05000311/LER-1982-104, Forwards LER 82-104/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-104/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20063P717
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/29/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063P718	List: 05000311/LER-1982-104, Forwards LER 82-104/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000311/LER-1982-104-03, /03L-0:on 820908,vital Bus 2A Would Not Transfer Automatically from One 4 Kv Transformer to Another.Caused by Dirt in Undervoltage Relay.Relay Cleaned
References
NUDOCS 8210150109
Download: ML20063P717 (3)

LER-1982-104, Forwards LER 82-104/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111982104R00 - NRC Website

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l Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station September 29, 1982 Mr.

R.

C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO'.

50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-104/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-104/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

/

H.

J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks

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Distribution O hhohh PDR The Energy People g6@

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R port Numb rs 82-104/03L Report Date:,

09-29-82 Occurrence Date:

09-08-32 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 2A Vital Bus Automatic Transfer - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-266.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />, September 8, 1982, during performance of Surveillanc Procedure SP (O) 4. 8.1.1. lb, it was discovered that the No. 2A Vital Bus would not automatically transfer from one 13/4kv transformer to another.

The AC power source involved was not declared. inoperable at that time, however, as it was assumed that a manual transfer capability was sufficient to demonstrate operability.

After re-consideration of the question of operability, at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, September 9, 1982, the 13/4kv source involved was de-clared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.la was entered, retroactive to the time of discovery of the transfer problem.

Due to the delay, surveillance Procedures SP (O) 4. 8.1.1.1.a and SP (O) 4. 8.1.1. 2.a2 were not performed as re-quired by the action statement until approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />.

The surveillance results were satisfactory.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of the automatic transfer feature was due to accumulation of dirt in the undervoltage relay.

The problem is apparently of an isolated nature; no previous failures of the undervoltage relay have been noted.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of AC power sources ensures that power will be available to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation of accidents considered in the FSAR.

As noted, redundant safety related equipment was operable, and the incident involved no risk to the health or safety of the public.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

.i' JL2R 82-104/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:Action Statement 3.8.1.1.a requires:

With either an AC offsite source to the vital bus system or diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter, restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, the necessary surveillances were performed and opera-bility of redundant AC sources demonstrated.

The undervoltage relay was cleaned and satisfactorily tested.

No further action was deemed necessary in view of the nature of the occurrence.

At 1220 hours0.0141 days <br />0.339 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.6421e-4 months <br />,-September 9, 1982, the AC source was declared operable and Action Statement 3.8.1.1.a was-terminated.

Finally, to prevent future misinterpretation of Technical Specification 3. 8.1.1, the specification will be addressed in Operation Directive OD-12, Technical Specification Interpretations.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R.

Frahm

^- /

Generad Mahager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-87