ML17264A760

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Proposed Annual TS Bases
ML17264A760
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/1996
From:
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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ML17264A761 List:
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NUDOCS 9612200087
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TABLEOFCONTENTS2.02.1.12.1.283.083.083.183.1.183.1.283.1.383.1.483.1.583.1.683.1.783.1.883.283.2.183.2.283.2.383.2.4SAFETYIIMITS{SLs')ReactorCoreSLs........ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSL.....LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION{LCO)APPLICABILITY.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYREACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS.....'.SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)CoveReactivity.ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)RodGroupAlignmentLimits.......ShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsRodPositionIndicationPHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2....POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z))NuclearEqthalpyRiseHotChannelNFacto'F~)o~~~~~~~~~~~AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)82.0-182.0-182.0-83.0-13.0-12~83.1-"183.1-183.1-883.1-1583.1-2283.1-3483.1-4183.1-4983.1-5783.2-183.2-183.2-883.2-1783.2-2983.383.3.183.3.283.3.383.3.483.3.583.3.683.483.4.183.4.283.4.383.4.483.4.583.4.683.4.783.4.883.4.983.4.10INSTRUMENTATIONReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationPostAccidentMonitoring{PAN)InstrumentationLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation...........ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentatiControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsRCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality.RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP.RCSLoops-NODES1s8.5/RTP,2,and3RCSLoops-MODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,loopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledPressurizerPressurizerSafetyValveson83.3-183.3-183.3-6483.3-10883.3-13083.3-,13883.3-14683.4-.183.4-183.4-883.4-1283.4-2083.4-2483.4-3183.4-3783.4-4383.4-4783.4-5396i220008796i2i6I'ORADOCK05000244PPDR(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantivRevision1 TABLEOFCONTENTS3.483.4.1183.4.1283.4.1383.4.1483.4.1583.4.1683.583.5.183.5.283.5.383.5.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)(continued)PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemRCSOperationalLEAKAGERCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage..RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationRCSSpecificActivityEHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)Accumulators0~~~~~~~~~~~~ECCS-NODES'1,2,and3ECCS-MODE4.RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)~~~~~~~~~~83.4-5883.4-6883.4-8583.4-9283.4-10083.4-10883.5-183.5-183.5-1083.5-2583.5-2983.683.6.183.6.283.6.383.6.483.6.583.6.63.6.783.6-183.6-183.6-883.6-1883.6-3883.6-42CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSContainmentContainmentAirLocksContainmentIsolationBoundaries.........ContainmentPressureContainmentAirTemperatureContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems...............83.6'-46HydrogenRecombiners..............83.6-6683.783.7.183.7.23.7.383.7.483.7.583.7.683.7.783.7.883.7.983.7.1083.7.1183.7.1283.7.1383.7.14PLANTSYSTEMSHainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)....HainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValves.....HainFeedwaterRegulatingVhlves(HFRVs),AssociatedBypassValves,andMainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(MFPDVs)AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)..AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System........CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System......ServiceWater(SW)System~ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)...AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelSpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationSpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageSecondarySpecificActivity3.7-13.7-183.7-683.7-1383.7-2283.7-2783.7-4283.7-4683.7-5583.7-6583.7-7583.7-8283.7-8683.7-9083.7-97(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantRevision TABLEOFCONTENTS83.883.8.183.8.283.8.383.8.483.8.583.8.683.8.783.8.883.8.983.8.1083.983.9.183.9.2l83.9383.9.483.9.583.9.6ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS.ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4...ACSources-MODES5and6DieselFuelOilDCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4....DCSources-MODES5and6BatteryCellParametersACInstrumentBusSources-HODES1,2,3,ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,andDistributionSystems-MODES5and6REFUELINGOPERATIONS.BoronConcentrationNuclearInstrumentationContainmentPenetrations.......-.ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-MaterLevela23Ft'esidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtRefuelingCavityWaterLevel~~0~~and4483.8-183.8-183.8-2483.8-3183.8-3683.8-4683.8-5283.8-5783.8-6483.8-7083.8-8383.9-183.9-183.9-683.9-1083.9-1683.9-2183.9-25R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantviRevision1 RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONSB.2B.3B.4B.5and8.6(continued)Verifyingthat'Fo(Z)andF~arewithintherequiredlimits(i.e.,SR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1)ensuresthatcurrentoperation'tz75%RTPwitharodmisalignedisnotresultinginpowerdistributionsthatmayinvalidatesafetyanalysisassumptionsatfullpower.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursallowssufficienttimetoobtainfluxmapsofthecorepowerdistributionusingtheincorefluxmappingsystemandtocalculateFo(Z)andF~.Oncecurrentconditionshavebeenverifiedacceptable,timeisavailabletoperformevaluationsofaccidentanalysistodeterminethatcorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccidentforthedurationofoperationundertheseconditions.Asam'inimum,thefollowingaccidentanalysesshallbere-evaluated:a~b.C.d.e.f.g.Rodinsertioncharacteristics;Rodmisalignment;Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents(LOCAs);Rodwithdrawalatfullpower;LargebreakLOCAs;Mainsteamlinebreak;andRodejection.ACompletionTimeof5daysissufficienttimetoobtaintherequiredinputdataandtoperformtheanalysis.C.1WhenRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintheirCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours,whichobviatesconcernsaboutthedevelopmentofundesirablexenonorpowerdistributions.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderl'ymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.I-30RevisionI BASESRTSInstrumentationB3.3.1ACTIONS(continued)U.landU.2ConditionUappliestotheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms(i.e.,diversetripfeatures)inMODES1and2.ConditionUappliesonaRTBbasis.ThisallowsonediversetripfeaturetobeinoperableoneachRTB.However,withtwodiverse.tripfeaturesinoperable(i.e.,oneoneachoftwodifferentRTBs),atleastonediversetripfeaturemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeinterval.WithonetripmechanismforoneRTBinoperable,itmustberestoredtoanOPERABLEstatuswithin4Shours.TheaffectedRTBshallnotbebypassedwhileoneofthediversetripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredtoperformmaintenancetooneofthediversetripfeatures.Theallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthediversetripfeatures'is6hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditionT.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredActionU.2isreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditionthereisoneremainingdiversetripfeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLERTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.V.1IftheRequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionR,S,T,orUisnotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEwheretheFunctionsarenolongerrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinNODE3withinthenext6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.ItshouldbenotedthatforinoperablechannelsofFunctions16a,16b,16c,and16d,theMODEofApplicabilitywillbeexitedbeforeRequiredActionV.1iscompleted.Therefore,theplantshutdownmaybestoppeduponexitingtheNODEofApplicabilityperLCO3.0.2.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-50Revision1 00 BASESRTSInstrumentationB3.3.1ACTIONS(continued)M.landW.2ConditionMappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctionsinMODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted:~RTBs;~RTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms;and~AutomaticTripLogic.Mithtwotripmechanismsirioperable,atleastonetripmechanismmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeihterval;Mithonetripmechanismortraininoperable,theinoperabletripmechanismortrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.Forthetripmechanisms,ConditionMappliesonaRTBbasis.ThisallowsonediversetripfeaturetobeinoperableoneachRTB.However,withtwodiversetripfeaturesinoperable(i.e.,oneoneachoftwodifferentRTBs),atleastonediversetripfeaturemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunction,andgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.X.landX.2IftheRequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionMisnotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEwheretheFunctionsarenolongerrequired.Toachievethisstatus,actionbemustinitiatedimmediatelytofullyinsertallrodsandtheCRDSystemmustbeincapableofrodwithdrawalwithin1hour.TheseCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperiencetoexittheMODEofApplicabilityinanorderlymanner.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-51(continued)~Revision1 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)e.AuxiliarFeedwater-Undervoltae-BusllAandllBTheUndervoltage-BusllAand11BFunctiohmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequire'heSGsasaheatsink.Alossofpowerto4160VBusllAand11Bwillbeacc'ompaniedbyalossofpowertobothMFWpumpsandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatremoval.Thelossofoffsitepoweris'etectedbyavoltagedroponeachbus.LossofpowertobothbuseswillstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumptoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainsenoughwatertoserveastheheatsinkforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremovalfollowingthereactortrip.EachbusisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.IAuxiliarFeedwater-TriOfBothHainFeedwater~PumsATripofbothHFWpumpsisanindicationofalossofHFWandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatandsensibleheatremoval.TheHFWpumpsareequippedwithabreakerpositionsensingdevice.Anopensupplybreakerindicatesthatthepump.isnotrunning.TwoOPERABLEchannelsperHFWpumpsatisfyredundancyrequirementswithtwo-out-of-twologic.EachHFWpumpisconsideredaSeparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.AtripofbothHFWpumpsstartsbothmotordrivenAFW(HDAFW)pumpstoensurethatatleastoneSGisavailablewithwatertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.However,thisactuationoftheHDAFWpumpsi'snotcreditedinthemitigationofanyaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-92Revision4 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYf.AuxiliarFeedwater-TriOfBothHainFeedwater~Puns(continued)DuringHODES1and2,theAFWpumpsmaybeprovidingforremovalofdecayheatwiththeHFWpumpsremovedfromservice.TopreventanunnecessaryactuationofbothHDAFWpumpsundertheseconditions,aHFWpumpbreakermaybeplacedinthetestpositionprovideditiscapableofbeingtrippedonundervoltageandovercurrentconditionsontheassociated4160Ybus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-92aRevision4

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)IftheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesofConditionLarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<2000psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedon.operatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.N.lConditionNappliesifaAFMManualInitiationchannelisinoperable.Ifamanualinitiationswitchisinoperable,theassociatedAFMorSAFMpumpmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.7.5,"AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFM)System"mustbeenteredimmediately.EachAFMmanualinitiationswitchcontrolsoneAFMorSAFWpump.DeclaringtheassociatedpumpinoperableensuresthatappropriateactionistakeninLCO3.7.5basedonthenumberandtypeofpumpsinvolved.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSTheSRsforeachESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.2-1.~EachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheESFAS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrain8mustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.2-1determineswhich.SRsapplytowhichESFASFunctions.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-100Revision4 PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO19,20.AFMFlow(continued)TheAFWSystemprovidesdecayheatremovalviatheSGsandiscomprisedofthepreferredAFMSystemandtheStandbyAFM(SAFM)System.TheuseofthepreferredAFMorSAFWSystemtoprovidethisdecayheatremoval.functionis.dependentuponthetypeofaccident.AFWflowindicationisrequiredfromthethreepumptrainswhichcomprisethepreferredAFWSystemsincethesepumpsautomaticallystartonvariousactuationsignals.ThefailureofthepreferredAFWSystem(e.g.,duetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding)'sdetectedbyAFMflowindication.Atthispoint,theSAFMSystemismanuallyalignedtoprovidethedecayheatremovalfunction.SAFMflowcanalsobeusedtoverifythatAFWflowisbeingdeliveredtotheSGs.However,theprimaryindicationofthisisprovidedbySGwaterlevel.Therefore,flowindicationfromtheSAFWpumpsisnotrequired.EachofthethreepreferredAFWpumptrainshastworedundanttransmitters;however,onlytheflowtransmittersuppliedpowerfromthesameelectricaltrainastheAFMpumpisrequiredforthisLCO.Therefore,flowtransmittersFT-2001{HCBindicatorFI-202lA)andFT-2006(HCBindicatorFI-2023A)comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandFT-2002(HCBindicatorFI-'2022A)andFT-2007(HCBindicatorFI-2024A)comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-12lRevisionI

LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLOPDGstartinstrumentationisrequiredfortheESFSystemstofunctioninanyaccidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ItsdesignbasisisthatoftheESFActuationSystem(ESFAS).UndervoltageconditionswhichoccurindependentofanyaccidentconditionsresultinthestartandbusconnectionoftheassociatedDG,butnoautomaticloadingoccurs.Accident"analysescredittheloadingoftheDGbasedonthe*lossofoffsitepowerduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThemostlimitingDBAofconcernisthelargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)whichrequiresESFSystemsin'rdertomaintaincontainmentint'egrityandprotectfuelcontainedwithinthereactorvessel(Ref.2).Thedetectionandprocessingofanundervoltagecondition,andsubsequentDGloading,hasbeenincludedinthedelaytimeassumedforeachESFcomponentrequiringDGsuppliedpowerfollowingaDBAandlossofoffsitepower.ThelossofoffsitepowerhasbeenassumedtooccureithercoincidentwiththeDBAoratalaterperiod(40to90secondsfollowingthereactortrip)duetoagriddisturbancecausedbytheturbinegeneratortrip.Ifthelossofoffsitepoweroccursatthesametimeasthesafetyinjection(SI)signalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheSIsignalwillactuatetheDGwithin2secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursbeforetheSIsignalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillactuatetheDGwithin2.75secondsandthattheDGwillconnectto.theaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12:75secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursaftertheSIsignalparametersarereached(griddisturbance),theaccidentanalysesassumestheDGwillconnecttothebuswithin1.5secondsafterthefeederbreakertothebusi.sopened(DGwas'actuatedbySIsignal).Thegriddisturbancehasbeenevaluatedbasedona140'FpeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduringaLOCAanddemonstratedtoresultinacceptableconsequences.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-131Revision1 ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESACTIONS(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationof.CompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.5-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.A.lConditionAappliestothefailureofonecontainmentventilationisolationradiationmonitorchannel.Sincethetwocontainmentradiationmonitorsmeasuredifferentparameters,failureofasinglechannelmayresultinlossoftheradiationmonitoringFunctionforcertainevents.Consequently,thefailedchannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.The4hourallowedtorestoretheaffectedchannelisjustifiedbythelowlikelihoodofeventsoccurringduringthisinterval,andrecognitionthatoneormoreoftheremainingchannelswillrespondtomostevents.8.1ConditionBappliestoallContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionsandaddressesthetrainorientationofthesystemandthemasterandslaverelaysfortheseFunctions.Italsoaddressesthefailureofmultipleradiationmonitoringchannels,ortheinabilitytorestoreasinglefailedchanneltoOPERABLEstatusinthetimeallowedforRequiredActionA.l.Ifatrainisinoperable,multiplechannelsareinoperable,ortheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,operationmaycontinue-aslongastheRequiredActionfortheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.6.3ismetforeachvalvemadeinoperablebyfailureofisolationinstrumentation.ANoteisaddedstatingthatConditionBisonlyapplicableinMOOEI,2,3,or4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-142RevisionI

ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation83.3.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2ConditionCappliestoallContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionsandaddressesthetrainorientationofthesystemandthemasterandslaverelaysfortheseFunctions.Italsoaddressesthefailureofmultipleradiationmonitoringchannels,ortheinabilitytorestoreasinglefailedchanneltoOPERABLEstatusinthetimeallowedforRequiredActionA.l.Ifatrainisinoperable,multiplechannelsareinoperable,ortheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,operationmaycontinueaslongastheRequiredActiontoplaceeachvalveinitsclosedpositionortheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.9.3,"ContainmentPenetrations,"aremetforeachvalvemadeinoperablebyfailureofisolationinstrumentation.TheCompletionTimefortheseRequired'ActionsisImmediately.ANotestatesthatConditionCisapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSandduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.5-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctions.SR3.3.5.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery24hoursensuresthata.grossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurredandtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCHECKagreementcriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-143RevisionI ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREqUIRENENTSSR3.3.5.1(continued)TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels..SR3.3.5.2ACOTisperformedevery92daysoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.TheFrequencyisbasedonthestaffrecommendationforincreasingtheavailabilityofradiationmonitorsaccordingtoNUREG-1366(Ref.2).Thistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidethecontainmentventilationsystemisolation.Thesetpointshallbeleftconsistentwiththecurrentplantspecificcalibrationproceduretolerance.SR3.3.5.3ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTEST.Allpossiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.Inaddition,themasterrelayistestedforcontinuity.ThisverifiesthatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEandthereisan.intactvoltagesignalpath,tothemasterrelaycoils.Thistestisperformed'very24months.TheSurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedoninstrumentreliabilityandindustryoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-144RevisionI

ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.5.4ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNEL'ALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.NUREG-1366.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-145Revision1

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherequirementsofthisLCOrepresenttheinitialconditionsforDNBlimitedtransientsanalyzedintheplantsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).ThesafetyanalyseshaveshownthattransientsinitiatedfromthelimitsofthisLCOwillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion.ThisistheacceptancelimitfortheRCSDNBparameters.,ChangestotheplantthatcouldimpacttheseparametersmustbeassessedfortheirimpactontheDNBdesigncriterion.Thetransientsanalyzedincludelossofcoolantfloweventsanddroppedorstuckrodevents.Akeyassumptionfortheanalysisof.theseeventsisthatthecorepowerdistributioniswithinthelimitsofLCO3:1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)."Thelimitforpressurizerpressureisbasedona+30psiginstrumentuncertainty.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatnominalpressureismaintainedat2235psig.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedpressureis2235psig.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitisbasedona+4'Finstrumentuncertaintywhichincludesa+1.5Fdeadband.ItisassumedthatnominalT.,ismaintainedwithin+1.5FofthenominalT.,specifiedintheCOLR.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedtemperatureiswithin1.5Fofnominal.ThelimitforRCSflowrateisbasedonthenominalT.andSGpluggingcriterialimit.Additionalmarginofapproximately3%isthenaddedforconservatism.TheRCSDNBparameterssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOspecifieslimitsonthemonitoredprocessvariables-pressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrate-toensurethecoreoperateswithinthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.OpetatingwithintheselimitswillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterionintheeventofaDNBlimitedtransient.(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-3Revision4 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thisLCOrequiresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.TheRCSloopsareconsideredfilleduntiltheisolationvalvesareopenedtofacilitatedrainingoftheRCS.TheloopsarealsoconsideredfilledfollowingthecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.However,inbothcases,loopsfilledisbasedontheabilitytouseaSGasabackup.TobeabletotakecreditfortheuseofoneSGtheabilitytopressurizeto50psigandcontrolpre'ssureintheRCSmustbeavailable.ThisistopreventflashingandvoidformationatthetopoftheSGtubeswhichmaydegradeorinterruptthenaturalcirculationflowpath(Ref.2).OneloopofRHRprovidessufficientci'rculationforthesepurposes.However,oneadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,orthesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastoneSGisrequiredtobea16%.OperationILC0,3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.4,LCO3.9.5,inother'MODESiscoveredby:"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-'MODES1s8.5%RTPy2yAND3"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-MaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothSGshavesecondarysidewaterlevels<16%,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusortorestoreatleastoneSGsecondarysidewaterlevel.EitherRequiredActionA.1orRequiredActionA.2willrestoreredundantheatremovalpaths.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilanRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorSGsecondarysidewaterlevelisrestored.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-40Revision1 RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled83.4.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.7.3VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbyRHRpump.Ifsecondarysidewaterlevelisz16%inatleastoneSG,this;Surveillanceisnotneeded.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableand'hasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.62.NRCInformationNotice95-35.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-42Revision1

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainment'Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)Theanalysisandevaluationshowthatundertheworstcasescenario,thehighestpeakcontainmentpressureis59.8psigandthepeakcontainmenttemperatureis374F(bothexperiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeettheintentofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentTemperature,"foradetaileddiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsassumeaplantspecificpowerlevelof102%,oneCStrainandonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperating,andinitial(pre-accident)containmentconditionsof120Fand1.0psig..Theanalysesalsoassumearesponsetimedelayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculatedcontainmentpressureandtemperatureresponses.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,theeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.7).TheeffectofaninadvertentCSactuationisnotconsideredsincethereisnosinglefailure,includingthelossofoffsitepower,whichresultsinaspuriousCSactuation.ThemodeledCSSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysis'sbasedonaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHi-HipressuresetpointtoachievingfullflowthroughtheCSnozzles.ToincreasetheresponseoftheCSSystem,theinjectionlinestothesprayheadersaremaintainedfilledwithwater.TheCSSystemtotalresponsetimeis28.5secondsforonepumptotheuppersprayheaderand26.5secondsfor.twopumps(averagetimebetweenupper,andlowersprayheaders).Thesetotalresponsetimes(assumingthecontainmentHi-Hipressureisreachedattimezero)includesopeningofthemotoroperatedisolationvalves,containmentspraypumpstartup,andspraylinefilling(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-51Revision1 CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6IyIllRUNS1ty010LcScndtTltcRtVSTandanociatcdcotnmonlincbsddtcatcdbytA3033'SPumpTrainNaonSystem-NotaddrcslcdbyLCD3.6.6CVCSIIQ4044orIultratlononRNRIcyItIIIIIIIIN~ONI~otII011~fk",IISlII450ACSfteoteAIII~eloectoIIISdottotaaIIatyA~IIotlat4410IVIOeeOoedooeetSteerlyetaIIONotetoetettoChoetodrdtotA~CheteoelIutet4~+410AQayca44lc4114CootoeooeetaeterICeaQ9ItotdeclCSIteea0FigureB3.6.6-1ContainmentSprayandNaOHSystemsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-64Revision1' CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6//ContainmentRecirculatingFanCoolingUnitA/->QP/ContainmentRecirculatingFanCoolingUnitB/ContainmcntRecirculatingFanCoolingUnitC58I5873(FO)(FC)5875(FC)586(FO)PostAccidCharcoalFilterUnitA587(FO)5874(FO)PostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitB/ContainmcnRecirculating,FanCoolingUnitD5877(FO)VVariousSupplyPointsForillustrationonlyNotes:1.Dampers5871and5872areassociatedwithPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitA2.Dampers5874and5876areassociatedwithPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitB3.Damper5873isassoicatedwithbothCRFCUnitAandPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitA4.Damper5875isassociatedwithbothCRFCUnitCandPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitBFigureB3.6.6-2CRFCandContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-65Revision1 WFRYBypassYalvc421l-39t399l3995A3993SGAStputpo.PA3973FccdeatcrHeaterSAMptCY39~39SSA3NSA3Ãt39StgSN93933A3933Oe2tt)CS2OsC23CBCUthCaaCh~tttsChFtoraCoadeosatcBoosterbmpsMFWLcadlogEdScTtaosdoccrg3NO398039133932A3N2hWVPotapB39F4MFPDY3926FccdwctcrHeaterSB4.LCO3.7.3Condition8enteredwhenanyeombinalionofvalveinopcrabilitiesresultsinanuniso!ableftowpathfromlhecondensateboosterpumpstooncormoreSGs.Notes:1.LCO3.7.3ConditionAenteredwhenMFPDV3976and/or3977isinoperable.2.LCO3.7.3CondiuonBenteredcvhenMFlCV4269and/or4270isinoperable.3.LCO3.7.3ConditionCenteredwhenMFRVBypassValve4271and/or4272isinoperable.MAYBypassYalw422239SSS934MHCY3N63992422039S4A39'SdhorustraonoY3994lSOBOcnC5.(cnChC5DDCay~NO~(CayCh

AFWSystemB3.7.5B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheAFWSystemsuppliesfeedwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)toremovedecayheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)uponthe.lossofnormalfeedwater.supply.TheSGsfunctionasaheatsinkforcoredecayheat.TheheatloadisdissipatedbyreleasingsteamtotheatmospherefromtheSGsviathemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)oratmosphericreliefvalves(ARVs).Ifthemaincondenserisavailable,steammaybereleasedviathesteamdumpvalves.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwo'separatesystems,apreferredAFMSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFM)System(Ref.1).~AFMSstemThepreferredAFWSystemconsistsoftwo,motordrivenAFM(HDAFW)pumpsandoneturbinedrivenAFW(TDAFM)pumpconfiguredintothreeseparatetrainswhicharealllocatedin.theIntermediateBuilding(seeFigureB3.7.5-1).EachHDAFMtrainprovides100%ofAFMflowcapacity,andtheTDAFWpump~provides200%of,therequiredcapacitytotheSGs,asassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thepumpsareequippedwithindependentrecirculationlinestothecondensatestoragetanks(CSTs).EachHDAFWtrainispoweredfromani.ndependentClasslEpowersupplyandfeedsoneSG,althougheachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheother.SGviacross-tielinescontainingnormallyclosedmotoroperate'dvalves(4000Aand4000B).ThetwoHDAFMtrainswillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalineitherSG,openingofthemainfeedwater(HFW)pumpbreakers,asafetyinjection(SI)signal,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuati'oncircuitry(AHSAC).Thepumpscan.alsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-27Revision5

AFMSystemB3.7.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheSAFWPumpBuildingenvironmentiscontrolledbyroomcoolerswhicharesuppliedbythesameSWheaderasthepumptrains.Thesecoolersarerequiredwhentheoutsideairtempe}atureisa80FtoensuretheSAFMPumpBuildingremainss120Fduringaccidentconditions.TheAFMSystemisdesignedtosupplysufficientwatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatwithSGpressureatthelowestHSSVsetpressureplusl%%d.Subsequently,theAFWSystemsuppliessufficientwatertocooltheplanttoRHRentryconditions,withsteamreleasedthroughtheARVs.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheAFMSystemis,tosupplywatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatandotherresidualheatbydeliveringatleasttheminimumrequiredflowratetotheSGsatpressurescorrespondingtothelowestHSSVsetpressureplus1/.TheAFMSystemmitigatestheconsequences'f.anyeventwiththelossofnormalfeedwater.ThelimitingDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)andtransientsfortheAFWSystemareasfollows(Ref.2):a.FeedwaterLineBreak(FWLB);b.LossofHFM(withandwithoutoffsitepower);c.SteamLineBreak(SLB);d.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);e.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR);andf.Externalevents(tornadosandseismicevents).AFMisalsousedtomitigatetheeffectsofanATWSeventwhichisabeyonddesignbasiseventnotaddressedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-29Revision5 AFWSystem83.7.5,BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheAFMSystemdesignissuchthatanyoftheaboveOBAscanbemitigatedusingthepreferredAFMSystemorSAFMSystem.FortheFWLB,SLB,andexternaleventsOBAs{itemsa,c,andf),theworstcasescenarioisthelossofallthreepreferredAFWtrainsduetoaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuilding,orafailureoftheIntermediateBuildingblockwalls.Forthesethreeevents,theuseoftheSAFWSystemwithin10minutesisassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.SinceasinglefailuremustalsobeassumedinadditiontotheHELBorexternalevent,thecapabilityoftheSAFWSystemtosupplyflowtoanintactSG,couldbecompromisediftheSAFWcross-tieisnot,available.ForHELBswithincontainment,useofeithertheSAFMSystemortheAFMSystemtotheintactSGisassumedwithin10minutes.(FortheSGTRevents(iteme),theaccidentanalysesassumethatoneAFWtrainisavailableuponaSIsignalorlow-lowSGlevelsignal.AdditionalinventoryisbeingaddedtotherupturedSGasaresultoftheSGTRsuchthatAFWflowisnotacriticalfeatureforthisOBA.ThelossofMFW'(itemb)isaCondition2event(Ref.3)whichplaceslimitsontheresponseoftheRCSfromthetransient(e.g.,nochallengetothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisallowed).ThisanalysishasbeenperformedassumingnoAFMflowisavailableuntil10minuteswithacceptableresults.ThemostlimitingsmallbreakLOCA(itemd)analysishasalsobeenperformedassumingnoAFWflowwithnoadverseimpactonpeakcladdingtemperature.Insummary,alllimitingOBAsandtransientshavebeenanalyzedassuminga10minutedelayforactuationofflow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-30Revision5 AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)IInadditiontoitsaccidentmitigationfunction,theenergyandmassadditioncapabilityoftheAFWSystemisalsoconsideredwithrespecttoHELBswithincontainment.ForSLBsandFWLBswithincontainment,maximumpumpflowfromallthreeAFWpumpsisassumedfor10minutesuntiloperationscanisolatetheflowbytrippingtheAFMpumpsorbyclosingtherespectivepumpdischargeflowpath(s).Therefore,themotoroperateddischargeisolationvalvesforthemotorHDAFMpumptrains(4007and4008)aredesignedtolimitflowtoz230gpmtolimittheenergyandmassadditionsothatcontainmentremainswithindesignlimitsforitemsaandc.TheTDAFMtrainisassumedtobeatrunoutconditions(i.e.,600gpm).TheAFWSystemsatisfiestherequirementsofCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheAFWSystemwillperformitsdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorcontainment.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwosystemswhichareconfiguredintofivetrains.TheAFWSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthecomponentsandflowpathsrequiredtoprovideredundantAFWflowtotheSGsareOPERABLE(seeFiguresB3.7.5-1and3.7.5-2).ThisrequiresthatthefollowingbeOPERABLE:a.Two'DAFWtrainstakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andcapableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGwitha200gpmwithin10minutesands230gpmtotalflowuponAFMactuation;b.TheTDAFMtraintakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin'10minutes),providedsteamisavailablefrombothmainsteamlinesupstreamoftheHSIVs,andcapableofsupplyingbothSGswitha200gpmeachwithin10minutes;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-31Revision5 AFWSystem83.7.5BASESLCO(continued)c.TwomotordrivenSAFWtrainscapableofbeinginitiatedeitherlocallyorfromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes,takingsuctionfromtheSWSystem,andsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGandtheoppositeSGthroughtheSAFWcross-tielinewithz200gpm.Thepiping,valves,instrumentation,andcontrolsintherequiredflowpathsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLE.TheTDAFWtrainiscomprisedofacommonpumpandtwoflowpaths.ATDAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.ThefailureofthepumporbothflowpathsrenderstheTDAFWtraininoperable.Thecross-tielineforthepreferredHDAFMpumpsisnotrequiredforthisLCO.However,sincetheaccidentanalyseshavebeenperformedassuminga10minutedelayforAFM,andtherearetwoseparatesystems,theuseofthiscross-tielineisallowedinMODES1,2,and3.Also,providedthattheAFWandSAFWdischargevalvesaresettoprovidetheminimumrequiredflow,the.recirculationlinesforthepreferredAFMsystemandSAFWsystempumpsarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.TherecirculationlinesarealsonotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheHSSYsmaintaintheSGpressurebelowthepump'sshutoffhead.TheSAFWPumpBuildingroomcoolersarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwhentheoutsideairtemperatureisz80F.Ifoneroomcoolerisinoperable,theassociatedSAFWtrainisinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheeventthatitiscalledupontofunctionwhentheHFWSystemislost.Inaddition,theAFWSystemisrequiredtosupplyenoughmakeupwater'toreplacethelostSGsecondaryinventoryastheplantcoolstoHODE4conditions.InHODE4,5,or6,theSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremoval,andtheAFWSystemisnotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-32Revision5 m44S2001OID5IIIIT2022TDTD5tltDCCI555ID63.CQrl4A5tab~CVlV)ItDCSTA4025LI-----------IlIIa-IX~I40154014Forillustrationonly4Ols4016Note-t.I'-200l,tI'-2002,Fl'-2006andFf-2007alsoaddressedbyLCO3.3.3.43444026SerriceWaterSctviccWaicr4013SctariccWaictLabeOilCooler36529SISBtubeOinCoolerMDAFIYB4291rIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII403140324310<<5laniM8SteamGcnctamtA43524000AQ4000B4356SIILmGcactamtB3505AI3505BCpI--Mt-++--=-;II7IToMSlVI3512IIITo<<MSWISSI6IICPI3504B3504ALEGEND:-FlowpathnotrequiredforLCO----AddressedinLCO3.7.6------TDAFWflovvpathAFWTrain(N<<ia-TDAFWtrainincludesbothsteamandbothinjectionQovvpaths)LubeOilCoolct014431443CQ~th~IDUlQ ScM9626A6A9629ASAFWPumpC01A4084A9702A970A9706ASteamGenera'orAOtDSVOcD8toChMt<<2<<5CZ'1MtD~4JcnmlhVlIcDSAFWPumpRoomCoolingUnit1BSAFWPumpRoomCoolingUnit1B9708AIf9707AIIII9728IICondenteteTettTank9710A9703BServiceWater1I622B9627B9629B$9707BIII9708BISAFWPumpD9710B9701B4085¹69704B9702B9705B9706BStcamGeneratorBcDOLegend:-----Flowpathnot'retluiredforLCOSAFWTrainForillustrationGnlTlCQ<i'~\h~rDUlB CCWSystem83.7.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionoftheCCWSystemis'theremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)System.SincetheremovalofdecayheatviatheRHRSystemisonlyperformedduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident,theCCWpumpsdonotreceiveanautomaticstartsignal.Followingthegenerationofasafetyinjectionsignal,thenormallyoperatingCCWpumpwillremaininserviceunlessanundervoltagesignalis'.presentoneitherClasslEelectricalBus14orBus16atwhichtimethepumpisstrippedfromitsrespectivebus.ACCWpumpcanthenbemanuallyplacedintoservicepriortoswitchingtorecirculationoperationswhichwouldnotberequireduntilaminimumof22.4minutesfollowinganaccident.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtrainandoneCCWheatexchangertoremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase.TheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andcontainmentmodelsforaLOCAeachconsidertheminimumperformanceoftheCCWSystem.ThenormaltemperatureoftheCCWiss100F,and,duringLOCAconditions,amaximumtemperatureof120Fisassumed.ThispreventstheCCWSystemfromexceedingitsdesigntemperaturelimitof200F,andprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofcontainmentsumpfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bytheECCSpumps.TheCCWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.TheCCWtrains,heatexchangers,andloopheadersaremanuallyplacedintoservicepriortotherecirculationphaseofanaccident(i.e.,22.4minutesfollowingalargebreakLOCA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-47Revision1 717L777FSlPUMPASlPUMP8777M7775iltQhChgLrlCQtrr4rJrDIReturnLineFromNon.AccidentLoadsIIIII,IIII~$728I122AI'IIICCW'2&APumpACCWPump8IAIIIIIForiHustrationonlyLEGENDIIIIIIIIIIICCWLoopHeaderIICCWTrainIICCWheatexchanger,'IIIIIIIIToNonAeeldantyLoadsZ725CCWHX8724AIII7338II7348IIIIIIILJJ~OOLIICCWHXAIIII-'l0-IrR-'248133AII134AI~QQi%%&7778777J777N777HSlPUMPC777K777R777G771P777CCSPUMP8777D164CIIIIIIIIIIII764DIIIII73&AHRLOOPA780A741AAHRLOOPARHRLOOP8RHRt.OOPS73887078817707ARHRPUMP18RHRPUMP1A780814187697088708A14&A750AACPA15&A62A74987508742A743813RCP8Excess~tdownHXRxSupportCool~rs75987628qFC7457428814815ACSPVMPA7778777A'IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIhG7trltrJLL~th~rD SWSystemB3.7.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheS'Wtrainsandloopheaderareassumedtosupplytofollowingcomponentsfollowinganaccident:a.TheCRFCs,DGsandsafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolersimmediatelyfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal(i.e.,aftertheloopheaderbecomesrefilled);b.ThepreferredAFWandSAFWpumpswithin10minutesfollowingreceiptofalowSGlevelsignal;andc.TheCCWheatexchangerswithin22.4minutesfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheSWsystem,inconjunctionwiththeCCMSystem,canalsocooltheplantfromresidualheatremoval(RHR)entryconditions(T.,<350F)toMODE5(T.,<200F)duringnormaloperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350F,to200FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRSystemtrains.thatareoperating.SinceSWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,a.passivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsinfailingtheSWSystemtopotentiallymultiplesafetyrelatedfunctions.TheSWsystemhasbeenevaluatedtodemonstratethecapabilitytomeetcoolingneedswithanassumed500galleak.TheSMSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofSWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAFMSystems)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).ThetemperatureofthefluidsuppliedbytheSWSystemisalsoa.considerationintheaccidentanalyses.IfthecoolingwatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfancoolersandCCWheatexchangersistoowarm,theaccidentanalyseswithrespecttocontainmentpressureresponsefollowingaSLBandthecontainmentsumpfluidtemperaturefollowingaLOCAmaynolongerbebounding.Ifthecoolingwatersupplyistoocold,thecontainmentheatremovalsystemsmaybemoreefficientthanassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thiscausesthebackpressureincontainmenttobereducedwhichpotentiallyresultsinincreasedpeakcladtemperatures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-57RevisionI rr7ToCireuiatmgSVatcrPumpsAndTravellingScreens3rDt/)Cc3~GJtrtJ~4609StVPumpA~47309rSWPumpB46024606IIX46124613StVPumpCIprI202SIS'tVPumpD604460Legend:~StVPumpTrain(onepumpl'romeachclcctricatvainfaired)--~SWLoopHeaderToSlpumps(LCD3')andSafetyRelatedPumpRoomCoolers4623413941394640tToMotor&vanAFWPumps(LCD3.78)II4'7334790ToSlpumps(LCO382)andSafetyRelatedPumpRoomCoolersII4663P~ToNonSafetys~610i~l~ReiatedLoadsI(StationAir)LIToDirectM&0Ih4667(LCD3.g.l)III$4559IIIIToDieselcj~WOcncratorB(LCO3.S.I)466SBToSAFWPumpCToCCWHXAandSAFWRootn(LCO3.7.7)andCoolerA(LCO3.7S)SpentFuelPoolHXAA4N27h~4133IN26AIIsIIIIh.A4616IIIIIt$4670ToSAFWpumpDand.SAFWRoomCoo!caB9d27B47799626BIs0-P'473446ISToCCtVHXB(LCD3.7.7)andSpentFociPoolHXBToHonSafetyRclatcdLoads(thCom>>store)IIToTDAFWPump(LCD3.73)IIIIIToCRFCUnitA0.CO3.tL6)IIIIToCRFCUnitB(LCO35.6)"------.MwIIIIIIg4736IIIIg4639IIToCRFCsUnitC(LCO366)IIIToCRFCsUnitD(LCD3.6.6)Ir-MIIIIIIII4663eIDP4733yToXonSafetyRcbtcdLoads(Killers)CQLhtas<~th~rDCO6Forillustrationonly II ACSources-HODES.1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)DGLoadDGATime480VsafeguardsbusesandCSpumps10SIpumpAand'B10SIpumpC15Residualheatremovalpump20Selectedservicewaterpump25Firstcontainmentrecirculatio'nfancooler30Secondcontainmentrecirculationfancooler35Hotor'rivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump40Thepumpsandfansareassumedtoberunningwithin5secondsfollowingbreakerclosure.DGBTime1010172227323742SincetheDGsmuststartandbeginloadingwithin10seconds,onlyoneairstartmustbeavailableintheairreceiversasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThelongtermoperationoftheDGs(untiloffsitepowerisrestored)isdiscussedinLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil."TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3ofNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandseparateandindependentDGsforeachtrainensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.AnOPERABLEqualifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe,480VsafeguardsbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSubsystems-HODES1,2,3,and4."Powerfromeitheroffsitepowercircuit751or767satisfiesthisrequirement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-7Revision1 BASESACSources&ODES1,2,3,and483.8.1LCO'continued)ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:'a~TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;(c'ontinued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.8-7aRevision1 ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESLCO(continued)b.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,CCWpump,andCSpumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal);C.TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervalsfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);d.TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfora1hourat110/designloads;e.ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andf.AventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.g.Theservicewater(SW)~pthroughthedieselgeneratorheatexchangersis<31psidwithtwoSWpumpsoperatingand<44psidwiththreeSWpumpsoperating.TheACsourcesinonetrainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,separationandindependencemustbecompleteassumingasingleactivefailure.Fortheindependentoffsitepowersource,separationandindependencearetotheextentpractical(i.e.,operationispreferredinthe50/50mode,butmayalsoexistinthe100/0or0/100mode).APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-8Revision1 iACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABILITYa.Acceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolant(continued)pressureboundary,limitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-8aRevision1

\

ACSources-NODES5and6B3.8.2BASESLCO(continued)ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a~b.C.d.e.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelated'motorcontrolcenters,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pump,andcontainmentspray(CS)pumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentsafetyinje'ction(SI)andundervoltagesignal);TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsmanually.SincemostequipmentwhichreceivesaSIsignalareisolatedintheseMODESduetomaintenanceorlowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionconcerns,andtheDBAofconcern(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)wouldnotgenerateaSIsignal,manualloadingoftheDGswillmostlikelyberequired.TheseloadsmustbecapableofbeingaddedtotheOPERABLEDGwithin10minutes;TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilforz1hourat110%designloads;ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8;3,"DieselFuelOil");andAventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.g,Theservicewater(SW)~pthroughthedieselgeneratorheatexchangeris<31psidwithtwoSWpumpsoperatingand<44psidwiththreeSWpumpsoperating.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-27(continued)Revision1

Til4100VBUS12A4180VBUS12B)STATIONSERViCETRANSFORMEANO.IaSTATIONSERVICE'TRANSFORMERNO.18480VBUSIaDQAT.S.C.VITALBAiTEAYDQBBUS18TlCO(DCO4JCJ1ODIIBATTERYiiiCHARGEIIAIIMCCCBATIEAYCHARGERIADIST.PANELAINVERT.A125.VBATTERYARISECABINETAABAiT.OISCON.iSWITCHiBBAiT.T.S.C.DISCOH.BATTEAYDISCONNECTSWITCHT.S.C.125VVITALBATT.BATTERYMANUALBTHAOWOVERSWITCHFUSECABINETBBATTERYCHARGEA1BDIST.PANELBINVERTSBIBATTERYCHARGER1S1IMCCBMCCAEM&.INSTILTRANSFORMEA78KVA120VOLTAUTOSTATICTRANSFERA7.5KVA110VOLTCONST.VOLTAGE1RINSFDAMEIIA)AUTOLSTAilCTRANSFERB7SKVA110VOLTCONST.VOLTAGETRANSFORMERBIDOINSTR.BUSA+NORMAILYOPEHWHENTavy>>200FINSTR.BUSeDCSOUACEtDCDIST.SYSTEMSga'DCELEC.POWERSOURCESINSTR.BUSCINSTTLBUSDINST>>BUSPOWERSOURCESGJguCOCL DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)LCOVariouscombinationsofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,trainswithinthesesubsystems,andequipmentandcomponentswithin.thesetrainsarerequiredOPERABLEbyotherLCOs,dependingonthespecificplantcondition.ImplicitinthoserequirementsistherequiredOPERABILITYofnecessarysupportfeatu}es.ThisLCOexplicitlyrequiresenergizationoftheportionsof.theelectricaldistributionsystemnecessarytosupportOPERABILITYofrequiredsystems,equipment,andcomponents-allspecificallyaddressedineachLCOandimplicitlyrequiredviathedefinitionofOPERABILITY.TheLCOswhichapplywhentheReactorCoolantSystemiss200'Fandwhichmayrequireasourceofelectricalpowerare:LCO3.1.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.12LCO3.7.9LCO3.9.2LCO3.9.4LCO3.9.5SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationControlRoomEmer'gencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsfilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)NuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel.<23FtMaintainingthenecessarytrainsoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsenergizedensurestheavailabilityofsufficientpowertooperatetheplantinasafemannertomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-86Revision3 l1 DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESLCO(continued)Bus-tiebreakersrequiredtobeopenduringMODES1,2,3,and4perSR3.8.9.1maybeclosedduringMODES5and6providedthatthedistributionsystemalignmentcontinues.to'-supportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsassumingeitheralossofalloffsitepower,lossofallonsiteDGpower,oraworstcasesinglefailure.ThepostulatedeventsduringMODES5and6includeaborondilutioneventandfuelhandlingaccident.Examplesofallowedconfigurationsareasfollows(notethatotherconfigurationsareacceptableprovidedthattheymeettheabovecriteria):'a~b.Bus-TieBreakers16-15.and14-13(andtheirassociated"dummy"breakersonnon-safeguardsBuses13and15)providethecapabilitytocross-tiethesafeguardsandnon-safeguards480Vbuses.Closureofthesebus-tiesisallowedprovidedthattheOPERABLEDGperLCO3.8.2canacceptallloadswhichwouldbeautomaticallyloadedfromthesafeguardsandnon-safeguardsbuses,andacceptthoseloadswhichmustbemanuallyloadedtomitigatetheaccident.Bus-TieBreakers14-16,16-14,and17-18providethecapabilitytocross-tiethetwosafeguardelectricaltrains.Closureofthesebus-tiesisallowedprovidedthattheOPERABLEDGperLCO3.8.2canacceptallloadswhichwouldbeautomaticallyloaded,andacceptthoseloadswhichmustbemanuallyloadedtomitigatetheaccident.Inaddition,theautomatictriplogicofthebus-tiesduetoanundervoltagesignalfromeitherofthetwocross-tiedbusesmustbeOPERABLE.Thistriplogicensuresthatuponafaultofeither480Vsafeguardsbusasthesinglefailure,theredundantbusiscapableofmitigatingtheaccidentusingeithertheDGoroffsitepower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-87(continued)Revision3 DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedeventandmaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.lAlthoughredundantrequiredfeaturesmayrequireredundanttrainsofelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeOPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemtrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesassociatedwithaninoperabledistributionsubsystemortraininoperable,appropriaterestrictionsareimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5Withoneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsortrainsinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingp'ositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionor'ormalco'oldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures.(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-88Revision3 DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredAC,OC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.InadditiontoperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,A.23,andA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5requiresdeclaringRHRinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHRactions.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-89(continued)Revision3

'i0 DistributionSystems-NODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.10.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheelectricalpowerdistributiontrainsarefunctioningproperly,withalltherequiredpowersour'cecircuitbreakersclosed,requiredtie-breakersopen,andtherequiredbusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisz420VAC,fortheDCpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystema108.6VDC,andforACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisbetween113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4.VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccountthecapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectrical.powerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-90Revision3 NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOrequirestwosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsbeOPERABLEtoensureredundantmonitoringcapabilityisavailabletodetectchangesincorereactivity.Tobe'PERABLE,eachmonitormustprovidevisualindicationandatleastoneofthetwomonitorsmustprovideanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroom.Miththedischargeoffuelfromcorepositionsadjacenttosourcerangedetectorlocations,countsdecreasingtozeroistheexpectedresponse.Basedonthisindicationalone,sourcerangedetectionshouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.Followingafullcoredischarge,sourcerangeresponseisverifiedwiththeinitialfuelassembliesreloaded.APPLICABILITYInMODE6,thesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsmustbeOPERABLEtodeterminechangesincorereactivity.TherearenootherdirectmeansavailabletocheckcorereactivityconditionsinthisMODE.InMODES2,3,4,and5,thesesameinstalledsource'rangedetectorsandcircuitryarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACTIONSA.landA.2MithonlyonesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorOPERABLE,redundancyhasbeenlost.Sincetheseinstrumentsaretheonlydirectmeansofmonitoringcorereactivityconditions,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.landA.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition(i.e.,otherthannormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-7Revision1

\\0 iepNuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2MithnosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorOPERABLEtherearenodirectmeansofdetectingchangesincovereactivity.Therefore,actionstorestoreamonitortoOPERABLEstatusshallbeinitiatedimmedi'atelyandcontinueuntilasourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-7aRevisionI NuclearInstrumentation83.9.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.2.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECK,whichisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononemonitortoasimilarparameteronanothermonitor.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatthetwoindicationchannelsshouldbeconsistentwithcoreconditions.Changesinfuelloadingandcoregeometrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesbetweensourcerangemonitors,buteachmonitorshouldbeconsistentwithitslocalconditions.TheinoperabilityofonesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelpreventsperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKfortheoperablechannel.However,theRequiredActionsfortheinoperablechannelrequiressuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsuchthattheCHANNELCHECKoftheoperablechannelcanconsistofensuringconsistencywithknowncoreconditions.TheFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeCHANNELCHECKFrequencyspecifiedsimilarlyforthesameinstrumentsinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."SR3.9.2.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedata.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillance.unde}theconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,.Section7.7.3.2.2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC13and19,IssuedforCommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-9FRevision1 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsBASESBACKGROUNDDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,areleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfrom.escapingtotheenvironmentwhentheLCOrequirementsaremet.InMODESI,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplishedbymaintainingcontainmentOPERABLEasdescribedinLCO3.6.1,"Containment."InMODE5,therearenoaccidentsofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.-InMODE6,thepotentialforcontainmentpressurizationasaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore,requirementstoisolatethecontainmentfromtheoutsideatmospherecanbelessstringent.TheLCOrequirementsarereferredtoas"containmentclosure"ratherthan"containmentOPERABILITY."Containmentclosuremeansthatallpotentialescapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.Thecontainmentservestocontainfissionproductradioactivitythatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowinganaccident,suchthatoffsiteradiationexposuresaremaintainedwithintherequirementsof'10CFR100.Additionally,thecontainmentprovidesradiationshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentequipmenthatch,whichispartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,providesa=meansformovinglargeequipmentandcomponentsintoandoutofcontainment.DuringCOREALTERATIONSorm'ovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,theequipmenthatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineeringpracticedictatesthat.aminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipmenthatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximatelyequallyspaced.Asanalternative,theequipmenthatchopeningcanbeisolatedbyaclosureplatethatrestrictsairflowfromcontainmentorbyaninstalledrollupdoorandenclosurebuilding.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-l0Revision2 ContainmentPenetrations83.9.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontainmentequipmentandpersonnelairlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,provideameansforpersonnelaccessduringMODESI,2,3,and4inaccordancewithLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.ThedoorsarenormallyinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopeningwhencontainmentOPERABILITYisrequired.Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainmentclosureisnotrequired,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,containmentclosureisrequired;therefore,thedoorinterlockmechanismmayremaindisabled,butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnelandequipmenthatch(unlesstheequipmenthatchisisolatedbyaclosureplateortherollupdoorandassociatedenclosurebuilding).Therequirementsforcontainmentpenetrationclosureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironment.Theclosurerestrictionsaresufficienttorestrictfissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.TheContainmentPurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetrationanda36inchexhaustpenetration.Thesecondsubsystem,aMini-PurgeSystem,includesa6inchpurgepenetrationanda6inchexhaustpenetration.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaustpenetrationsareisolatedbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessaryboundary.Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purgepenetrationscanbeopenedintermittently,butareclosedautomaticallybytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationSystem.NeitherofthesubsystemsissubjecttoaSpecificationinMODE5.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11Revision2 e

ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainmentbylimitingthepotentialescapepathsforfissionproductradioactivityreleasedwithincontainment.TheLCOrequiresanypenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheretobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations.FortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations,thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrationsis'solablebytheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITYThecontainmentpenetration'equirementsareapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentbecausethisiswhenthereisapotentialforafuelhandlingaccident.InMODESI,2,3,and4,containmentpenetrationrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.InMODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.arenotbeingconducted,thepotentialforafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore,undertheseconditions,norequirementsareplacedoncontainmentpenetrationstatus.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthecontainmentequipmenthatch(oritsclosureplateorro11updoorandassociatedenclosurebuilding),airlockdoors,orany'ontainmentpenetrationthatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereisnotintherequiredstatus,includingtheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystemnotcapableofautomaticactuationwhenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinaconditionwheretheisolationfunctionisnotneeded.ThisisaccomplishedbyimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Performanceoftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.'.E.GinnaNuclealPowerPlantB3.9-13(continued)Revision2 CW'PI

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