IR 05000331/2018002
| ML18215A351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2018 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Dean Curtland NextEra Energy Duane Arnold |
| References | |
| IR 2018002 | |
| Download: ML18215A351 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ust 3, 2018
SUBJECT:
DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000331/2018002
Dear Mr. Curtland:
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Duane Arnold Energy Center. On July 5 and July 12, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated under the significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green).
The NRC also determined one violation is associated with this issue. Because the licensee initiated a corrective action document to address the issue, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation is described in the enclosed inspection report.
If you contest the violations or significance of the NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Duane Arnold Energy Center. If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at Duane Arnold Energy Center.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla Stoedter, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000331/20180002 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Duane Arnold Energy Center in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Inappropriate Procedural Guidance Resulted in Loss of Scram Function and Failure to Enter Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Mitigating Green H.1- Human 71153Follow-up Systems05000331/2018002-01 Performance of Events and Open/Closed Resources Notices of Enforcement Discretion The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have procedures appropriate to the circumstance for testing the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and turbine stop valve (TSV) closure functions. Specifically,
STP 3.3.1.1-17, MSIV Functional Test, and STP 3.3.1.1-19, Main Turbine Stop and Combined Intermediate Valves Test, directed the use of a reactor protection system test box which disabled the MSIV and the TSV closure automatic reactor scram functions while testing specific combinations of MSIVs and TSVs and failed to require entry into appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation action statements.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000331/2016-001 Two Instances of Both Doors in 71153 Closed Secondary Containment Airlock Opened Concurrently LER 05000331/2018-001 Loss of Reactor Protection System 71153 Closed Function during MSIV and TSV Channel Functional Testing due to Use of a Test Box LER 05000331/2015-S01 Regarding Security Visual 71153 Closed Assessment Problem Due to Fog Was Not Adequately Compensated For Within Time Limits
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLANT STATUS
INSPECTION SCOPES
................................................................................................................
REACTOR SAFETY
..................................................................................................................
RADIATION SAFETY
................................................................................................................
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
............................................................................................
INSPECTION RESULTS
..............................................................................................................
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
............................................................................................ 12
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
......................................................................................................... 12
PLANT STATUS
Duane Arnold Energy Center began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On
May 19, 2018, operations personnel lowered reactor power to 72 percent to perform a planned
control rod sequence exchange. Power was gradually increased and the unit returned to rated
thermal power on May 21, 2018. With the exception of small power changes for control rod line
adjustments, the unit remained at 100 percent power for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the Inspection Procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with IMC 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The
inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status
and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The
inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and
regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and onsite alternating current (AC)
power systems current power systems.
Seasonal Extreme Weather (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the
onset of the tornado season. This evaluation included a review and inspection of the diesel
fuel oil storage systems and the standby diesel generators.
Impending Severe Weather (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions (winter
storm) on April 18, 2018.
External Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on May 4, 2018.
71111.04Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) A residual heat removal on April 6, 2018;
(2) A standby diesel generator (SBDG) on May 10, 2018;
(3) A emergency service water on June 6, 2018; and
(4) A residual heat removal service water on June 7, 2018.
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the core
spray system on April 18-19, 2018.
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected
areas:
(1) Intake Structure on April 2, 2018;
(2) Reactor Building 812 on April 26, 2018;
(3) South and East Protected Area fire zones on April 26, 2018;
(4) Reactor Building 833 on May 9, 2018;
(5) Reactor Building 855 on May 23, 2018; and
(6) Pump House on June 6, 2018.
Annual Inspection (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on April 5, 2018.
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
Cables (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in manhole (MH) MH114 on
May 9, 2018; MH201 and MH213 on May 11, 2018, 1MH116 and 2MH215 on May 19, 2018,
and in the east and west cable vaults on June 22, 2018.
Internal Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated flood protection measures associated with the high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) room water level instrumentation on April 4, 2018.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated operators in the simulator on May 15, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated a downpower evolution to perform a control rod
sequence exchange on May 19, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated
with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1) HPCI System on April 17, 2018;
(2) Technical Support Center (TSC) diesel modification on April 24, 2018; and
(3) A standby liquid control pump motor inspection on May 30, 2018.
Quality Control (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the
A main steam isolation valve 90 percent open limit switch failure on May 20, 2018.
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent
work activities:
(1) Planned TSC diesel modification on April 24, 2018;
(2) Emergent A reactor water clean-up pump variable speed drive replacement on
May 15, 2018;
(3) Emergent failed A main steam isolation valve 90 percent open limit switch on
May 20, 2018;
(4) Planned B core spray pump conduit asbestos seal abatement on May 21, 2018; and
(5) Planned A standby liquid control pump motor inspection on May 30, 2018.
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality
assessments:
(1) Condition Report (CR) 02257736; Pumphouse Temperature [low out of specification]
LOOS on April 4, 2018;
(2) CR 02257955; Unable to calibrate to meet all required specs on April 5, 2018; and
(3) CR 02259862; Prompt Operability Determination for lack of conduit support (2B854A)
going to MO1933 on April 19, 2018.
71111.18Plant Modifications (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1) LS2219 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Drain Pot High Level Switch on April 16, 2018;
(2) Design Change 285074; TSC Diesel Generator Replacement on April 23, 2018; and
(3) Work Order (WO) 40596280Install Temp Diesel Driven Air Compressor Per
EC-291018 on April 24, 2018.
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1) HPCI torus suction valve torque diagnostic testing on April 10, 2018;
(2) Drywell high pressure instrument, E/S2309 calibration after instrument replacement on
April 10, 2018;
(3) HPCI steam inlet drain pot drain line solenoid valve stroke after replacement on
April 12, 2018;
(4) A fuel pool cooling pump check for leaks and proper operation on May 1, 2018;
(5) A SBDG room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning check for proper operation on
May 2, and May 7, 2018;
(6) A standby liquid control pump motor lube and inspection, check for proper operation on
May 31, 2018.
71111.22Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine (5 Samples)
(1) FLEX cable inspection on April 3, 2018;
(2) A primary containment isolation system Group 3 logic system functional test on
April 3, 2018;
(3) Low-low set pressure setpoint channels functional test on April 19, 2018;
(4) A residual heat removal valve position indicator verification on April 30, 2018; and
(5) Low-pressure coolant injection subsystem simulated automatic actuation on
June 26-27, 2018.
In-service (1 Sample)
Standby gas treatment instrument air over pressure relief valve in-service test on
April 5, 2018.
71114.06Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated licensee performance during an emergency planning drill on
May 15, 2018.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive material storage.
Radioactive Waste System Walk-down (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive waste processing facility during plant
walkdowns.
Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive waste characterization and
classification.
Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive material shipment preparation
processes.
Shipment Records (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees non-excepted package shipment records.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151Performance Indicator Verification (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittal listed below:
BI02: Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Sample April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018.
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be
indicative of a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors evaluated repetitive failures of the HPCI room water level instrument to
calibrate on April 17-18, 2018.
Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
related to the following issues:
(1) Severe accident management program procedure for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
black start on April 2-10, 2018; and
(2) Scaffold evaluation and documentation trend on April 30, 2018.
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Reports (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000331/2016-001-00, Two Instances of Both Doors in
Secondary Containment Airlock Opened Concurrently on April 27, 2018;
(2) LER 05000331/2018-001, Loss of RPS Function during MSIV [main steam isolation
valve] and TSV [turbine stop valve] Channel Functional Testing due to Use of a Test Box
on May, 23, 2018; and
(3) LER 05000331/2015-S01, Regarding Security Visual Assessment Problem Due to Fog
Was not Adequately Compensated For Within Time Limits.
Licensee Event Report 05000331/2015-S01 was not counted as an inspection sample since
the circumstances surrounding the event were reviewed and were the subject of a
previously documented Severity Level IV Violation (NOV 05000331/2016407-01;
200032/2016401-01, Failure to Assess ISFSI Intrusion Alarms and Implement
Compensatory Measures).
INSPECTION RESULTS
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Minor Violation - Failure to have Procedure Appropriate to the 71153Follow-up of
Circumstance for Testing Secondary Containment Airlock Doors Events and Notices of
Minor Violation: On June 19, 2016, while operating at 82 percent power, two secondary
containment access airlock doors were opened simultaneously during surveillance testing as
part of STP 3.6.4.1-02, Secondary Containment Airlock Verification. The inspectors
determined this event was caused by inadequate procedural guidance which directed the user
to attempt to open one airlock door while the other door was already open. During this test,
the interlock failed because the permanent magnets had rotated and were misaligned. This
failure could have been identified without challenging airlock interlock integrity if the second
airlock door wasnt held open. The failure to have adequate procedural guidance for testing
the secondary containment airlock doors was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, which requires licensees to have
procedures appropriate to the circumstance when performing safety-related activities. In
response to this issue, the licensee immediately closed the airlock doors. In addition, the
licensee submitted a TS change request to address the concurrent opening of two secondary
containment airlock doors. The licensees corrective action program is tracking the TS
change as CR 02034076, Secondary Containment Airlock Doors #225 and 228 Both
Opened.
Screening: The issue screened as minor because all of the questions associated with a minor
issue found in IMC 0612, Appendix B were answered No due to the licensee reestablishing
secondary containment operability immediately after the second airlock door opened. In
addition, the inspectors considered the failure to have an appropriate procedure was less than
a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Violation: The failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, constitutes a
minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs
The disposition of this violation closes LER 05000331/2016-001.
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Inappropriate Procedural Guidance Resulted in Loss of Scram Function and Failure to Enter
Applicable Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Green H.1- Human 71153Follow-up of
Systems05000331/2018002-01 Performance Events and Notices
Open/Closed Resources of Enforcement
Discretion
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for
the failure to have procedures appropriate to the circumstance for testing the main steam
isolation valve (MSIV) and turbine stop valve (TSV) closure functions. Specifically,
STP 3.3.1.1-17, MSIV Functional Test, and STP 3.3.1.1-19, Main Turbine Stop and
Combined Intermediate Valves Test, directed the use of a reactor protection system (RPS)
test box which bypased the MSIV and the TSV closure automatic reactor scram functions
while testing specific combinations of MSIVs and TSVs and failed to require entry into
appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation action statements.
Description: The DAEC Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.2.1.2.3 describes a
RPS logic scheme that initiates a reactor scram if three MSIVs or three TSVs close. During
periodic surveillance testing of the RPS instrumentation for the MSIVs, STP 3.3.1.1-17,
Revision 9, Steps 7.2.2 and 7.3.2 directed the installation of a RPS test box. The inspectors
identified the RPS test box installation allowed multiple contacts in a parallel RPS logic string
to be bypassed which rendered the RPS channels and the scram function associated with
certain MSIV closure combinations inoperable. Similarly, Steps 7.1.6, 7.2.6, 7.3.2 and 7.4.2
of STP 3.3.1.1-19, Revision 23, also directed the use of a RPS test box when testing TSVs
which allowed multiple RPS contacts to be bypassed and rendered the RPS channels and the
scram function associated with certain TSV closure combinations inoperable. Because the
loss of channels and the loss of scram function was not known by the licensee, operations
personnel did not enter TS 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Conditions
A and C which required a channel to be placed into a tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and
the trip capability restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires activities affecting quality be prescribed by
documented instructions, procedures and drawings appropriate to the circumstance. The
inspectors determined procedures STP 3.3.1.1-17 and STP 3.3.1.1-19 were activities
affecting quality because the procedures were used to verify the continued operability of TS
required, safety-related equipment. However, the inspectors determined procedures
STP 3.3.1.1-17 and STP 3.3.1.1-19 were not appropriate to the circumstance due to the
RPS test box installation rendering multiple RPS trip channels and the RPS trip capability for
the MISVs and the TSVs inoperable respectively.
Corrective Actions: The licensee immediately removed the use of the RPS test box from
STP 3.3.1.1-17 and STP 3.3.1.1-19. In addition, the licensee confirmed that the time the
RPS test box was installed for individual MSIV and TSV testing never exceeded the time
limits allowed by TS 3.3.1.1.
Corrective Action Reference: The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action
program as CR 02248146 - Potential Loss Of RPS Trip Capability During MSIV Testing, and
CR 02248121Potential Loss of RPS Capability During TSV Testing.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the failure to have procedures
appropriate to the circumstance for testing the MSIV and TSV closure functions as required
by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was a performance deficiency and a violation.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it adversely affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, installing
the test box for MSIV or TSV testing failed to maintain the MSIV closure scram function and
similarly the TSV closure scram function.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609,
Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Section C and determined the finding was of very low safety
significance (Green) because all of the questions were answered No.
Cross-cutting Aspect: H.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment,
procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, Activities affecting quality
shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type
appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, from June 1, 2015, until March 18, 2018, STP 3.3.1.1-17, Main
Steam Isolation Valve Functional Test, Revision 9, Steps 7.2.2, and 7.3.2 directed the
licensee to install the RPS test box and bypass RPS channels required for the MSIV closure
scram function without entering the action statements required in TS 3.3.1.1. Similarly,
from May 18, 2006, until March 18, 2018, STP 3.3.1.1-19. TSV Functional Test,
Revision 23, Steps 7.1.6, 7.2.6, 7.3.2 and 7.4.2 directed the licensee to install the RPS test
box and bypass RPS channels required for the TSV closure scram function without entering
the action statements required in TS 3.3.1.1.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes LER 05000331/2018-001.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public
disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.
- On July 5, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to
Mr. D. Curtland and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 12, 2018, the inspectors updated Mr. M. Davis and other members of the licensee
staff, the characterization of the Green NRC identified violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, for the inappropriate procedure guidance used to test individual MSIVs and
TSVs.
- On May 4, 2018, the inspector presented the radiation protection program results to
Mr.
- D. Curtland, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
- OP-AA-102 1002; Seasonal Readiness; Revision 23;
- OP-AA-102 0112 (DAEC-Specific Attachment); NG-271K; Plant Return To Normal Checklist;
Revision 16;
- Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 902; Flood; Revision 62
- P.&I.D., BECH-M132<1>; Diesel Generator Systems; Revision 18
- EGM 15-002; Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection
Non-Compliance; Revision 1
- RIS 2015-06; Tornado Missile Protection; Revision 0
- CR 02259540; Tornado Missile Hazards Identified
- IES Utilities Duane Arnold Energy Center Individual Plant Examination of External Events;
November 1985
- AOP 903; Severe Weather; Revision 59
- OSM Logs; 18-Apr-2018 @ 0522
71111.04Equipment Alignment
- OI 149A2; A RHR System Valve Lineup; Revision 14
- OI 151A2; A Core Spray System valve Lineup; Revision 9
- OI 151A4; B Core Spray System valve Lineup; Revision 7
- OI 324A3; SBDG 1G-31 System Valve Lineup; Revision 15
- OI 454A2; A Emergency Service Water System Valve Lineup; Revision 17
- OI 416A2; A Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Valve Lineup; Revision 13
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
- FP-AB-100; DEAC Fire Protection Program; Revision 12
- Pre-Fire Plan (PFP)-IS-757; Intake Structure
- PFP-OE-757 & PFP-OS-757; all fire zones
- PFP-RB-812; Reactor Building 812'
- PFP-RB-833; Reactor Building 833'
- PFP-RB-855; Reactor Building 855'
- PFP-PH-757; Pump House
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
- ER-AA-106; Cable Condition Monitoring Program; Revision 4
- GMP ELEC-39; Electrical Man-Hole Inspection; Revision 7
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
- Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario for May 15, 2018
- STP 3.7.7-01 Bypass Valve Test; Revision 18
- STP 3.3.1.1-19; Function Test of Turbine Stop Valve Closure; Revision 23
- STP NS930002; Main Turbine Stop and Combined Intermediate Valves Test; Revision 5
- STP 3.3.1.1-17; MSIV Functional Test; Revision 12
- STP 3.3.1.1-13; Turbine Control Valve EOC RPT Logic And RPS Instrument Functional Test;
Revision 15
- Reactivity Management Plan; Downpower for May 2018 Control Rod Sequence Exchange;
Revision Date: May 17, 2018
- OP-020; Area Inspections; Revision 27
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
- OI 152; High Pressure Coolant Injection System; Revision 118
- Design Change Package 285074; TSC Diesel Generator Replacement; Revision 0
- ER-AA-100-2002; Maintenance Rule Program Administration; Revision 6
- ER-AA-100-2002-10000; Maintenance Rule Activity Guidance; Revision 02
- STP 3.3.1.1-17; MSIV Functional Test; Revision 12
- APED-C71-004<06>; Revision 33
- APED-C71-004<07>; Revision 34
- WO 49537183; Motor, Standby Liquid Control (SBLC), 1P230A Boron Injection
- STP 3.1.7-01; SBLC Pump Operability Test; Revision 43
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- Design Change Package 285074; TSC Diesel Generator Replacement; Revision 0
- Duane Arnold Station Daily Status Report; April 24, 2018
- WO 40476465-07; Wetted Cable Motor Replacement
- SA-AA-100; Fleet Industrial Safety Program; Revision 8
- SA-200-1000; Asbestos Control Program; Revision 19
- WO 49537183; Motor, SBLC, 1P230A Boron Injection
- STP 3.1.7-01; SBLC Pump Operability Test; Revision 43
- WO 40595147; Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Pump 1P-205A Variable Speed Control
- Design Change Package 291139; 1C380 and 1C381 Variable Frequency Drive Replacement
- CR 02258197; 1P205A RWCU Pump Trip
- CR 02261378; A RWCU Pump Tripped
- CR 02263275; 1P205A RWCU Pump Trip
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- CR 02259862; Prompt Operability Determination for lack of conduit support (2B854A) going to
MO1933
- OSM Log; April 18, 2018
- OSM Log; April 19, 2018
- OI-711; Pumphouse HVAC System; Revision 19
- CR 02257736; Pumphouse Temperature LOOS
- CR 02257955; Unable to Calibrate to Meet All Required Specs
- OSM Log; April 4, 2018
- Executive Summary for CR 2259867; Analysis for the HPCI Area Water Level EITER
71111.18Plant Modifications
- WO 40585917 - HPCI RTS
- WO 40596001-08 - LS2219 Troubleshooting
- CR 02259459; LS2219 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Drain Pot High Level Cal.
- ARP 1C03C; Section D-8; HPCI Control Power Failure; Revision 51
- WO 40596280 - Install Temp Diesel Driven Air Compressor Per EC-291018
- Commercial Change Package #291018; Revision. 0
- AOP 518; Failure of Instrument and Service Air; Revision 41
- OI 518.1; Instrument, Service, and Breathing Air System; Revision 102
- Design Change Package 285074; TSC Diesel Generator Replacement; Revision 0
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
- VALVOP-T083-01; VOTES Calibration Method; Revision 10
- WO 40532761; MO2322-0; Diagnostic Test
- STP 3.5.1-08; Calibration of Drywell Pressure - High Instrumentation; Revision 3
- WO 40474595; E/S2309; Replace Capacitors
- WO 40585917; RTS Work Order for HPCI CMM
- VALVE-A610-01, Section H; Generic ASCO Solenoid Valve Replacement Instructions;
Revision 15
- WO 40396905; SV2211; Replace Solenoid Valve
- PUMP-U055-03; Union Centrifugal, Fuel Pool Pumps Model HHS and HHD; Revision 8
- WO 40244528; Lower Than Expected A FPC Pump Disclosure Pressure
- GMP-TEST-60_010, Section A, Sub-Section 5.2; A SBDG 1G-31 Room HVAC Test;
Revision 10
- WO 40142897; Replace Current TC/7000A With Seimens Model Replacement
- WO 49537183; Motor, SBLC, 1P230A Boron Injection
- STP 3.1.7-01; SBLC Pump Operability Test; Revision 43
71111.22Surveillance Testing
- STP NS590006; ASME O&M Code Pressure Relief Valve Testing; Revision 21
- CR 02257935; PSV-733B has exceeded Code Required Test Frequency
- WO 40536349-01; Inspect FLEX Electrical Cables
- STP 3.3.6.1-50A; A PCIS Group 3 Isolation Logic System Functional Test; Revision 20
- STP 3.3.6.3-03; Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoint Channels Functional Test; Revision 11
- CR 02244850; 2018 UHS SA- Improper Documentation of Incomplete STP step;
January 16, 2018
- WO 40439017-01; STP NS540003-B Emergency Service Water Operability; July 14, 2016
- WO 40536371-01; STP 3.3.6.3-04; Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoint; March 21, 2018
- AD-AA-100-1006; procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence; Revision 14
- STP 3.3.3.1-09 RHRA; A RHR Valve Position Indicator Verification - Operating; Revision 8
- STP 3.5.1-04; Low-pressure Coolant Injection Subsystem Simulated Automatic Actuation;
Revision 16
71114.06Drill Evaluation
- Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario for May 15, 2018
71124.08Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
- Shipment 17-25; Condensate Resin; September 12, 2017
- Shipment 17-17; Dry Active Waste; July 17, 2017
- Shipment 17-21;
- 16-002-R; 10 CFR 61 Compliance Data Technical Basis for DAEC Condensate Resin;
June 3, 2016
- 14-001-R; 10 CFR 61 Compliance Data Technical Basis for DAEC Condensate Resin;
March 10, 2014
- 12-005-R; 10 CFR 61 Compliance Data Technical Basis for DAEC Condensate Resin;
September 24, 2012
- 17-009-R; 10 CFR 61 Compliance Data Technical Basis for DAEC Dry Active Waste;
November 15, 2017
- RWH 3410.0; Process Control Program; Revision 20
- RWH 3414.2; Ecodex Precoat/Powdex/Solka-Floc/Diatomaceous Earth/Zeolite Dewatering
Procedure for EnergySolutions14-215;or Smaller Liners Utilizing the Self-Engaging
Dewatering System; Revision 6
- RWH 3414.3; Bead Resin/Activated Carbon Dewatering Procedure for EnergySolutions14-215 or Smaller Liners Utilizing Self-Engaging Dewatering System; Revision 3
- RWH 3404.1; General Requirements for Cask Handling; Revision 24
- RP-AA-107; Radioactive Material Control Program; Revision 1
- RP-AA-108-1002; Shipment of Radioactive Material; Revision 11
- RP-AA-108-1003; Radioactive Materials Surveys for Shipment; Revision 6
- CNSI-DW-11118-01-NP; Dewatering Topical: Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc;
December 23, 1983
- 665-1754U-87; Dewatering Topical Report Applicability to 14-215 HIC Containers;
October 12, 1987
- CS-OP-PR-010; Bead Resin/Activated Carbon Dewatering Procedure for EnergySolutions14-215 Or Smaller Liners, Utilizing EnergySolutions Self-Engaging Dewatering System;
Revision 4
- CR 02203294; Level 1 Assessment: Review of Columbia Statin Shipping OE; May 4, 2017
71151Performance Indicator Verification
- RCS Leakage Tracking Data between April 1, 2017 and March 31, 2018
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
- SAMP 703; RCIC Operation Following Loss of Electric Power; Revisions 5-8
- CR 02018807; 2015 FP Triennial PEO Challenged To Perform A Step SAMP 703
- CR 02018593; Batch Change SAMPs 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 718
- CR 02090877; SAMP 703-RCIC Operations Following Loss Of Electric Power
- OP-AA-100-1000; Conduct Of Operations; Revision 24
- MM-AA-100-1002; Scaffold Installation, Modification and Removal Requests; Revision 8
- CR 02254212; Scaffold Inspection Documentation
- CR 02251762; Scaffolding In Bay 3 Of Torus Less than 2 Inches From Torus
- WO 40509538-05; Scaffold Work Plan; Control Building Exhaust Isolation Dampers
- WO 40546658-02; Scaffold Work Plan; RCIC Outboard Torus Suction Valve Operator
- WO 40539053-02; Scaffold Work Plan; RCIC Steam Exhaust to Torus Stop-Check
- WO 40534607-02; Scaffold Work Plan; V87-0001, 0002 & 0003
- WO 40515580-02; Scaffold Work Plan; 1VAC017B-M; Motor Reactor Building H&V
- WO 40530292-03; Scaffold Work Plan; Conduit 2A202; Torus Basement, North Wall
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
- CR 02034076; Secondary Containment Airlock Doors #225 and 228 Both Opened
- LER 05000331/2016001; Two Instances of Both Doors in Secondary Containment Airlock
Opened Concurrently
- CR 2248121; Potential Loss of RPS Trip Capability during TSV Testing
- CR 2248146; Potential Loss of RPS Trip Capability during MSIV Testing
- LER 05000331/2018; Loss of RPS Function During MSIV and TSV Channel Functional Test
due to Use of a Test Box
16