05000311/LER-1982-147, Forwards LER 82-147/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-147/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20064F036
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20064F039 List:
References
NUDOCS 8301060236
Download: ML20064F036 (3)


LER-1982-147, Forwards LER 82-147/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982147R00 - NRC Website

text

'O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 22, 1982 Mr.

R. C. Ilaynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes :

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. ~0-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-147/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-147/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, "f

II.

J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks l

CC:

Distribution 8301060236 821222 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR L

The Energy People gS

% 218912C*A) 1181

t Report Number:

82-147/03L Report Date:

12-22-82 Occurrence Date:

12-05-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Electrical Power Sources - No. 2A Vital Bus - De-energized.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-504.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0424 hours0.00491 days <br />0.118 hours <br />7.010582e-4 weeks <br />1.61332e-4 months <br />, December 5, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed'a spurious actuation of No. 2A Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) Cabinet.

4KV Infeed Breaker 22ASD opened and Breaker 21ASD failed to close, resulting in the de-energization of No.

i 2A Vital Bus.

No. 2A Emergency Diesel Generator started but did not load, and safety related loads energized off the bus tripped.

With the loss of the vital bun, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.2.la was entered.

The Control Room Operator took appropriate action to restore necessary vital loads; redundant safety equipment was operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Spurious actuation of No. 2A SEC Cabinet apparently resulted from noise in the system control circuitry.

Several similar occurrences i

have been noted in the past (See LER's 82-132/03L, 82-063/03L, 82-031/03L and 82-019/03L).

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

(

The operability of AC power sources insures that power will be available to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation of accidents considered in the FSAR.

As noted, redundant safety related equipment was operable, and i

[

the incident involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by l

a limiting condition for operation and was reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

l l

l l

~

LER 82-147/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Action Statement 3.8.2.la requires:

With less than the required complement of AC buses operable or energized, restore the inoperable buses to operable and energized status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

4

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Breaker 22ASD was reclosed, No. 2A Vital Bus was re-energized, and at 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br />, December 5,.1982, Action Statement 3.8.2.la was terminated.

Following restoration of the vital bus, No. 2A SEC Cabinet was reset and was satisfactorily tested.

No. 2A Diesel Generator was stopped and the safety equipment was returned to a normal configuration.

Design Change Request 2ECl387 has been issued to install noise suppression circuitry in the SEC System; installation is scheduled to be completed during the next refueling outage.

A commitment to submit a Supplemental Report upon completion was made in LER 82-019/03L.

Installation of noise suppression devices in Salem Unit No. 1 SEC System has reduced problems with spurious actuations.

FAILURE DATA:

Automation Industries, Inc.

Safeguards Equipment Control System Prepared By R.

Frahm

. I 4y

/

General Manager -

SORC Meeting No.82-113 l

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