IR 05000277/1999004

Insp Repts 50-277/99-04 & 50-278/99-04 on 990405-0517. Non-cited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Surveillances & Maintenance,Engineering & Technical Support & Plant Support Areas

ML20195K239
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	06/11/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195K230	List: IR 05000277/1999004 ML20195K225
References
50-277-99-04, 50-277-99-4, 50-278-99-04, 50-278-99-4, NUDOCS 9906220036
Download: ML20195K239 (15)

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, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

License No DPR-44 DPR-56 Report No Docket No Licensee: PECO Energy Company Correspondence Control Desk i P.O. Box 195 Wayne, PA 19087-0195 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection Period: April 5,1999 through May 17,1999 Inspectors: A. P.1cMurtray, Senior Resident inspector M. Buckley, Resident inspector B. Welling, Resident inspector Approved by: Curtis J. Cowgill, Cr .

Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

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9906220036 990611

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PDR ADOCK 05000277 l O PDR l

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!'L EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station l NRC Inspection Report 50-277/99-04,50-278/99-04 l This inspection report included aspects of PECO operations; surveillances and maintenance; l engineering and technical support; and plant support area Operations:

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e Equipment operators performed well during plant rounds. They property completed surveillance readings and reported abnormal plant conditions. The use of peer mentors for improving performance of newly qualified equipment operators was a positive practice. (Section 04.1)

e PECO controlled the overtime hours of operations and maintenance personnel within the limits of the technical specifications and administrative procedures. (Section O6.1)

! Maintenance:

l :e Maintenance activities associated with Thsrmolag and penetration seal upgrades were I typically well-controlled. (Section M2.1)

t Plant Sunoort:

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e . Communications equipment, supplies and data acquisition systems were maintained in a l high state of operational readiness in the Technical Support Center and the Operational

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Support Center. Emergency siren activation equipment was fully operationa Equipment and supplies for off-site dose assessment teams were properly calibrated and fully functional. (Section P2.1).

e On April 6,1999, site security personnel discovered that a Unit 3 vital area door alarm l

l had been disabled. The alarm had inadvertently been disabled by security personnel i during planned maintenance on security system equipment. This Severity Level IV

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l violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (Section S2.1) l l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lil

" Summary of Plant Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l . Operations - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 02.1 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . 1

'02.2 Operations Personnel Response to High Control Rod Drive (CRD) Seal

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Temperatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 04 Operator Knowledge and Pedormance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 04.1 Equipment Operator (EO) Performance During Daily Rounds . . . . . . . 2 06 Operations Organization and Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 06.1 Site Use of Overtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

.08 Miscellaneous Operations issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-277/98-06-02 Plant Status Control Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 08.2 -(Closed) Violation 50-277(278)/98-06-04 Failure to Perform Surveillance Required for First Recirculation Pump Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 08.3 (Closed) LER 50-278/3-99-001 Unit 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Isolation due to High Steam Flow Signal During System Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 08.4 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-278/98-08-01 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Startup Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 l l . M aintena nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M1 Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M1.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 5 M2.1 Thermolag Remediation Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Ill . Engineering ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 E8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-278/98-06-03 Unit 3 Recirculation Loop Mismatch Following the Runback of the 3 'A' Recirculation Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 IV. Plant Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 P2- ' Status of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources 6 P2.1 Readiness of Site Emergency Response Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 S1.1 Significant Fitness for Duty Event Requiring NRC Notification . . . . . . . 7 l S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 n

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. S Inadvertent Disabling of a Unit 3 Safeguard System Vital Area Door and (Closed) LER 50-278/3-99-002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . 8 F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection lasues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 F (Closed) Inspector Follow-up item (IFI) 50-277(278)/97-04-02 Review Revisions to Fire Protection Training Lesson Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 j V. Management Meetings . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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X1 Exit M eeting S u m m a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l

l lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ......... . 10 ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ... . .... . .. 10 LIST OF ACRONYM S USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .11

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! Report Detalla I M1

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Summary of Plant Status

, PECO operated both units safely over the period of this repor . Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100% power. On May 15,1999, Unit 2 load was reduced to approximately 71% for maintenance on an outboard main steam isolation valve. Unit 2 power retumed to full power later that day and remained at 100% for the rest of the perio Unit 3 began this inspection period at 100% power. On April 17,1999, Unit 3 load was reduced to approximately 83% power for a control rod pattom adjustment and to repair an air leak on a i

control rod hydraulic control unit. Unit 3 power retumed to 1R% later that day. On May 15, Unit 3 load was reduced to approximately 80% power for a control rod pattem adjustment, then restored to 100% power.. Unit power remained at 100% for the rest of the perio l. Operations

O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment l

02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

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The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walkdown sections of the following safety systems or subsystems:

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High Pressure Service Water Pumps - Units 2 and 3 i

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Emergency Service Water System- Units 2 and 3 l l

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Emergency cooling Booster Pumps- Units 2 and 3 i i

Equipment operability and material condition were acceptable in all cases. Minor equipment discrepancies were brought to the attention of operations personnel and ,

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corrective actions were initiate .2 Operations Personnel Response to Hiah Control Rod Drive (CRD) Seal Temperatures Inspection Scope (71707)  ;

On April 25,1999, a high high temperature alarm (greater than 500*F) was received for the Unit 3 control rod drive (CRD) 26-11. The inspectors reviewed the actions by operations and engineering personnel to monitor and address the impact of high CRD seal temperature Observations and Findinas After a routine stroking surveillance was performed on CRD 26-11 on April 25, the inspectors observed that the CRD temperature was indicating 514'F. After further review of this high temperature condition, the inspectors noted that a high-high

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temperature al arm for this CRD was first received by operators on March 13,1999. At that time, operators initiated an action request (AR) to address the problem. Engineering personnel evaluated the AR and concluded the CRD remained operable. Later in March, the temperature dropped below the high-high temperature alarm setpoin The inspectors reviewed PECO's operability determination and identified no concems. A CRD high temperature condition can cause seal degradation and could result in up to a 0.15 second increase in scram insertion times, according to a General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL). However, the technical specification maximum scram time would not be approached for this CRD, even with the 0.15 second increas After the inspectors questioned the high temperature reading, reactor engineedng provided guidance to the control room operators to correct the condition. The CRD was subsequently moved from the full out position of 48 to 46 to reestablish proper cooling flow and reduce drive temperature below the alarm setpoint. The inspectors noted that these steps were not incorporated into existing procedures. PECO personnel stated that they were evaluating updating procedures to add this actio ;

I Although the system manager was tracking CRDs with high temperatures, the inspectors noted that the control room CRD discrepancy log was not updated to reflect that CRD 26-11 was moved to position 46 to alleviate a high temperature condition. Operations management indicated that operators should have made an entry in the CRD deficiency log to indicate that the position of the CRD was changed to correct a discrepant condition. Subesquently, a CRD discrepancy log entry was made. In addition, the operators included CRD status during shift tumover, Conclusions Inspectors identified two discrepancies during the review of a high temperature condition (above 500 *F) on a Unit 3 control rod drive (CRD). The station had not incorporated into operating response procedures the practice of moving a CRD from the full out position to corract a high temperature condition. In addition, operators were not documenting in the CRD discrepancy log that a CRD was moved to reduce the temperatur Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Eauioment Operator (EO) Performance Durina Daily Rounds Insoection Scope (71707)

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The inspectors observed EOs out in the field to assess their performance and to determine whether abnormal conditions observed during rounds were being noted and l reporte !

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... Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that fiOs for both units performed well during plant round They properly completed surveillance readings and reported abnormal plant condition Newly qualified EOs were aul;ne.d peer mentors with several years of experienc These mentors were refenud f.o as needed and provided insights into tasks being performed. The inspectors tietermined that use of peer mentors for improving performance of newly qual!(ied equipment operators was a positive practic Conclusions Equipment operators performed well during plant rounds. They properly completed surveillance readings and reported abnormal plant conditions. The use of peer mentors for improving performance of newly qualified equipment operators was a positivo practic Operations Organization and Administration 06.1 Site Use of Overtime Insoection Scone (71707 & 62707)

The inspectors reviewed overtime records for the last six months to determine if overtime usage for safety-related work by the operations and maintenance departments complied with technical specifications and administrative limit Observations and Findinas The administrative controls section of the Peach Bottom technical specifications lists overtime guidelines and requires that administrative procedures be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related function The inspectors reviewed the overtime records for operations and maintenance personnel for the last six months and compared the overtime worked with the technical specification and site administrative procedures. The inspectors determined that overtime was well-controlled within the limits of the technical specifications and administrative procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed overtime records and documentation for restoration and post-maintenance testing for a recent E-3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) outage. The inspectors noted that there were no indications that the amount of overt;me worked by plant personnel affected work quality or testing performanc Conclusions PECO controlled the overtime hours of operations and maintenance personnel within the limits of the technical specifications and administrative procedure i

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l~ 0 Miscellaneous Operations issues p

L 08.1 ~ - (Closed) Violation NIO) 50-277/98-06-02 Plant Status Control Corrective Action

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_ The inspectors verified that the corrective actions that addressed the cause of this violation were implemented. Corrective actions for station wide plant status control deficiencies were addressed in Performance Enhancement Program (PEP) No.

l 10008068. In addition, the procedure improvement initiative at the station addressed generic issues that contributed to this violation. The inspectors have no additional -

concems with this issue. This violation is close '

08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-277(278)/98-06-04 Failure tc Perform Surveillance Raauired for ~

First Recirculation Pumo Start This Severity Level IV violation was documented in a Notice of Violation issued before i

March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level l' iV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because this violation would have been treated as an NCV in accordance with Appendix C, it is being closed out in this report., This violation is in PECO's correction program as PEP No.1000812 .3 (Closed) LER 50-278/3-99-001 Unit 3 Reactor Core isolation Coolina (RCIC) Enoineered Safety Feature (ESF) Isolation due to Hiah Steam Flow Sianal Durina System Restoration i

This event was' discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-277(278)/99-02, Section O3.1.

The inspectors performed an on-site review of the LER. Shift managers reviewed this

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event during a professional developm6nt seminar. Instruction on repressurizing the RCIC system so that the high flow isolation does not occur was planned for future l operator training. No additional concems were identified by the inspectors during this )

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08.4 (Closed) Violation NIO) 50-278/98-08-01 Reactor Water Cleanuo (RWCU) System Startuo Procedure This Severity Level IV violation was documented in a Notice of Violation issued before March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because this violation would have been treated as an NCV in accordance with Appendix C, it is being closed out in this report. This violation was documented in PECO's corrective action program as PEP Nos.10008835 and 10000884 '

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11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments I

NRC Inspection Procedures 62707 and 61726 were used in the inspection of plant maintenance and surveillance activities. The inspectors observed and reviewed ;

selected portions of the following maintenance and surveillance test activities:

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Maintenance Observations: Observed On:

C0186325 Install Data Acquisition System April 27,1999 Penetration in Cable Spreading Room C0186392 Thermolag Upgrade (E13 4KV Switchgear April 27,1999 Room)

M1206858 'B' Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Thrust May 7,1999 -

Bearing Drain Oil Temperature Variations C0188535 Rework /Recalibrate/ Replace Power May 7,1999 Supply for APRM Channel'E'(Unit 2)

Surveillance Observations: Observed.On-RT-O-023-725-3 High Pressure Coolant injection April 13,1999 (HPCI) Response Time Test (Unit 2)

. ST-O-23-301-2 HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit May 11,1999 Cooler Functional and Inservice Test The work and testing performed during these activities was professional and thoroug ' Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The work and testing procedures were present at the job site anc' actively used by the technicians and operators for activities observed. Good pre-job briefs were observed prior to the performance of the surveillances observed. Engineering personnel were present and actively monitoring system performance during the surveillances observe M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Thermulag Remediation Work i' Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of work activities associated with Thermolag and fire i protection penetration seal upgrade l i

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6 Observations and Findinos The inspectors observed that the work activities were typically well-controlled. Much of the work was being performed in the vicinity of sensitive equipment such as safety-related battery chargers and switchgear in the 4KV switchgear rooms. Station personnel had installed barriers and covers to provide protection from inadvertent bumping. Also, workers had been briefed on the location of the sensitive equipment. Some unexpected control room alarms occurred when workers placed materials in front of the cooling air vents for the battery chargers; in response to the alarms, station personnel removed the material prior to any equipment damage, Conclusions

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Maintenance activities associated with Thermolag and penetration seal upgrades were typically well-controlle . Engineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E (Closed) VIO 50-278/98-06-03 Unit 3 Recirculation Looo Mismatch Followino the Runback of the 3 'A' Recirculation Pumo This Severity Level IV violation was documented in a Notice of Violation issued before March 11,1999, imr5 mentation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level i IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because this violation would have been treated as an NCV in accordance with Appendix C, it is being closed out in this report. This violation was documented in the PECO's corrective action program as PEP No.1000852 IV. Plant Support P2 . Status of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P Readiness of Site Emeroency Response Facilities Insoection Scooe (71750)

The inspectors toured the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support

. Center (OSC) to determine if the facilities and equipment were adequately maintained for adivation and response to an emergency. The inspectors also inspected on-site emergency siren activation equipment and the equipment that would be used by the off-site dose assessment team !

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7 Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified that emergency communications equipment in the control room, TSC and OSC was operational. The main and back-up batteries for the TSC communications equipment were clean with tight connections and proper electrolyte l level. The exterior of the ventilation ducting and supply and exhaust fans for the TSC l were functional. All dosimetry staged at the TSC was properly calibrated. Work areas in

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the TSC and OSC were uncluttered and in a good state of readiness. Emergency ,

procedures and other documentation were properly filed and readily availabl l Computers in the TSC were working properl l The inspectors verified that radiological monitoring equipment at the OSC was within the calibration dates. Field survey kits and decon kits to be used by off-site dose assessmer:t teams were appropriately stocked. Radiological monitoring equipment, ;

used by the off-site dose assessment teams, was properly calibrated. The emergency l siren activation system was observed to be fully operationa !

Although the plant monitoring system computers in the TSC were operational during this 1 inspection, they have locked up twice this year. The computers were not able to be reset locally to restore the terminals to service during these failures and were restored by l Nuclear information Services Department personnel at the terminal server. This issue was documented in PEP 10009678 and should be resolved later this year when the existing plant monitoring system computer terminals are replace Conclusions i t

Communications equipment, supplies and data acquisition systems were maintained in a high state of operational readiness in the Technical Support Center and the Operational Support Center. Emergency siren activation equipment was fully operationa Equipment and supplies for off-site dose assessment teams were properly calibrated and fully functiona Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities i S1.1 Sionificant Fitness for Duty Event Reauirina NRC Notification Ir=nadian Scope (71750)

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On May 10,1999, PECO site security personnel received the results of laboratory l analysis on syringes found inside the protected area. The results indicated a presence

[ of a controlled substance. The inspectors reviewed PECO's initial response to this event.

l Observations and Findinas On April 15,1999, PECO staff found three used syringes in the trash from a warehouse bathroom located within the protected area. The syringes were subsequently sent to an

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independent laboratory for drug testing. The testing determined the presence of a ,

controlled substance. On May 11,1999, PECO made a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report to the NRC per l 10 CFR26.73(a) for this issu .

The inspectors discussed this issue with security management. The inspectors l determined that the initial actions by security personnel for this event were appropriate l and the issue was properly reported to the NRC. Security management indicated that ,

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further action for this event was on-goin Conclusiom s

On May 11,1999, PECO notified the NRC that syringes found in the protected area  !

tested positive for a controlled substance. Initial actions by security personnel for this event were appropriate and the issue was properly reported to the NRC. Evaluation and actions for this event by PECO were on-goin S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Inadvertent Disablina of a Unit 3 Safeauard System Vital Area Door and (Closed) LER 50-278/3-99-002 Insoection Scope (71750)

On March 31,1999, security personnelinadvertently disabled a Unit 3 vital area door alarm function during planned maintenance on a security system multiplexer unit. The inspectors discussed this issue with the security management and reviewed PECO's initial corrective action Observations and Findinas On April 6,1999, security personnel deiacted a disabled vital area door alarm in Unit The door alarm function was disabled for approximately six days. Security personnel restored the vital door alarm to operation as part of the initial corrective actions and informed security management. Although the door alarm was disabled, the door continued to be maintained locked and controlled in all other respect Security personnel's investigation yielded no evidence of unauthorized access or tampering with the door. All security personnel were briefed on the event, the tumover process for the security alarm station operators was revised, and all security personnel were required to attend self-check trainin The inspectors performed an on-site review of LER 3-99-002, and identified no additional concem The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 Facility Operatir.] License (DPR-56)

specifies that all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical Securit/ Plan shall be fully implemented. Maintaining the alarm function of vital area doors is a requirement of

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the Peach Bottom Physical Security Plan. Contrary to this requirement, a Unit 3 vital area dc>cr alarm remained disabled for approximately six days. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in PECO's corrective action program as PEP 10009658. (NCV 50-278/99-04-01) Conclusions On April 6,1999, site security personnel discovered that a Unit 3 vital area door alarm had been disabled. The alarm had inadvertently been disabicd by security personnel during planned maintenance on security system equipment. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the l

NRC Enforcement Policy.

I F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues F (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-277(278)/97-04-02 Review Revisions to Fire Protection Trainina Lesson Plans in NRC Inspection Report 50-277(278)/97-04, the inspectors opened an inspector follow-up item to review the hotwork firewatch training lesson plan for lessons leamed from a Unit 2 vent stack fire in August 1994. The lesson plan should have discussed the unavailability of communication equipment at the job site as a contributing cause for the event, as a corrective action for Performance Enhancement Program (PEP) report 10002682.

l The inspectors verified that the current hotwork firewatch lesson plan, LMCTR-1075, Revision 4, contained a section on the lessons leamed from the vent stack fire event, which included the unavailability of communications equipment. During plant tours, inspectors questioned firewatch personnel and verified they were aware of the need for l communications equipment at the job site. This item is close V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary l

l The inspectors presented the results of the inspection to members of PECO management on May 28,1999. PECO acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was l identified by PECO.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 T Onsite Engineering Observations -

- IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observation IP 71707 Plant Operation IP 71750 L Plant Support Observations

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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED QDR0ed/Ce sed 50-278/99-04-01 NCV inadvertent Disabling of Safeguard System Vital Area Door Clossd 50-277(278)/97-04-02' IFl Review Revisions to Fire Protection Training Lesson Plans 50-277/98-06-02- VIO Plant Status Control Corrective Action 50-278/98-06-03 VIO Unit 3 Recirculation Loop Mismatch Following the Runback of the 3 'A' Recirculation Pump 50-277(278)/98-06-04 VIO Failure to Perform Surveillance Required for First -

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Recirculation Pump Start 50-278/98-08-01' VIO RWCU System Startup Procedure 50-278/3-99-001 LER Unit 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Isolation Due to High Steam Flow Signal During System Restoration 50-278/3-99-002 LER Failure to Maintain Alarmed Access Control to a Safeguard System Vital Area Door

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. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED APR average power range monitor 4 CFR~ code of federal regulations CRD control rod drive CS' core spray 1 DC di sct current ECCS emergency core cooling system eel escalated enforcement issue -

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EO equipment operator EP emergency preparedness ES engineered safety feature FSS fire safe shutdown i

'HCU hydraulic control unit HPCI high pressure coolant injection l LERs licensee event reports

. MCREV main control room emergency ventilation NCV non-cited violation NRC . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODC ONsite Dose Calculation Manual'

OSC Operational Support Center PBAPS ' Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station PDR public document room

.PECO PECO Energy PEP performance enhancement program RCIC - reactor core isolation cooling RHR- residual heat removal SBO station blackou TSC: Technical Support Center

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UFSAR~ updated final safety analysis report l

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