ML20217A688
| ML20217A688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217A673 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-98-02, 50-263-98-2, NUDOCS 9803250168 | |
| Download: ML20217A688 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000263/1998002
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION til
Docket No: 50-263 1
License No: DPR-22 )
Report No: 50-263/98002(DRP) I
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Licensee: Northern States Power Cornpany i
Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station
Location: 414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Dates: January 13,1998 - February 23,1998
Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector
M. Kunowski, Project Engineer
D. Wrona, Resident inspector
Approved by: J. W. McCormick Barger, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 7
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9803250168 900318
gDR ADOCK 05000263
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-263/98002(DRP) i
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant
support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
. . Operator performance during routine operations and surveillance test activities was good.
With one exception, operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and equipment
status. An operator's questioning attitude prevented a potential Group I isolation during a
routine main steam line high flow surveillance test and standby gas treatment system
operability test (Section 01.1).
. Three concerns were identified with respect to the restoration of equipment to operational
readiness after maintenance activities were performed. These included not providing
adequate instructions for restoring a reactor core isolation cooling valve to service; )
declaring a residual heat removal service water pump operable with an outstanding hold- I
and-secure card located on the control room hand-switch; and not providing adequate
instructions to fill a portion of the fire protection system. Two violations forinadequate
procedures and failure to follow administrative procedures were cited (Section 01.2).
. The training provided to operations personnel for the handling and inspection of new fuel
bundles and channels was adequate. Operators conducted the inspection and handling
activities in a controlled manner (Section O1.3).
. Operations personnel displayed good teamwork during three simulator training scenarios.
The senior reactor operator verified that actions were taken in accordance with the
emergency operating procedures and displayed good command and control over the crew
(Section 05.1).
Maintenance
. In general, maintenance staff's performance of observed work activities and surveillance j
tests was acceptable. However, maintenance personnel did not establish proactive i
foreign material exclusion control during the reactor building closed cooling water heat
exchanger work activities (Section M1.1).
. The work order (WO) associated with moving channel crates to the refueling floor did not
contain adequate instructions, which resulted in a heavy load movement without proper )
evaluation. One violation for an inadequate procedure was identified (Section M1.2). i
Enaineerina
- The acceptance criterion in a Technical Specification (TS)-required surveillance test did
not reflect the TS requirements. The licensee had several opportunities to identify the
discrepancy, including during the biennial review of the surveillance test. Also, the
inspectors identified a weakness in the licensee's TS change process, in that the process
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did not assure that changes to TSs are reflected in related procedures in a timely
manner The incorrect acceptance criterion in a required test was a violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings"
(Section E2.1).
. Training provided to station personnel for the inspection of new fuel bundles and
channels was adequate. Engineering personnel performed a very detailed and
meticulous inspection of the new fuel bundles and channels (Section E5.1).
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Plant Support
. The inspectors noted that effective radiological controls were established for the new fuel ,
inspections and that radiation protection technicians provided support during i
maintenance and surveillance activities (Section R1).
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Report Details
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' Summary of Plant Status.
The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent until an end-of-life coastdown began on
January 17,1998. ,
I. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
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01.1 . General Observations
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing
plant operations, includinc observations of control room evolutions and shift tumovers.
, The inspectors also reviewed control room logbooks and operability determinations.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13, " Plant Operations," was reviewed as
. part of this inspection.
I b. - Observations and Findinas
With one exception, as discussed in Section 01.2, operators were knowledgeable of
. plant conditions, equipment status, on-going maintenance activities, and on-going
I' surveillance tests. The inspectors noted a consistent use of a three-way repeat-back
communication technique between control room operators and instrumentation and
control personnelin the plant during surveillance test activities. Also, procedure steps
were adhered to or were revised in accordance with established administrative
procedures, in addition, a control room operator raised a concem with respect to
performing a routine main steam line high flow Group I isolation surveillance test
l _ concurrent with a standby gas treatment (SBGT) operability test. The operability test
required the operators to isolate the main steam tunnel ventilation which would result in
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increased area temperatures in the tunnel. This would increase the possibility of an !
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inadvertent high temperature Group i isolation signal. Since one trip system of the i
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Group I isolation logic would be satisfied during the routine surveillance test, an
! inadvertent high main steam tunnel temperature could have resulted in a Group I isolation
at reactor power. The licensee acknowledged the vulnerability and rescheduled the
routine surveillance test until after the SEGT tests were completed.
c. Conclusion
Operator performance during routine operations and surveillance test activities was good.
With one exception, operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and equipment
status. An operator's questioning attitude prevented a potential Group I isolation during a
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routine main steam line high flow surveillance test and SBGT operability test.
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' 01.2' Attenten-to-Detail Concems Dunna Restoraten of Eauipment
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed operations personnel restore several systems and components
to operational readiness status.-
- b.- Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors reviewed several equipment isolation instructions and verified that :
l0 ' equipment isolation tags were properly hung.- The inspectors also monitored operators
l during the restoration of several equipment isolations and notert good operator ._
l- self-checking. However, the following concoms were noted
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.ig the restoration of the
- reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), residual heat removas i. mice water (RHRSW), and
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fire protection systems:
- J On January 21,1998, operators restored the RCIC system after maintenance '
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personnel completed some planned maintenance acti"ities. During the operability ' '
test for the RCIC system, the operators were unable to electrically stroke the ;
turbine steam supply valve, MO-2076, and terminated the surveillance test. _ i
Operations personnel found the manual declutch for this valve out-of-position. 1
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The licensee determined that the valve had been manually closed and tagged
closed in accordance with the isolation worksheet for WO 9800108,' * Install surge
suppression diode at MO-2080 trip coil," but was not properly retumed to service
when the system was restored. The operators subsequently manually unseated
the valve, positioned the manual declutch, and initiated another surveillance test.
On January 23,1998, the inspectors noted that the terminated test was not
documented in the control room log book and the valve discrepancy had not been '
reported in a condition report (CR).' The shift manager made a late entry in the
control room log book and initiated a CR after discussion with the inspectors.
The inspectors reviewed the equipment isolation worksheet and determined that
the instructions provided to the operators were inadequate. Specifically, the
instructions stated that the isolated and restored position for this valve was
closed. It did not contain instructions to require the operators to manually unseat
i the valve and position the manual declutch. Criterion V of Appendix B of
10 CFR Part 50 requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by written -
procedures. The failure to provide adequate instructions for the restoration of
MO-2078 is a violation (VIO 50-263/98002-01(DRP). Although the violation was
discovered as a result of a self-disclosing event, enforcement discretion was not
warranted since the root cause, improper restoration, was obvious, and this was
one of three examples of equipment restoration issues identified during this i
inspection period.
+ On January 29,1998, during RHRSW motor cooling flow testing, a plant operator ;
was unable to open the #13 RHRSW motor cooling water outlet valve, i
RHRSW-21-3. The shift supervisor declared the #13 RHRSW pump inoperable, 1
and on the pump's control room panel hand-switch placed a hold-and-secure card
which stated not to operate the pump. Work Order 98000309 was initiated for ;
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maintenance personnel to establish an attemate flow path for the motor cooling
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L line and ' operations personnel declared the pump operable when this work was
completed. During a subsequent control room panel walk-down, the ' inspectors
identified that the operators failed to remove the hold-and-secure card attached to
the #13 RHRSW pump hand-switch. The tag was then removed and the shift
manager re-declared the system operable.
The safety significance of this event was minimal since the pump was physically
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capable of performing its safety function. However, the pump does not
! automatically start in an accident condition and would require a manual start by
1- control room operators. The hold-and secure tag could have caused some -
! confusion with respect to the operability status of the pump, Also, previous
l- concems with respect to operations personnel awareness of equipment status
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were documented in inspection Reports No. 50-263/97006(DRP) and
l No. 50-263/97015(DRP). Although declaring the #13 RHRSW pump operable
! with an administrative tag on the hand-switch did not challenge the physical
! operability of the system, it demonstrated that additional management attention to
operations personnel control room panel attentiveness may be warranted.
Step 4.4.2 of 4AWI.04.05.05, Revision 8, "WO Closeout and Disposition," states,
in part, that the shift supervisor shall coordinate the permanent clearing of an
isolation to Ocilitate required testing and the retum-to-service of components or
systems. The failure to remove the hold-and-secure card during the restoration of
the #15 RHRSW pump is a violation (VIO 50-263/98002-02(DRP)), as described
in the attached NOV.
. On January 28,1998, operators drained a portion of the piping common to the .
I electrical fire pump and screenwash/ fire pump in support of maintenance
activities. The instructions to restore the fire system to readiness required the
operators to start the diesel fire pump in order to fill this drained piping. The
inspectors noted that a check valve located downstream of the electric fire pump
and screenwash/ fire pump but upstream of the common fire water header would
prevent the diesel fire pump from filling the drained piping. The inspectors
discussed this observation with a plant operator peiforming the restoration
activity. The plant operator contacted the shift supervisor and system engineer.
The restoration instructions were revised to instruct the operators to start the
screenwash/ fire pump and open a vent valve. The inspectors noted that this
concern would have been identified had the operators proceeded with the original
instructions,
cc Conclusions
Three concerns were identified with respect to the restoration of equipment to operational
readiness after maintenance activities were performed. These included not restoring a
reactor core isolation cooling valve to service properly; declaring a residual heat removal
service water pump operable with an outstanding hold and secure card on the control !
room handswitch; and not providing adequate instructions to fill a portion of the fire i
protection system. The inspectors were concemed that although these observations
were not safety significant, they represented a need for increased operations personnel
attentiveness-to-detail. Two violations for failure to follow administrative procedures were
cited. l
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. 01.3 L Handlina of New Reactor Fuel Bundles and Fuel Bundle Channels ,
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! - a. Inspechon Scope (60705 and 60710)
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-The inspectors observed the training provided to operators by an exponenced fuel.
handler supervisor on the handling of new fuel bundles and channels. The inspectors
also observed seversi operations crews channel and manipulate about 25 of 128 new fuel .,
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. bundles received for the upcoming refueling outage. - The following associated
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procedures were reviewed by the inspectors:
- General Electric (GE) Procedure 246-GP-54,' Revision 3, " Customer Site Handling
and inspection of GE New Fuel Bundles, Channels and Channel Fasteners;" and
. Procedure 9015, Revision 18 " Procedure for inspection of New Fuel."
!- b. Observations
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The inspectors observed several operations crews during this evolution. The training
- provided to the operators by the fuel handler supervisor was adequate. Mock-ups were
used as appropriate. The fuel handling supervisors, who were licensed senior reactor
i operators, provided guidance to and oversight of the operators and were cognizant of all
l. activities on the refueling floor. Movement of the fuel bundles from the receiving crates to
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' the inspection platforms and to the spent fuel pool was conducted in a deliberate,
conservative manner. The fuel handling supervisors maintained an accurate record of
the fuel bundle movements. In addition, the licensee established adequate foreign
material exclusion (FME) controls and promptly implemented an additional control
recommended by GE.
c. Conclusions
f The trair>ing provided to operations personnel for the handling and inspection of new fuel
L bundles and channels was adequate. Operators conducted the inspection and handling
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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1 Enoineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns
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L The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to inspect selected portions of the
! standby liquid control, fire protection, and #12 emergency diesel generator service water
systems. Minor housekeeping issues identified during the walkdowns were promptly
corrected by the licensee. No operability concems were identified.
05 Operator Training and Qualification
05.1 Operator Performance Durina Simulator Scenarios
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The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to observe an operations crew respond
to three scenarios during simulator training. The operators were knowledgeable of their
assigned tasks and displayed good teamwork. A senior reactor operator verified that
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' displayed good command and control over the crew. 1
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11. Maintenance -
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- M1 - Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 ~ General Comments
a.' Inspection Scope (62703 and 61726)
!. The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance and surveillance test
activities. Included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance test procedures or
WOs listed as well as the appropriate USAR sections perisining to these activities.
b. Observations and Findinas
in general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with these activities was
conducted in a professional and thorough manner. All work observed was performed with
the work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and
knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors
and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were
present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control
measures were in place.
The following work was observed. Specific concerns or observations are provided where
appropriate.
. Surveillance Test 0003, Revision 13, "Drywell High Pressure Scram and
Group 2, 3, and SCTMT [ secondary containment) Isolation Test."
-The inspectors verified that the acceptance criterion specified in the surveillance
test was consistent with the requirements in TSs 4.1 and 4.2. The surveillance ;
test was conducted as described in USAR Section 7.6.1.4. The inspectors also l
reviewed logic diagrams NX-7834-67, sheets 7 through 9, " Reactor Protection l
System," and NX-7823-4, various sheets, " Primary Containment isolation System," -!
and had no concems.
. Surveillance Test 0006, Revision 16, " Scram Discharge Volume Hi Level Scram
Test and Calibration Procedure."
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. Surveillance Test 0051, Revision 15, " Main Steam Line High Flow Group I 1
Isolation Instrument Test and Calibration Procedure."
. Surveillance Test 0255-08-IA-1, Revision 39, *RCIC Valve Operability Test." ;
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. Surveillance Test 0255-11-lll-4, Revision 19, "#14 Emergency Service Water
Pump Flow Test."
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L a. Surveillance Test 0255-18-IA, Revision 6, "TIP [traversmg incore probe) Ball Valve
L . Quarterly Exercise."
l - The inspectors verified that the acceptance criteria as stated in the surveillance
test were consistent with the requirements in TS 4.15 and engineering work
instruction-09.04.01, Revision 3, " Inservice Testing Program," requirements.
l . Post-maintenance test for WO 9706042, PRoutine replacement of Reactor
l Building WRGM [ wide range gas monitor) "A" SVS [ solenoid valves] "
. . WO 9800100, ." Install packing in FP-242 [ fire protection)," and WO 9706055,
" Repair / Replace valve guide / yoke on FP-11-1."
The inspectors verified that the equipment isolation was appropriate for the work
performed.- The electric fire pump and screenwash/ fire pump were declared
inoperable and operations personnel appropriately entered a 24-hour limiting -
condition for operation to establish a backup fire suppression water supply. Also,
the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC on January 29,1998, in accordance -
with TS 3.13.B.3.b., informing the NRC of the out-of-service.
. WO 9800304, " Annunciator panel alarms and clears without sounds."
The inspectors noted good cooperation between the electrician, system engineer,
and control room operators during followup efforts to address the annunciator
panel problem. For example, the system engineer provided guidance to the
electrician during the troubleshooting activities.
.- ' Preventive Maintenance (PM) 4131, Revision 7, "RBCCW [ reactor building closed
cooling water] Heat Exchanger inspection and Cleaning."
The licensee removed the end bells to the #13 RBCCW heat exchanger to
facilitate cleaning and inspection of the heat exchanger tubes. During a routine
inspection in the reactor building, the inspectors observed that no FME controls I
were in-place to prevent material from entering the opened service water outlet i
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piping. The inspectors discussed this observation with the maintenance
supervisor who agreed that the expectations delineated in 4AWi-04.05.09,
" Foreign Material Exclusion / Cleanliness Control," were not met. Step 4.2.2.8 of
this procedure stated that openings should be covered or personnel should be i
present to prevent foreign material from entering the system unless attemative ,
methods were established to prevent or detect foreign materialintrusion.
Because the RBCCW system is a non-safety, non-quality assurance system, the
lack of a proactive FME control was considered a weakness rather than a
violation by the inspectors,
c Conclusions
in general, the performance of observed work activities and surveillance tests was
acceptable. However, maintenance personnel did not establish proactive foreign material
. exclusion control during the RBCCW heat exchanger work activities.
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L ' M1.2 Potential for Heavy Load Movement Not included in Work Instruction -
- ' a'. Inspection Scope (62703)
On January 21,1998, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel move crates
containing fuel bundle channels from the ground level to the refueling floor. The following
supporting documents were also reviewed:
.' Procedure 8151, Revision 4, " Heavy Load Movement Procedure;"
% -- . 4AWi-06.06.01, Revision 6, " Material Handling and Control of Heavy Loads;" and
- 4 awl-04.05.01, Revision 11, " General Work Controls."
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b. Observations and Findinas
On January 21,1998, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel using the reactor
building crane to move two crates from the ground level to the refueling floor area. The
(; crates contained fuel bundle channels'and each crate weighed about 1400 pounds. The
inspectors identified that when lifting two of the crates simultaneously, the resulting load
should have been classified as a heavy load which required an evaluation using
Procedure 8151. The inspectors also noted that WO 9800042, " Move New
Channels / Blades to RB1027 [ reactor huilding,1027-foot elevation) and Remove Empty
Boxes," did not specify the number of boxes to be moved at a time. The licensee initiated
CR 98000165 to document the cause and corrective actions. The failure to provide
adequate instructions for lifting crates to the refueling floor is contrary to
! 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings"
i - (VIO 50-263/98002-03(DRP)).
c. Conclusions
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- The WO associated with moving channel crates to the refueling floor did not contain -)
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adequate instructions which resulted in a heavy load movement without a proper j
i- evaluation. A violation was identified. !
Me Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report: (LER) 50-263/%006. Revision 0: " Reactor Scram Due .;
to Loss of Stator Water Cooling Flow." This event was discussed in detailin Inspection j
Report No. 50-263/96006(DRP). All corrective actions were completed. !
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Incorrect Acceptance Criterion in TS-reauired Surveillarice Tett
a. . Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the TS-required surveillance testing of the "B" SBGT system.
The following documents were also reviewed:
. License Arrendment No. 94 regarding SBGT and' secondary containment
systems;
. Surveillance Test 0147, Revision 9, " Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Tests;"
. Surveillance Test 0149, Revision 5, " Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal Adsorber -
Cartridge Test;"
. Surveillance Test 0253-2, Revision 18, "SBGT B Train Testing;"
. WO 9706064, " Perform 18-month PM and test;"
. TS 3.7.B.2.a(3); and
. Procedure 3071, Revision 11 "TS Requirement Control Procedure."
b. Observations and Findinas
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. The inspectors reviewed WO 9706064 and the steps contained in Surveillance
Tests 0149,0147, and 0253-2 to ensure that the requirements of TS 3.7.8.2.a and
TS 3.7.B.2.b were met. The inspectors noted that the acceptance criterion for the
laboratory carbon sample analysis for the charcoal adsorber cartridge test was incorrectly
stated in surveillance test 0149; however, it was correctly stated in the WO. The
inspectors found that Amendment 94, issued on October 2,1995, revised TS 3.7.B.2.a(3)
requirements for the carbon analysis. The amended TS required a 194 percent methyl
iodine removal efficiency when tested at 30 Celsius and at 95 percent relative humidity,
whereas, the previous TS required a ;90 percent efficiency at 130' Celsius and at
95 percent relative humioity. Surveillance test 0149 had not been revised to reflect this
amendment. ,
The inspectors determined that the licensee's process for implementing TS amendments
was weak, in that, the documents potentially affected by a TS change were not identified
until after a TS amendment was approved by the NRC. As described in Procedure 3071,
the surveillance test coordinator would distribute the amended TS to several department
supervisors to identify needed changes to surveillance tests, operating procedures, and
other documents; however, no time limit was specified for this review, in fact,
Amendment 94, approved in late 1995, was still in the review process. The licensee
agreed that this greater than two-year review did not meet management's expectations.
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The inspectors were concemed with this lack of administrative control of the
TS amendment process. The licensee planned to review this process as part of
corrective actions associated with a previous event as discussed in LER 50 263/97011.
The inspectors were also concemed that the licensee had several opportunities to identify
this discrepancy. Specifically, in December 1996, the same work was performed on
l SBGT Trains "A" and "B" under WOs 9500183 and 9500184. The correct
TS-requirements were referenced in these WOs; however, Surveillance Test 0149 was
incorrect in that it did not contain the correct acceptance criterion. Also, in January 1997,
j the system engineer conducted a biennial review of Surveillance Test 0149 in accordance
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with TS 6.5.B.4.h review requirements, but did not identify any required changes. The
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failure to ensure that Surveillance Test 0149 incorporated the requirements and
! acceptance limits contained in the TS is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
! Criterion V, " Instructions,' Procedures, and Drawings," and is a violation
l (VIO 50-263/98002-04(DRP)). The licensee's immediate corrective actions included
initiation of a CR and preventing the use of Surveillance Test 0149 until the procedure
was revised to incorporate the correct acceptance criterion.
l c. . Conclusions
l ' The acceptance criterion in a TS-required surveillance test did not reflect the
l TS requirements. The licensee had several opportunities to identify the discrepancy
j including during the biennial review of the procedure. Also, the inspectors identified a
weakness in the licensee's TS change process, in that the process did not assure that
L- changes to TSs are reflected in related procedures in a timely manner. The incorrect
- acceptance criterion in a required test procedure is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."
l E5 Engineering Staff Training and Qualification
E5.1 Inspection and Handlina of New Reactor Fuel and Fuel Channels
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a .. Inspection Scope (60705 and 60710)
The inspectors observed the training provided by a representative of the reactor fuel
vendor to the nine engineers assigned to inspect the new fuel bundles. The inspectors
also observed the inspection and channeling of about 25 of 128 new fuel bundles. The
following associated procedures were reviewed by the inspectors:
. GE Procedure 246-GP-54, Revision 3, " Customer Site Handling and Inspection of
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GE New Fuel Bundles, Channels and Channel Fasteners;" and
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l * ' Procedure 9015, Revision 18, " Procedure for Inspection of New Fuel."
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. b. Observations
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The GE representative was knowledgeable and experienced. The classroom training and
the " hands-on" training provided at the new fuel receipt area were adequate. Engineering 1
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personnel conducted the inspection and handling of new fuel bundles and channels in a
controlled manner. Personnel adhered to the steps of the procedures and were l
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met 4ulous in the inspection activities. Discrepancies identified Curing these inspections
l were promptly handled and resolved with the assistance of the vendor.
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c. Condusbns
l The training provided to station personnel for the inspection of new fuel bundles and
channels was adequate. Engineering personnel performed a very detailed and
meticulous inspection of the new fuel bundles and channels.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (97200)
E8.1 (Closed) Inspection Follow-up item (IFl 50-263/95012-02(DRP)): A reference contained
in the USAR stated that the refuel floor area superstructure could withstand tomado-force
winds. This conflicted with actual building construction and other sections of the USAR.
In a letter dated February 2,1996, the licensee committed to modify the superstructure to
withstand tomado-force winds. On December 18,1996, the licensee completed this
modification. The licensee planned to revise the appropriate sections of the USAR during
the next USAR revision.
E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI 50-263/95010-02(DRP)): The inspectors identified
several discrepancies in controlled drawings. The problems included drawings which
were not updated after implementation of a modification and severaljumper-bypasses not
reflected in controlled drawings. The licensee corrected the discrepant drawings and
discussed the controlled drawing concem with engineering personnel. Administrative
procedures were revised to require operations shift management to verify that
jumper-bypasses were noted on controlled drawings. The inspectors reviewed 10 closed
and outstanding jumper-bypasses and verified that the controlled drawings reflected the l
current status. Inspection Report No. 50-263/97008(DRP) documented inaccuracies
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found in several reactor core isolation cooling controlled drawings and
Violation 50-263/97008-01c(DRP) was cited. The inspectors had no further concems.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the
area of radiation protection. The inspectors noted that effective r6diological controls were
established during the new fuel bundle inspection activities and that radiation protection
technicians provided support during maintenance and surveillance test activities.
81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)
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During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the
areas of security and safeguards activities. No concems were noted.
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l V. Manaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary
On February 23,1998, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of
licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The
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inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection !
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. )
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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M. Wadley, Vice President Nuclear Generation
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' *M. Hammer, Plant Manager
B. Day, . Training Manager _.
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K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection
l L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment
l- *M.' Onnen, General Superintendent Operations
- E. Reilly, General Superintendent Maintenance !
" *C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering
( *A. Ward, Manager Quality Services
L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security
J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection
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NRC.
! *J. McCormick-Barger, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 7 -
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- Indicates those present at the exit meeting on February 23,1998.
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I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 37551: Onsite Engineering .
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations ,
IP 62703: Maintenance Observations j
IP 71707: Plant Operations i
IP 71750: Plant Support ' ,
IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor i
Facilities
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED j
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Opened i
50-263/98002-01(DRP) VIO Inadequate instructions for the restoration of MO-2078 :
50-263/98002-02(DRP) VIO Failure to follow 4AWi-04.05.05 during the restoration of the
l" #13 RHRSW pump j
50-263/98002-03(DRP) VIO Failure to provide adequate instructions for lifting crates to
the refueling floor i
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50-263/98002 04(DRP) VIO Failure to ensure that Surveillance Test 0149 incorporated
the requirements and acceptance limits contained in TS
Closed
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, '50-263/96006(DRP) LER " Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Stator Water Cooling Flow"
50-263/95012-02(DRP) IFl A reference contained in the USAR stated that the refuel
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floor area superstructure could withstand tornado-force
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winds
50-263/95010-02(DRP) URI Several discrepancies in coni. olled drawings identified
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! LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
4AWI Administrative Work Instruction 1
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations )
CR Condition Report
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
FME Foreign Material Exclusion
FP Fire Protection
GE General Electric
IFl Inspection Followup Item
LER Licensee Event Report
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSP Northem States Power
OWI Operations Work Instruction j
PDR Public Document Room
PM Preventive Maintenance
RB Reactor Building
RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water
SBGT Standby Gas Treatment
SCMT Sacondary Containment
SVS Solenoid Valves
TIP Traversing incore Probe
TS Technical Specification
URI Unresolved item
USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
VIO Violation
WO Work Order
WRGM Wide Range Gas Monitor
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