ML17335A368

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Proposed Tech Specs,Adding New TS Re Distributed Ignition Sys
ML17335A368
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 12/03/1998
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A367 List:
References
NUDOCS 9812080069
Download: ML17335A368 (32)


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ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1291 CURRENTPAGESMARKED-UP TOSHOWPROPOSEDAMENDMENT TOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM981208006'P 981203PDRADOCK050003i5'PDR I

~IINDEX.jLIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS SECTIONPAGE34.53/4.5.13/4.5.23/4.5.33/4.5.43/4.5.5EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCSACCUMULATORS ECCSSUBSYSTEHS

-Tavggreaterthanoreoto350Fe~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ECCSSUBSYSTEMS' Tavglessthan350F..BORONINJECTION SYSTEMIntentionally LeftBlankIntencionally LeftBlankREFUELING WATERSTORAGETANKSqual3/45-13/45-33/45-73/45-93/45-103/45-1134.6CONTAINMENT SYSTE."fS 3/4.6.1PRIMLYCONTAINMENT Concainment Integrity Containment LeakageContainment AirLocks..InternalPressureAirTemperature Containmenc Structural Integrity Contai.nment Venti.lation Systems.3/4.6.2OEPRESSURI2ATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTE."iS 3/46-13/46-23/46-43/46-63/46-73/46-93/46-9a3/4.6.33/4.6.4Containment SpraySystem.5.ayAdditiveSystem..CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESCOMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLHydrogenAnalyzers ElectricHydrogenRecombiners

-W3/46-103/46-123/46-143/46-233/46-24Sird~ia~ma'gni+io~

SySA~......

S/<COOK'NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT1VIIAMENDMENT No.gl,SitXN,15S 3.6.4.2Twoindependent containment hydrogenrecombiner systemsshallbeOPERABLE.

MODES1and2.*hQXlQE-Vfthonehydrogenrecombfner syseemfnoperable, reseorecheinoperable syseemeoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysorbefnatleastHOTSTANDBYwithfxt'Che nexe6hours.4.6.4.2Eachhydrogenrecombfner syseemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

a.Atleastonceper18monthsbyverifying duringarecombiner systemfunceional testthaetheminimumheatersheathtemperature increases to0x700Pwithin90minutesandismaintained foraelease2hours.b.Aeleaseonceper18monthsby:PerfoxELLGg.a QfhNNEFCALIBRATION of.allrecombfner fnsCreaentation and.'conerol"cfrcufts.'erffyfngthroughavfsualeximfnatfon chattherefs.noevfdenceabnormalconditions withintherecombfners (f.e.,loosewiringorstructural'connections, depositsofforefgnmiterfals, etc.)~~>+<<7~Wzsri~~>Mu~~rcwwmcm,~~4'miiza~aZ rSS-Mrna4.wNo~Z/~COOKNUCLFdB.PLANT-UNIT1;j13/46-24'.1AMENDMENT NO.+M.~

3/4LIMITINGCONiDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINiiIENT SYSTEMSVerifying duringarccombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases to~1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.~A//T/r/5Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestfollowing theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbe210,000ohms.~uuV~raWageQC@urrZEmaurg fH~+ZDISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEMLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.6.4.3BothtrainsoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1a11d2.ACTION:WithonetrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSysteminoperable:

Restoretheinoperable traintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orb.Performsurveillance requirement 4.6.4.3aonceper7daysontheOPERABLEtrainuntiltheinoperable trainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.WithnoOPERABLEhydrogenigniterinonecontainment region,restoreonehydrogenigniterintheaffectedcontainment regiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orbeinHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.6.4.3EachtrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

a.Onceper92daysbyenergizing thesupplybreakersandverifying thatatleast34of35ignitersareenergized.

b.Onceper92days,verifyatleastonehydrogenigniterisOPERABLEineachcontainment region.c.Onceper18monthsbyverifying thetemperature ofeachigniterisaminimum1700'F.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UMT 1Page3/46-25AMENDME223~Pa'Wy'uPscgypgzg 3/4BASES3/4.6COilTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEiVITheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethatI)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.

Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheevent'fareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.

Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlocked.sealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:

(I)stanoning aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.

3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:I)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheelementisatatemperature aboveambient.+ycYroy<nAnal'drsNrroPMrrrc5iner zPg>N@7fPW~&ayr>uZrow8'Z/4>-SH0COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT IPageB3/46-3AMENDMENT 48k,~3-Distributed IgnitionSystem(DIS)TheDISpermitscontrolled burningoftheexcessive hydrogengenerated duringdegradedcoreLOCAspostulated by10CFR50.44 "Standards forcombustible gascontrolsysteminlight-water-cooled powerreactors."

Thepostulated amountofhydrogenisequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwater.Controlled burningatlowhydrogenconcentrations precludes containment damagethatcouldresultfromrandomignitionathighconcentrations.

Anextensive programoftestingandanalysishasdemonstrated thatasystemofstrategically placedhydrogenigniters(theDIS)canberelieduponforcontrolled burnsofthehydrogengaspostulated fordegradedcores.Furthermore, ithasbeenshownthatthiscanbeaccomplished atcombustion temperatures andpressures thatwillnotchallenge theintegrity ofthecontainment structure ortheoperability ofcontainment equipment necessary toshutdown(andmaintainshutdown) thereactor.Thehydrogenignitersarenotincludedformitigation ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)becauseanamountofhydrogenequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwaterisfarinexcessofthehydrogencalculated forthelimitingDBAlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thehydrogenconcentration resulting fromaDBAcanbemaintained lessthantheflammability.

limitusingthehydrogenrecombiners.

TheDISconsistsoftwoindependent trainsof35igniterslocatedthroughout containmcnt.

Theignitersineachtrainarefurtherdividedintosixgroupspertrainpoweredfromdifferent phasesoftwoseparatethreephasetransformers.

Itisthetransformer phasethatuniquelydefinesagroup.Operation inModes1and2withbothtrainsavailable ensuresthecapability forcontrolled burningofhydrogengasinsidecontainment duringdegradedcoreLOCAevents.InModes3and4boththehydrogenproduction rateandthetotalhydrogenproduction afleraLOCAwouldbesignificantly lessthanthatcalculated fortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobability ofanaccidentrequiring theDISislow.Therefore theDISisnotrequiredinModes3and4.InModes5and6,theprobability andconsequences ofaLOCAarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature limitations oftheseModes.Therefore, theDISisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinModes5and6.The7dayCompletion Timeforrestoration ofaninoperable DIStraininModes1or2isbasedonthelowprobability ofoccurrence ofadegradedcoreeventthatwouldgeneratehydrogeninamountsequivalent toametalwaterreactionof75%ofthecorecladdingandthelowprobability offailureoftheOPERABLEDIStrain.Thisjustification alsoappliestothe7dayCompletion Timeallowedforredundant ignitersbeinginoperable inthesamecontainment region.Forthiscasetherewouldalsobeignitioncapability fromadjacentcontainment regionsbyflamepropagation totheregionwithnoOPERABLEigniters.

Confidence insystemOPERABILITY isdemonstrated bysurveillance testing.Sincemanyignitersareinaccessible atpower,surveillance testinginMode1islimitedtomeasurement ofignitercurrentwhentheDISisenergized bygroups.Measuredcurrentsarecomparedwithbaselinedataforthegroup.Ignitertemperature measurements foralligniterscanonlybeperformed duringshutdownandisperformed every18months.Thistestingenergizes allignitersandconfirmstheabilityofeachignitertoobtainasurfacetemperature ofatleast1700'F.Thistemperature isconservatively abovethetemperature necessary toignitehydrogenmixturesatconcentrations nearthelowerflammability limit.Testexperience indicates thatindividual igniterfailuresaregenerally totalfailuresanddonotinvolvetheinability toreachtherequiredtemperature whenanigniterisdrawingnormalamperage.

Thisobservedfailuremodeprovidesreasonable confidence thatanigniterfailingtoreachtherequiredtemperature wouldalsobedetectedbyreducedgroupcurrentmeasurements duringtheMode1surveillances.

Therefore the18monthfrequency foractualtemperature measurements isacceptable.

INDEXLIMITINCCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE UIRBQBiTS SECTIONPhCE3/4,5.2ECCSSUbSYSTEMS

-Tavegreaterthanorequalto3/4.5.3ECCSSUbSYSTEMS

-Taveleeachan350F.........

3/4.5.4bORONIHJECTION SYSTEM350F.34.5EMERCENCY CORECOOLINCSYSTEMSECCS4IC]'EI4cACCUMUKATORS

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~~s~~~~s~~~3/45-13/4533/45-73/4.5.5Intentionally Leftblank.............

Intentionally Leftblank.....

REFUELINC VATERSTORAGETANK....~*~~3/4593/45-103/45-1134.6CONThINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT 3/4.6.23/4.6.33/4.6.4Containaent Integrity

~~4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Containment Leakage>>ConteizcNntAirLocks~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~InternalPreeaure.

~s~s~s~~~s~~~~~ii~~i~~~~~~~hirTemperature

.Concainlent Struccural Integrity

.Concainaenc Ventilation Syecea......................,..

DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINCSYSTEMSContainlent SpraySyetaa0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SprayAdditiveSyacea.CONTAIHMEHT ISOIATIOH VALVESCOMbUSTIbLE CASCOHTMLHydropnhnalyrer~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ElectricHydrogenRecoabinere

-W......................

3/46-13/46-23/46-43/46-63/46-73/46-93/46-9a3/46-103/46-113/46-133/46-333/46-34COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2VIIAMZgleENT NO.I~.~<>,142 INDEXBASESSECTION.~3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMContinued 3/4.4.9PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS.3/4.4.10STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 3/4.4.11RELIEFVALVES..3/4.4.12REACTORCOOLANTVENTSYSTEMPAGEB3/44-6B3/44-10B3/44-11B3/44-113/4.5EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCS3/4.5.1ACCUMULATORS 3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMS 3/4.5.4BORONINJECTION SYSTEM3/4.5.5REFUELING WATERSTORAGETANK(RWST).B3/45-1B3/45-1B3/45-2B3/45-33/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS'.4.6.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT 3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROL'/4.6.5 ICECONDENSER B3/46-1B3/46-33/4.7PLANTSYSTEMS3/4.7.1TURBINECYCLE3/4.7.2STEAMGENERATOR PRESSURE/1'EMPERATURE LIMITATION

.......3/4.7.3COMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEM3/4.7.4ESSENTIAL SERVICEWATERSYSTEM...

"~..B3/47-1B3/474B3/474B3/4743/4.7.5CONTROLROOMEMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM...........

B3/474a3/4.7.6ESFVENTILATION SYSTEM..3/4.7.7HYDRAULIC SNUBBERSB3/47-5B3/47-5COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2AMENDMENT 407,4$6, 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLAi ICEREQUIREtWIENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSDISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEMLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.6.4.3BothtrainsoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1and2.ACTION:WithonetrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSysteminoperable:

Restoretheinoperable traintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orPerformsurveillance requirement 4.6.4.3aonceper7daysontheOPERABLEtrainuntiltheinoperable trainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.WithnoOPERABLEhydrogenigniterinonecontainment region,restoreonehydrogenigniterintheaffectedcontainment regiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orbeinHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.6.4.3EachtrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

Onceper92daysbyenergizing thesupplybreakersandverifying thatatleast34of35ignitersareenergized.

Onceper92days,verifyatleastonehydrogenigniterisOPERABLEineachcontainment region.OnceperIgmonthsbyverifying thetemperature ofeachigniterisaminimum1700'F.~~~C/mi7~COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-34a 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMIS3/46.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:I)'zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswittuncontainment.

Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.'heacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.3/4.6.5ICECONDENSER Therequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.

3/4.6.5.1 ICEBEDTheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimation.

Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions after,g',>%i!Ithreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.

Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.3/4.6.5.2 ICEBEDTEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.

Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespeciifiied timelimits.~p'>+<g~~~

+<>>ye~~aK~&~~~o~c5~n~~~C~~~~rg+~+~~++rnid56@Wrensgp,$,5ZAPCOuy&rsdrZ p)+,y,ygg~,4~~ZHryWw~~n+rrru~o'n m~~~/Zing8-<WCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/4~AMENDMENT 4,444,A4,207 J~'I'PI Distributed IgnitionSystem(DIS)TheDISpermitscontrolled burningoftheexcessive hydrogengenerated duringdegradedcoreLOCAspostulated by10CFR50.44 "Standards forcombustible gascontrolsysteminlight-water-cooled powerreactors."

Thepostulated amountofhydrogenisequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75'/oofthefuelcladdingwithwater.Controlled burningatlowhydrogenconcentrations precludes containment damagethatcouldresultfromrandomignitionathighconcentrations.

Anextensive programoftestingandanalysishasdemonstrated thatasystemofstrategically placedhydrogenigniters(theDIS)canberelieduponforcontrolled burnsofthehydrogengaspostulated fordegradedcores.Furthermore, ithasbeenshownthatthiscanbeaccomplished atcombustion temperatures andpressures thatwillnotchallenge theintegrity ofthecontainment structure ortheoperability ofcontainment equipment necessary toshutdown(andmaintainshutdown) thereactor.Thehydrogenignitersarenotincludedformitigation ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)becauseanamountofhydrogenequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75~/oofthefuelcladdingwithwaterisfarinexcessofthehydrogencalculated forthelimitingDBAlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thehydrogenconcentration resulting fromaDBAcanbemaintained lessthantheflammability limitusingthehydrogenrecombiners.

TheDISconsistsoftwoindependent trainsof35igniterslocatedthroughout containmcnt.

Theignitersineachtrainarefurtherdividedintosixgroupspertrainpoweredfromdifferent phasesoftwoseparatethreephasetransformers.

Itisthetransformer phasethatuniquelydefinesagroup.Operation inModes1and2withbothtrainsavailable ensuresthecapability forcontrolled burningofhydrogengasinsidecontainment duringdegradedcoreLOCAevents.IInModes3and4boththehydrogenproduction rateandthetotalhydrogenproduction afleraLOCAwouldbesignificantly lessthanthatcalculated fortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobability ofanaccidentrequiring theDISislow.Therefore theDISisnotrequiredinModes3and4.InModes5and6,theprobability andconsequences ofaLOCAarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature limitations oftheseModes.Therefore, theDISisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinModes5and6.The7dayCompletion Timeforrestoration ofaninoperable DIStraininModes1or2isbasedonthelowprobability ofoccurrence ofadegradedcoreeventthatwouldgeneratehydrogeninamountsequivalent toametalwaterreactionof75~/oofthecorecladdingandthelowprobability offailureoftheOPERABLEDIStrain.Thisjustification alsoappliestothe7dayCompletion Timeallowedforredundant ignitersbeinginoperable inthesamecontainment region.Forthiscasetherewouldalsobeignitioncapability fromadjacentcontainment regionsbyflamepropagation totheregionwithnoOPERABLEigniters.

Confidence insystemOPERABILITY isdemonstrated bysurveillance testing.Sincemanyignitersareinaccessible atpower,surveillance testinginMode1islimitedtomeasurement ofignitercurrentwhentheDISisenergized bygroups.Measuredcurrentsarecomparedwithbaselinedataforthegroup.Ignitertemperature measurements foralligniterscanonlybeperformed duringshutdownandisperformed every18months.Thistestingenergizes allignitersandconfirmstheabilityofeachignitertoobtainasurfacetemperature ofatleast1700'F.Thistemperature isconservatively abovethetemperature necessary toignitehydrogenmixturesatconcentrations nearthelowerflammability limit.Testexperience indicates thatindividual igniterfailuresaregenerally totalfailuresanddonotinvolvetheinability toreachtherequiredtemperature whenanigniterisdrawingnormalamperage.

Thisobservedfailuremodeprovidesreasonable confidence thatanigniterfailingtoreachtherequiredtemperature wouldalsobedetectedbyreducedgroupcurrentmeasurements duringtheMode1surveillances.

Therefore the18monthfrequency foractualtemperature measurements isacceptable.

ATTACHMENT 3TOAEP:NRC:1291 PROPOSEDAMENDMENT TOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEM I

UNIT1 INDEXLIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTIONPAGE3/4.5EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCS3/4;5".1ACCUMUL'ATORS 3/45-13/4.5.33/4.5.4ECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-Tavglessthan350'FBORONINJECTION SYSTEM3/4.5.2ECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-Tavggreaterthanorequalto350'F..3/45-33/45-73/4.5.5Intentionally LeftBlankIntentionally LeftBlankREFUELING WATERSTORAGETANK3/45-93/45-103/45-113/4:6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT Containment Integrity Containment-Leakage

-........

Containment AirLocksInternalPressureAirTemperature Containment Structural Integrity Containment Ventilation Systems.3/4.6.2.DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/46-13/46-23/4643/46-63/46-73/46-93/46-9a3/4.6.33/4.6.4Containment SpraySystemSprayAdditiveSystemCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESCOMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROL3/46-103/46-123/46-14HydrogenAnalyzers

.ElectricHydrogenRecombiners

-WDistributed IgnitionSystem3/46-233/46-243/46-25COOINGNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1VIIAMENDMENT QR,36,k%)AS, 4I

~~3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSELECTRICHYDROGENRECOMBINERS

-WLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.6.4.2Twoindependent containment hydrogenrecombiner systemsshallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1and2.ACTION:IWithonehydrogenrecombiner systeminoperable, restoretheinoperable systemtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysorbeinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithinthenext6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.6.4.2Eachhydrogenrecombiner systemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

Atleastonceper18monthsbyverifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheminimumheatersheathtemperature increases to2700'Fwithin90minutesandismaintained foratleast2hours.b.Atleastonceper18monthsby:1.Performing aCHANNELCALIBRATION ofallrecombiner instrumentation andcontrolcircuits.

2.Verifying throughavisualexamination thatthereisnoevidenceofabnormalconditions withintherecombiners (i.e.,loosewiringorstructural connections, depositsofforeignmaterials, etc.)Verifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases to21200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.4,Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestfollowing theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbeR10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-24AMENDMENT 4Q,R2S, 0R~w'N1d8'II tt3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSDISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEMLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.6.4.3BothtrainsoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1and2.ACTION:WithonetrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSysteminoperable:

a.Restoretheinoperable traintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orb.Performsurveillance requirement 4.6.4.3aonceper7daysontheOPERABLEtrainuntiltheinoperable trainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.WithnoOPERABLEhydrogenigniterinonecontainment region,restoreonehydrogenigniterintheaffectedcontainment regiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orbeinHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.6.4.3EachtrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

aob.C.Onceper92daysbyenergizing thesupplybreakersandverifying thatatleast34of35ignitersareenergized, Onceper92days,verifyatleastonehydrogenigniterisOPERABLEineachcontainment region.Onceper18monthsbyverifying thetemperature ofeachigniter'is aminimum1700'F.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-25 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.

Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.

Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:

(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.

3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLHydrogenAnalyzers andRecombiners TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with1)zirconium-water reactions, 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwaterand3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Theacceptance criteriaof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.Distributed IgnitionSystem(DIS)TheDISpermitscontrolled burningoftheexcessive hydrogengenerated duringdegradedcoreLOCAspostulated by10CFR50.44, "Standards forcombustible gascontrolsysteminlight-water-cooled powerreactors."

Thepostulated amountofhydrogenisequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwater.ControHed burningatlowhydrogenconcentrations precludes containment damagethatcouldresultfromrandomignitionathighconcentrations.

Anextensive programoftestingandanalysishasdemonstrated thatasystemofstrategically placedhydrogenigniters(theDIS)canberelieduponforcontrolled burnsofthehydrogengaspostulated COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3AMENDMENT 4R,~,

CJe 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLcontinued fordegradedcores.Furthermore, ithasbeenshownthatthiscanbeaccomplished atcombustion temperatures andpressures thatwillnotchallenge theintegrity ofthecontainment structure ortheoperability ofcontainment equipment necessary toshutdown(andmaintainshutdown) thereactor.Thehydrogenignitersarenotincludedformitigation ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)becauseanamountofhydrogenequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwaterisfarinexcessofthehydrogencalculated forthelimitingDBAlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thehydrogenconcentration resulting fromaDBAcanbemaintained lessthantheflammability limitusingthehydrogenrecombiners.

TheDISconsistsoftwoindependent trainsof35igniterslocatedthroughout containment.

Theignitersineachtrainarefurtherdividedintosixgroupspertrainpoweredfromdifferent phasesoftwoseparatethreephasetransformers.

Itisthetransformer phasethatuniquelydefinesagroup.Operation inMODES1and2withbothtrainsavailable ensuresthecapability forcontrolled burningofhydrogengasinsidecontainment duringdegradedcoreLOCAevents.InMODES3and4boththehydrogenproduction rateandthetotalhydrogenproduction afteraLOCAwouldbesignificantly lessthanthatcalculated fortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobability ofanaccidentrequiring theDISislow.Therefore theDISisnotrequiredinMODES3and4.InMODES5and6,theprobability andconsequences ofaLOCAarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature limitations oftheseMODES.Therefore, theDISisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.The7dayCompletion Timeforrestoration ofaninoperable DIStraininMODES1or2isbasedonthelowprobability ofoccurrence ofadegradedcoreeventthatwouldgeneratehydrogeninamountsequivalent toametalwaterreactionof75%ofthecorecladdingandthelowprobability offailureoftheOPERABLEDIStrain.Thisjustification alsoappliestothe7dayCompletion Timeallowedforredundant ignitersbeinginoperable inthesamecontainment region.Forthiscasetherewouldalsobeignitioncapability fromadjacentcontainment regionsbyflamepropagation totheregionwithnoOPERABLEigniters.

Confidence insystemOPERABILITY isdemonstrated bysurveillance testing.Sincemanyignitersareinaccessible atpower,surveillance testinginMODE1islimitedtomeasurement ofignitercurrentwhentheDISisenergized bygroups.Measuredcurrentsarecomparedwithbaselinedataforthegroup.Ignitertemperature measurements foralligniterscanonlybeperformed duringshutdownandisperformed every18months.Thistestingenergizes allignitersandconfirmstheabilityofeachignitertoobtainasurfacetemperature ofatleast1700'F.Thistemperature isconservatively abovethetemperature necessary toignitehydrogenmixturesatconcentrations nearthelowerflammability limit.Testexperience indicates thatindividual igniterfailuresaregenerally totalfailuresanddonotinvolvetheinability toreachtherequiredtemperature whenanigniterisdrawingnormalamperage.

Thisobservedfailuremodeprovidesreasonable confidence thatanigniterfailingtoreachtherequiredtemperature wouldalsobedetectedbyreducedgroupcurrentmeasurements duringtheMODE1surveillances.

Therefore the18monthfrequency foractualtemperature measurements isacceptable.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3a 0INDEXLIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTIONPAGE3/4.5EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCS3/4.5.1ACCUMULATORS 3/45-13/4.5.2ECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-Tavggreaterthanorequalto350'F..3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-Tavglessthan350'F3/4.5.4BORONINJECTION SYSTEMIntentionally LeftBlankIntentionally LeftBlank3/4.5.5REFUELING WATERSTORAGETANK3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/45-33/45-73/45-93/45-103/45-113/4.6.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT Containment Integrity Containment LeakageContainment AirLocksInternalPressureAirTemperature Containment Structural Integrity Containment Ventilation System3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMSContainment SpraySystemSprayAdditiveSystem3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES3/46-13/46-23/46P3/46-63/46-73/46-93/46-9a3/46-103/46-113/46-133/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLHydrogenAnalyzer..ElectricHydrogenRecom(iners

-WDistributed IgnitionSystem3/46-333/46-343/46-34aCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2AMENDMENT 48,QQ,445, lc INDEXBASESSECTIONPAGE3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMContinued 3/4.4.9PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS3/4.4.10STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 3/4.4.11RELIEFVALVES..3/4.4.12REACTORCOOLANTVENTSYSTEMB3/44-6B3/44-10B3/44-11B3/44-113/4.5EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCS3/4.5.1ACCUMULATORS 3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMS 3/4.5.4BORONINJECTION SYSTEM..3/4.5.5REFUELING WATERSTORAGETANK(RWST)..B3/45-1B3/45-1B3/45-2B3/45-33/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3.4.6.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT 3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROL....3/4.6.5ICECONDENSER B3/46-1B3/46-3B3/46-3B3/464B3/464a3/4.7PLANTSYSTEMS3/4.7.1TURBINECYCLE3/4.7.2STEAMGENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION 3/4.7.3COMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEM3/4.7.4ESSENTIAL SERVICEWATERSYSTEM..3/4:7.5CONTROLROOMEMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM3/4.7.6ESFVENTILATION SYSTEM.3/4.7.7HYDRAULIC SNUBBERSB3/47-1B3/47-4B3/474B3/47-4B3/474aB3/47-5B3/47-5COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2XIIAMENDMENT 4P,4',IVY, 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSDISTRIBUTED IGNITIONSYSTEMLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.6.4.3BothtrainsoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES1and2.ACTION:WithonetrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSysteminoperable:

Restoretheinoperable traintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orPerformsurveillance requirement 4.6.4.3aonceper7daysontheOPERABLEtrainuntiltheinoperable trainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.WithnoOPERABLEhydrogenigniterinonecontainment region,restoreonehydrogenigniterintheaffectedcontainment regiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,orbeinHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.6.4.3EachtrainoftheDistributed IgnitionSystemshallbedemonstrated OPERABLE:

Onceper92daysbyenergizing thesupplybreakersandverifying thatatleast34of35ignitersareenergized.

Onceper92days,verifyatleastonehydrogenigniterisOPERABLEineachcontainment region.Onceper-18monthsbyverifying thetemperature ofeachigniterisaminimum1700'F.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-34aAMENDMENT 3/4'ASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLHydrogenAnalyzers andRecombiners TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with1)zirconium-water reactions, 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwaterand3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.Distributed IgnitionSystem(DIS)TheDISpermitscontrolled burningoftheexcessive hydrogengenerated duringdegradedcoreLOCAspostulated by10CFR50.44, "Standards forcombustible gascontrolsysteminlight-waterwooled powerreactors."

Thepostulated amountofhydrogenisequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwater.Controlled burningatlowhydrogenconcentrations precludes containment damagethatcouldresultfromrandomignitionathighconcentrations.

Anextensive programoftestingandanalysishasdemonstrated thatasystemofstrategically placedhydrogenigniters(theDIS)canberelieduponforcontrolled burnsofthehydrogengaspostulated fordegradedcores.Furthermore, ithasbeenshownthatthiscanbeaccomplished atcombustion temperatures andpressures thatwillnotchallenge theintegrity ofthecontainment structure ortheoperability ofcontainment equipment necessary toshutdown(andmaintainshutdown) thereactor.Thehydrogenignitersarenotincludedformitigation ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)becauseanamountofhydrogenequivalent tothatgenerated fromthereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwaterisfarinexcessofthehydrogencalculated forthelimitingDBAlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thehydrogenconcentration resulting fromaDBAcanbemaintained lessthantheflammability limitusingthehydrogenrecombiners.

TheDISconsistsoftwoindependent trainsof35igniterslocatedthroughout containment.

Theignitersineachtrainarefurtherdividedintosixgroupspertrainpoweredfromdifferent phasesoftwoseparatethreephasetransformers.

Itisthetransformer phasethatuniquelydefinesagroup.Operation inMODES1and2withbothtrainsavailable ensuresthecapability forcontrolled burningofhydrogengasinsidecontainment duringdegradedcoreLOCAevents.InMODES3and4boththehydrogenproduction rateandthetotalhydrogenproduction afteraLOCAwouldbesignificantly lessthanthatcalculated fortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobability ofanaccidentrequiring theDISislow.Therefore theDISisnotrequiredinMODES3and4.InMODES5and6,theprobability andconsequences ofaLOCAarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature limitations oftheseMODES.Therefore, theDISisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.The7dayCompletion Timeforrestoration ofaninoperable DIStraininMODES1or2isbasedonthelowprobability ofoccurrence ofadegradedcoreeventthatwouldgeneratehydrogeninamountsequivalent toametalwaterreactionof75%ofthecorecladdingandthelowprobability offailureoftheOPERABLEDIStrain.Thisjustification alsoappliestothe7dayCompletion Timeallowedforredundant ignitersbeinginoperable inthesameCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/4MAMENDMENT Q%,

C'I~

3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.f~.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLcontinued containment region.Forthiscasetherewouldalsobeignitioncapability fromadjacentcontainment regionsbyflamepropagation totheregionwithnoOPERABLEigniters.

Confidence insystemOPERABILITY isdemonstrated bysurveillance testing.Sincemanyignitersareinaccessible atpower,surveillance testinginMODE1islimitedtomeasurement ofignitercurrentwhentheDISisenergized bygroups.Measuredcurrentsarecomparedwithbaselinedataforthegroup.Ignitertemperature measurements foralligniterscanonlybeperformed duringshutdownandi5performed every18months.Thisitesting energizes allignitersandconfirmstheabilityofeachignitertoobtainasurfacetemperature ofatleast1700'F.Thistemperature isconservatively abovethetemperature necessary toignitehydrogenmixturesatconcentrations nearthelowerflammability limit.Testexperience indicates thatindividual igniterfailuresaregenerally totalfailuresanddonotinvolvetheinability toreachtherequiredtemperature whenanigniterisdrawingnormalamperage.

Thisobservedfailuremodeprovidesreasonable confidence thatanigniterfailingtoreachtherequiredtemperature wouldalsobedetectedbyreducedgroupcurrentmeasurements duringtheMODE1surveillances.

Therefore the18monthfrequency foractualtemperature measurements isacceptable.

3/4.6.5ICECONDENSER Therequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.

3/4.6.5.1 ICEBEDTheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthrough'sublimation.

Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions afterthreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.

Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.3/4.6.5.2 ICEBEDTEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.

Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecified timelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/4&4a

~~5PI(e'h\