IR 05000400/2025004
| ML26020A041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/2026 |
| From: | Matthew Fannon NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB2 |
| To: | Joseph C Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26020A041 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2025004
Dear Carolyne Joseph:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. On January 14, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
January 22, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000400
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0020
Licensee:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant
Location:
New Hill, NC
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer
P. Boguszewski, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Kay, Resident Inspector
K. Kirchbaum, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Matthew S. Fannon, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Evaluate Main Steam PORV Hydraulic Fluid Temperature Limits
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent
Process
A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was
identified when the licensee failed to provide design control measures to maintain the main
steam (MS) power operated relief valve (PORV) operable. Specifically, the licensee failed to
include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and
incorporated into design documents. The licensee did not control deviations from those
standards when they failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS PORV actuator
hydraulic fluid prior to using temporary heaters to keep the fluid warm. This resulted in
exceeding the temperature limits of the hydraulic fluid and the C MS PORV failing to stroke
open during surveillance testing on June 10, 2025.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On October 3, 2025, Unit 1 was
shutdown for a planned refueling outage. After completion of the refueling outage, operators
commenced reactor startup on November 2, 2025. Unit 1 was returned to rated thermal power
on November 5, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the
inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,
Appendix DProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 2515,</br></br>Appendix D" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1)
Spent fuel pool cooling system after core offload while 'B' safety bus was out of
service on October 17, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
high head safety injection system on December 3, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
Reactor auxiliary building steam tunnel on October 2, 2025
(2)
Reactor containment building 221' and 236' elevations on October 8, 2025
(3)
Reactor containment building 261' and 286' elevations on October 8, 2025
(4)
'A' and 'B' 6.9kV switchgear rooms on December 16, 2025
(5)
Reactor auxiliary building 324' elevation on December 19, 2025
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be
administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's
Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the
individual operating examinations, and the crew simulator operating examinations in
accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed
Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in
Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
(1)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure
rates for the requalification annual operating exam completed on December 18, 2025.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
(1)
Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification
written examination completed on March 8, 2024.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification
operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering
requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility
licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training
objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination
material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the
licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who
did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators
met the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room
simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2
Samples)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during a reactor shutdown for a planned refueling outage on October 3, 2025.
(2)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during reactor startup on November 1, 2025.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)
Elevated risk due to lowered inventory during refueling outage on October 6, 2025
(2)
Elevated risk due to 'B' safety bus outage during refueling outage on October 10,
2025
(3)
Elevated risk due to lowered inventory for reactor vessel head reinstall during
refueling outage on October 23, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
Refueling water storage tank header pipe broken variable spring support (Nuclear
Condition Report (NCR) 2571834) on December 3, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1
Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)
Engineering Change 420531, 'B' startup transformer replacement on October 14,
2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage H1R26 activities from October 3, 2025, to
November 1, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system
operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)
OST-1815, "Remote Shutdown: Test of Interposing MDR Relays Primary and Backup
Fuses," following transfer auxiliary relay TRA-1/1746 replacement on October 19,
2025
(2)
OST-1100, "Emergency Safeguards Sequencer 1B-SB Response Time Test,"
following maintenance on October 21, 2025
(3)
OST-1043, "Reactor Coolant System Vent Path Operability," following maintenance
on 1RC-905 on October 27, 2025
(4)
LP-L-0926, "Accumulator Tank B Level," following replacement of 'B' cold leg
accumulator level transmitter on December 15, 2025
(5)
OST-1824, "1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test," following multiple
relay replacements in the 'B' sequencer on December 19, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
LP-P-2001A/B, "Feedwater to Steam Generator A Pressure," loop calibration on
October 24, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
1ED-161, reactor coolant drain tank hydrogen supply and vent, local leak rate testing
during refueling outage on October 14, 2025
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
related to the following issues:
(1)
'C' Main Steam power operated relief valve (PORV) failure to stroke during
surveillance testing (NCR 02557590) on December 10, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential
trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Evaluate Main Steam PORV Hydraulic Fluid Temperature Limits
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent
Process
A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control,
was identified when the licensee failed to provide design control measures to maintain the
main steam (MS) power operated relief valve (PORV) operable. Specifically, the licensee
failed to include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and
incorporated into design documents. The licensee did not control deviations from those
standards when they failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS PORV actuator
hydraulic fluid prior to using temporary heaters to keep the fluid warm. This resulted in
exceeding the temperature limits of the hydraulic fluid and the C MS PORV failing to stroke
open during surveillance testing on June 10, 2025.
Description: Each main steam supply line is provided with one PORV, Harris has three main
steam lines and three associated MS PORVs. The safety-related MS PORVs are designed to
remove heat from the nuclear steam supply system when the main steam isolation valves are
closed. Additionally, in the event of a ruptured steam generator, the MS PORVs can be used
to depressurize the reactor coolant system so that residual heat removal can be placed in
service.
During routine surveillance testing in June 2025, the C MS PORV failed to stroke open when
the output was raised to 100% from the control room. Operations declared the C MS PORV
inoperable and commenced troubleshooting. Two solenoid valves, two pilot operated check
valves and one dual pilot check valve that are internal to the hydraulic actuator were
examined by the vendor. The vendor identified each solenoid valve had a varnished surface
and was sticky to the touch. The two solenoid valves identified as varnished are modulating
valves which permit movement of pressurized hydraulic fluid during operation which provides
a mode of force for the MS PORV to open or close. The vendor attributed the failure of the
solenoid valves to the varnished surface likely caused by overheating. A review of quarterly
maintenance on the PORVs identified that in January of 2025, as a result of temporary heater
installation, the C MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid was subjected to 160 degrees F, which
is the maximum recommended operating temperature for the fluid. Due to being further away
from the heaters, the A and B MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid temperature were
recorded to be 100 degrees F.
The temporary heaters were previously installed near the MS PORV actuators in April 2024
while Harris Unit 1 was in a refueling outage. During a refueling outage there is no steam in
the main steam lines and therefore the steam tunnel experiences colder temperatures. Based
on previous issues with MS PORV operations during outages, the vendor recommended
keeping the actuator hydraulic fluid temperature above 70 degrees. This was being
accomplished with the use of temporary heaters. The heaters were installed using licensee
procedure AP-301 Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring, but there is no record
(work request or work order) that controlled installation of the heaters. The licensee placed
the unit online on May 12, 2024. However, the heaters remained powered and unmonitored.
This resulted in the uncontrolled addition of heat to the MS PORV hydraulic fluid ultimately
resulting in the C MS PORV failing to stroke open from the main control room on June 10,
2025.
Per licensee procedure AP-301, drawing/checklist 7-S-5917, Seasonal HVAC Equipment
Installations, should have been completed prior to installing the temporary heaters. The
licensee failed to complete the checklist, which would provide guidance on whether
installation of temporary heater warrants an Engineering Change product. Duke Energy
performed a causal evaluation and determined that licensee procedure AP-301 and drawing
7-S-5917 were inadequate to ensure evaluation of the temperature impacts on components
are evaluated prior to placement of temporary heaters.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program,
performed corrective actions to restore operability of the C MS PORV which included a
complete actuator replacement during the most recent refueling outage in October 2025, and
completed a causal evaluation. The licensee also established administrative limits for the total
acid number based on vendor recommendation which is an indicator of the potential for
varnish formation on internal components. The licensee has planned corrective actions to
revise AP-301 and drawing 7-S-9517 to ensure that potential temperature impacts on
components (including internal fluids and environmental quality temperature impacts) are
evaluated prior to use of temporary heaters. Additionally, the licensee plans to revise the
vendor manual and preventive maintenance procedure for the MS PORV actuators to include
more detailed tracking of MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid health.
Corrective Action References: NCR 02557590
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provide
design control measures for installation of temporary heaters to maintain the MS PORV
actuators operable was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to
foresee and correct.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS
PORV hydraulic fluid prior to the placement of temporary heaters. This affected the
availability and reliability of the MS PORVs.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
Appendix AProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 0609</br></br>Appendix A" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. The inspectors
determined a detailed risk evaluation (DRE) was required. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst
(SRA) performed a DRE using SAPHIRE 8 Version 8.2.11 and the Harris SPAR Model
Version 8.83 dated September 21, 2023. The exposure time was considered to be T/2 since
the last successful valve opening test was completed on December 5, 2024, and the date of
the failed test occurred on June 10, 2025 (188 days/2), plus repair time until June 30, 2025,
when the PORV was returned to service. This is a total of 114 days. The SRA modelled the
condition by setting MSS-ARV-CC-MS62 SG 1C PORV MS-62 FAILS TO OPEN, to TRUE.
The dominant accident sequence was a steam generator tube rupture, with a failure of
auxiliary feedwater, main feedwater, and a failure of operators to isolate the affected steam
generator. The change in core damage frequency was less than 1 E-6 corresponding to a
finding of very low safety significance (GREEN).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic
approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the
licensee failed to follow procedure AP-301 and subsequently drawing 7-S-9517 to evaluate
the impact of temporary heaters on the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid. An upper
temperature limit was not established due to inadequate control of temporary heaters.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states in part that
measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the
design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those
structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated
into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include
provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design
documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. Measures shall also be
established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts,
equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures,
systems and components.
Contrary to the above, from April 2024 to June 2025, the licensee failed to assure that
appropriate quality standards related to the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid were specified
and that any deviations are controlled.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On January 14, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
Carolyne Joseph and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial licensed operator
requalification inspection results to Kevin O'Brien, Training Manager, and other members
of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NCR 2577396
Corrective Action
Documents
20296239
20296240
20753755
20296243
20296240
5-S-0550
Simplified Flow Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 1
Revision 18
5-S-1304
Simplified Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control
System Sheet 2
Revision 14
5-S-1305
Simplified Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control
System Unit 1
Revision 30
5-S-1308
Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System
Revision 12
5-S-1309
Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Sheet 2
Unit 1
Revision 21
5-S-1310
Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Sheet 3
Unit 1
Revision 14
Drawings
5-S-1324
Simplified Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
Unit 1
Revision 12
Procedures
Safety Injection
Revision 53
CSD-HNP-PFP-
Containment Building Pre-Fire Plan
Revision 0
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-261
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 261 Pre-Fire-Plan
Revision 4
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-286
Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 Pre-Fire Plan
Revision 4
Procedures
CSD-HNP-PFP-
RAB-305-324
Reactor Building Elevations 305 and 324 Pre-Fire Plan
Revision 6
Drawings
TK-1-261-1-CT-
H-201
5/D
Procedures
Containment Spray System
Revision 19
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5-S-1309
Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System
Revision 23
6-B-401 Sheet
1148
Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1B-SB
Revision 14
6-B-401 Sheet
1165
Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1B-SB Sh. 20
Revision 15
6-B-401 Sheet
1750
Emergency Diesel Generator 1B-SB Breaker 126SB Sh. 2
Revision 12
6-B-401 Sheet
1752
6.9 KV Emer Bus 1B-SB to Aux Bus 1E Tie BKR 125 SB Sh.
Revision 11
6-B-401 Sheet
2008
Diesel Generator 1B-SB Engine Control Sh. 1
Revision 15
6-B-401 Sheet
2304
ESW Aux Reservoir Bay No. Traveling Screen 1B-SB
Revision 13
Drawings
6-B-401 Sheet
3290
Emer Service Water Intake Structure Elec Equipment Room
Supply Fan AH-86(1B-SB)
Revision 13
Engineering
Changes
Accumulator Transmitter Upgrade to Rosemount
Revision 12
EST-212
Type C Local Leak Rate Tests
Revision 6
Procedures
Accumulator Tank B Level
Revision 8
Work Orders
20681859
NCR 2557590
Corrective Action
Documents
NCRs 2505389
2505381 2512233
2512232 2518442
2526518 2547223
2537547
5-S-0542
Simplified Flow Diagram Main Steam System Unit 1
Revision 28
Drawings
7-S-9517
Seasonal HVAC Equipment Installations
Revision 3
Miscellaneous
VM-OSO
Operators
Revision 22
AD-MN-ALL-0800
Temporary Power
Revision 3
AP-301
Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring
Revision 89
Main Steam, Extraction Steam, and Steam Dump Systems
Revision 45
Procedures
OST-1191
Steam Generator PORV and Block Valve Operability Test
Revision 33