Text

IR 05000390-10-005; 10/01/2010 - 12/31/2010; Watts Bar, Unit 1; Maintenance Effectiveness and Other Activities
	ML110280456
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/28/2011
From:	Eugene Guthrie; Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	Krich R; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	IR-10-005
	Download: ML110280456 (34)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

January 28, 2011

Mr. R. M. Krich

Vice President, Nuclear Licensing

Tennessee Valley Authority

3R Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000390/2010005

Dear Mr. Krich:

On December 31, 2010, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed

an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. The enclosed integrated inspection

report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 10, 2010, with Mr. D.

Grissette and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents three NRC-identified findings which were determined to be of very low

safety significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC

requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they are

entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited

violations (NCVs) consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this

report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with

the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control

Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the

Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar facility.

TVA 2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-390

License No.: NPF-90

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2010005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

_ ML110280456__ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS

SIGNATURE RLM /RA/ Via email BBD /RA for/ EFG /RA for/ MKM /RA for/ Via email BBD /RA for/

NAME RMonk WDeschaine PHiggins MSchwieg RBaldwin MMeeks RLewis

DATE 01/26/2011 01/26/2011 01/28/2011 01/28/2011 01/28/2011 01/27/2011 01/28/2011

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRP

SIGNATURE BBD /RA for/ CRK /RA/ EFG /RA/

NAME RWilliams CKontz EGuthrie

DATE 01/28/2011 01/28/2011 01/28/2011

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

TVA 3

cc w/encl:

D. E. Grissette

Vice President

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

P.O. Box 2000

Spring City, TN 37381

G. A. Boerschig

Plant Manager

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

P.O. Box 2000

Spring City, TN 37381

M. K. Brandon

Manager

Licensing and Industry Affairs

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

E. J. Vigluicci

Assistant General Counsel

Tennessee Valley Authority

6A West Tower

400 West Summit Hill Drive

Knoxville, TN 37902

County Mayor

P.O. Box 156

Decatur, TN 37322

Ann Harris

341 Swing Loop

Rockwood, TN 37854

TVA 4

Letter to R. M. Krich from Eugene Guthrie dated January 28, 2011

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000390/2010005

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII

L. Douglas, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMWattsBar1 Resource

RidsNrrPMWattsBar2 Resource

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No: 50-390

License No: NPF-90

Report No: 05000390/2010005

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

Location: Spring City, TN 37381

Dates: October 1 - December 31, 2010

Inspectors: R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector

W. Deschaine, Regional Inspector, Region II (RII)

P. Higgins, Regional Inspector, RII

M. Schwieg, Resident Inspector

R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer (1R11.2, 3)

M. Meeks, Operations Engineer (1R11.3)

R. Lewis, Resident Inspector (4OA5.2, 3)

R. Williams, Reactor Inspector (4OA5.1)

Approved by: Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000390/2010-005; 10/01/2010 - 12/31/2010; Watts Bar, Unit 1; Maintenance Effectiveness

and Other Activities

The report covered a three-month period of routine inspection by resident inspectors. Three

NRC identified findings, each of which are non-cited violations (NCVs), were identified. The

significance of an issue is indicated by its color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using the

Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance

Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of

commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), was

identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to set goals and monitor the

performance and condition of the B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning

system as required by 10CFR50.65(a)(1), and had no justification for not doing so,

after it had failed to demonstrate effective control of the performance or condition of

the system through appropriate preventive maintenance. The inspectors identified

three Component Deficiency Reports that documented failures which had been

evaluated by the licensee as non-functional failures. The licensee has subsequently

implemented goal setting and monitoring requirements specified in 10 CFR

50.65(a)(1) and entered this issue into the corrective action program as PER

205438.

The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor since the B MCR

Air Conditioning Train was not placed in (a)(1) monitoring status in a timely manner

which if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. NRC staff

review has determined this MR violation to have a very low safety significance

(Green) because it was not among the contributing causes of the degraded

performance and condition of the B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning

system and not processed through the significance determination process. The

cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Problem

Identification and Resolution, evaluation aspect of the corrective action program

component, in that, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate failures and determine

those failures to be functional failures of the B MCR Air Conditioning System such

that the system was placed in category a(1) in a timely manner. P.1(c) (Section

1R12)

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to assure that appropriate quality

standards were specified and included in design documents and that deviations from

such standards were controlled. Specifically, the licensee failed to demonstrate the

necessary conditions for commercial grade dedication and seismic qualification of

Enclosure

3

molded case circuit breakers to safety-related application within the station 120VAC

vital instrumentation boards. Corrective actions for this issue are still being

evaluated and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as

PER 171695.

Failure to specify appropriate qualification standards in performing commercial grade

dedication of a component-level commodity is a performance deficiency. This

performance deficiency is more than minor and a finding because it affected the

design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to

prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, adequate measures were not

implemented to ensure the station 120VAC vital instrumentation boards were

properly seismically qualified for their application. The inspector assessed the finding

using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) because the breaker panels had originally been qualified by testing a

complete prototype panel, while the licensees processes replaced a component-

level item within that panel utilizing the original make and model component through

commercial grade dedication. The inspectors concluded that overall operability was

not brought into question.

This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified, as it

was determined not to reflect current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.2)

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to assure that applicable regulatory

requirements and the design basis for structures, systems, and components are

correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Specifically, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements for

undervoltage (degraded) voltage protection, including those prescribed in TS 3.3.5-1,

item 2, were correctly translated into design calculation, WBN-EEB-MS-TI-06-0029,

Degraded Voltage Analysis, Revision. 31, which evaluated motor starting voltages

at the beginning of a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) concurrent with a

degraded grid condition. Corrective actions for this issue are still being evaluated

and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER 296306.

The failure to use the degraded voltage relay setpoint values as specified in TS and

configured in the 6900 VAC bus based on the electrical design calculation was a

performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affects the

Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. It impacts the

cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of the

6900 VAC safety buses to perform the intended safety function during a design basis

event. The potential availability, reliability, and operability of the 6900 VAC safety

buses during a potential degraded voltage condition was impacted as the licensee

design calculation used a non-conservative degraded voltage input, with respect to

the values specified in TS, into their safety-related motor starting and running

calculations. The inspectors assessed the finding using the SDP and determined

that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding

represented a design deficiency confirmed not to result in the loss of functionality of

Enclosure

4

safety-related loads due to the availability of related transformer load tap changers

(LTCs) that were installed to improve a degraded voltage condition.

The inspectors reviewed the performance deficiency for cross-cutting aspects and

determined that none were applicable since this performance deficiency was not

indicative of current licensee performance as the design calculation discussed above

was not recently performed. (Section 4OA5.3)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until November 14, 2010,

when the A Main Bank Transformer alarmed due to a loss of control power to the cooling fans

and pumps resulting in uncontrolled increase in winding temperatures necessitating a manual

Rx Trip. The unit was returned to full power operation on November 19, 2010. The unit

operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Readiness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee actions taken in preparation for low temperature

weather conditions to limit the risk of freeze-related initiating events and to adequately

protect mitigating systems from its effects. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure

1-PI-OPS-1-FP, Freeze Protection, and walked down selected components associated

with the five areas listed below to evaluate implementation of plant freeze protection,

including the material condition of insulation, heat trace elements, and temporary heated

enclosures. Corrective actions for items identified in relevant problem evaluation reports

(PERs) and work orders (WOs) were assessed for effectiveness and timeliness. This

inspection satisfied one inspection sample for extreme weather readiness. Documents

reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

Refueling water storage tank (RWST) freeze protection preparations

A-train and B-train essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system freeze protection

preparations

A-train and B-train high pressure fire protection system freeze protection

preparations

Main feedwater sensing lines freeze protection preparations

Diesel generator building freeze protection preparations

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

6

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted three equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to

evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other

train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional

system descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating

procedures, and technical specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the

current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify

that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which

could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment.

Partial walkdown of 1B containment spray (CS) pump following maintenance

activities on 1B CS pump

Partial walkdown of C-S component cooling system (CCS) pump following

maintenance activities

1A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump while B MDAFW pump out of

service (OOS) for maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Protection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the 10 areas important to reactor safety, listed below,

to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in the

Fire Protection Program, Standard Programs and Processes (SPP)-10.0, Control of Fire

Protection Impairments, NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, NPG-

SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work). The inspectors evaluated, as

appropriate, conditions related to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and

ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of

fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent

fire damage or fire propagation. This activity constituted ten inspection samples.

Cable Spreading Room

480 V RX MOV Board Room 1A

480 V RX MOV Board Room 1B

480 V RX MOV Board Room 2A

Enclosure

7

480 V RX MOV Board Room 2B

Vital Battery Rooms I, II, III, IV and V

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Drill Observations

a. Inspection Scope

On November 9, 2010, the inspectors observed an announced fire drill for a simulated

fire of the 6.9 kV Unit Board 1D. The drill was observed to evaluate the readiness of the

plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified

deficiencies; openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took

appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were: (1) specified number

of individuals responding; (2) proper wearing of turnout gear; (3) self-contained breathing

apparatus available and properly worn and used; (4) control room personnel followed

procedures for verification and initiation of response; (5) fire brigade leader exhibited

command and had a copy of the pre-fire plan; (6) fire brigade leader maintained control

starting at the dress-out area; (7) fire brigade response timely and followed the

appropriate access route; (8) control/command set up near the location and

communications were established; (9) proper use and layout of fire hoses; (10) fire area

entered in a controlled manner; (11) sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the

scene; (12) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; (13)

utilization of pre-planned strategies; (14) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario and

drill objectives acceptance criteria were met; and (15) firefighting equipment returned to

a condition of readiness to respond to an actual fire. This activity constituted one

inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed internal flood protection measures for the intake pumping

station flood protection features. The features were examined to verify that they were

installed and maintained consistent with the plant design basis. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees flooding study calculation for determining maximum flood level

in all building rooms for piping failures in both the essential raw cooling water (ERCW)

system and the fire protection system. The inspectors confirmed that flood mitigation

features such as drains and curbs were not degraded in such a manner as to adversely

impact the conclusions of the study. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment

to this report. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample.

Enclosure

8

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed two heat sink performance reviews. The inspectors reviewed

the licensees program for maintenance and testing of the 1A-A emergency diesel

generator (EDG) heat exchangers. Specifically, the review included the performance

testing and analysis of the 1A1 (1-HTX-082-720B1) and 1A2 (1-HTX-082-720B2) EDG

jacket water heat exchangers. The inspectors reviewed the ERCW system description,

the heat exchanger performance, and the eddy current testing program document as

well as completed WOs documenting the testing and visual inspection and associated

corrective actions to verify that corrosion or fouling did not impact the heat exchanger

from achieving its design basis heat removal capacity. The inspectors reviewed periodic

test data of ERCW flow rates as well as inlet and outlet temperatures to determine

whether potential degradations were being monitored and/or prevented. The inspectors

also reviewed eddy current inspection results to determine whether wall loss indications

and tube plugging requirements were being identified. The inspectors reviewed the

fouling factor calculation. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this

report. This inspection satisfied two annual inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

.1 Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On November 24, 2010, the inspectors observed the annual simulator examination of

Operations Crew 2 conducted per 3-OT-SRE0004A, Feed Water Isolation Followed by a

Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Revision 5. The plant conditions led to an Alert level

classification. Also observed was 3-OT-SRE0032, Loss of Coolant Accident from 75%

Power, Revision 4. The plant conditions led to an Alert level classification. Performance

Indicator credit was taken.

The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating

crews performance:

Clarity and formality of communication

Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit

Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms

Enclosure

9

Correct use and implementation of abnormal operating instructions (AOIs), and

emergency operating instructions (EOIs)

Timely and appropriate Emergency Action Level declarations per Emergency Plan

Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions

Command and Control provided by the unit supervisor and shift manager

The inspectors attended the post exam critique to assess the effectiveness of the

licensee evaluators and to verify that performance issues identified by the evaluators

were comparable to issues identified by the inspector.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Written Test Review

a. Inspection Scope

December 17, 2010, the licensee completed the comprehensive biennial requalification

written examinations and annual requalification operating tests required to be

administered to all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The

inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the written

examinations, individual operating tests and the crew simulator operating tests. These

results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I,

Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in

preparation for this inspection. During the week of November 15, 2010, the inspectors

reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the

administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification

program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the

effectiveness of the facility licensee in implementing requalification requirements

identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also

performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification

guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for

Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator

Requalification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation

facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5

Enclosure

10

1988, American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in

Operator Training and Examination. The inspectors also reviewed Unit 2 Job

Familiarization Guides associated with system familiarization for Unit 2 construction.

The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests.

Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures

(JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator

modification request records, simulator performance test records, operator feedback

records, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding

records, and medical records. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in

Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in

the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two performance-based problems listed below. A review

was performed to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped

structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and to verify that the licensee was following

the requirements of TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring,

Trending, and Reporting 10 CFR 50.65, and SPP-6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance

Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting 10 CFR 50.65. Reviews focused, as

appropriate, on: (1) appropriate work practices; (2) identification and resolution of

common cause failures; (3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (4)

characterization of reliability issues; (5) charging unavailability time; (6) trending key

parameters; (7) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification; and (8)

the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and

corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

Review of the Eighth Periodic Summary Assessment Report (A3)

Review of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) plan for the ice condenser following icing issues

b. Findings

Introduction. A Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), was identified by the

inspectors for the licensees failure to set goals and monitor the performance and

condition of the B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning system as required by

10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), and had no justification for not doing so, after it had failed to

demonstrate effective control of the performance or condition of the system through

appropriate preventive maintenance. Per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), effective control of SSC

performance and condition through appropriate preventive maintenance must be

demonstrated in order for the monitoring under Paragraph (a)(1) not to be required.

Therefore, a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified.

Enclosure

11

Description. The inspectors reviewed CDEs related to the B MCR Air Conditioning

Train and questioned whether three system failures were actually functional failures as

defined by the licensees procedures. Two of these failures were related to a cooling

water temperature control valve sticking open, causing an interruption of cooling water

flow, rendering the chiller inoperable. The third was related to the chiller tripping during

a fast bus transfer, also rendering the chiller inoperable. The licensee had initially

concluded that these were not functional failures.

Inspectors interviewed the system engineer, engineering supervision, and the

maintenance rule coordinator, questioning the analysis of the three CDEs that had been

classified as non-functional failures. Following the inspectors questions, the licensee

performed a re-evaluation of the CDEs in question, which included benchmarking with

other utilities, and determined the three CDEs should have been classified as functional

failures. The performance criterion established in licensee procedure TI-119, was no

more than three functional failures, per train, within a 24 month interval. The inspectors

determined that the addition of these three functional failures to the one existing

functional failure caused the performance criterion of TI-119 to be exceeded. The

maintenance rule expert panel re-evaluated the performance of the B MCR Air

Conditioning Train for movement from maintenance rule category a(2) to category a(1)

and determined that category a(1) was the appropriate classification.

The inspectors determined that the improper classification of the system functional

failures that ultimately led to the system being move into an a(1) monitoring status

constituted a failure by the licensee to demonstrate that the performance or condition of

the B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning system had been effectively controlled

through the performance of appropriate scheduled maintenance.

Analysis. The licensees failure to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the

B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning system had been effectively controlled

through the performance of appropriate scheduled maintenance (10 CFR 50.65(a)(2))

without implementing goal setting and monitoring requirements of 50.65(a)(1), was

determined to be a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this

performance deficiency was more than minor since the B MCR Air Conditioning Train

was not placed in 50.65(a)(1) monitoring status in a timely manner which if left

uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern.

The inspectors determined this finding to have very low safety significance (Green)

because it was not among the contributing causes of the degraded performance and the

condition of the B Main Control Room (MCR) Air Conditioning system. The cause of the

finding was directly related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and

Resolution, evaluation aspect of the corrective action program component, in that, the

licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate failures and determine those failures to be

functional failures of the B MCR Air Conditioning System such that the system was

placed in category a(1) in a timely manner. P.1(c)

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, that licensees shall monitor the

performance or condition of system, structures and components within the scope of the

rule against licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable

Enclosure

12

assurance the system, structures and components are capable of fulfilling their intended

safety functions. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that the monitoring specified in

paragraph (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated the performance or

condition of a system, structures and components is being effectively controlled through

the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance such that the system, structures

and components remains capable of performing its intended function.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR

50.65(a)(2), to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the B MCR Air

Conditioning Train system had been effectively controlled through the performance of

appropriate scheduled maintenance and subsequently failed to implement monitoring of

the system against licensee-established goals as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).

Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and properly account for three functional

failures which demonstrated that the performance of the system was not being

effectively controlled and, as a result, goal setting and monitoring, as required by 10

CFR 50.65(a)(1), was required since October 9, 2009, but not initiated or performed.

The licensee implemented goal setting and monitoring as described in 50.65 (a)(1) for

the B MCR Air Conditioning Train on October 21, 2010. Because this inspection finding

was characterized as having very low risk significance (Green) and has been entered in

the licensees corrective action program as PER205438, this violation is being treated as

a non-cited violation, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000390/2010005-01, Failure to Monitor Performance of the B MCR Air Conditioning

Train.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, for the four work activities listed below: (1) the

effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were

conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen

situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work

activities; and (4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were

adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was

complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4); SPP-7.0, Work Control and

Outage Management; NPG-SPP-07.1, One Line Work Management; and TI-124,

Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix. This inspection satisfied four inspection samples for

Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control.

Risk assessment for emergent failure of 1B main control room (MCR) chiller during

A-train work week

Risk assessment for work week 605

Risk assessment for replacement of C-S CCS motor while D ERCW pump OOS

Risk assessment of 1A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump component

outage while F-B ERCW OOS

Enclosure

13

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating

systems, listed below, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the

evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether the

compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were

appropriately controlled; (4) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the

impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and the risk significance in

accordance with the significant determination process (SDP). The inspectors verified

that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with NPG-SPP-03.1,

Corrective Action Program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Daily ice removal from ice condenser intermediate deck doors

FCV-061-193A ice condenser isolation valve AO contact stuck

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities,

(listed below) as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess

whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control

room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance

performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational

readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation

had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests

were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or

leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing;

and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The

inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with SPP-8.0,

Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing; and NPG-SPP-07.1,

On Line Work Management.

WO 08-819114-000, 1-FCV-67-144, CCS Hx C ERCW bypass valve-MOVATS test

WO 10-813997-000, 1-FCV-77-19, RCDT to vent HDR flow control valve stroke time

WO 09-821944, 1-MVOP-077-0010, RCDT pump discharge valve replacement

Enclosure

14

WO 111516647, 1B MDAFW 1-FCV-3-132 maintenance

WO 111238674, Replacement of ERCW pump D-A

b. Findings

No findings were identified

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed seven surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected

risk-significant SSCs, listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met the

requirements of the TS; the UFSAR; SPP-8.0, Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-06.9.2,

Surveillance Test Program; and SPP-9.1, ASME Section XI. The inspectors also

determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were

operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Test:

WO 10-814595-000, 1-SI-63-901-B, Safety Injection Pump 1B-B Quarterly

Performance Test

WO 10-814970-000, 1-SI-72-901-B, Containment spray pump 1B-B quarterly

performance test

WO 10-814988-000, 1-SI-31-901-B, Quarterly valve full stroke exercising during

plant operation chilled water - B-train

Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate:

WO 10-814987-000, 1-SI-30-701, Containment isolation valve local leakrate test -

purge air

Other Surveillances

WO 10-815229-000, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test (1B)

WO 111539446, 1-SI-0-24, Measurement of At Power Moderator Temperature

Coefficient

WO 10-815487-0, 0-SI-82-19-A, Fast Start and Load Test DG 2A

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

15

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On October 7, 2010, the inspectors observed a licensee-evaluated emergency

preparedness drill, listed below, to verify that the emergency response organization was

properly classifying the event in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification

Flowchart, and making accurate and timely notifications and protective action

recommendations in accordance with EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event; EPIP-3,

Alert; EIPIP-4, Site Area Emergency; EPIP-5, General Emergency; and the Radiological

Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors verified that licensee evaluators were

identifying deficiencies and properly dispositioning performance against the performance

indicator criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline.

A steam generator tube rupture leads to an Alert classification

A PORV on the ruptured steam generator fails open, requiring Site Area Emergency

classification

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification & Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily PER summary

reports and attending daily PER review meetings.

.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends

a. Inspection Scope

As required by IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors

performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends

that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors

review was focused on human performance trends, licensee trending efforts, and

repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues. The inspectors also

considered the results of the daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section

4OA2.1. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of July 2010

Enclosure

16

through December 2010, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when

the scope of the trend warranted.

b. Observations

No findings were identified. However, the inspectors identified a number of instances

where the PER screening committees (PSC) review of incoming PERs failed to

recognize conditions adverse to quality which required potential operability reviews,

potential reportablity reviews, or the need to upgrade some PER classifications. Also,

examples of degraded or non-conforming conditions of plant equipment related to the

current licensing basis were not addressed by the PSC. Inspectors noted a trend in the

number of instances where questioning from the inspectors was necessary for the

licensee to address these types of issues. The inspectors discussed these issues with

the licensee during the exit meeting and the licensee entered them into the corrective

action program as PERs 252780, 252215 and 241755.

.3 Annual Sample: Corrective actions associated with NCV 05000390/2008005-01, Failure

to Translate ERCW Pump Coupling Material Change into Procedures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plan and implementation of corrective actions for non-cited

violation (NCV)05000390/2008005-01, which were documented in PER 148716.

b. Findings and Observations

The corrective action plan for PER 148716 implemented DCN 52920 to replace all

ERCW pumps w/ pumps capable of 2 unit operation. This combined with changes to MI-

67.1, Removal, Inspection, And Repair Of Essential Raw Cooling Water Pumps,

changed all existing 410 Stainless Steel ERCW pump shaft couplings with XM-19 alloy

shaft couplings. The inspectors reviewed replacement work orders and the licensees

extent of cause and condition. The licensee determined during an the extent of

condition review that the Screen Wash and High Pressure Fire Pumps could have the

same susceptibility and pursuing potential design changes for these components. The

licensee also determined that a weakness existed in follow-up of NRC Information

Notices.

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

a. Inspection Scope

On November 14, 2010, Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped as a result of the A Main

Bank Transformer alarming due to a loss of control power to the cooling fans and pumps

resulting in a loss of oil cooling which resulted in an uncontrolled increase in the

transformers winding temperatures. All systems/components behaved as expected

Enclosure

17

except the #1 main feedwater bypass valve isolation which indicated mid-position. This

was later determined to be a limit switch issue and the valve was actually shut.

Inspectors responded to the event, reviewed plant logs, procedures, and corrective

action documents. The inspectors interviewed personnel associated with the reactor trip

and abnormal transformer indications.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force

personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee

security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities

did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an

integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

(Closed) Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds (TI 2515/172, Revision 1)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees activities regarding licensee

dissimilar metal butt weld (DMBW) mitigation and inspection implemented in accordance

with the industry self-imposed mandatory requirements of Materials Reliability Program

(MRP) 139, Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines.

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt

Welds, Revision 1, was issued May 27, 2010, to support the evaluation of the licensees

implementation of MRP-139.

On December 8, 2010, the inspectors performed a review in accordance with TI

2515/172, Revision 1, as described in the Observations section below:

Enclosure

18

b. Observations

The licensee has met the MRP-139 deadlines for baseline examinations of all welds

scoped into the MRP-139 program. TI 2515/172, Revision 1, is considered closed. In

accordance with requirements of TI 2515/172, Revision 1, the inspectors evaluated the

following areas:

(1) Implementation of the MRP-139 Baseline Inspections

This portion of the TI was not inspected during the period of this inspection report but

was previously covered in NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2008003.

(2) Volumetric Examinations

This portion of the TI was not inspected during the period of this inspection report, but

was previously covered in NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2010002.

(3) Weld Overlays

There were no weld overlay activities performed or planned by this licensee to comply

with their MRP-139 commitments.

(4) Mechanical Stress Improvement (SI)

This portion of the TI was not inspected during the period of this inspection report, but

was previously covered in NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2008003.

(5) Application of Weld Cladding and Inlays

There were no weld cladding nor inlay activities performed or planned by this licensee to

comply with their MRP-139 commitments.

(6) Inservice Inspection Program

This portion of the TI was not inspected during the period of this inspection report, but

was previously covered in NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2008003.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 (Closed) URI 05000390/2009002-003: Acceptability of Seismic Qualification of 120VAC

Vital Instrumentation Board Circuit Breakers

a. Inspection Scope

During the 2009 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant

Modifications inspection, an unresolved item was indentified related to the adequacy of

seismic qualification of station 120VAC vital instrumentation boards. The inspectors

Enclosure

19

were concerned that the breaker mounting did not adequately represent the plant-

specific mounting and that the breakers were not tested at adequate accelerations to

fully bound the required response spectrum (RRS) across the ground frequency range.

The item was unresolved pending further review of the adequacy of the licensees

seismic qualification of the installed equipment.

b. Findings

Introduction: A green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was

identified for the failure to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and

included in design documents and that deviations from such standards were controlled.

Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the substitute Heinemann Circuit Breakers

utilized in the station 120VAC vital instrumentation boards were properly seismically

qualified for their application.

Description: The licensee originally procured the 120VAC vital instrumentation boards

as a complete functional unit, dedicated and seismically qualified by the vendor. In the

early 1990s, the licensee implemented a complete replacement of the Heinemann

circuit breakers in the instrumentation boards with commercial grade breakers from the

same manufacturer. A different third party vendor was contracted to perform seismic

qualifications for the replacement breakers.

Both, the licensee and the contract vendor, committed to IEEE Standard 344 (1975),

which requires, in part, that the test mounting dynamically simulate the plant-specific

mounting and that the test accelerations adequately bound the required response

spectrum (RRS) for the application.

Given limited accelerometer mounting locations on the original 1974 qualification testing,

the licensee translated maximum accelerations seen on the panel itself as bounding the

subcomponent accelerations without adequately demonstrating the rigidity of mounting

necessary to support that assumption. As the mounting configuration of the devices to

the test platform did not mimic the actual installed mounting, the licensee had

responsibility to ensure, by analysis, that the test accelerations adequately bounded the

RRS. The licensee failed to ensure such analysis was conducted. Specifically,

calculation WCG-ACQ-1004 failed to fully establish that the method of support of the

breakers within the board was a rigid mounting system, that the 1992 test mounting

represents a suitable mounting method, or that the test accelerations to which the device

was subjected were, in fact, bounding.

In October 2010, the licensee issued calculation WCG-ACQ-1301, Frequency Evaluation

of the Heinemann Breaker Support Structure, Rev. 000 to demonstrate the rigidity of the

breaker mounting system by performing a finite element analysis of the panel front plate

and rear angle supports used for impinging the breakers to satisfy the expectation of

rigidity. Calculation WCG-ACQ-1004 was revised (Revision 2) to credit calculation

WCG-ACQ-1301 with that demonstration to justify the ability to perform seismic testing

on an individual component basis, to investigate the potential for local structural support

Enclosure

20

flexibility and associated amplifications, and to demonstrate the appropriateness of the

3G test level used in the 1992 qualification testing.

Additionally, at the time of inspection in March 2009, the licensee initiated PER 165130

to enhance existing work instructions to specify the tightness requirement of press-fit

devices on various boards.

The licensee presented all of these details in a public meeting held on December 16,

2010, intended to address NOV 05000391/2010603-08 associated with the Unit 2

Completion Projects acceptance and application of the new breakers (identified in URI

05000390/2009002-03) based on the 1992 testing in question. The inspectors

determined that the licensee response was inadequate in that it did not demonstrate that

the 1992 test adequately represented the installed configuration and in that the snug fit

configuration cannot be adequately assured through the maintenance and testing

procedures as presented.

Analysis: Failure to adequately qualify commercial-grade molded-case circuit breakers

to their safety-related application is a performance deficiency. This performance

deficiency is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the

mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and

capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, adequate measures were not implemented to ensure the

station 120VAC vital instrumentation boards had proper seismic qualification for their

application. The inspector assessed this finding for significance in accordance with NRC

Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, Significance Determination Process

(SDP) for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, and determined that it

was of very low safety significance (Green) as the devices in question had been

intrinsically qualified for this application as part of a complete panel test by the original

vendor. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified as

it was determined to not reflect current licensee performance.

Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that

design control measures shall assure that appropriate quality standards are specified

and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are

controlled. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to demonstrate the necessary

conditions for the commercial grade dedication and seismic qualification of molded case

circuit breakers to safety-related application within the station 120VAC vital

instrumentation boards. This condition existed since commercial operations began in

1995. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER

171695 related to the URI. Because the finding was of very low safety significance and

has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being

treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000390/2010005-XX, Failure to Adequately Qualify Molded-Case Circuit

Breakers to Safety-Related Application Through Commercial Grade Dedication.

Enclosure

21

.3 (Closed) URI 05000390/2010008-02, Worst Case 6900 VAC Bus Voltage in Design

Calculations

Introduction: The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to correctly translate the 6900

VAC emergency bus undervoltage trip value specified in Technical Specifications (TS)

into design calculations for motor starting and loading. The values used by the licensee

in the design calculations were non-conservative with respect to the specified TS values.

This issue was initially discussed as URI 05000390/2010008-02: Worst Case 6900

VAC Bus Voltage in Design Calculations.

Description: Offsite power at Watts Bar is normally provided to the Class 1E 6900 VAC

buses from the 161 kV offsite power system through the Common Station Service

Transformers (CSSTs). Watts Bar TS Section 3.3.5-1, item 2, Loss of Power Diesel

Generator Start Instrumentation, requires and specifies the undervoltage and degraded

voltage relay trip setpoints, including allowable values and time delays associated with

the safety-related 6900 VAC buses. These degraded voltage setpoints provide the

bases for the minimum voltage available to all safety-related equipment such as motors,

contactors, and solenoid valves during a postulated degraded voltage scenario.

At Watts Bar, the degraded voltage relays initiate the nominal 10 second time delay at

the TS specified relay voltage setting. When the 10 second time delay has elapsed, the

plant loads are removed from the offsite power supply and transferred to the onsite

emergency diesel generators. The degraded voltage relays drop-out (de-energize)

when sufficient voltage is not available and normally pick-up (energize) if voltage is

recovered within the 10 second delay on the 6900 VAC bus. The degraded voltage

relay settings at Watts Bar are in accordance with TS Table 3.3.5-1 which states the

values to be as follows: Allowable Value 6570 VAC, Trip Setpoint between 6606 VAC

and 6593 VAC.

The inspector reviewed licensee calculation of record WBN-EEB-MS-TI-06-0029,

Degraded Voltage Analysis, Rev. 31, which evaluated motor starting voltages at the

beginning of a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) concurrent with a degraded

grid condition. This calculation used the degraded voltage setpoint of 6672 V to analyze

post LOCA load motor starting. This voltage of 6672 VAC used in the calculation was

non-conservative with respect to the voltage specified in TS which specified a maximum

value of 6606 VAC.

Analysis: The failure to use the degraded voltage relay setpoint values as specified in

TS and installed in the plant for the 6900 VAC bus electrical design calculation was a

performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affects the Design

Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. It impacts the cornerstone

objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and operability of the 6900 VAC safety

buses to perform the intended safety function during a design basis event. The potential

availability, reliability, and operability of the 6900 VAC safety buses during a potential

degraded voltage condition was impacted as the licensee calculation used a non

conservative degraded voltage input, with respect to the values specified in TS, into their

safety-related motor starting and running calculations. The inspectors assessed the

Enclosure

22

finding using the SDP and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) because the finding represented a design deficiency confirmed not to result in

the loss of functionality of safety-related loads due to the availability of load tap changers

(LTCs) that are installed to improve a degraded voltage condition.

The inspectors reviewed the performance deficiency for cross-cutting aspects and

determined that none were applicable since this performance deficiency was not

indicative of current licensee performance as the design calculation discussed above

was not recently performed.

Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that

measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the

design basis for structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into

specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. This appendix also states in part

that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of

application of processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the

structures, systems, and components. Watts Bar TS Section 3.3.5-1, Loss of Power

Diesel Generator Start instrumentation, table 3.3.5-1, item 2 specifies the 6900 VC

emergency bus undervoltage (degraded) relay trip setpoints to be as follows: Allowable

Value, 6570 VAC, Trip Setpoint, 6606 VAC and 6593 VAC.

Contrary to the above, since at least December 2001, the licensee failed to assure that

applicable regulatory requirements for undervoltage (degraded) voltage protection,

including those prescribed in TS 3.3.5-1, item 2, were correctly translated into design

calculation, WBN-EEB-MS-TI-06-0029, Degraded Voltage Analysis, Revision 31, which

evaluated motor starting voltages at the beginning of a design basis loss of coolant

accident (LOCA) concurrent with a degraded grid condition. Further, the process used

by the licensee for the selection of input voltage value in the design calculation was non-

conservative with respect to the TS. Specifically, the licensee used the input value of

6672 VAC which was higher than the maximum value of 6606 VAC specified in TS. This

did not result in a loss of function of safety-related loads.

Because this finding is of very low safety significance and was entered into the

licensees corrective action program as PER 296306 this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding is identified as NCV

05000390, 2010005-:Failure to Use Worst Case 6900 VAC Bus Voltage in Design

Calculations. URI 05000390/2010008-02,Worst Case 6900 VAC Bus Voltage in

Design Calculations is closed.

Enclosure

23

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

An exit meeting was conducted on November 19, 2010, to discuss the findings of the

biennial requalification inspection. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary

information was reviewed during this inspection.

An interim exit was conducted on December 16, 2010, to discuss the findings associated

with the URI follow-up inspection. Although proprietary information was reviewed during

the inspection, no proprietary information is included in this report.

On January 10, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Don

Grissette, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors

confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee Indentified Violations

None

Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

G. Boerschig, Plant Manager

M. Brandon, Director, Safety & Licensing (Interim)

J. Bushnell, Licensing Engineer

R. Crews, Operations Training Manager

J. Dalton, Initial Licensing Operator Training Supervisor

T. Detchemende, Emergency Preparedness Manager

B. Ennis, Electrical Engineering

N. Good, Simulator Manager

D. Grissette, Site Vice President

W. Hooks, Radiation Protection Manager

D. Hughes, Training Supervisor

B. Hunt, Operations Superintendent

D. Hutchinson, Chemistry Manager

G. Mauldin, Director, Engineering

M. McFadden, Operations Manager

J. Milner, Technical Support Superintendent, Radiation Protection

D. Murphy, Maintenance Manager (Interim)

M. Pope, Licensing Engineer

C. Riedl, Licensing Manager (Interim)

A. Scales, Work Control Manager

M. Schmader, Training Supervisor

J. Smith, Health Physics Supervisor

W. Thompson, Site Training Director

D. Voeller, Director, Project Management

J. Wilcox, Security Manager

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

05000390/2010005-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Monitor the Performance of

the B MCR Air Conditioning Train Under 10 CFR

50.65.05000390/2010005-02 NCV Failure to Adequately Qualify Molded-Case Circuit

Breakers to Safety-Related Application Through

Commercial Grade Dedication. (Section 4OA5.2)

Attachment

2

05000390/2010005-03 NCV Failure to Use Worst Case 6900 VAC Bus Voltage

in Design Calculations. (Section 4OA5.3)

Closed

05000390/2515/172 TI Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt

Welds (Section 4OA5.1)05000390/2009002-03 URI Acceptability of Seismic Qualification of 120VAC

Vital Instrumentation Board Circuit Breakers05000390/2010008-02 URI Worst Case 6900 VAC Bus Voltage in Design

Calculations

Discussed

None

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

1-PI-OPS-1-FP, Freeze Protection

PER 272583

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

SOI-3.02 Checklist 1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Handswitch Alignment Verification

SOI-3.02 Checklist 2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Electrical Power Alignment Verification

SOI-3.02 Checklist 3, Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment Verification

SOI-70.01-Attachment 1P, Unit 1 and Common Power Checklist

SOI-7001-Attachment 1V, Unit 1 CCS Normal Power Checklist

SOI-72.01-Attachment 1P, Containment Spray Power Checklist

SOI-72.01-Attachment 1V, Containment Spray Valve Checklist

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

WB-DC-20-28, Intake Pumping Station Watertight Doors at Elevation 722.0

Technical Instruction (TI)-50.023, Intake Pumping Station Strainer Room B Sump Pump A

Performance Test

Technical Instruction (TI)-50.024, Intake Pumping Station Strainer Room B Sump Pump B

Performance Test

TVA Calculation WBN OSG4099 Appendix E, MELB Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB)

Flooding Study (Intake Pumping Station)

WO 10-811526 B Strainer Room Sump Pump B

WO 09-820527 B Strainer Room Sump Pump A

Dwg 1-47610-40

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

TI-79.823 Diesel Generator 2A-A Jacket Water Cooler Performance Test

TI-79.821 Diesel Generator 1A-A Jacket Water Cooler Performance Test

TI-79.000 Program for implementing NRC Generic letter 89.13

Calculation MDQ00008220030077 - DG JWHX

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

Job performance measures (JPMs):

JPM 3-OT-JPMR108, Return PRM N-42 to Service Per AOI-4, rev. 3.

JPM 3-OT-JPMR093, Establish RCS Bleed Paths Per FR-H.1, rev. 8.

JPM 3-OT-JPMR018, Perform Boration of the RCS During an ATWS Per FR-S.1., rev. 6.

JPM 3-OT-JPMA049B, 1B-B Diesel Generator Idle Start for Warm Up Per SOI-82.02., rev. 1.

JPM 3-OT-JPMS090A, Classify the Event per the REP (ATWS-Reactor Tripped Locally), rev. 5.

JPM 3-OT-JPMA136, Control the 1B-B Motor-Driven AFW Pump Discharge Pressure Control

Valve Locally per AOI-30.2, Appendix C., rev. 3.

JPM 3-OT-JPMR071A, Align an RHR Train for Hot Leg Recirculation per ES-1.4, rev. 5,

9/1/2010.

JPM 3-OT-JPMR173A, Start Up Upper Containment Purge Per SOI-30.02, rev. 0, 11/01/2010.

JPM 3-OT-JPMR027A, Raise Cold Leg Accumulator Level Per SOI-63.01, rev. 5, 10/05/2010.

JPM 3-OT-JPMS082A, Classify the Event per the REP (Loss of Main Control Room

Annunciation), rev. 8, 10/05/2010.

Attachment

4

Procedures:

OPDP-10, License Status Maintenance, Reactivation and Proficiency for Non-Licensed

Positions, rev. 2, 06/01/2010.

TI-12.10, Control of Sensitive Equipment, rev. 00003, Watts Bar Unit 1.

TRN 11.4, Continuing Training for Licensed Personnel, rev. 0016, 03/11/2010.

TRN 11.8, Operator License Examinations and Renewals, rev. 8, 10/05/2010.

TRN 11.9, Simulator Exercise Guide Development and Revision, rev. 0006, 10/23/2009.

TRN-11.10, Annual Requalification Examination Development and Implementation, rev. 16,

05/26/2010.

TRN-11.12, Job Performance Measure Development, Administration, and Evaluation Manual,

rev. 0004, 07/25/2008.

TRN-11.14, TVA Operator Licensing Examination Security Program, rev. 0004, 07/03/2006.

TRN-12, Simulator Regulatory Requirements, rev. 0009, 10/22/2010.

3TRN-205.2, Evaluation.

Simulator Exam Scenarios (SES):

3-OT-SRE022A, Feedwater Malfunction Followed by Large Break LOCA, rev. 4, 09/29/2010.

3-OT-SRE004A, Feed Water Isolation Followed by a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, rev. 5,

09/30/2010.

Simulator Transient Tests:

Transient Test-2 (TT-2), Loss of Normal and Emergency Feedwater, (2009 and 2010).

TT-4, Simultaneous Four Loop Reactor Coolant Pump Trip, (2009 and 2010).

TT-6, Manual Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip, (2009 and 2010).

Simulator Steady State Tests:

TRN-12 100%, 75%, 25% Steady-State Performance Test, (2008, 2009, 2010).

Steady State Drift Test60 minute run at 100% power (2010).

Simulator Malfunction Tests:

FW05, Main Feed Pump Trip (2005 and 2009).

FW09, Loss of Vacuum (2003 and 2007).

IA02, Loss of Non-Essential Control Air (2004 and 2008).

IA03, Loss of Essential Control Air (2003 and 2007).

TH09, Fuel Cladding Failure (2003 and 2007).

Written Examinations Reviewed:

Week 2 RO and SRO Biennial Written Exams (2009).

Week 4 RO and SRO Biennial Written Exams (2009).

Week 5 RO and SRO Biennial Written Exams (2009).

Condition Reports:

PER 152195, Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip in response to a turbine trip.

PER 152955, Reactor Trip due to a personnel error - Human Performance.

PER 154635, Human performance - self checking was a flawed defense.

PER 210805, Identifies that SROs are not being trained as ROs to take the OATC position

when it is necessary.

Attachment

5

ML110280456

Text

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