel II indication was reading slightly higher than the other channels.

During subsequent investigation of the difference on December 7, 1982, it was discovered that the Channel II transmitter was out of calibration.

Attempts to calibrate the transmitter were unsuccessful, and the channel was declared inoperable.

The failure of the instrument rendered inoperable one channel each of the Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch reactor trip and Steam Flow-High engineered safety feature actuations.

Accordingly, at 1905 hours0.022 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.248525e-4 months <br />, December 7, 1982, Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1 Action 7 and 3.3.2 Action 14 were entered.

All bistables associated with the channel had been placed in the tripped condition prior to checking the transmitter l

calibration.

The redundant steam generator steam flow channels were operable throughout the occurrence.

l APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

l As noted, attempts at recalibrating the channel flow transmitter were unsuccessful, and the problem was attributed to failure of the device.

No other problems with the channel were evident, and no recent failures of this type have been noted.

The occurrence was l

therefore assumed to be of an isolated nature.

1 ANALYSIS Of__QCCilREERCE:

The steam generator steam flow instruments are utilized in the Reactor l

Trip System and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESPAS).

The reactor trip on high steam /feedwater flow mismatch is l

i redundant to the low steam generator water level trip.

The flow l

mismatch function enhances the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip l

System.

Automatic initiation of safety injection, turbine trip, i

l I

I l

LER 82-152/93L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) feedwater isolation, and steamline isolation occurs on a high ttaam flow signal.

Operability of the instruments is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the mitigation of accident conditions.

The integrated operation of the systems is consistent with the assumptions l

used in the accident analyses.

Due to the operability of the redundant channels, the event involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

As such, the incident is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1 Action 7 and 3.3.2 Action 14 1

require:

1 With the number of operable channels one less than the total number of channels, power operation may proceed until performance of the next required channel functional test, provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, the bistables associated with the channel were already in the tripped condition as required by the action statements.

The failed transmitter was replaced and the newly installed transmitter calibrated.

No. 23 Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel II was satisfactorily tested, the channel was declared operable, and at 2235 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.504175e-4 months <br />, December 7, 1982, Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1 Action 7 and 3.3.2 Action 14 were terminated.

In view of the nature I

of the occurrence, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Rosemount, Inc.

Differential Pressure Transmitter Model ll53HA5 Prepared By R.

Frahm

)

,D Gen'eral Manager -

SORC Meeting No. 83-02