ML21096A028

From kanterella
Revision as of 22:09, 17 April 2023 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
RB-2021-02 Final Written Exam
ML21096A028
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/19/2021
From: Greg Werner
Operations Branch IV
To:
Entergy Operations
References
Download: ML21096A028 (352)


Text

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 203000 (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI) RHR/LPCI: Tier 2 Injection Mode Group # 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.03 following on the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION Rating 3.2 MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC); and (b) based Revisio on those predictions, use procedures to n correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal 1 conditions or operations:

A2.03 Valve closures Revision Statement:

Reordered the distractors in a logical order.

Question: 1 Initial Conditions: MODE 2 Reactor Pressure is 400 psig An Inadvertent LPCS/RHR DIV 1 INITIATION has occurred.

AOP-34, INADVERTENT INITIATION OF AN ECCS OR RCIC, has been entered.

NOTE: Refer to the pictures below (1) Which combination of indications would be seen AFTER the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) A system is secured?

(2) What action should the Unit Operator take FIRST when securing the RHR A system?

(A) (B) (C) (D)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination (1) (2)

A. A and C Stop RHR Pump A B. A and D Close LPCI A INJ Valve C. B and C Stop RHR Pump A D. B and D Close LPCI A INJ Valve Answer: B Explanation:

AOP-34 states the following:

The injection valve must be closed first to prevent a low pressure condition in the injection line.

Overriding the injection valve will bring the amber light indication.

Stopping the Pump will ONLY result in a green light indication, the amber light is only for trip condition.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct light indication for E12-F042A but not for E12-PC002A RHR Pump A.

Stopping the pump is not the first action to take.

B. Correct Answer C. The amber light will be lit on E12-F042A, and not E12-PC002A RHR Pump A D. The light combination is correct but stopping the E12-PC002A RHR Pump A is not correct.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to predict the impacts of the valve closures on the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE; and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0204 AOP-34 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0204 Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 205000 (SF4 SCS) Shutdown Cooling Tier 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Group # 1 malfunction of the following will have on K/A K6.02 the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR Rating 2.7 SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE): Revisio K6.02 D.C. electrical power 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 2 Initial Conditions: MODE 4 RHR A is operating in Shutdown Cooling mode Shutdown Cooling Protection Plan has NOT been implemented ENS-SWG1A has lost 125 VDC Control Power.

In this condition, how would the RHR A System respond to a Level 3 Isolation signal?

NOTE: E12-F008, RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING OUTBD ISOL VALVE E12-F009, RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING INBD ISOL VALVE E12-F008 E12-F009 RHR A Pump A. Open Open Operating B. Close Close Operating C. Open Open Tripped D. Close Close Tripped Answer: B Explanation:

Without the Shutdown Cooling Protection implemented, both isolation valves (F008 and F009) have power and will close on an isolation signal. The loss of DC electrical power to the ENS-SWG1A will result in NO remote or automatic functions for the breakers on that bus. The isolation logic will still have power and so will the isolation valves. Loss of suction path is a trip for RHR A, but without control power to the trip coil the Pump will not trip.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Both isolation valves close with an isolation signal present. The Pump will remain operating.

B. Correct Answer C. Both isolation valves close with an isolation signal present. The Pump will remain operating because of the loss of control power.

D. Both isolation valves close with an isolation signal present. The Pump will remain operating because of the loss of control power K/A Match The applicant must have the knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of D.C.

electrical power will have on the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE).

Technical

References:

SOP-31, RHR System R-STM-0204 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0204 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 205000 (SF4 SCS) Shutdown Cooling Tier 2 Ability to manually operate and/or Group # 1 monitor in the control room: K/A A4.06 A4.06 Reactor water level Rating 3.8 Revisio 2

n Revision Statement: (1)Modified the stem of the question, and changed answer and all distractors. The applicant must identify which level instrumentation to monitor as opposed to identifying which vessel internal corresponds to a RPV level.

(2) Remove above the steam separators from the stem.

Question: 3 Initial Conditions: MODE 4 RHR A is operating in Shutdown Cooling mode NO Recirc Pumps are operating Reactor Water Level is 36 inches An Inadvertent Isolation of RHR A Shutdown Cooling has occurred and the Main Control Room (MCR) has entered AOP-51, LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL.

RPV water level should be maintained greater than the minimum natural circulation level of 75 inches using ____ Range Level Instrumentation IAW AOP-51.

A. Wide B. Narrow C. Fuel Zone D. Shutdown Answer: D Explanation:

From the question stem, forced circulation is lost and natural circulation is required to prevent inadvertent pressurization:

From AOP-51, LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination TOP OF THE STEAM SEPARATORS This question requires the applicant to know what RPV level corresponds to the top of the steam separators. The applicant may confuse the natural circulation water level of 45 inches given in EOP-1 with 75 inches given in AOP-51. Nothing in the stem of the question has implied entry into EOP-1.

Distracters:

A. Plausible, applicant may confuse natural circulation above the steam separators to be 45 inches and not 75 inches. Wide range goes to 60 inches.

B. See A.

C. The applicant fuel zones range goes above 75 inches.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to manually operate and/or monitor Reactor water level in the control room.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

AOP-51 R-STM-51 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0543 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 209001 (SF2, SF4 LPCS) Low-Pressure Tier 2 Core Spray Group # 1 G2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal K/A G2.4.4 indications for system operating Rating 4.5 parameters that are entry-level conditions Revisio for emergency and abnormal operating n 1 procedures.

Revision Statement:

Added information in the explanation about Shutdown Margin Question: 4 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A Large Break Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) has occurred.

ALL Control Rods have been fully inserted EXCEPT Control Rod 40-17.

The following parameters currently exist for the Low Pressure Core System (LPCS):

(1) Which Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) is being used to control Reactor parameters?

(2) Based on the indications, what is the approximate Reactor Pressure?

(1) (2)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. EOP-1, RPV CONTROL 280 psig B. EOP-1, RPV CONTROL 480 psig C. EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS 280 psig D. EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS 480 psig Answer: A Explanation:

Entry into EOP-1 would occur due a Level 3.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN(as defined in the definition section of TS): All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.(Knowledge of this definition was cover in GFE training. 292002 Neutron Life Cycle K1.10)

First Override from EOP-1 to decide if the Reactor is shut down. One Control Rod did not insert but SHUTDOWN MARGIN is met thus transferring to EOP1A is not required.

LPCS is indicating a flowrate greater than 5000 gpm which it is required to do at 282 psid per TS. Shutoff Head of LPCS is 497 psig. At 480 psig, LPCS flowrate would be very low.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The EOP entry is correct, but LPCS flow rate would be very low at 480 psig C. Wrong EOP entry. The applicant may think entry into EOP-1A is appropriate due one Control Rod not inserting.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination D. Wrong EOP entry. The applicant may think entry into EOP-1A is appropriate due one Control Rod not inserting.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

Technical

References:

EOP-1 EOP-1A TSG-0001 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-OPS-HLO-513 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 209002 (SF2, SF4 HPCS) High-Pressure Tier 2 Core Spray Group # 1 Knowledge of the operational K/A K5.02 implications of the following concepts as Rating 2.6 they apply to HIGH PRESSURE CORE Revisio SPRAY SYSTEM (HPCS): n K5.02 Heat removal (transfer) mechanism: 0 BWR-5,6 Revision Statement:

Question: 5 (1) What heat transfer mechanism(s) is/are utilized by the High Pressure Core System (HPCS) to achieve adequate core cooling following a Large Break LOCA?

(2) What is the peak cladding temperature that the HPCS system is designed to prevent exceeding IAW 10 CFR 50.46, Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors?

Announced to the Class not to get hung up on leak size it is a large break LOCA during administration (1) (2)

A. Spray Flow ONLY 1500°F B. Spray Flow ONLY 2200°F C. Spray Flow and Submergence 1500°F D. Spray Flow and Submergence 2200°F Answer: D Explanation:

From EOP Bases:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination From R-STM-0203:

Distracters:

A. Applicant may think that Spray Flow is the only heat transfer mechanism removing heat by not taking into account the 2/3 submergence.

B. Applicant may think that Spray Flow is the only heat transfer mechanism removing heat by not taking into account the 2/3 submergence.

C. 1500°F is a plausible temperature because it is mentioned in the HPCS STM and its the temperature associated with Steam Cooling with injection.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must possess knowledge of the operational implications of the heat removal (transfer) mechanism as they apply to HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM (HPCS).

Technical

References:

EOP BASES R-STM-0203 10 CFR 50.46 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0203 Obj.1 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 209002 (SF2, SF4 HPCS) High-Pressure Tier 2 Core Spray Group # 1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes K/A A1.01 in parameters associated with operating Rating 3.6 the HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY Revisio SYSTEM (HPCS) controls including: n 0 A1.01 HPCS flow: BWR-5,6 Revision Statement:

Question: 6 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power STP-203-6305 HPCS QUARTERLY PUMP AND VALVE TEST in progress E22-MOVF012, Suppression Pool Min Flow Bypass Vlv, will begin closing when indicated flow rises above ______ gpm after the HPCS pump is started.

A. 300 B. 750 C. 875 D. 1100 Answer: B Explanation:

Per R-STM-203, HPCS System,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. 300 psig is the pressure requirement for opening the HPCS Min Flow Bypass Valve.

B. Correct Answer C. 875 gpm is the flow requirement to open the RHR Min Flow Valve.

D. 1100 gpm is the flow requirement to open the LPCS Min Flow Valve.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to predict and/or monitor changes in system flow associated with operating the HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM (HPCS).

Specifically the applicant must be able to predict based on system flow when to monitor a change in status of the HPCS Min Flow Bypass Valve.

Technical

References:

R-STM-203, HPCS System R-STM-204, RHR System R-STM-205, LPCS System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0203 Obj.2 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 211000 (SF1 SLCS) Standby Liquid Tier 2 Control Group # 1 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or K/A K6.03 malfunction of the following will have on Rating 3.2 the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL Revisio SYSTEM: n 1 K6.03 A.C Power Revision Statement:

Change the question to ask the applicant more directly the result of a power loss. Removed picture.

Question: 7 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power EHS-MCC2A has lost power.

In this condition, initiating Standby Liquid Control (SLC) A would result in SLC Pump A

_(1)_ and Squib Valve A _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. Running Firing B. Running Not Firing C. Not Running Firing D. Not Running Not Firing Answer: D Explanation:

From R-STM-0201:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Applicant may confuse the power supply to SLC Pump with EJS-SWG1A instead of EHS-MCC1A. Most all major pumps are powered from switchgears instead motor control centers. The applicant may also know that the Squib vale receives power from the pump breaker.

B. Applicant may confuse the power supply to SLC Pump with EJS-SWG1A instead of EHS-MCC1A. Most all major pumps are powered from switchgears instead motor control centers. The applicant may think that the squib valve receive power from a different source independent of EHS-MCCA. SCM-PNL01A provides power to the continuity circuit of the squib valve.

C. See A and B D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of A.C Power will have on the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0201 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-STM-0201 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 211000 (SF1 SLCS) Standby Liquid Tier 2 Control Group # 1 G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute K/A G2.1.20 procedure steps. Rating 4.6 Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 8 An Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) has occurred.

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) has directed that Boron Injection is Required to achieve HOT SHUTDOWN IAW EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS.

The Unit Operator should start _(1)_ SLC Pump(s) and inject a MINIMUM of _(2)_

gallons.

(1) (2)

A. One 672 B. One 1,505 C. Both 672

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination D. Both 1,505 Answer: A Explanation:

From EOP-1A:

Reading SLC level from picture provided, the applicant should determine it reads 3500 gals. Hot Shutdown weight is the 74 lb column and Cold Shutdown weight is the 166 lb column. Using attachment 13 provided, the applicant should subtract 2828 gallons from 3500 gallons equaling 672 gallons.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The amount of SLC pumps used is correct, but not the amount of boron injected. That value correlates to the Cold Shutdown weight.

C. The incorrect amount of SLC pumps used.

D. See C and D K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to interpret and execute procedure steps associated with the Standby Liquid Control system.

Technical

References:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination EOP-1A OSP-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

OSP-53 Attachment 13 page 2 Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-STM-0201 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 212000 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection Tier 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Group # 1 malfunction of the REACTOR K/A K3.11 PROTECTION SYSTEM will have on Rating 3.0 following: Revisio K3.11 Recirculation system 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 9 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Which of the following annunciators would come in due to a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) B?

(A) (B) (C)

A. A and C B. A and B C. B and C D. A, B, and C Answer: A Explanation:

A loss of RPS B would cause all BOP Inboard Isolation valves to close. CCP Inboard valves would close, thus isolating flow to the Recirc Pumps in the Drywell. Seal Cooling alarm and winding cooling alarm would come as a result. Seal Staging water flow will still be supplied by the CRD system.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Seal Staging water would still be supplied by the CRD system.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination C. Seal Staging water would still be supplied by the CRD system D. Seal Staging water would still be supplied by the CRD system K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM will have on the Recirculation system.

Technical

References:

AOP-10 R-STM-0053 ARP-680-04 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-53 Obj.13 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #4 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 212000 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection Tier 2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of Group # 1 the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM K/A A3.06 including: Rating 4.2 A3.06 Main turbine trip Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 10 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power 5 SECONDS AFTER a Plant Transient has occurred, these are the following annunciators in alarm at the H13-P680 Panel:

NOTE: (NO OPERATOR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN)

What caused this Plant Transient?

A. Main Turbine Vibration exceeded 10 mils B. Reactor Water Level lowered below 9.7 inches.

C. Reactor Vessel Pressure exceeded 1094.7 psig D. Main Condenser Vacuum lowered below 22.3 in. Hg/Vac..

Answer: D

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Explanation:

A Turbine Trip (identified by the Turbine Stop Valve and Control Valve closure alarms) will cause an RPV high pressure Scram. The Scram will then cause a shrink event when all rods go in resulting in a Level 3 Scram signal. Low Main Condenser vacuum is a turbine trip signal. The question establishes a timeline for the events at 5 seconds. A Reactor Scram would eventually cause a turbine trip on reverse power, but that would take at least 2 minutes to occur to allow the turbine to coast down, Distracters:

A. This is a turbine trip signal, but it is disabled during normal operations and only enabled when rolling the turbine to 1800 rpm.

B. RPS Scram that is one of the alarms listed, but it would take about 2 minutes to result in a turbine trip.

C. RPS Scram that is one of the alarms listed, but it would take about 2 minutes to result in a turbine trip.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor automatic operations of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including Main turbine trip.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0508 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0508 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #4 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 215003 (SF7 IRM) Intermediate-Range Tier 2 Monitor Group # 1 Knowledge of the physical connections K/A K1.07 and/or cause-effect relationships between Rating 3.0 INTERMEDIATE RANGEMONITOR (IRM) Revisio SYSTEM and the following: n 1 K1.07 Reactor vessel Revision Statement:

Rewrote the question to add more information in the stem. Question is now a new question.

Question: 11 Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) detectors full in position is _(1)_ inches ABOVE the core and full out position is _(2)_ inches BELOW the core.

(1) (2)

A. 15 15 B. 15 30 C. 30 15 D. 30 30 Answer: B Explanation:

During a normal reactor startup, all IRM detectors are fully inserted into the reactor core (15 inches above core centerline) on Range 1. Once the APRM System is on scale above the APRM Downscale rod block trip setpoint and the Reactor Mode Switch is placed in the "RUN" position, the IRM detectors can be withdrawn to their fully withdrawn position (30 below the core).

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Part 1 is correct, but Part 2 is incorrect.

B. Correct Answer C. Part 1 is incorrect, but Part 2 is incorrect.

D. Part 1 is incorrect, but Part 2 is correct.

K/A Match The applicant must have Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between INTERMEDIATE RANGEMONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM and the Reactor vessel.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0503 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0503 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 215004 (SF7 SRMS) Source-Range Tier 2 Monitor Group # 1 Knowledge of SOURCE RANGE MONITOR K/A K4.01 (SRM) SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or Rating 3.7 interlocks which provide for the Revisio following: n 1 K4.01 Rod withdrawal blocks Revision Statement:

Modified the question stem and changed the distractors to add plausibility.

Question: 12 Initial Conditions: MODE 2 Source Range Monitor shorting links are installed SRM C is Bypassed SRM READINGS SRM READING A 2.3 X 105 CPS B 1.5 X 105 CPS C 1.0 X 105 CPS D 2.1 X 104 CPS Which of the following Annunciators would be in alarm on panel H13-P680?

A. CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK ONLY B. SRM UPSCALE and RPS TRIP LOGIC ACTIVATED C. SRM UPSCALE and CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK ONLY D. SRM UPSCALE, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK, and RPS TRIP LOGIC ACTIVATED Answer: C Explanation:

From STM-503:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination An SRM reading of greater than 1.0E+05 will cause a Control Rod Block and the SRM UPSCALE comes in. The scram setpoint for SRMs is 2.0E+05 if the shorting links are NOT installed.

Distracters:

A. Plausible if the applicant doesnt realize that the SRM UPSCALE comes in at the same setpoint as the rod block alarm.

B. Plausible because the scram setpoint has been exceeded but the shorting links are installed preventing RPS activation.

C. Correct Answer D. See A and B.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Rod withdrawal blocks.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0503 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-STM-0503 obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 215005 (SF7 PRMS) Average Power Tier 2 Range Monitor/Local Power Range Group # 1 Monitor K/A A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic operations of Rating 3.2 the AVERAGE POWER RANGE Revisio MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE n MONITOR SYSTEM 1 including:

A3.04 Annunciator and alarm signals Revision Statement:

Rewrote the entire to better meet the K/A Question: 13 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Instrumentation failure has resulted in the following indication for APRM F:

Which of the following APRM F backpanel light(s) would be lit as a result of this failure?

A B C

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. A ONLY B. A and B ONLY C. A and C ONLY D. A, B, and C Answer: A Explanation:

From STM-503:

.The Upscale Light would come in at 108%. APRM F is reading 108.19%

The Upscale Neutron would come in at 118% and the Upscale thermal trip at 111%

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Upscale alarm will only be generated by a high flux 118% or failed detector C. Upscale thermal trip at 111%

D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor automatic operations of the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM including Annunciator and alarm signals.

Technical

References:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination R-STM-503 R-STM-508 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0508 Obj.9 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 217000 (SF2, SF4 RCIC) Reactor Core Tier 2 Isolation Cooling Group # 1 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or K/A K3.01 malfunction of the REACTOR CORE Rating 3.7 ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) Revisio will have on following: n 0 K3.01 Reactor water level Revision Statement:

Question: 14 Initial Conditions: MODE 3 10 minutes after a LOCA HPCS is tripped Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is maintaining Reactor Water Level at -24.5 inches and stable.

Failure of E51-FTN003, RCIC Flow Transmitter, has resulted in the following indications:

Reactor Water Level would _(1)_ until automatic action via _(2)_ range level switches actuate.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination (1) (2)

A. increase wide B. increase narrow C. decrease wide D. decrease narrow Answer: B Explanation:

The RCIC flow controller has a setpoint of 600 rpm and will emit steam to the turbine to achieve this flow. With the flow signal failed low, the RCIC governor will respond by raising the turbine speed to achieve 600 gpm. RPV level was initially stable when the controller was operating correctly, but when the flow input failed low the RCIC turbine will flow more water to vessel and raise water level. Once RPV level reached Level 8 narrow range, the steam supply valve will isolate and stop RCIC flow.

Distracters:

A. Part 1 is correct, but the wrong level range. Applicant may confuse RCIC with HPCS because its level 8 is off of wide range.

B. Correct Answer C. Part 1 is wrong D. Part 1 is wrong K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) will have on following Reactor water level.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0209 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0209 Obj.5

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 218000 (SF3 ADS) Automatic Tier 2 Depressurization Group # 1 Ability to monitor automatic operations of K/A A3.01 the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION Rating 4.2 SYSTEM including: Revisio A3.01 ADS valve operation 1 n

Revision Statement:

Enhanced the wording to better established a timeframe Question: 15 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A LOCA has occurred and the following plant conditions exist:

  • Drywell Pressure D/P has been over 1.68 psid for 360 seconds
  • All Low Pressure ECCS pumps are running.

After Reactor Water Level has been below -143 inches for 50 seconds, the Unit Operator depresses the ADS A(B) TIMER/LEVEL 3 SEAL-IN RESET pushbuttons.

If the Reactor parameters stay the same, how long will it take for the ADS SRVs to automatically open after the ADS A(B) TIMER/LEVEL 3 SEAL-IN RESET pushbuttons have been depressed?

A. 55 seconds B. 105 seconds C. 355 seconds D. 405 seconds Answer: B Explanation:

After receipt of high drywell pressure (5-minute timer bypass), low reactor water level (Level 1), and confirmatory low reactor water level (Level 3) initiation signals, both 105-second timers start. The 105 second timer is only present in the A and B subchannels.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Based on the indications in the stem, the 105 second timer has been running for 50 seconds. Depressing the timer reset pushbutton with the conditions still present will start the timer back to 0 thus requiring 105 seconds to initiate.

Distracters:

A. The applicant may think the time cannot be reset once its started B. Correct Answer C. The applicant may think the 5-minute timer is in play.

D. The applicant may think the 5-minute timer is in play.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor automatic operations of the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM including ADS valve operation.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0202 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-STM-0202 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Ranked #3 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 223002 (SF5 PCIS) Primary Containment Tier 2 Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Group # 1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes K/A A1.01 in parameters associated with operating Rating 3.5 the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Revisio SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY n SHUT-OFF controls including: 0 A1.01 System indicating lights and alarms Revision Statement:

Question: 16 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Containment Pressure 0.02 psig A SMALL steam leak has resulted in Drywell Pressure reaching 1.72 psig.

Which of the following light indications on the H13-P601 Panel would be observed?

A.

B.

C.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination D.

Answer: C Explanation:

The question is essentially asking which systems isolate on a high Drywell Pressure signal of 1.68 psid. The white lights extinguish when the system receives a 1/4 isolation signal, the amber light is indicative of an Outboard isolation (DIV 1 and DIV 4).

Distracters:

A. This represents a Level 2 isolation. MSL isolate on Level 1. All other systems here will isolate on Level 2.

B. This represents a high steam tunnel temperature of 173°F isolation signal.

C. Correct Answer D. This represents a Level 3 isolation signal.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF controls including System indicating lights and alarms.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0058 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-58 Obj.8 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 239002 (SF3 SRV) Safety Relief Valves Tier 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Group # 1 following on the PRIMARY K/A A2.01 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Rating 3.8 SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY Revisio SHUT-OFF; and (b) based on those n predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of 1 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.01 Stuck open vacuum breakers Revision Statement:

Updated the distractor anaylsis.

Question: 17 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Both vacuum breakers for Safety Relief Valve (SRV) B21-F051D are stuck open.

Actuation/Opening of this SRV would result in the direct pressurization of the _(1)_.

SRV B21-F051D can be prevented from opening in RELIEF MODE by placing the _(2)_

(1) (2)

A. Drywell DIV 1 hand switch to OFF ONLY B. Drywell DIV 1 and DIV 2 hand switches to OFF C. Containment DIV 1 hand switch to OFF ONLY D. Containment DIV 1 and DIV 2 hand switches to OFF Answer: B Explanation:

Two parallel check valves (vacuum breakers) on each SRV discharge line (tailpipe) relieve any vacuum following the closure of the SRV before tailpipe damage can occur. The vacuum breakers open to admit drywell atmosphere into the tailpipe if the condensing steam forms a vacuum. The SRV opening with both vacuum breakers stuck open will direct steam into the Drywell. The SRV pressure relief logic is divided into SRV Channel A (Division I) and SRV Channel B (Division II). The redundant

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination logic channels and corresponding solenoid pilot valves ensure reliable operation when required (Figure 7). Each channel controls the operation of its corresponding solenoid pilot valve. Energizing either the Channel A or Channel B solenoid pilot valve causes the associated SRV to actuate in the pressure relief mode. The DIV 1 hand switches on the P601 panel will disable the A solenoid and the hand switches on the P631 panel will disable the B solenoid when they are placed in the OFF position.

Distracters:

A. With the vacuum breakers stuck open, the steam will flow into the Drywell.

Only operating the DIV 1 hand switch will not prevent the SRV from opening in relief mode.

B. Correct Answer C. With the vacuum breakers stuck open, the steam will flow into the Drywell not the Ctmt. Only operating the DIV 1 hand switch will not prevent the SRV from opening in relief mode.

D. With the vacuum breakers stuck open, the steam will flow into the Drywell not the Ctmt. Only operating DIV 1 and DIV 2 hand switches will prevent the SRV from opening in relief mode K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to predict the impacts of the Stuck open vacuum breakers on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF; and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0109 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0109 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO Knowledge of the physical connections Tier 2 and/or cause effect relationships between Group # 1 REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL K/A K1.03 SYSTEM and the following: Rating 3.8 K1.03 Reactor Water Level Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed the LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 18 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A Plant transient has caused the following indication on panel H13-P680:

The Feedwater Level Control System setpoint is currently _(1)_.

When transferring to the Startup Feedwater Level Controller, The At the Controls(ATC)

Operator should set the controller setpoint to _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 18 inches 25 inches B. 18 inches 36 inches C. 30.8 inches 25 inches D. 30.8 inches 36 inches Answer: A Explanation:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination In the event reactor water level decreases to Level 3 with the Master Flow Controller in automatic, Setpoint Setdown is initiated. There is an amber indicating light which informs the operator that aSetpoint Setdown signal is present. Below this light is a pushbutton used to reset this signal. When initiated, it causes the Master Flow Controller to change the level setpoint to 18 after a 5 second time delay.

From OSP-53:

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Part 1 is correct, S/U feed regulating valve will be set 25 inches.

C. Plausible because this is Level 4 and lower than the normal operating bang of 36 inches D. Plausible because this is Level 4 and lower than the normal operating bang of 36 inches K/A Match The must have knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM and Reactor Water Level.

Technical

References:

R-STM-107 OSP-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-107 Obj.10 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 261000 (SF9 SGTS) Standby Gas Tier 2 Treatment Group # 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.07 following on the STANDBY GAS Rating 2.7 TREATMENT SYSTEM; and (b) based on Revisio those predictions, use procedures to n correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal 1 conditions or operations:

A2.07 A.C. electrical failure Revision Statement:

Added more information to the explanation Question: 19 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power 5 MINUTES after a loss of RPS B, Standby Gas _(1)_ would be operating.

(2) In regard to the Standby Gas System, what action must be taken IAW AOP-10, LOSS OF ONE RPS BUS?

(1) (2)

A. B ONLY Contact Security to remove door AB-070-04 card reader from service.

B. B ONLY Contact Radiation Protection to plug Aux Bldg floor drain hubs.

C. A and B Contact Security to remove door AB-070-04 card reader from service.

D. A and B Contact Radiation Protection to plug Aux Bldg floor drain hubs.

Answer: C Explanation:

A loss of power to RPS bus A will cause an actuation of GTS A due to the loss of the A and D channels. A loss of power to RPS bus B will cause an actuation of GTS B due to a loss of the B and C channels. Additionally, the secondary containment isolations of annulus pressure control which occur due to the loss of either RPS bus will also generate GTS start signals in both divisions due to annulus pressure control low flow.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination From AOP-10:

From SOP-43:

Distracters:

A. Plausible because a loss of RPS B will directly start Standby gas B but the question asks about 5 minutes later. After annulus pressure control goes away, the low flow signal will Standby Gas train A.

B. Plausible because a loss of RPS B will directly start Standby gas B but the question asks about 5 minutes later. After annulus pressure control goes away, the low flow signal will Standby Gas train A C. Correct Answer D. This action would be done before a surveillance run of Standby Gas and not after an automatic start.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to (a) predict the impacts of A.C. electrical failure on the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

Technical

References:

R-STM-0257 AOP-10 SOP-59

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0529 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 262001 (SF6 AC) AC Electrical Tier 2 Distribution Group # 1 Knowledge of the operational K/A K5.01 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.1 they apply to A.C. ELECTRICAL Revisio DISTRIBUTION: n K5.01 Principle involved with paralleling 1 two A.C. sources Revision Statement:

Revised the question to have completely different answers to make the question more plausible Question: 20 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power The Unit Operator is preparing to parallel the DIV 1 Standby Diesel Generator with Offsite Power IAW SOP-53, STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR AND AUXILIARIES.

Division 1 Diesel Generator and grid voltages are matched.

After placing the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to GEN, the synchroscope is rotating at a rate of ONE REVOLUTION EVERY 4 SECONDS.

(Initially) (1 second later)

Based on these indications:

If the operator takes the switch for the Diesel Output Breaker to close when the synchroscope next reaches the 12 O-Clock position the diesel generator will ______.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. immediately accept real load and keep running.

B. immediately accept reactive load and keep running.

C. become a reactive load and trip on reverse power.

D. become a real load and trip on generator differential.

Answer: C Explanation:

From the indications above, frequency is too low too parallel with offsite power.

Voltage is in range Frequency should be above 60 Hz to prevent a reverse power condition. From SOP-0053 Adjust diesel speed, using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A(B) GOVERNOR CONTROL, to bring the frequency within the range of grid frequency. Adjust speed so the SY-1-SYDA(B)01, STBY BUS A(B)

SYNCHROSCOPE indicator is rotating slowly in the SLOW direction (counterclockwise) at a rate of one revolution in greater than or equal to 4 seconds and less than or equal to 6 seconds.

Distracters:

A. Frequency is already too low based on the indications provided B. raising frequency is correct, but the synchroscope needs to be moving SLOW in the FAST direction before closing the output breaker to acquire load.

C. Correct Answer D. Frequency is already too low based on the indications provided K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor diesel generator indications before parallel operation for abnormalities and make the appropriate adjustments per procedure.

Technical

References:

SOP-0053 Standby Diesel Generator Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0305S Obj13

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #4 Operator Action: Recover a Diesel Generator within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 262002 (SF6 UPS) Uninterruptable Power Tier 2 Supply (AC/DC) Group # 1 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or K/A K3.01 malfunction of the UNINTERRUPTABLE Rating 3.1 POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) will have on Revisio following: n 2 K3.01 Water Level Control: Plant-Specific Revision Statement:

(1) Rewrote the question as a 2X2 and enhanced the distractor analysis.

(2) added changes to the distractor analysis.

Question: 21 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Inverter BYS-INV01B has lost ALL power inputs.

As a direct result of this transient, The Feedwater Regulation Valves will fail _(1)_ and Reactor Water Level will _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. As is Rise B. Open Rise C. As is Lower D. Closed Lower Answer: A Explanation:

The applicant must know which instrument bus would be lost if an inverter loses power, and how that will impact RPV level.

Inverter BYS-INV01B provides power to VBN-PNL01B1.

From AOP-42:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination The Recirc pumps downshifting will cause a drastic reduction in Reactor Power from voiding. The Feed reg valves being locked up will not be able to respond from Feedwater Level Control signals and continue to supply the same amount of water at 100%. RPV will rise and reach Level 8 in approximately 15 seconds causing all feed pumps to trip.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The Feed reg valves lockup on a loss of control signal. RPV level will rise making this distractor plausible.

C. The Feed reg valves lockup on a loss of control signal making this distractor plausible, but RPV level will rise as a result not lower.

D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) will have on Water Level Control.

Technical

References:

AOP-42 R-STM-0107 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0540 Obj.2 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 263000 (SF6 DC) DC Electrical Tier 2 Distribution Group # 1 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to K/A K2.01 the following: Rating 3.1 K2.01 Major D.C. loads Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 22 Which DC bus provides power to the RCIC Gland Seal Compressor, E51-C002C?

A. ENB-SWG01A B. BYS-SWG01A C. ENB-SWG01B D. BYS-SWG01B Answer: D Explanation:

Power for the RCIC Gland Seal Compressor comes from BYS-SWG01B. It is the only RCIC DC powered component that doesnt receive its power from a safety related source.

Distracters:

A. Plausible because the majority of the DC powered RCIC components receive power from this bus.

B. Plausible because the applicant may confuse which non-safety related DC bus provides power to the RCIC Gland Seal Compressor.

C. Plausible because a few RCIC components receive power from this bus.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Major D.C.

loads.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

R-STM-0209 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-209 Obj.2 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 264000 (SF6 EGE) Emergency Generators Tier 2 (Diesel/Jet) EDG Group # 1 Knowledge of the physical connections K/A K1.05 and/or cause effect relationships between Rating 3.2 EMERGENCY GENERATORS Revisio (DIESEL/JET) and the following: n K1.05 Emergency generator fuel oil 0 supply system Revision Statement:

Question: 23 The Motor Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump for the HPCS Diesel Generator is powered from _(1)_.

It receives an auto start signal when _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 480 VAC Fuel header pressure lowers to 6 psig B. 480 VAC The HPCS Diesel Generator starts C. 125 VDC Fuel header pressure lowers to 6 psig D. 125 VDC The HPCS Diesel Generator starts Answer: D Explanation:

The main fuel oil pump is shaft driven and the motor driven pump is powered from the DIV 3 DC bus. All the AC motor driven pumps for the DIV 3 diesel are 480 Vac.

From STM-0309H

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination The Backup DC oil pumps start when oil header pressure lowers below 6 psig.

Distracters:

A. Wrong power supply B. Wrong power supply C. Right power supply, but the wrong auto start signal.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) and the Emergency generator fuel oil supply system.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0309H Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-309H Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #7 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 264000 (SF6 EGE) Emergency Generators Tier 2 (Diesel/Jet) EDG Group # 1 G2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown K/A G2.4.9 implications in accident (e.g., loss of Rating 3.8 coolant accident or loss of residual heat Revisio removal) mitigation strategies. 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 24 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power The Plant has experienced a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) concurrently with a LOCA.

DIV 1 and DIV 2 Diesel Generators should restore power to its respective bus in within

_(1)_ seconds.

If the DIV 1 Diesel Generator fails to start, _(2)_ would be available to restore Reactor Water Level.

(1) (2)

A. 10 RHR C B. 10 LPCS C. 30 RHR C D. 30 LPCS Answer: A Explanation:

From R-STM-0309S Each diesel generator is designed to be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds for the Division I and II DGs.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 30 seconds is the sequencing time for some major equipment after a loss of offsite power. SSW Pump C and B.

If DIV 1 Diesel Generator failed to start, LPCS and RHR A would be unavailable to restore water level. RHR B and C would still have power from DIV 2 Diesel generator.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. With DIV 2 diesel available, only DIV 2 ECCS components will have power C. See B D. The DIV 1 and 2 diesels should provide power within 10 seconds.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies associated with diesel generators.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0309S&H SOP-31, RHR System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-309 Obj.14 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #4 Operator Action: Recover a Diesel Generator within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 300000 (SF8 IA) Instrument Air Tier 2 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to Group # 1 the following: K/A K2.01 K2.01 Instrument air compressor Rating 2.8 Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed distractor D to NJS-SWG1D Question: 25 Which of the following electrical buses provide power to IAS-C2A INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR?

A. NJS-SWG1A B. NJS-SWG1L C. NJS-SWG1G D. NJS-SWG1D Answer: C Explanation:

This is a direct memory power supply question. All the distractors are non safety related 480 Vac switchgears. The power supply for IAS-C2A INSTR AIR COMPRESSOR is NJS-SWG1G.

Distracters:

A. Wrong power supply.

B. Wrong power supply C. Correct Answer D. Wrong power supply K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Instrument air compressors.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

R-STM-122 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-121 Obj.2 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #2 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 400000 (SF8 CCS) Component Cooling Tier 2 Water Group # 1 Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) K/A K4.01 and or interlocks which provide for the Rating 3.4 following: Revisio K4.01 Automatic start of standby pump 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 26 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power An automatic start of the standby Component Cooling Primary(CCP) Pump has occurred along with the following alarms:

  • H13-P870/55A/F04 RPCCW SYSTEM LOW HEADER PRESSURE
  • H13-P870/55A/E04 RPCCW SURGE TANK TK1 EXTREME LOW LEVEL NOTE: NO other alarms are in The Pressure Setpoint for initiating this first alarm is _(1)_ psig.

The transient was caused by _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 56 Trip of a running CCP Pump B. 56 System leakage C. 95 Trip of a running CCP Pump D. 95 System leakage Answer: D Explanation:

From ARP H13P870/55A:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination RPCCW Pump discharge header pressure is maintained at approximately 115 psig. The pumps prime mover is a 150 hp, AC induction motor. The standby pump will automatically start if the discharge header experiences low pressure (95 psig) or either of the other two pumps is tripped automatically. The pumps are located at elevation 70' of the Auxiliary Building, west side.

The Low Surge Tank level alarm being in is indicative of a system leak. If a CCP pump trip would have caused the auto start then this annunciator would be in as well:

Distracters:

A. This CCP safety loop isolation pressure.

B. This CCP safety loop isolation pressure C. Correct Pressure but wrong auto start signal.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the automatic start of standby pump.

Technical

References:

ARP-870-55 R-STM-115 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-115 Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 201003 (SF1 CRDM) Control Rod and Tier 2 Drive Mechanism Group # 2 Knowledge of the operational K/A K5.07 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.3 they apply to CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE Revision MECHANISM:

K5.07 How control rod movements affect 0 core reactivity Revision Statement:

Question: 27 Which Control Rod would add the LARGEST amount of positive reactivity when its FULLY withdrawn from the core?

NOTE: (Refer to the picture below) 08 08 40 40 33 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 A. 04-33 B. 24-33 C. 32-33 D. 52-33 Answer: B Explanation:

The question is asking which Control Rod has the most integral rod worth. The Control Rod that is further inserted and is closer to the center of the core will be the one. Control Rods 24-33 and 32-33 are both in the center of the core but 24-33 is inserted more. Control Rod 24-33 will insert more positive reactivity when it is fully withdrawn.

Distracters:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. Thermal neutron flux is higher in the center of core and the new fuel is located in the center of the core.

B. Correct Answer C. Center Control Rod, However, its almost fully withdrawn already.

D. See A and C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the operational implications of how control rod movements affect core reactivity as they apply to CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM.

Technical

References:

RLP-HLO-0162 Control Rods Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0162 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(1)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 202001 (SF1, SF4 RS) Recirculation Tier 2 Knowledge of RECIRCULATION System Group # 2 design feature(s) and/or interlocks which K/A K4.05 provide for the following Rating 2.9 K4.05 Seal cooling Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 28 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power If Control Rod Drive (CRD) seal purge flow is lost, the Recirc Pump seals are cooled by Reactor water circulated through a heat exchanger that rejects heat to the _(1)_

system.

In this configuration, Recirc Pump seal temperatures will _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. Component Cooling Primary Rise B. Component Cooling Primary Stay the same C. Normal Service Water Rise D. Normal Service Water Stay the same Answer: A Explanation:

From STM-53 If CRD injection flow is lost the seals are cooled by reactor water circulated through a heat exchanger. The heat exchanger is cooled by CCP.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. CCP is the correct cooling medium, but seal temperature will rise according to the chart.

C. NSW is not the correct cooling medium, but it does provides to components in the Drywell D. See C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of RECIRCULATION System design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Seal cooling.

Technical

References:

R-STM-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-53 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 202002 (SF1 RSCTL) Recirculation Flow Tier 2 Control Group # 2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of K/A A3.01 the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL Rating 3.6 SYSTEM including: Revisio A3.01 Flow control valve operation: BWR- n 0 5,6 Revision Statement:

Question: 29 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Runback would reduce loop drive flows to _(1)_.

(2) After the Recirc FCV Runback is complete (With NO Operator actions), which of the following indications would be observed for BOTH Recirc FCVs on panel H13-P680?

(A) (B)

OR (1) (2)

A. 60% A B. 60% B C. 75% A D. 75% B

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Answer: A Explanation:

From STM-53:

% Valve Position- indicates the percentage the valve is open, NOT the amount of loop flow. The applicant may think that 60% valve position correlates to 60% loop flow. The picture on the left was taken after a runback was initiated so it is the accurate position of the FCVs after a runback.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. This is the correct drive position, but incorrect FCV indicated position C. 75% would be the approximate Reactor Power level after a FCV Runback.

D. See C K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor automatic operations of the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM including Flow control valve operation.

Technical

References:

R-STM-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-53 Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 204000 (SF2 RWCU) Reactor Water Tier 2 Cleanup Group # 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or K/A K6.08 malfunction of the following will have on Rating 3.5 the REACTOR WATER CLEANUP Revisio SYSTEM: n 0 K6.08 PCIS/NSSSS Revision Statement:

Question: 30 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A loss of RPS A would cause Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NS4) Channels

_(1)_ to deenergize.

The Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) _(2)_ Isolation Valves would close as result.

(1) (2)

A. A and D Inboard B. A and D Outboard C. A and C Inboard D. A and C Outboard Answer: B Explanation:

For BOP logic, RPS A powers outboard channels A & D while RPS B powers inboard channels B & C.

RWCU Outboard isolation logic:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. The correct RPS channels, but wrong isolation valves B. Correct Answer C. The wrong isolation channels D. The wrong isolation channels K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of NSSSS will have on the REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM.

Technical

References:

R-STM-58 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-58 Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 216000 (SF7 NBI) Nuclear Boiler Tier 2 Instrumentation Group # 2 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes K/A A1.03 in parameters associated with operating Rating 2.9 the NUCLEAR BOILER Revisio INSTRUMENTATION controls including: n 0 A1.03 Surveillance testing Revision Statement:

Question: 31 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power While performing a surveillance, an I&C Technician accidently opens the equalizing valve for Narrow Range Level Transmitter B21-LTN080A.

This will result in RPS Half Scram from a _(1)_ signal.

With the Half Scram sealed in, RPS Channel _(2)_ could actuate a Full Scram.

(1) (2)

A. Level 3 C B. Level 3 B C. Level 8 C D. Level 8 B Answer: D Explanation:

The RPV Water level transmitters are wet leg style. The high-pressure side is the reference leg and the low pressure side is the variable leg. As D/P goes down, indicated level goes up and vice versa. Opening the equalizing valve would cause D/P to be zero which in turn would indicate maximum level. The Level 8 scram signal would be initiated when the equalizing valve for LT080A was open, not the Level 3 Scram signal. With A channel sealed for a half scram, channels B or D would cause a full scram based on the RPS logic scheme of one out of two taken twice.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Opening the equalizing valve would cause a rise in indicated level B. Opening the equalizing valve would cause a rise in indicated level C. With RPS channel A already tripped, it would require either B or D channel initiate a full reactor scram.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION controls including Surveillance testing.

Technical

References:

R-STM-508 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-508 Obj.6 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 234000 (SF8 FH) Fuel-Handling Tier 2 Equipment Group # 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.01 following on the FUEL HANDLING Rating 3.3 EQUIPMENT; and (b) based on those Revisio predictions, use procedures to correct, n control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: 1 A2.01 Interlock failure Revision Statement:

Fixed the K/A statement.

Question: 32 Initial Conditions: MODE SWITCH is the Refuel position All Control Rods Inserted Refueling Platform loaded with a fuel bundle over the core In this Condition, a failure of the _(1)_ Rod Block Interlock could lead to an inadvertent criticality event.

(2) Which Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) should be entered if there is an indication of inadvertent criticality?

(1) (2)

A. Refueling Equipment AOP-27, Fuel Handling Mishaps B. Refueling Equipment AOP-61, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/Malfunction C. Refuel Position One-Rod-Out AOP-27, Fuel Handling Mishaps D. Refuel Position One-Rod-Out AOP-61, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/Malfunction Answer: A Explanation:

The refueling equipment interlocks inhibit motion of the bridge and fuel hoist or generate a control rod withdrawal block to the Rod Control and Information System (RCIS) under certain conditions. In addition to the PLC I/O, hard-wired contacts from position switches provide direct output from the refueling bridge to RC & IS. These position switches will indicate to RCIS that the refueling bridge is over the reactor core

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination and be used to inhibit control rod withdrawal. Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures in preventing the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit that has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-in position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication")

and a rod selection signal (from the Rod Control and Information System).

From AOP-27 Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Correct interlock, but wrong AOP to correct the issue.

C. Incorrect Interlock D. Incorrect Interlock K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to (a) predict the impacts of Interlock failure on the FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.

Technical

References:

R-STM-55 TS 3.9.1 and 3.9.2 AOP-27 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-55 Obj.13

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 239001 (SF3, SF4 MRSS) Main and Reheat Tier 2 Steam Group # 2 Ability to manually operate and/or K/A A4.04 monitor in the control room: Rating 3.8 A4.04 System pressure Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed distractor from 140 to 130 Question: 33 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,70% Power GOP-2, POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN Reactor Power is being reduced to 40% Power.

The Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs) are to remain in service with power maintained between 15% and 70%, IAW with SOP-10, MSR and FW Heaters Extraction Steam and Drains.

Using Attachment 26 of SOP-10, MSS-MOV111/112, MSR 1/2 STM SPLY SHUTOFF should be throttled to a final approximate pressure of __ psia as observed on MSS-PI22A/B.

A. 70 B. 130 C. 250 D. 500 Answer: D Explanation:

Using Attachment 26 and a final power of 40%:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. If the applicant is reading shell side pressure instead of Reheater pressure.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination B. If the applicant is reading shell side temperature instead of Reheater pressure.

C. If the applicant is reading reheater temperature instead of Reheater pressure D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to manually operate and/or monitor Main and Reheat Steam System pressure in the control room.

Technical

References:

SOP-10 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam: 6 from SOP-10 Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-108 Obj.11 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 239003 (SF9 MSVLCS) Main Steam Tier 2 Isolation Valve Leakage Control Group # 2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of K/A 239003 A3.09 the MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM Rating 2.6 including: Revisio A3.09 Reactor building temperature: n 1 BWR-4,5,6(P-Spec)

Revision Statement: added to the word MINIMUM to the stem of the question.

Question: 34 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A Design-Basis LOCA has occurred with a steam leak located at the red arrow.

Operators would observe temperatures rising in the _(1)_.

When all MSIV Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) switches are taken to operate, both Divisions MS-PLCS will AUTOMATICALLY align when MS-PLCS system air pressure reaches a MINIMUM of _(2)_ psig.

(1) (2)

A. Drywell ONLY 45 B. Drywell and Main Steam Tunnel 45 C. Drywell ONLY 60 D. Drywell and Main Steam Tunnel 60 Answer: A Explanation:

Guard pipes are used around the main steam lines and the main steam drain line piping that run between the drywell and the shield building. The function of the guard pipes is to prevent pressurization of the containment volume in the event of

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination a steam line break by containing escaping steam and directing it back into the drywell.

From STM-208:

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. All the steam would divert back to the Drywell.

C. Wrong Reactor Pressure. Plausible because this RCIC isolation pressure.

D. See C K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to monitor automatic operations of the MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM including Reactor building temperature.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0208 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-208 Obj.8 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 241000 (SF3 RTPRS) Reactor/Turbine Tier 2 Pressure Regulating Group # 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or K/A K3.07 malfunction of the REACTOR/TURBINE Rating 3.3 PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM will Revision have on following: 1 K3.07 Main stop/throttle valves Revision Statement:

Added more information to the question explanation.

Question: 35 Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power The MCR entered AOP-17, REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS, due to ALL three Main Steam Throttle Pressure transmitters slowly failing DOWNSCALE at the same rate.

How will the Turbine Control Valves and Bypass Valves respond to this transient?

Turbine Control Valves Bypass Valves A. open open B. open remain closed C. close open D. close remain closed Answer: D Explanation:

All three Main Steam Throttle Pressure transmitters input into the Reactor Pressure Regulation System which in turn opens and close the control valves and bypass valves to control RPV pressure. If all three transmitters slowly failed DOWNSCALE it would indicate that RPV pressure is lowering. The turbine control valves would respond by closing to build up pressure and the Bypass valves would stay closed. If all three transmitters slowly failed UPSCALE it would indicate that RPV pressure is lowering. The turbine control valves would respond by opening to reduce pressure and once they were full open the Bypass valves would go open.

Distracters:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. Applicant may confuse which way a downscale failure would affect the system.

B. Applicant may confuse which way a downscale failure would affect the system.

C. Control Valves would close, but the BPV would not open.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR/TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM will have on Main stop/throttle valves.

Technical

References:

AOP-17 R-STM-0509 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-509 Obj.9 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 259001 (SF2 FWS) Feedwater Tier 2 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to Group # 2 the following: K/A K2.01 K2.01 Reactor feedwater pump(s): Motor- Rating 3.3 Driven-Only Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 36 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power The feeder breaker for NPS-SWG1B has tripped.

Which Feedwater and Condensate pumps are still operating after this event?

Condensate Pumps Feedwater Pumps A. A and C C B. B B and C C. A and C A D. A B and C Answer: C Explanation:

NPS-SWG1A supplies power to the A and C Condensate Pumps, and the A Feed water Pump.

NPS-SWG1B supplies power to B Condensate Pump, and the B and C Feed water Pumps.

Distracters:

A. Correct Condensate Pumps but wrong Feed water Pumps B. Wrong Condensate Pumps C. Correct Answer D. See B

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Reactor feedwater pump(s): Motor-Driven-Only.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0107 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0107 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank # OPS02532 X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level R0 271000 (SF9 OG) Offgas Tier 2 Knowledge of the physical connections Group # 2 and/or cause effect relationships between K/A K1.04 OFFGAS SYSTEM and the following: Rating 2.7 K1.04 Condensate system Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2. Added more information in the distractor analysis.

Question: 37 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power What System provides the cooling medium for the Offgas Condenser?

A. Condensate B. Normal Service Water C. Offgas Glycol Subsystem D. Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water Answer: A Explanation:

The Offgas Condenser passes full-Condensate flow. The condenser has an internal bypass that allows some of the condensate flow to bypass the tubes hence not all the condensate flow goes through the tubes. Condensate to lower the temperature of the Offgas process flow from approximately 750F to 150F and, consequently, remove a majority of condensate/moisture from the Offgas process flow.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Not a cooling medium for the Offgas System C. Cools the Cooler condenser of the Offgas System D. Cooling medium for the glycol compressors.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination K/A Match Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between OFFGAS SYSTEM and the following Condensate system.

Technical

References:

R-STM-606 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-606 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 290002 (SF4 RVI) Reactor Vessel Internals Tier 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Group # 2 following on the REACTOR VESSEL K/A A2.02 INTERNALS; and (b) based on those Rating 3.6 predictions, use procedures to correct, Revisio control, or mitigate the consequences of n those abnormal conditions 1 or operations:

A2.02 Over pressurization transient Revision Statement: Rewrote the question to better meet the K/A Question: 38 An Over pressurization transient could result in a breach of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) if peak pressure exceeds a MINIMUM of _(1)_ psig at the LOWEST elevation.

The operator should insert a manual scram if RPV pressure is at the Tech Spec limit and rising IAW _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 1325 AOP-1, Reactor Scram B. 1325 AOP-17, Reactor Pressure Control Malfunctions C. 1375 AOP-1, Reactor Scram D. 1375 AOP-17, Reactor Pressure Control Malfunctions Answer: D Explanation:

From Tech Spec Safety Limit B 2.1.2

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination From AOP-17:

The Tech Spec Pressure limit is 1075 psig. TS 3.4.12 Distracters:

A. The applicant may confuse the Safety Limit of 1325 psig with 1375 psig. 110%

of the design pressure is 1375 psig, not 1325 psig. 1325 psig would be plausible if the question asked at the highest elevation.

B. See A C. The correct pressure, but wrong procedure. AOP-1 is plausible because it directs the ATC to insert a manual scram if RPV pressure has exceeded 1094.7 psig and a automatic scram did not occur. AOP-17 directs inserting a manual scram at 1075 psig and rising.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to (a) predict the impacts of an Over pressurization transient on the REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.

Technical

References:

Tech Spec 2.1.2 Bases AOP-1 and 17 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0316 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295001 (APE 1) Partial or Complete Loss Tier 1 of Forced Core Flow Circulation / 1 & 4 Group # 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A AK3.02 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.8 FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and Revisio the following: n 0 AK2.06 Reactor Power Revision Statement:

Question: 39 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A Plant Transient has resulted in a trip of Recirc Pump A.

IAW with Technical Specifications, which of the following Reactor Power levels is the HIGHEST River Bend Station can be operated at?

A. 1545 MWt B. 2358 MWt C. 2628 MWt D. 3039 MWt Answer: B Explanation:

Per Tech Spec Definitions:

Per Tech Spec 3.4.1,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 3091 X 0.776 = 2398.616 MWth 2358 MWt is the highest power listed below 2398.616.

Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant confuses power and flow restrictions. If the applicant assumes with 1/2 the flow and 1/2 power limit; therefore, 1/2 X 3091 MW = 1545.5 B. Correct Answer C. If the applicant confuses the lowest power restriction per OSP-53, Trigger Points, 85% is the lowest power required for a main feed pump trip. 0.85 X 3091= 2627.35.

D. Plausible if applicant confuses single loop with TRM requirement for loss of one or both ultrasonic feedwater flow meters (UFFMs). One of the actions is to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 3039 MWt.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the power restrictions during a partial loss of recirculation flow. The applicant must be able to calculate the single loop power restriction and apply it to the given conditions.

Technical

References:

TS 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-53 Obj.13 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295003 (APE 3) Partial or Complete Loss Tier 1 of AC Power / 6 Group # 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the K/A AA2.01 following as they apply to PARTIAL OR Rating 3.4 COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C. POWER: Revisio AA2.01 Cause of partial or complete loss n 1 of A.C. power Revision Statement:

Rewrote the question to better reflect Tier 1 guidance.

Question: 40 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power Normal Electrical lineup A Grid transient has resulted in the following:

  • DIV 1 Diesel Generator powering ENS-SWG1A.
  • DIV 3 Diesel Generator powering E22-S004.

The transient caused a loss of Preferred Station Transformer _(1)_.

This would require entry into _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. RTX-XSR1C AOP-12, LOSS OF TPCCW B. RTX-XNS1C AOP-9, LOSS OF NORMAL SERVICE WATER C. RTX-XSR1D AOP-12, LOSS OF TPCCW D. RTX-XNS1D AOP-9, LOSS OF NORMAL SERVICE WATER Answer: A Explanation:

Per R-STM-300, AC Distribution,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination RTX-XSR1C powers DIV 1 bus and NNS-SWG1A. The question stated that DIV 1 diesel is running and powering the bus. This would be the result of an undervoltage condition from transformer RTX-XSR1C.

DIV 3 diesel is running which means power has been lost to NNS-SWG1C via NNS-SWG1A.

TPCCW pumps A, B, C are powered from NNS-SWG1A, B, C respectively.

Its been established that NNS-SWG1A and C have lost power resulting in a loss of 2 out of 3 TPCCW pumps. This would require entry into AOP-12.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The Normal Service Water pumps are powered from NNS-SWG2A and NNS-SWG2B. The applicant may confuse power supplies of 4160 VAC components.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination C. RTX-XNS1D is plausible because it can provide power to NNS-SWG1C via NNS-SWG1D.

D. See B and C K/A Match Given the plant conditions provided, the applicant must determine the cause of the partial loss of AC electrical power.

Technical

References:

R-STM-300, AC Distribution Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-300 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #6 Risk Significant System Ranked #2 Risk Significant Event

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295004 (APE 4) Partial or Total Loss of DC Tier 1 Power / 6 Group # 1 Knowledge of the operational K/A AK1.05 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.3 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE Revisio LOSS OF D.C. POWER: n 1 AK1.05 Loss of breaker protection Revision Statement:

Made the question reflect the Tier 1 level better.

Question: 41 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power BYS-PNL01, 125VDC Normal Switchgear Panel in the Circ Water Pump Structure, has lost power.

IAW AOP-14, Loss of 125 VDC, the loss BYS-PNL01 will remove electrical trip protection from the _________________.

A. Circ Water Pumps ONLY B. Circ Water Pumps and River Water Makeup Pumps C. Circ Water Pumps and Normal Service Water Pumps D. Circ Water Pumps and Service Water Cooling Pumps Answer: C Explanation:

From AOP-14, Loss of DC Power, for BYS-PNL01:

ALL Circ Water Pumps and Normal Service Water Pumps will lose electrical trip protection with no DC control power. All components listed as distractors are outside structure 4160V components.

Distracters:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. The applicant may think this only affects the Circ Water Pumps B. The applicant may think the River Water Makeup Pumps are powered from the same buses as the Circ Water Pumps.

C. Correct Answer D. The applicant may think the Service Water Cooling Pumps are powered from the same buses as the Circ Water Pumps K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the operational implications of Loss of breaker protection as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER.

Technical

References:

AOP-14 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295005 (APE 5) Main Turbine Generator Tier 1 Trip / 3 Group # 1 G2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical K/A G2.2.40 Specifications for a system. Rating 3.4 (CFR: 41.10) Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Rewrote the question to meet the Tier 1 criteria Question: 42 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power If not corrected, a rising water level in the _(1)_ Drain Receiver would require entry into AOP-2, Main Turbine and Generator Trips.

The _(2)_ that reposition on a Main Turbine Trip are required to be OPERABLE IAW Technical Specifications?

(1) (2)

A. Reheater Stop Valves B. Reheater Bypass Valves C. Moisture Separator Stop Valves D. Moisture Separator Bypass Valves Answer: D Explanation:

The Tube side of the MSRs drain to the Reheater Drain Tank and the Shell side goes to the Separator drain tank. The Main Turbine will trip if the Shell Side of the MSR gets a high level which could be caused by a high level in the Separator drain tank Per TS 3.7.5 Main Turbine Bypass System, the Main Turbine Bypass System shall be OPERABLE.

Distracters:

A. The applicant may confuse which drain tank will cause a high level on the MSR shell side.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination B. See B.

C. The Stop Valves do reposition on a Main Turbine trip but are not listed in Tech Specs D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the valves that re-position on a turbine trip and are required per tech specs.

Technical

References:

AOP-2, MAIN TURBINE AND GENERATOR TRIPS TS 3.7.5 Main Turbine Bypass System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-310 Obj.13 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #7 Risk Significant Event

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295006 (APE 6) Scram / 1 Tier 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the Group # 1 following responses as they apply to K/A AK3.02 SCRAM: Rating 4.1 AK3.02 Reactor power response Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Enhanced stem to reflect Tier 1 criteria.

Question: 43 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power for several months The ATC Operator was directed to Place the MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN in response to rising Drywell Pressure IAW AOP-1, Reactor Scram.

10 SECONDS following a Reactor Scram, Reactor Thermal Power will be approximately

_(1)_ derived MAINLY from _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 1% decay heat from fission products B. 1% fission events caused delayed neutrons C. 7% decay heat from fission products D. 7% fission events caused delayed neutrons Answer: C Explanation:

From BWR Generic Fundamentals Chapter 8. Reactor Operational Physics.

Following a scram, thermal power remains high for several seconds because of the stored heat within the fuel. The time lag between the power production from fission and heat being added to the coolant causes thermal output to remain the same for seven to nine seconds. Decay heat produced is at a level dependent on power history. Therefore, from a scram at 100% power, initially the thermal output of the reactor will be

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination about 100% power, 7% supplied by decay heat. Thermal heat output decreases rapidly to the decay heat level. Eight to ten seconds after the scram, thermal output is due mainly to decay heat and drops to 7% of rated thermal output.

After approximately one minute, thermal output is 3 to 5% of rated and drops to about 2% after about ten minutes. One hour after a scram, decay heat is about 1% rated thermal output.

Distracters:

A. The applicant may confuse the reactor power response versus time. May assume reactor power immediately drops to 1% after a scram.

B. See A C. Correct Answer.

D. Correct power level but the wrong source of power K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the reasons for Reactor power response following a SCRAM.

Technical

References:

BWR Generic Fundamentals: Reactor Operational Physics.

Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0165 Obj.17 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(1)

Level of Difficulty: 3

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295016 (APE 16) Control Room Tier 1 Abandonment / Group # 1 G2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and K/A G2.4.21 logic used to assess the status of safety Rating 4.0 functions, such as reactivity control, core Revisio cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant n system integrity, containment conditions, 1 radioactivity release control, etc.

(CFR: 41.7)

Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 44 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power The Shift Manager has evacuated the Main Control Room due to a FIRE.

AOP-31, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM, has been entered and ALL immediate operator actions have been completed.

Which EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, entry conditions can be observed on the DIV 1 Remote Shutdown Panel, RSS-PNL101?

A. Containment Pressure and Drywell Pressure B. Suppression Pool Level and Drywell Pressure C. Containment Pressure and Drywell Temperature D. Suppression Pool Level and Drywell Temperature Answer: D Explanation:

Per R-STM-200, Remote Shutdown System, the following indications are located at RSS-PNL101.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination The EOP-2, Primary Containment Control, entry requirements are:

Drywell Temperature above 145F CTMT Temperature above 90F CTMT pressure above 0.3 psig SP Temperature above 100F SP Level above 20 ft ST Level below 19 ft 6 in CTMT or DW Hydrogen concentration above 0.7%

Distracters:

Per EOP-1, RPV Control, entry requirements are:

PRV level below 9.7 inches RPV pressure above 1094.7 psig DW pressure above 1.68 psid Reactor scram required and reactor power above 5% or cannot be determined A. Plausible if applicant confuses indication on P808 and RSS-PNL101.

Containment pressure is located on P808 not on RSS-PNL101. Also, Drywell pressure is an EOP-1 entry requirement.

B. Plausible if applicant confuses EOP 1 and 2 entry requirements. Both indications are on the RSS-PNL101, but Drywell Pressure is an EOP-1 entry requirement.

C. Plausible if applicant confuses indication on P808 and RSS-PNL101.

Containment Pressure is located on P808 not on RSS-PNL101.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the knowledge of the parameters available at the division 1 remote shutdown panel to assess the status of primary containment as well as the entry requirements for EOP-2, Primary Containment Control.

Technical

References:

R-STM-200, Remote Shutdown System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-200 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295018 (APE 18) Partial or Complete Loss Tier 1 of CCW / 8 Group # 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the K/A AA1.02 following as they apply to PARTIAL OR Rating 3.3 COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT Revisio COOLING WATER: n 1 AA1.02 System loads Revision Statement:

Made changes as suggested to meet the Tier 1 component Question: 45 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A loss of CCP flow to CONTAINMENT ONLY will require entry into ARP-680-01 in response to which of the following alarms?

A. RWCU HX RM HI AMBIENT TEMP B. RWCU PMP RM 2 HI AMBIENT TEMP C. RWCU F/D INLET HIGH TEMP 140 DEG D. RWCU PUMP SEAL CAVITY HIGH TEMP F Answer: C Explanation:

Per H13-P680/01A/B01, F/D INLET HIGH TEMP 140 DEG F, possible cause is low cooling water flow to NRHX. Per R-STM-601, RWCU System, the Non-regenerative heat exchanger is in containment and cooled by CCP.

Distracters:

A Plausible if applicant confuses cooling water. The RWCU HX RM is in

. containment. The containment unit coolers are cooled by HVN chilled water.

Per R-STM-403, Rx Bldg HVAC System,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination B Plausible if applicant confuses the location of the pump room with the heat exchanger room. The RWCU pump room is in the auxiliary building.

Per R-STM-409, Auxiliary Building HVAC, D Plausible if applicant confuses the location of the pump room with the heat exchanger room. The RWCU pump room is in the auxiliary building. The seal water is cooled by CCP, but it is outside containment.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of loads lost during a CCP isolation to containment and what alarms could be observed in the control room to provide indication of the loss of CCP to the containment.

Technical

References:

R-STM-601, RWCU System R-STM-403, Rx Bldg HVAC System R-STM-409, Auxiliary Building HVAC ARP-680-01 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-115 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295019 (APE 19) Partial or Complete Loss Tier 1 of Instrument Air / 8 Group # 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A AK2.05 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.4 INSTRUMENT AIR and the following: Revisio AK2.05 Main Steam System 1 n

Revision Statement:

Made changes as suggested to meet the Tier 1 component Question: 46 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A pipe rupture has resulted in a lowering of Instrument Air pressure.

AOP-8, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, was entered.

When Instrument Air header pressure lowers to _(1)_ psig, AOP-8 directs the operator to verify the _(2)_ MSIVs are closed.

(1) (2)

A. 50 Inboard ONLY B. 50 Inboard and Outboard C. 85 Inboard ONLY D. 85 Inboard and Outboard Answer: B Explanation:

MSIVs and Feed Reg Valves instrument air the motive force. The MSIVs will close when IAS pressure lowers to 50 psig and the Feed Reg Valves will lock up at 85 psig.

Per AOP-8, Loss of Instrument Air, if air header pressure lowers to 50 psig, then verify the MSIVs are closed.

Distracters:

A. Correct closing pressure. The applicant may confuse IAS isolated to Containment only.

B. Correct Answer

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination C. The is setpoint for Feed Reg valves locking up.

D. See C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of how a loss of instrument air impacts the main steam system and at what pressure expected actions occur.

Technical

References:

AOP-8, Loss of Instrument Air Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-109 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank # OPS06150 X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #2 Risk Significant System

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295021 (APE 21) Loss of Shutdown Tier 1 Cooling / 4 Group # 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the K/A AA1.06 following as they apply to LOSS OF Rating 2.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING: Revisio AA1.06 Containment/ drywell temperature 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 47 Initial Conditions: MODE 4 RPV Head Vent is NOT aligned to MSL A RPV Water Level is 36 inches RHR A in Shutdown Cooling NO Recirc Pumps operating Shutdown Cooling would be lost if RHR A Equipment Room Temperature reached its leak detection isolation setpoint of _(1)_.

With NO OPERATOR action, INITIALLY temperature in the _(2)_ would rise as a result of losing Shutdown Cooling.

(1) (2)

A. 117°F Drywell B. 117°F Containment C. 173°F Drywell D. 173°F Containment Answer: A Explanation:

Per AOP-3, Automatic Isolations, at 117°F the RHR shutdown cooling valves (E12-F008/F009/F053A/F053B) will isolate based on a high temperature in the RHR equipment room.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination With RPV Head Vent not aligned to MSL A, it would be aligned to the Drywell Equipment drain sump.

From GOP-2:

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The containment is plausible if the applicant confuses mode 4 and 5. If the plant was in mode 5 the head bolts would no longer be tensioned and the heat from the vessel would directly be sent to the upper pools which are in containment.

C. Per AOP-3, 173F is plausible if the applicant confuses the shutdown cooling setpoint with the main steam line tunnel temperature isolation setpoint.

D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of shutdown cooling isolation setpoints. Also, the applicant must understand the overall impact of a loss of shutdown cooling and the changing plant conditions as a result of the isolation.

Technical

References:

AOP-3, Automatic Isolations Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-204 Obj.4

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295023 (APE 23) Refueling Accidents / 8 Tier 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the Group # 1 following as they apply to REFUELING K/A AA2.01 ACCIDENTS: Rating 3.6 AA2.01 Area radiation levels Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 48 Initial Conditions: MODE 5 Gas bubbles are observed rising after an Irradiated Fuel Bundle was dropped in the Spent Fuel Pool.

Which Area Radiation Monitor would detect the High Airborne activity and what immediate action should be taken to prevent fuel handling personnel exposure?

A. RMS-RE192, FUEL BLDG. REFUELING FLOOR. Evacuate the Fuel Building.

B. RMS-RE140, REACTOR BLDG REFUELING FLOOR, Evacuate the Reactor Building.

C. RMS-RE192, FUEL BLDG. REFUELING FLOOR. Initiate Fuel Building Filter trains.

D. RMS-RE140, REACTOR BLDG REFUELING FLOOR, Initiate Standby Gas Filter Trains.

Answer: A Explanation:

Per R-STM-511, Radiation Monitors, RMS-RE192 monitors elevation 148 in the fuel building. If gas bubbles are observed rising after a fuel bundle was dropped in the spent fuel pool which is in the fuel building, RMS-RE192 would detect the high airborne activity.

AOP-27, Fuel Handling Mishaps, will be entered due to the observation of bas bubbles escaping from the spent fuel. As a result, the fuel building will be evacuated.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Per AOP-27:

Distracters:

A Correct Answer B Plausible if applicant confuses the location of the spent fuel pool with the refuel

. floor fuel pool. Per R-STM-511 Radiation Monitoring, C Plausible if the applicant confuses action with RMS-RE5A or 5B high radiation

. initiation. The fuel building charcoal filter trains are for the exhaust, not for recirculation and would not protect personnel exposure inside the fuel building.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Per AOP-27, D Plausible if applicant confuses with RMS-RE11A or 11B. See B and C.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the radiation monitors associated with the spent fuel pool to determine if a refueling accident has occurred. The applicant must also know the required action to minimize personnel exposure as a result of the refueling accident.

Technical

References:

R-STM-511, Radiation Monitors AOP-27, Fuel Handling Mishaps Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between Group # 1 HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE and the K/A EK2.17 following: Rating 3.0 EK2.17 Auxiliary building isolation logic: Revisio Plant-Specific 2 n

Revision Statement:

Made changes as suggested to meet the Tier 1 component Added more detail to the distractor analysis Question: 49 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A small break LOCA has occurred resulting in the following Plant Parameters:

PARAMETER READING Reactor Water Level 25 inches and stable (lowest -15 inches)

Containment Pressure 0.03 psig and stable Drywell Pressure 1.43 psig and lowering (highest 1.74 psig)

EOP-3, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT and RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL, was entered due to rising area radiation levels.

Based on the conditions above, Enclosure 38, DEFEATING AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC RPV LOW LEVEL AND HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE ISOLATION INTERLOCKS, can be installed to defeat the _(1)_ isolation interlock to allow operation of an Auxiliary Building _(2)_ fan to operate in conjunction with Standby Gas Treatment to lower radiation levels.

(1) (2)

A. RPV Low Level Supply B. RPV Low Level Exhaust C. High Drywell Pressure Supply D. High Drywell Pressure Exhaust Answer: C

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Explanation:

The applicant must analyze the plant data and determine which LOCA signals have been exceeded. RPV water level reached a low value of -15 in (which is below Level 3 but above Level 2) and Drywell Pressure exceeded the LOCA isolation point of 1.68 psid. (1.74-.03= 1.71). Enclosure 38 is needed to defeat the High Drywell Pressure isolation signal.

From EOP-3:

The determination of whether operation of a system is necessary necessitates a judgment based on the nature of the event and current plant conditions. For example, an Auxiliary Building supply fan could be operated in conjunction with SGT to supply cool fresh air to assist in cooling and radiation levels reduction.

Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant confuses high drywell isolation signal with the RPV low level isolation signal.

B. See B C. Correct Answer D. Plausible if applicant confuses which fan will aid the SGT system in removing excess airborne radiation.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of high drywell isolation signal relationship to the Auxiliary building isolation and the alignment of standby gas treatment.

Technical

References:

R-STM-409, Auxiliary Building HVAC Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-404 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level 50 295025 (EPE 2) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the Group # 1 following responses as they apply to K/A EK3.09 HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: Rating 3.9 EK3.09 Low-low set initiation Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Made changes as suggested to meet the Tier 1 component Question: 50 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A Loss of Offsite power has occurred followed by a hydraulic lock ATWS.

The MCR entered EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS.

Low-Low Set would initiate to minimize the cyclic stresses on the _(1)_ Vessel.

OSP-53 directs the operator to leave the lowest Low-Low Set Valve, _(2)_, in AUTO while operating the other Low-Low Set valves in MANUAL to control pressure in the prescribed band.

(1) (2)

A. Reactor B21-F051B B. Reactor B21-F051D C. Containment B21-F051B D. Containment B21-F051D Answer: D Explanation:

Per R-STM-109, Main Steam System,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant confuses opening setpoint changes with closing setpoint changes. Reactor vessel plausible due to SRVs controlling RPV pressure.

B. See A C. See A D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of low-low set initiation setpoint changes and the reason for the changes.

Technical

References:

R-STM-109, Main Steam System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-109 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295026 (EPE 3) Suppression Pool High Tier 1 Water Temperature / 5 Group # 1 Knowledge of the operational K/A EK1.02 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.5 they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL Revisio HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: n 1 EK1.02 Steam condensation Revision Statement:

Made changes as suggested to meet the Tier 1 component Question: 51 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A Safety Relief Valve has failed open.

AOP-35, SAFETY RELIEF VALVE STUCK OPEN, directs the ATC operator to reduce Reactor power to less than or equal to _(1)_.

If ALL subsequent actions of AOP-35 have failed to close the SRV, AOP-35 directs the operator to _(2)_ to prevent the Suppression Pool from being heated beyond design limits.

(1) (2)

A. 85% Place the MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN B. 85% Initiate Suppression Pool Cooling C. 88% Place the MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN D. 88% Initiate Suppression Pool Cooling Answer: C Explanation:

From AOP-35:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant confuses with the power setpoint for two Feed Pumps B. Plausible if applicant confuses with the power setpoint for two Feed Pumps C. Correct Answer D. Initiating Suppression Pool Cooling is an action in AOP-35 but K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the operational implications of Steam condensation as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE.

Technical

References:

Tech Spec 3.6.2.1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-57 Obj.13 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295027 (EPE 4) High Containment Tier 1 Temperature (Mark III Containment Only) / Group # 1 5 K/A EA1.03 Ability to operate and/or monitor the Rating 3.5 following as they apply to HIGH Revisio CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III n CONTAINMENT ONLY) : 0 EA1.03 Emergency Depressurization Mark III Revision Statement:

Question: 52 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A LOCA has occurred and Containment parameters are rising due to Drywell bypass leakage.

EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, entry is required when Containment air temperature is >_(1)_.

When containment temperature cannot be maintained below _(2)_ (containment design temperature), EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED.

(1) (2)

A. 90°F 185°F B. 90°F 330°F C. 100°F 185°F D. 100°F 330°F Answer: A Explanation:

Per EOP-2, Primary Containment Control:

Entry requirement for CTMT Temperature

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. 330F is plausible based on drywell temperature requirements per EOP-2.

C. 100F is plausible if applicant confuses with suppression pool temperature entry requirement for EOP-2.

D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must understand the relationship between the high containment temperature and the requirement for emergency depressurization.

Technical

References:

EOP-2, Primary Containment Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0515 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295030 (EPE 7) Low Suppression Pool Tier 1 Water Level / 5 Group # 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A EK2.07 LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER Rating 3.5 LEVEL and the following: Revisio EK2.07 Downcomer/ horizontal vent n 0 submergence Revision Statement:

Question: 53 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A Suppression Pool leak into the Auxiliary Building Crescent Area has occurred.

Per EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, maintaining Suppression Pool Level 15 ft 5 ensures a MINIMUM of ___ submergence of the Mark III horizontal vents.

A. 2 ft B. 3 ft C. 4 ft D. 5 ft Answer: A Explanation:

Per EPSTG*002, EOP-2 Bases

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

B. Plausible if applicant confuses difference in suppression pool levels of EOP-2 low level entry and CMS-RTD40 are uncovered and inaccurate.

C. Plausible if applicant confuses difference in suppression pool levels of EOP-2 low level entry and horizontal vents not adequately covered.

D. Plausible if applicant confuses the distance between the horizontal vents. The first two vents are located at 82ft 3 inches and 77 ft 3 inches.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the suppression pool level and the reason for the different levels. Specifically, what level ensures the submergence of the horizontal vents.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

EPSTG*002, EOP-2 Bases USAR (page 119/8588) Figure 1.2-12, General Arrangement Reactor Building Sections 1-1 &1-2.

Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(9)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295031 (EPE 8) Reactor Low Water Level / Tier 1 2 Group # 1 Knowledge of the operational K/A EK1.02 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.8 they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER Revisio LEVEL: n (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10) 1 EK1.02 Natural circulation Revision Statement:

Changed distractor A to make it more plausible.

Question: 54 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A LOCA has resulted in Reactor Water Level Lowering to -50 inches before the leak was isolated.

IAW EOP-1, RPV CONTROL, Reactor Water Level band is 45 to 100 inches.

The LOW end of this level band will __________.

A. maintain indicated level within the narrow range band B. stop and reverse bottom head cooldown due to stratification C. establish a cooldown below 200°F with the RHR shutdown cooling D. maintain a suitable margin from system initiations and isolations that will occur should RPV level drop to the Level 2 setpoint Answer: B Explanation:

Per EPSTG*002,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Plausible due to the fact that 45 inches is within the narrow band of 0 to 60 inches.

B. Correct Answer C. Plausible if applicant confuses reason for 75 inches.

D. Plausible if applicant confuses reason for low end of expanded band.

K/A Match The applicant must know the operational implications of using the natural circulation RPV water level band in the EOPs.

Technical

References:

EPSTG*002, EOP Bases Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-513 Obj.4

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295037 (EPE 14) Scram Condition Present Tier 1 and Reactor Power Above APRM Group # 1 Downscale or Unknown / 1 K/A EK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the Rating 4.3 following responses as they apply to Revisio SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND n REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM 0 DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN :

EK3.02 SBLC injection Revision Statement:

Question: 55 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power After a Plant Transient, the Main Control Room has entered EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS.

The CRS has directed Boron Injection to achieve a Cold Shutdown.

The Cold Shutdown Boron Weight (CSBW) is that amount of soluble boron which, if injected into the RPV and mixed uniformly, will maintain the reactor shutdown under all conditions.

The CSBW is determined assuming:

A. All control rods are fully withdrawn.

B. RPV pressure is at 1100 psia.

C. No shutdown cooling is in service.

D. Full power equilibrium xenon is present in the reactor core.

Answer: A Explanation:

Per EPSTG*002, The CSBW is determined assuming All control rods are fully withdrawn.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Plausible if applicant confuses assumptions for hot shutdown boron weight as shown below.

C. Plausible if applicant confuses assumptions for hot shutdown boron weight as shown below.

D. Plausible if applicant confuses assumptions for hot shutdown boron weight as shown below.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the reasons why different boron capacities are injected during an ATWS and the assumptions associated with the boron weights.

Technical

References:

EPSTG*002, EOP Bases Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective: RLP-HLO-515 Obj.8 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10) 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295038 (EPE 15) High Offsite Tier 1 Radioactivity Release Rate / 9 Group # 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A EK2.01 HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE and the Rating 3.1 following: Revisio EK2.01 Radwaste 1 n

Revision Statement:

Rewrote the question to meet the Tier 1 criteria.

Question: 56 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power LWS discharge to the river in progress During the discharge from a _(1)_ Tank, RMS-RE107 reached its HIGH ALARM setpoint.

How does the operator verify the discharge is terminated IAW ARP-RMS-DSPL230?

(1) (2)

A. Waste Collector Pump trip B. Waste Collector Valve closure C. Recovery Sample Pump trip D. Recovery Sample Valve closure Answer: D Explanation:

A LWS discharge is from a Recovery Sample Tank. Waste Collector Tanks and Floor Drain Collector Tanks only collect the water that needs to be processed.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant if the applicant confuses the tanks that used for a discharge.

B. Plausible if applicant if the applicant confuses the tanks that used for a discharge C. Plausible if applicant confuses the action that terminates a discharge.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the process to transfer radwaste tanks and which rad monitor has an associated automatic isolation due to high radioactivity release rate.

Technical

References:

R-STM-511, Radiation Monitors SOP-113, LIQUID RADWASTE PROCESSING/RECOVERY SAMPLE TANK SYSTEM ARP-RMS-DSPL230 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-606 OBJ.8 Question Source: Bank #

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(13)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 600000 (APE 24) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Tier 1 G2.4.49 Ability to perform without Group # 1 reference to procedures those actions K/A G2.4.49 that require immediate operation of Rating 4.6 system components and controls. Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 57 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A FIRE in the Main Control Room has resulted in the implementation of AOP-31, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM.

Which of the following is an Immediate Operator Action from AOP-31?

A. Initiate RCIC B. Close all MSIVs C. Evacuate the Main Control Room D. Place the Mode Switch in the Shutdown Position Answer: D Explanation:

Per AOP-31, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM, Distracters:

Per AOP-31, Subsequent actions:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination A. Plausible if applicant confuses subsequent operator actions with immediate operator actions. See above.

B. Plausible if applicant confuses subsequent operator actions with immediate operator actions. See above.

C. Plausible if applicant confuses subsequent operator actions with immediate operator actions. See above.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match Given a fire in the main control room, the applicant must have knowledge of immediate operator actions IAW AOP-31.

Technical

References:

AOP-31, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-AOP31 Obj.5

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank # RBS 2010 X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

Ranked #1 Fire Zone

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Tier 1 Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 Group # 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the K/A AA2.04 following as they apply to GENERATOR Rating 3.6 VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID Revisio DISTURBANCES: n (CFR: 41.5 ) 0 AA2.04 VARs outside capability curve Revision Statement:

Question: 58 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power The Main Control Room has entered AOP-64, DEGRADED GRID, due to a large Grid Transient.

The Main Generator has a LEADING Power Factor of 0.9, and ALL other Main Generator parameters are normal.

The ATC Operator should _(1)_ VARS to prevent _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. raise Field Heating B. raise Armature Core End Heating C. lower Field Heating D. lower Armature Core End Heating Answer: D Explanation:

Per SOP-80, Main Generator,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Based on given conditions the ATC should RAISE excitation to LOWER VARS to prevent Armature Core End Heading. Per Attachment 8, Capability Curves:

Distracters:

A. Raise is plausible if the applicant confuses the units while reading the graph.

The Y-axis must be raised, but with a leading pf the VARS should be lowered.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Field heating is plausible if applicant confuses the readings on the graph. If the applicant assumes a lagging pf of 0.9, Curve AB is limited by field heating.

B. See A C. See A D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must apply the given abnormal conditions to the capabilities curve and determine the required action to correct the conditions and the reason for the actions.

Technical

References:

SOP-80, Main Generator Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

SOP-80, Main Generator, Attachment 8, Capability Curves Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295007 (APE 7) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier 1 G2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate Group # 2 components, including local controls. K/A G2.1.30 Rating 4.4 Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 59 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power The presence of TOXIC FUMES has resulted in an evacuation of the Main Control Room.

ALL Emergency Transfer switches have been repositioned IAW AOP-31, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM.

Which of the following components are available to control Reactor Pressure, and where are they located?

A. 3 SRVs at the DIV 1 Remote Shutdown Panel ONLY.

B. 3 SRVs ONLY at the DIV 1 and DIV 2 Remote Shutdown Panels.

C. 3 SRVs and RCIC at the DIV 1 and DIV 2 Remote Shutdown Panels.

D. 3 SRVs ONLY at the DIV 1 and DIV 2 Remote Shutdown Panels, and RCIC at the DIV 1 Remote Shutdown Panel.

Answer: D Explanation:

Per R-STM-200, Remote Shutdown, three (3) Safety Relief Valves (SRVs), B21-F05lC, D and G can be operated from either RSS Room.

Also, the RCIC system, when controlled from C61-P001, has steam, water and RCIC test flow paths, Figure 3. Additionally, it can only be controlled and operated from C61-P001.

Per R-STM-209, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, RCIC operation may provide more stability for pressure control, requiring less SRV cycling, and therefore help in

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination level control. Any energy being consumed by the RCIC turbine operation is that much less energy being deposited into the suppression pool.

Distracters:

A. Plausible if applicant confuses what is located on the division 2 panel. There are several components specific to the individual panels.

B. Plausible if applicant forgets about using RCIC for pressure control.

C. Plausible if applicant confuses what is on both remote shutdown panels. RCIC is not located on the division 2 remote shutdown panel.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of where to operate components for pressure control at the remote shutdown panels.

Technical

References:

R-STM-200, Remote Shutdown System R-STM-209, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-AOP31 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295010 (APE 10) High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the Group # 2 following as they apply to HIGH K/A AA1.02 DRYWELL PRESSURE : Rating 3.6 AA1.02 Drywell floor and equipment drain Revisio sumps 1 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 60 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power AOP-13, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, was entered due to elevated UNIDENTIFIED leakage caused by a small steam leak.

(1) Which of the following Drywell sump tank levels would be monitored to manually calculate UNIDENTIFIED leakage?

(A) (B)

(2) If the small steam leak developed into a large LOCA, which of the following signal(s) would isolate ALL Drywell sumps?

(1) (2)

A. A RPV Level 2: -43 inches ONLY

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination B. A RPV Level 2: -43 inches and High Drywell Pressure: 1.68 psid C. B RPV Level 2: -43 inches ONLY D. B RPV Level 2: -43 inches and High Drywell Pressure: 1.68 psid Answer: B Explanation:

Per STM-207:

Per STM-609:

Distracters:

A. Plausible because Drywell Floor drain sump level does factor into the unidentified leakage calculation. Some isolation valves only close on a Level 2 and not 1.68 psid (ie RWCU).

B. Correct Answer C. Wrong Drywell sumps. Equipment drains due factor in for identified leakage.

D. See C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the operation of floor and equipment drain sump pumps during a LOCA. The applicant must also have knowledge of alternate alignment methods for the system.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

STM-609 STM-207 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0609 Obj.7 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295012 (APE 12) High Drywell Tier 1 Temperature / 5 Group # 2 Knowledge of the reasons for the K/A AK3.01 following responses as they apply to Rating 3.5 HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: Revisio AK3.01 Increased drywell cooling 1 n

Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 61 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A partial loss of Drywell Cooling has occurred due to the loss of NHS-MCC102A.

EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT, entry is required when Drywell air temperature is

>_(1)_, which directs operation of available drywell cooling to maintain Drywell pressure and temperature within limits.

Per EOP-2, Drywell Cooling should be maximized to maintain Drywell temperature and pressure within limits. Maintaining Drywell_(2)_ is the HIGHEST priority because the consequences are more severe.

(1) (2)

A. 140°F Pressure B. 140°F Temperature C. 145°F Pressure D. 145°F Temperature Answer: C Explanation:

EOP-2, Primary Containment Control, entry is required when drywell temperature is above 145°F.

Per EOP-2, step DWT-1, maintain DW pressure and temperature within limits, but maintaining pressure takes priority over maintaining temperature.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. 140°F is plausible if applicant confuses with alarm setpoint for drywell ambient high temperature. The initiating device setpoint is 142°F and the applicant may confuse this with 140°F knowing it is a rounded number multiple of 5.

B. Temperature is plausible if applicant confuses the step requirement for DWT-1, because both temperature and pressure are both maintained per this step.

C. Correct Answer D. See steps A and B.

K/A Match The applicant must know how drywell cooling is operated to prevent drywell temperature and pressure limits from being exceeded. The applicant must also the reason for maintaining the two parameters and the consequences of both parameters.

Technical

References:

EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-404 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295013 (APE 13) High Suppression Pool Tier 1 Temperature. / 5 Group # 2 Knowledge of the operational K/A AK1.01 implications of the following concepts as Rating 2.5 they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL Revisio TEMPERATURE:AK1.01 Pool n 0 stratification Revision Statement:

Question: 62 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A leaking SRV has led to following Suppression Pool Temperature indications on CMS-TR24B:

004 RTD24H 005 RTD24K 86.4 DEG F 81.9 DEG F 001 RTD24B 002 RTD24D 003 RTD24F 85.3 DEG F 98.1 DEG F 100.3 DEG F What is/are the Operational implications of these current temperature indications?

A. Alarm ONLY B. Alarm and entry into Tech Specs ONLY C. Alarm and Mode Switch to Shutdown ONLY D. Alarm, entry into Tech Specs, and Mode Switch to Shutdown Answer: A Explanation:

Per H13-P808/84A/F03, Suppression Pool High Temperature Limit, any of the individual temperatures will initiate the alarm only.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Plausible if applicant confuses the AVERAGE temperature requirement per TS 3.6.2.1:

C. Plausible if applicant confuses with EOP-2 requirement. EOP-2 is required to be entered when Suppression Pool temperature is above 100ºF. EOP entry is based on bulk or average temperature per EPSTG*0001 EOP/SAP introduction.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must understand the pool stratification that takes place with a leaking SRV and determine the operational implications associated with the condition to determine entry into alarm procedure only.

Technical

References:

H13-P808/84A/F03, Suppression Pool High Temperature Limit EOP-2, Primary Containment Control EPSTG*0001 EOP/SAP introduction TS 3.6.2.1, Suppression Pool Average Temperature Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-57 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295029 (EPE 6) High Suppression Pool Tier 1 Water Level / 5 Group # 2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the K/A EA2.02 following as they apply to HIGH Rating 3.5 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: Revisio EA2.02 Reactor pressure 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 63 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power A plant transient has led to entry into EOP-1A, RPV CONTROL-ATWS and EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.

Suppression Pool temperature is currently 135°F and Suppression Pool level is 18 ft and stable.

Which of the following is the HIGHEST Reactor Pressure that can be maintained without exceeding the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit?

A. 650 psig B. 750 psig C. 900 psig D. 950 psig Answer: B Explanation:

Per EOP-2, when the suppression pool level is located between curves on the HCTL curves, then the lower curve (most conservative) must be applied. Per the stem, suppression pool level is at 18 feet and stable, so the 17-foot curve must be applied.

Per the HCTL graph below, the green arrow illustrating 750 psig is the highest pressure allowed to operate in the safe zone.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. 650 psig is plausible if the applicant either chooses the 15 ft 5 in curve or interprets the 750 psig curve is too close to the line and assumes it is unsafe.

B. Correct Answer C. 900 psig is plausible if applicant uses the 19 ft 6-inch curve and assumes the 950 psig curve is too close to the unsafe region.

D. 950 psig is plausible if applicant uses the 19 ft 6-inch curve and uses the highest pressure for that curve.

K/A Match The applicant must be able to interpret the HCTL figure to determine the maximum safe pressure allowed per the given conditions Technical

References:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination EOP-2, Primary Containment Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

HCTL Curve for EOP-1 Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-510 Obj.5 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 295035 (EPE 12) Secondary Containment Tier 1 High Differential Pressure / 5 Group # 2 Knowledge of the operational K/A EK1.01 implications of the following concepts as Rating 3.9 they apply to SECONDARY Revisio CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL n PRESSURE: 2 EK1.01 Secondary containment integrity Revision Statement:

Rewrote the question to make it more plausible Added more detail to the distractor analysis Question: 64 Initial Conditions: MODE 1,100% Power The following alarm received:

H13-P863-72A-F04, AUX BLDG PRESSURE HIGH EOP-3, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT and RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL, is entered.

A high Secondary Containment differential pressure could result in _(1)_.

When directed by the CRS, the Unit operator should Isolate the Auxiliary Building and manually initiate the Standby Gas System by operating _(2)_.

A. (1) uncontrolled release of radioactivity (2) AUX BLDG TO SGT FLTR A and B MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons ONLY B. (1) uncontrolled release of radioactivity (2) AUX BLDG TO SGT FLTR A and B MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons AND HVR-AOD22 and B, ANNULUS MIX SPLY TO SGT hand switches C. (1) compromising equipment reliability (2) AUX BLDG TO SGT FLTR A and B MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons ONLY D. (1) compromising equipment reliability (2) AUX BLDG TO SGT FLTR A and B MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons AND HVR-AOD22 and B, ANNULUS MIX SPLY TO SGT hand switches

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Answer: B Explanation:

Per EOP-3 Bases:

A high secondary containment or fuel building differential pressure is indicative of a potential loss of reactor building structural integrity and could result in uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.

Rising pressure in the excess of 2 psig could cause damage to the HVAC ductwork in the Auxiliary Building.

Per OSP-53:

Distracters:

A. Plausible because the purpose, but presses the manual initiation pushbuttons only open the suction dampers to the Aux Building but does not start the Standby Gas System B. Correct Answer C. Plausible because is the purpose of isolating the Containment vent path when pressure reaches 2 psig is an action from EOP-2 to prevent HVAC duct work damage in the Aux building.

D. See A and C K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the operational implications of the Secondary containment integrity as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.

Technical

References:

R-STM-257 EOP-3 entry requirements basis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination OSP-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 500000 (EPE 16) High Containment Tier 1 Hydrogen Concentration / 5 Group # 2 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A EK2.04 HIGH CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN Rating 2.7 CONCENTRATIONS the following: Revisio EK2.04 Drywell recirculating fan 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 65 Initial Conditions: Post LOCA Containment Hydrogen Concentration 0.5%

Drywell Hydrogen Concentration 0.8%

With the LOCA signal sealed in, the Hydrogen Mixing System is started _(1)_.

While operating the Hydrogen Mixing System, the hydrogen concentration in containment is expected to _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. manually or automatically lower B. manually or automatically rise C. manually ONLY lower D. manually ONLY rise Answer: D Explanation:

Per SOP-40,

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Per R-STM-57, Primary Containment, When the H2 Mixing System is actuated, air from the primary containment enters the Drywell through two openings located diametrically opposite each other, just above the Suppression Pool. The Drywell atmosphere is exhausted into the Primary Containment through two penetrations at the top of the Drywell by two recirculating fans.

The higher concentration of hydrogen in the drywell is circulated to the high volume of containment to be diluted and lower the hydrogen concentration in the drywell. This will result in a higher concentration of hydrogen in containment.

Distracters:

A. Manually or automatically is plausible if the applicant confuses with most systems associated with an automatic LOCA signal start (Ex. All ECCS systems and Standby Gas).

Lower is plausible if applicant confuses the flow path of the hydrogen mixing system.

B. See A C. See A D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of when the Hydrogen Mixing system is required to be in operation per EOP-2.

Technical

References:

SOP-40 R-STM-57, Primary Containment Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.1.13 Knowledge of facility requirements Tier 3 for controlling vital/controlled access. Group # N/A K/A 2.1.13 Rating 2.5 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 66 Per EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, who may authorize non-shift personnel entry into the SURVEILLANCE and CONTROLS AREA -

INCLUDING AT THE CONTROLS (ATC)?

A. ATC ONLY B. ATC or CRS ONLY C. CRS or SM ONLY D. Any on shift control room watch-stander Answer: D Explanation:

Per EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, all Personnel with the exception of the Operations on-shift crew, are required to obtain permission to enter the At-the-Controls Area, the Controls Area, and the Surveillance Area.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

All distractors are plausible due to partial correct answers.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the facility requirements for accessing the control room.

Technical

References:

EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

Per RLP-HLO-206, List responsibilities of the NCO.

Question Source: Bank # 66 2010 Grand X

Gulf NRC (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled Tier 3 procedure copy. Group # N/A K/A 2.1.21 Rating 3.5 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Made corrections as suggested Question: 67 Refer to the pictures below:

(1) Which of the following methods is used to verify the NMM Procedures revision?

Per EN-AD-103, the use of hard copy-controlled documents or a controlled set of aperture cards located in the Control Room _(2)_ be used without verifying the current revision.

(A) (B)

(1) (2)

A. A only may B. A only may not C. A or B may D. A or B may not Answer: A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Explanation:

Per EN-AD-103, Document Control and Records Management Programs, personnel shall ENSURE that work is performed to the current revision by verifying document and record status is active in the following manner:

a. Site Procedure revisions/changes are verified in EDMS only and NMM Procedure revisions are verified using the ECH Eb REFLIB site tree view per EN AD 101.
b. Use of hard copy controlled documents or a controlled set of aperture cards located in Control Room may be used without verifying the current revision in EDMS/AS. In an emergency or simulated emergency, only hard copy controlled documents or Disaster Recovery (DR) computers located in the Emergency Facilities may be used without verifying the current revision in EDMS/AS.

Distracters:

(1) May not is plausible if applicant confuses requirements for controlled copies with uncontrolled copies of procedures.

(2) Applicant may confuse both methods as possible methods to verify current revision. Method 2 will allow the applicant to access the most current revision of all procedures, but the most current revision may not be effective at every site at the same time. In order to determine the current revision effective and applicable to each site, only method one should be used.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the process required to verify the current revisions of controlled copies.

Technical

References:

EN-AD-103, Document Control and Records Management Programs Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety Tier 3 procedures (such as rotating equipment, Group # N/A electrical, high temperature, high K/A 2.1.26 pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and Rating 3.4 hydrogen). Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 68 A tagout is being developed for a water system with the following conditions:

Highest system water temperature: 250°F Highest system water pressure: 250 psig In accordance with EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, the system is ______.

A. NOT a High Energy System B. a High Energy System due to pressure only C. a High Energy System due to temperature only D. a High Energy System due to both pressure and temperature Answer: C Explanation:

EN-OP-102 defines a High Energy System as having a temperature greater than 200F or pressure greater than 500 psig. Therefore, this system is a High Energy System based on a temperature of >200F, but not based on pressure.

Distracters:

A. Incorrect- This is a High Energy System based on a temperature of >200F.

B. Incorrect-The system is a High Energy System, but based on temperature, not pressure. The highest system water pressure is below the threshold of 500 psig.

D. Incorrect- The system is a High Energy System, but based on temperature, not pressure. The highest system water pressure is below the threshold of 500 psig.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the tagging requirements for high temperature and high pressure systems.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

EN-OP-102 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

FLP-OPS-ESOMS, given a plant situation requiring protective tagging actions, the trainee will demonstrate a working knowledge of the protective tagging program as outlined in EN-OP-102.

Question Source: Bank # 2014 Fitzpatrick X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.2.17 Knowledge of the process for Tier 3 managing maintenance activities during Group # N/A power operations, such as risk K/A 2.2.17 assessments, work prioritization, and Rating 2.6 coordination with the transmission Revision system operator. 2 Revision Statement:

Rev 1 Rewrote the question to make it more generic.

Rev 2 Rewrote the question to remove multiple correct answers.

Question: 69 Which of the following activities requires prior notification to the System Dispatcher during a Plant Startup?

A. Entering MODE 2 and Rolling the Main turbine B. Entering MODE 2 and Closing Main Generator disconnects C. Rolling the Main Turbine and Closing Main Generator disconnects D. Rolling the Main Turbine, Entering MODE 2, and Closing Main Generator disconnects Answer: A Explanation:

Per GOP-1:

Notify System Dispatcher of pending startup and give time estimated for unit On the Line. Make appropriate Control Room Log entries.

Per SOP-80:

4.5.15. Notify Load Dispatcher of pending turbine roll.

Distracters:

Closing Main Generator disconnects is in GOP-1 but does not require notifying the System Dispatcher.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of when to notify the System Dispatcher.

Technical

References:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination GOP-1, Plant Startup Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-310, Describe the interfaces between the Main Generator and the following systems: A. Electrical Distribution Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to Tier 3 track inoperable alarms. Group # N/A K/A 2.2.43 Rating 3.0 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 70 Per EN-OP-115-08, Annunciator Response, Attachment 1 (Annunciator Removal from Service or Modification) is required to be completed if an annunciator is non-functional due to failure extending beyond ______.

A. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> C. 1 shift D. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Answer: C Explanation:

Per EN-OP-115-08, Annunciator Response, an annunciator that is non-functional due to a failure is documented on Attachment 1 if non-functionality is expected to extend beyond ONE shift.

Distracters:

A. Plausible if confused with the numerous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time required items.

B. Plausible if confused with EN-OP-115, Walkdown Main Control Room panels outside the At the Controls area approximately every three hours.

D. Plausible if confused with EN-OP-115-07, configuration control requirements. The difference between short term and long term configuration control is less than or greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

K/A Match Applicant must be knowledgeable of the process used to track inoperable alarms including the time requirement to document a non-functional alarm.

Technical

References:

EN-OP-115-08, Annunciator Response Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.2.35 Ability to determine Technical Tier 3 Specification Mode of Operation. Group # N/A K/A 2.2.35 Rating 3.6 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Rewrote worded the stem to raise the LOD Question: 71 Initial Conditions: Reactor Coolant temperature is 125F The Steam Dryer is currently being removed NO surveillance testing in progress What Mode of operation is the plant in IAW Technical Specifications?

A. Mode 2 Startup B. Mode 3 Hot Shutdown C. Mode 4 Cold Shutdown D. Mode 5 Refueling Answer: D Explanation:

With switch in refuel and fuel shuffle in progress, the RPV head would have to be removed meaning the head bolts are not tensioned. This is a MODE 5 refueling configuration.

Per TS 1.1 Definitions:

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. The RPV head is removed, Startup requires head bolts tensioned B. To be in MODE 4 or 5, mode switch is required to be in Shutdown C. To be in MODE 4 or 5, mode switch is required to be in Shutdown D. Correct Answer K/A Match Given the plant conditions, the applicant must be able to determine the appropriate mode of operation.

Technical

References:

Tech Spec Definitions Table 1.1-1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-416 Obj.3 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure Tier 3 limits under normal or emergency Group # N/A conditions. K/A 2.3.4 Rating 3.2 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 72 Which of the following are the Annual Regulatory Limits?

TEDE: Total Effective Dose Equivalent SDE: Shallow Dose Equivalent WB: Whole Body LDE: Lens Dose Equivalent TEDE (mrem per year) SDE, WB (rem) LDE (rem)

A. 4500 40 12 B. 5000 40 12 C. 5000 50 15 D. 4500 50 15 Answer: C Explanation:

Per EN-RP-201, Dosimetry Administration:

Annual Regulatory Limits TEDE = 5 rem LDE = 15 rem SDE, WB = 50 rem Distracters:

The limits are Entergy Routine Annual Administrative Guidelines.

Maximum Annual Administrative Guidelines TEDE = 4.5 rem LDE = 12 rem SDE, WB = 40 rem

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the annual regulatory requirement.

Technical

References:

EN-RP-201 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

Rad Worker Objectives Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #2016 X

parent) RBS NRC 72 New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(12)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Modified from 2016 NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO Radiation Control Tier # 3 Group #

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under K/A # 2.3.4 normal or emergency conditions. Rating 3.2 Revision 1 Question 72 Which of the following exposure limits are Entergy's Routine Annual Administrative Guidelines?

TEDE: Total Effective Dose Equivalent SDE: Shallow Dose Equivalent WB: Whole Body LDE: Lens Done Equivalent TEDE (mrem per year) SDE, WB (rem) LDE (rem)

A. 2000 40 12 B. 5000 40 12 C. 5000 50 15 D. 2000 50 15 Answer: A Explanation:

A. is correct, the limits are Entergy Routine Annual Administrative Guidelines B. Is incorrect, Maximum Annual Administrative guidelines for Entergy C. is incorrect, they are Annual Regulatory limits D. is incorrect, they are a mix of different limits Technical

References:

EN-RP-201 References to be provided to applicants during exam: None Learning Objective: Rad Worker Objectives.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam No

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental F2 Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(12)

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work Tier 3 permit requirements during normal or Group # N/A abnormal conditions. K/A 2.3.7 Rating 3.5 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Changed LOD from 3 to 2 Question: 73 What type of information would you expect to find on a General Radiation Work Permit (RWP)?

A. Dose rates at Hot Spots B. An individuals dose margin C. Electronic Alarming Dosimeter (EAD) settings D. Total department cumulative dose and dose goals Answer: C Explanation:

Per EN-RP-105, Radiological Work Permits, EAD Settings are provided on each RWP. See attached RWP.

Distracters:

An individuals dose margin is not available on the RWP, nor is the department dose/dose goal. The dose rate at a Hot Spot is found on survey maps.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of what is contained in RWP to comply with RWP.

Technical

References:

EN-RP-105, Rev 4 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

FCBT-GET-RWT:

State the function of the Radiation Work Permit and the responsibility for complying with its requirements.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Extract information for an RWP (for example protective clothing, dosimetry, special instructions.

Question Source: Bank # 2008 RBS NRC X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(12)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination 2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident Tier 3 instrumentation. Group # N/A K/A 2.4.3 Rating 3.7 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 74 The plant has experienced an ATWS condition and you are asked to verify reactor water level with a Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrument by the CRS prior to lowering level for power control.

Which of the following reactor water level instruments is appropriate for this request and how can you tell if it is a PAM instrument?

A. 1) Wide range recorder B21 LR/PR-R623B on panel P601

2) red label with Post-Accident Monitor letters in white or black B. 1) Fuel zone instrument B21 LI-R610 on panel P680
2) red label with Post-Accident Monitor letters in white or black C. 1) Fuel zone instrument B21 LI-R610 on panel P680
2) tan label with Post-Accident Monitor letters in white or black D. 1) Wide range recorder B21 LR/PR-R623B on panel P601
2) tan label with Post-Accident Monitor letters in white or black Answer: D Explanation:

Photo of instrumentation is shown below.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Per R-STM-51, Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation:

Distracters:

A is wrong because the label is tan not red. The second part (the instrument is correct)

B is wrong because of both aspects. The label is tan not red, and this PAM fuel zone instrument is not located on the P680 panel.

C is wrong because the PAM fuel zone instrument is not located on the P680 panel.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the post-accident instrumentation and labeling requirements.

Technical

References:

R-STM-0051 Rev 6, page 41

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0051 Obj B3-B6 Question Source: Bank # 2016 NRC 62 X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level RO 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions Tier 3 and immediate action steps. Group # N/A K/A 2.4.1 Rating 4.6 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 75 Which of the following EOP entries requires an immediate manual reactor scram?

A. EOP-1, RPV Control B. EOP-2, Primary Containment Control C. EOP-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control D. EOP-4, RPV Flooding Answer: A Explanation:

Per EOP-1, step RC-1, Verify reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN.

Distracters:

All other EOPs are plausible because they have steps that include a manual reactor scram; however, only EOP has it required immediately.

K/A Match The question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the immediate actions upon entry to the EOPs.

2021 RBS RO NRC Examination Technical

References:

EOP-1, RPV Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-0512:

3. List the EOP-1 entry conditions.
7. Given EOP-1 RPV Control and EOP-4 Continencies flowcharts and plant conditions, determine the next action required to be implemented.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental X Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

N/A PRA Applicability:

N/A

CONTINUOUS USE ATTACHMENT 13 PAGE 2 OF 2 INITIATING STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL INJECTION REQUIREMENTS TANK LEVEL PRIOR TANK LEVEL AFTER TANK LEVEL AFTER TO INJECTION INJECTION OF 74 lb Boron INJECTION OF 166 lb Boron (approximately 17 min inj time) (approximately 37 min inj time)

GAL GAL GAL NOTE WHEN tank level falls between values, THEN the smaller value should be used.

1505 833 0 1550 878 45 1600 928 95 1700 1028 195 1800 1128 295 1900 1228 395 2000 1328 495 2100 1428 595 2200 1528 695 2300 1628 795 2400 1728 895 2500 1828 995 2600 1928 1095 2700 2028 1195 2800 2128 1295 2900 2228 1395 3000 2328 1495 3100 2428 1595 3200 2528 1695 3300 2628 1795 3400 2728 1895 3500 2828 1995 3600 2928 2095 3700 3028 2195 3800 3128 2295 3900 3228 2395 4000 3328 2495 4100 3428 2595 4200 3528 2695

(§§§)Do not type any more of this Attachment's information below this line. ZZZOrder2_16Stop OSP-0053 REV - 027 PAGE 51 OF 87

SOP-0010 Rev. 059 Page 141 of 142 MSR and FW Heaters Extraction Steam and Drains 6 Page 1 of 1 MSR Operating Curve

CONTINUOUS USE ATTACHMENT 8 PAGE 1 OF 1 CAPABILITY CURVES - Capability CurvesÇ ZZZOrder1_21Start[2.5.8][ ][ ][2.5.10]

(§§§)Do not type any more of this Attachments information below this line. ZZZOrder1_21Stop SOP-0080 REV - 342 PAGE 81 OF 87

River Bend Station RO Written Answer Key Question # Answer Question # Answer Question # Answer 1 B 26 D 51 C 2 B 27 B 52 A 3 D 28 A 53 A 4 A 29 A 54 B 5 D 30 B 55 A 6 B 31 D 56 D 7 D 32 A 57 D 8 A 33 D 58 D 9 A 34 A 59 D 10 D 35 D 60 B 11 B 36 C 61 C 12 C 37 A 62 A 13 A 38 D 63 B 14 B 39 B 64 B 15 B 40 A 65 D 16 C 41 C 66 D 17 B 42 D 67 A 18 A 43 C 68 C 19 C 44 D 69 A 20 C 45 C 70 C 21 A 46 B 71 D 22 D 47 A 72 C 23 D 48 A 73 C 24 A 49 C 74 D 25 C 50 D 75 A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295018 (APE 18) Partial or Complete Loss Tier 1 of CCW / Group # 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the K/A AA2.04 following as they apply to PARTIAL OR Rating 2.9 COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT Revision COOLING WATER: 1 AA2.04 System flow Revision Statement:

Edited the initial conditions to say 3 days after a refueling outage.

Updated Explanation statement.

Question: 76 Initial Conditions: MODE 1 100% Power (BOL), 3 days after a 21 day Refueling Outage.

SFC-E1A, Fuel Pool Cooler A In-Service Spent Fuel Temperature is 130°F A Plant transient has resulted in the following indications:

The CCP System has stabilized.

(1) Which Safety Loop(s) Of CCP have lost CCP System Flow?

(2) IAW AOP-11, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, the CRS should FIRST prioritize aligning _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. DIV 1 ONLY SSW B to the CRD Pump Bearing Cooler B. DIV 1 ONLY SSW A to the Fuel Pool Cooler A C. DIV 1 and DIV 2 SSW B to the CRD Pump Bearing Cooler D. DIV 1 and DIV 2 SSW A to the Fuel Pool Cooler A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Answer: C Explanation:

Based on light indication, the CCP system experienced an extreme low pressure condition of <56 psig in the DIV 1 safety loop that is possibly due to system leak. This signal will cause an isolation of both Safety Loops(DIV 1 and DIV 2) and SSW Standby Service Water system automatically initiates and can be supplied to the CCP safety related components at the discretion of the Operations Shift Manager or Control Room Supervisor (AOP-0011, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Subsequent Operator Actions). The Safety-related loads are the RHR Pump Seal Coolers and Fuel Pool Coolers. The B safety loop also provides cooling to the CRD pumps bearing cooler. The CRD pumps receive a trip signal if a <56 psig is receive in either safety loop due both safety loops losing CCP system flow.

From R-STM-0115:

From AOP-11:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Restoration of the CRD system is more time critical than restoring cooling of the Spent Fuel Pool. With the CRD pumps tripped due to the <56 psig signal charging water pressure has dropped, and accumulator faults will start occurring. After 2 faults occur, the crew has a minimum of 20 minutes to restore cooling back to the CRD system and start a CRD pump. The Spent Fuel Pool at the EOL will take over 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> to reach 200°F Distracters:

A. This distractor is stating that ONLY DIV1 safety loop will be isolated due to the <

56 psig isolation signal. This is plausible due the fact only DIV 1 valves will isolate, however, there are DIV 1 valves that isolate the DIV 2 safety loop as well. The applicant may only think that the DIV 1 loop is isolated due to divisional separation criteria.

B. This distractor is stating that ONLY DIV1 safety loop will be isolated due to the <

56 psig isolation signal. This is plausible due the fact only DIV 1 valves will isolate, however, there are DIV 1 valves that isolate the DIV 2 safety loop as well. The applicant may only think that the DIV 1 loop is isolated due to divisional separation criteria.

C. Correct Answer D. First part is correct, But the CRD System is more critical then Spent Fuel Cooling.

K/A Match The applicant is required to determine and/or interpret CCP system after a PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

Technical

References:

AOP-11 R-STM-0115 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-115 Obj.4 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier 1 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system Group # 1 limits and precautions. K/A 2.1.32 Rating 4.0 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Rewrote the entire question to better meet the K/A Question: 77 Per TS B 3.6.5.4 Drywell Pressure, The limitation on _(1)_ Drywell-to-Primary Containment differential ensures Drywell INTERNAL Pressure Differential will not exceed its design basis limit of _(2)_ psid during a postulated LOCA due to differences in water level of the Suppression Pool and the Weir Annulus.

(1) (2)

A. positive 20 B. positive 25 C. negative 20 D. negative 25 Answer: D Explanation:

From TS B 3.6.5.4:

Drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure shall be -0.3 psid and 1.2 psid.

The limitation on negative drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure ensures that changes in calculated peak LOCA drywell pressures due to differences in water level of the suppression pool and the drywell weir annulus are negligible. The limitation on positive drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure helps ensure that the horizontal vents are not cleared with normal weir annulus water level.

From USAR 6.2:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. See B and C B. Plausible due to being the correct design basis internal differential pressure.

C. Plausible due to the correct Tech Spec pressure.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant is required to have the ability to explain and apply the of this systems limitations and precautions.

Technical

References:

TS 3.6.5.4 STM-57 USAR 6.2.1.1.3 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-57 Obj.13 Question Source: Bank # ADD old question (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)2 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295025 (EPE 2) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the Group # 1 following as they apply to HIGH K/A EA2.05 REACTOR PRESSURE: Rating 3.6 EA2.05 Decay heat generation Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 78 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A large Main Condenser leak has caused Condenser vacuum to degrade.

The ATC operator placed the Mode Switch in the Shutdown position when Main Condenser vacuum reached 23Hg/Vac, and reported the following:

Main Condenser vacuum has lowered to 5Hg/Vac.

The increase of Reactor Pressure caused by Decay Heat Generation will be controlled by the cycling of _(1)_ Low-Low Set SRV(s).

The CRS should direct an RPV Level band of _(2)_.

(1) (2)

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. One 10 to 51 inches B. One -20 to 51 inches C. Two 10 to 51 inches D. Two -20 to 51 inches Answer: B Explanation:

(1) The Plant has been scrammed due to lowering Main Condenser and ALL control rods went in from the scram report. Decay Heat will account for the majority of Reactor Power which will be less than 1% after scram. An SRV has the capacity to pass 7% Reactor Power. So only one SRV will be cycling to relieve pressure from decay heat steam generation (2) From the Scram Report, EOP-1 was entered on Level 3. Normal Level band in EOP-1 is 10 to 51 inches. Main Condenser lowering below 8.5 Hg/Vac will cause the MSIVs to isolate. The expanded level band of -20 to 51 inches simplifies control of RPV injection systems during emergencies when the RPV is isolated.

Distracters:

A. Plausible due to one SRV cycling to relieve pressure created decay heat generation, but the level band should be expanded from the normal band to accommodate for shrink and swell from SRV operation.

B. Correct Answer .

C. Plausible due to the fact the applicant may assume the normal level band for EOP-1 is required in this situation, and this is the incorrect amount of SRVs cycling to control pressure generated from decay heat.

D. Plausible due to the correct level band being directed, but this is the incorrect amount of SRVs cycling to control pressure generated from decay heat K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to determine how SRVs are required to control High Reactor Pressure generated by decay heat.

Technical

References:

USAR 5.2-12

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination EOP-1, RPV CONTROL Bases Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295026 (EPE 3) Suppression Pool High Tier 1 Water Temperature / 5 Group # 1 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions K/A 2.2.22 for operations and safety limits. Rating 4.7 Revisio 1

n Revision Statement:

Changed 110°F to 100°F as suggested Question: 79 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power At time 0800, the RCIC system was started IAW STP-209-6310, RCIC QUARTERLY PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY TEST.

While the RCIC system is in operation, Suppression Pool Average Temperature shall be less than or equal to _(1)_ per TS 3.6.2.1.

If Suppression Pool Average Temperature is verified the first time as required per Condition A of TS 3.6.2.1, then it MUST be verified the SECOND TIME within _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 100°F 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. 100°F 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> C. 105°F 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> D. 105°F 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> Answer: D Explanation:

Part 1 of the question is above the line Tech Spec information:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination RCIC is a steam driven system that exhausts to the Suppression Pool, adding heat.

Part 2 of the question is based on the applicants knowledge of generic LCO SR 3.0.2:

Condition A of TS 3.6.2.1 states the following:

SR 3.0.2 states the following:

Verifying Suppression Temperature is 110°F qualifies for the 25% extension after the first one is performed, so each verification after qualifies for the 25% extension.

Distracters:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. 100°F applies is the incorrect temperature. Verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed.

B. 100°F applies is the incorrect temperature. Verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed C. 105°F applies is the correct temperature for this situation, however, verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed D. Correct Answer .

K/A Match The K/A states Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Suppression Pool High Water Temperature and TS 3.6.2.1 deals directly with Suppression Pool Temperature LCOs.

Technical

References:

TS 3.6.2.1 and SR 3.0.2 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0057 Obj.9 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)2 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295031 (EPE 8) Reactor Low Water Level / Tier 1 2 Group # 1 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system K/A 2.1.32 and integrated plant procedures during Rating 4.4 all modes of plant operation. Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Added the abnormal situation of lowering RPV level to the question.

Question: 80 Initial Conditions: MODE 3 GOP-2, POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN, states the following:

WHEN RPV pressure has been lowered to below _(1)_ psig, THEN place one loop of RHR in Shutdown Cooling IAW SOP-0031, Residual Heat Removal.

During the plant shutdown a Loss of Coolant Accident has resulted in a lowering Reactor Water Level.

IAW Tech Spec bases, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System will isolate on Level 3 to ensure that _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 135 RPV water level does not drop below top of active fuel B. 135 offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are NOT exceeded C. 150 RPV water level does not drop below top of active fuel D. 150 offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are NOT exceeded Answer: A Explanation:

RHR Shutdown Cooling cannot be placed in service until RPV pressure is below the cut in pressure interlock of 135 psig per GOP-2, POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Tech Spec Bases B3.3.6.1 5.b states:

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. Plausible due to 135 psig being the correct RPV pressure to place RHR Shutdown Cooling in service. Ensuring that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded are part of the basis behind the level 3 isolation during MODES 1,2, and 3 when pressure is greater than or equal to 135 psig per tech specs. The question specifically says RPV below 135 psig.

C. The applicant may confuse the 150 psig applicability for RCIC with the 135 psig cut in pressure permissive.

D. The applicant may confuse the 150 psig applicability for RCIC with the 135 psig cut in pressure permissive.

K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. The integrated procedure GOP-2 is directing actions from SOP-31.

Technical

References:

GOP-2 SOP-31 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 42(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 600000 (APE 24) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Tier 1 Ability to determine and interpret the Group # 1 following as they apply to PLANT FIRE K/A AA2.07 ON SITE: Rating 3.0 AA2.07 Whether malfunction is due to Revisio common-mode electrical failures 2 n

Revision Statement:

Changed distractor answer from Open Phase to Undervoltage.

Update the 10 CFR 55.43 Question: 81 The RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of _(1)_, which could lead to an excessive current draw and potential electrical fire if the normal circuit breakers would fail to trip on overcurrent.

If the SINGLE Fire Alarm in the vicinity of the RPS MG sets was in alarm and NOT VERIFIED, an Unusual Event, HU4.2, would be declared within _(2)_ minutes of the initial fire alarm.

(1) (2)

A. Overvoltage 15 B. Overvoltage 30 C. Undervoltage 15 D. Undervoltage 30 Answer: D Explanation:

1. Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) protect the RPS buses from voltage and frequency anomalies that may damage RPS components. Each power source to the RPS Buses has two EPAs in series to provide redundant protection for the buses Either EPA can disconnect the bus from a power source where an overvoltage, undervoltage, or under-frequency condition exists.
2. Per HU4.2 in EIP-2-1:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. Overvoltage detection is provided for individual buses, and the 15 min time is not correct. The 30 min time is correct B. Overvoltage detection is provided for individual buses.

C. Undervoltage detection is the correct instrumentation but the 15 min time is not correct. The 30 min time is correct.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to determine which common mode electrical failure could potentially cause a fire.

Technical

References:

EIP-2-1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RCBT-EP-SRORMED.1.6

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Tier 1 Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 Group # 1 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the K/A 2.4.45 significance of each annunciator or Rating 4.3 alarm. Revisio 0

n Revision Statement:

Question: 82 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power.

Inclement weather has caused Grid Oscillations; the MCR has entered AOP-64, Grid Disturbances.

The Following two alarms are in:

  • P808-86A-H01, GRID TROUBLE
  • P680-09A-D08, PFD STA SVCE RTX-XSR1D TROUBLE Grid Voltage is 225 Kv and stable.

There is a confirmed visual indication of an Open Phase Event on RTX-XSR1D.

Which of the following actions should have the HIGHEST priority?

A. Adjust MVARS to maintain voltage at Fancy Point.

B. Normal start of Div 2 Diesel Generator and parallel with the grid.

C. Reduce the amount of 1250 hp motors powered from RTX-XSR1D to 3.

D. Emergency start Div 2 Diesel Generator and perform a dead bus transfer.

Answer: D Explanation:

The station had to enter AOP-64 due a grid disturbance and with receipt of multiple alarms. The GRID TROUBLE alarm is in due to grid voltage being below 225.86 Kv, and the PFD STA SVCE RTX-XSR1D TROUBLE alarm is in due to Open Phase detection. The grid voltage is stable but low 225 Kv and there has been visual

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination evidence from the field of an Open Phase on RTX-XSR1D which supplies power to the Div 2 bus.

AOP-64 states:

Distracters:

A. Plausible due to Adjusting VARS is a subsequent action of AOP-64 to maintain grid voltage between 224.25Kv and 242 Kv. Currently grid voltage is 225 Kv and stable which is in this acceptable range.

B. Plausible due to performing a Normal start of the Diesel Generators is a subsequent action of AOP-64 if grid voltage cannot be maintained above 224.25 Kv.

C. Plausible due to reducing the amount of 1250 hp motors powered from RTX-XSR1D to 3 is an Operator Action listed in the Alarm Response Procedure for the GRID TROUBLE alarm.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to prioritize alarms brought in due a grid disturbance.

Technical

References:

AOP-64 ARP-P808-86 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-OPS-AOP064.1.03 Given key plant parameters, determine the appropriate operator response. (3)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295008 (APE 8) High Reactor Water Level Tier 1

/2 Group # 2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the K/A AA2.05 following as they apply to HIGH Rating 3.1 REACTOR WATER LEVEL: Revision AA2.05 Swell 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 83 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred. All automatic actuations/isolations have been verified.

ATC operator gives the following report:

INITIALLY, Opening an SRV in this condition will cause indicated Reactor Water Level to _(1)_.

The CRS should direct a Reactor Water Level band of _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. Increase 10 to 51 inches B. Increase 45 to 100 inches

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination C. Decrease 10 to 51 inches D. Decrease 45 to 100 inches Answer: B Explanation:

A Loss of Offsite Power event will result in a Reactor Scram, MSIVs isolating, loss of Recirc Pumps, and loss of all Normal Feed to the RPV. From the Scram report given, the crew will enter EOP-1 on Level 3. In this condition, opening an SRV will result in a swell of indicated RPV water level. Due to the loss of the Recirc Pumps, the CRS should issue the Natural Circulation level band of 45 to 100 inches From EOP-1:

Distracters:

A. Level would increase due to swell from opening an SRV. The Normal level band should not be issued with NO forced circulation.

B. Correct Answer C. Level would NOT decrease due to swell from opening an SRV. The Normal level band should not be issued with NO forced circulation D. Level would NOT decrease due to swell from opening an SRV. The Natural Circulation level band is the correct level band with no forced circulation.

K/A Match The applicant should have the ability to determine the affect swell will have on RPV water level.

Technical

References:

EOP-1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295020 (APE 20) Inadvertent Containment Tier 1 Isolation / 5 & 7 Group # 2 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant K/A 2.1.7 performance and make operational Rating 4.7 judgments based on operating Revisio characteristics, reactor behavior, and n 1 instrument interpretation.

Revision Statement:

Added more supporting information in the question explanation to support the higher priority of IAS.

Question: 84 A loss of power to a Motor Control Center (MCC) has led to following indications:

An Inadvertent Isolation of Containment would result due the closure of the _(1)_

Containment Isolation Valves.

The CRS should place the HIGHEST priority on restoring _(2)_ to Containment IAW AOP-10, Loss of RPS.

(1) (2)

A. Inboard CCP B. Inboard IAS C. Outboard CCP

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination D. Outboard IAS Answer: D Explanation:

The loss of the MCC has caused a loss of RPS A. This is apparent from ALL the A solenoid lights for each division of RPS being extinguished. A loss of RPS A would result in an Inadvertent isolation of the Outboard containment isolation valves. IAS -

MOVF106 is an Outboard isolation valve that supplies instrument air to primary Containment. The Outboard CCP valves would isolate as well.

Recirc Seal Purge which is provided from CRD would not isolate From AOP-11, Loss CCP:

CAUTION If both seal purge flow and cooling water flow are lost to the Reactor Recirc Pump(s) with coolant temperature greater than 200°F, the pump(s) must be tripped, the seal staging valve(s) B33-FVF075A(B) must be closed, and the isolation valves closed as soon as possible. Seal damage may occur if the recirc pump is not tripped within 2 minutes and isolated within 30 minutes. (CR-RBS-2010-00017 CA 25)

A loss of one RPS would require entry into AOP-10.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF RPS BUS A NOTE Reopening of IAS-MOV106 must be done in a timely manner to prevent the Inboard MSIVs from closing.

(BASED STIMULATOR VALIDATION):

INSERTING A LOSS OF RPS A MALFUNCTION

1. Inboard MSIVs(located in the Drywell) would close within 7 minutes if IAS is not restored, causing a Complicated Scram.
2. Recirc Pump High Motor temperature alarm will come in after 8 minutes.

IAS restoration is a higher priority than CCP.

Distracters:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. Inboard isolation valves would not close due to a loss of RPS A. CCP restoration is a high priority due to the Recirc Pumps, but IAS is higher due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.

B. Inboard isolation valves would not close due to a loss of RPS A. IAS restoration is the highest priority due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.

C. Outboard isolation valves would close due a loss of RPS A. IAS restoration is the highest priority due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation Technical

References:

AOP-10 R-STM-0508 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO Ability to determine and/or interpret the Tier 1 following as they apply to SECONDARY Group # 2 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH K/A EA2.01 RADIATION: Rating 3.2 EA2.01 Ventilation radiation levels Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Added information about SRO only Question: 85 Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power A UNISOLABLE steam leak has resulted in the following indications:

PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE ISOLATION SETPOINT RMS-RE110 AUX BLDG 8.02E+07 uCi/ml 6.02E-03 uCi/ml PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE ALERT EAL SETPOINT RMS-RE125 MAIN PLANT 7.02E+07 uCi/sec 9.63E+06 uCi/sec EOP-3 (SC-2 OPERATING VALUES)

PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE MAX SAFE VALUE RMS-RE219 RCIC EQUIP RM 8.7E+02 mR/hr 9.5E+03 mR/hr RMS-RE215 RHR C EQUIP RM 5.2E+02 mR/hr 9.5E+03 mR/hr E31-R608 RCIC RM TEMP 205°F 200°F E31-R608 RWCU RM TEMP 190°F 200°F (1) What action(s) IAW OSP-51,EMERGENCY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE SUPPORT PROCEDURE, should be taken to reduce the Offsite Radioactivity Release Rate?

(2) When would Emergency Depressurization be required?

A. (1) Manually initiate both trains of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RCIC EQUIP RM area radiation levels reach Max Safe value B. (1) Manually initiate both trains of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RWCU RM TEMP reaches Max Safe value C. (1) Manually initiate one train of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RCIC EQUIP RM area radiation levels reach Max Safe value

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination D. (1) Manually initiate one train of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RWCU RM TEMP reaches Max Safe value Answer: B Explanation:

1. Based on the parameters, the RMS-RE110 has exceeded its isolation value and requires a manual isolation of the Auxiliary Building and a manual initiation of Both trains of Standby Gas Treatment.

From EOP-3:

From OSP-53:

2. From EOP-3:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination ED is required when ONE parameter listed in SC-2 exceeds its MAX SAFE limit in 2 or more areas. The RCIC has already exceeded its MAX SAFE temp, and it requires another room(ie RWCU) to exceed 200°F.

Distracters:

A. Plausible due to Manually Initiating Both trains of Standby Gas Treatment is the correct action. RCIC room rads exceeding MAX SAFE value does not meet the requirement for ED per EOP-3.

B. Correct Answer C. Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment should be initiated per OSP-53.

D. Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment should be initiated per OSP-53 K/A Match The applicant should possess the ability to determine and/or interpret ventilation radiation levels as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION and the actions require.

Technical

References:

EOP-3 OSP-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-0515.1.06

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Given an EOP-3 flow chart and plant conditions, determine the next action required to be implemented.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

TASK # 200006005002,DETERMINE IF EMERG DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED/ANTICIPATED, is an SRO ONLY task at RBS.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination From NUREG 1021:

Emergency RPV depressurization is considered an emergency contingency procedure.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 209001 (SF2, SF4 LPCS) Low-Pressure Tier 2 Core Spray Group # 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.06 following on the LOW-PRESSURE CORE Rating 3.2 SPRAY SYSTEM; and (b) based on those Revisio predictions, use procedures to correct, n control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal 1 conditions or operations:

A2.06 Inadequate system flow Revision Statement:

Changed the CFR link to 43.5 Question: 86 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power The following sequence of events occurs:

1. Double-ended rupture (DER) of a Recirculation Pump A suction line. The design basis accident (DBA) for Containment pressure and also for the Containment heat removal system.
2. A loss of offsite power. Div 2 Diesel Generator fails to start and remains out of service during the entire transient.
3. LPCS Pump started but E21-F005, LPCS INJECT ISOL VALVE, failed to open fully.

NOTE: ONLY INJECTION SYSTEMS AVAILABLE ARE THE ONES LISTED IN THE TABLE BELOW:

Post Accident Parameters:

PARAMETERS INDICATED VALUES RPV LEVEL -205 inches and stable RPV PRESS 15 psig and lowering CTMT PRESS 7.8 psig and rising SUPP POOL LEVEL 21.5 ft SUPP POOL TEMP 110°F and rising LPCS 900 gpm LPCI A 5050 gpm SLC A 43 gpm

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination HPCS 4500 gpm Long term operation of the LPCS system in this condition would cause damage to the_(1)_.

Based on the Post Accident Parameters, the CRS should direct _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. Pump impeller Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs B. Pump impeller Place RHR A in Suppression Cooling C. Motor windings Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs D. Motor windings Place RHR A in Suppression Cooling Answer: A Explanation:

(1) The LPCS Pump is operating in a minimum flow condition. With the injection valve closed, indicated flow would 0 gpm due to the location of the flow meter.

P&L 2.1 of SOP-32 states: To avoid impeller wear, minimize the time LPCS Pump is operated on minimum flow withE21-F005, LPCS INJECT ISOL VALVE closed.

(2) Based on the Post Accident Parameters, Adequate Core Cooling is not assured. At -211inches, It requires over 5000 gpm from either HPCS or LPCS to achieve Spray Cooling. ALC-13 and ALC-14 of EOP-1 states if Adequate Core Cooling cannot be restored to Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer.

B. Part 1 of this distractor is correct, Part 2 is not. The applicant may assumed that Adequate Spray Cooling is assured due to combined Spray flow(LPCS+HPCS) being greater than 5000 gpm.

C. LPCS Pump running in a low flow condition would cause Pump damage, High flow condition would drive higher current which could potentially damage motor windings.

D. LPCS Pump running in a low flow condition would cause Pump damage, High flow condition would drive higher current which could potentially damage motor windings.

K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to (a) predict the impacts of inadequate flow on the LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination conditions or operations.

Technical

References:

EOP-1 EOP-2 SOP-32 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-STM-0205.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43b(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 215003 (SF7 IRM) Intermediate-Range Tier 2 Monitor Group # 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.05 following on the INTERMEDIATE RANGE Rating 3.5 MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM; and (b)based Revisio on those predictions, use procedures to n correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those 2 abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.05 Faulty or erratic operation of detectors/system Revision Statement:

Added CHR 43.5 and LOD 2 to the question explanation Question: 87 Initial Conditions: MODE 2 IRM C is inoperable and bypassed Reactor is below the point of adding heat Erratic detector operation caused IRM A to spike to a value of 118/125.

(1) What automatic action occurred from the IRM A spike?

(2) With BOTH IRM A and C inoperable, what action is required IAW TS/TRM?

A. (1) Rod Block ONLY (2) Place one channel in trip B. (1) Rod Block ONLY (2) Transition to MODE 3 C. (1) Rod Block and Half Scram (2) Place one channel in trip D. (1) Rod Block and Half Scram (2) Transition to MODE 3 Answer: A Explanation:

From STM-503:

Rod Block occurs at >108/125 and Scram when >120/125.

118/125 will only cause a Rod Block.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. With the second channel inoperable. Condition A is the first required action.

After 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if not able to place channel in trip, then with both IRMS inoperable, that means 2 IRMS for the RPS A trip system is inoperable and 2 IRMS for the Rod Block function.

From TRM 3.3.1.1:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 3 out 4 IRMS are required for the A trip system. With 2 inoperable, action H needs to be entered.

From TS 3.3.1.1:

From TRM 3.3.2.1:

6 out 8 IRMS are required to be operable. With only two inoperable, the required amount of channels exist no action required.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The correct automatic action, but wrong initial TS/TRM action C. Wrong automatic action, but correct TS/TRM action D. See B and C K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to predict the impacts of a faulty or erratic IRM and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Technical

References:

TS 3.3.1.1 TRM 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

TS 3.3.1.1 TRM 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5 Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 223002 (SF5 PCIS) Primary Containment Tier 2 Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Group # 1 G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal K/A G2.4.8 operating procedures are used in Rating 4.5 conjunction with EOPs. Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 88 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel (MST) has caused the following alarms:

(A) (B)

(1) Which alarm is associated with the isolation of the MSIVs due to MST High Temperature?

If a primary system is discharging into the MST, The CRS should direct the manual initiation of a_(2)_ within 10 MINUTES IAW with AOP-3, Automatic Isolations.

(1) (2)

A. A Control Room Charcoal Filter Train B. A Standby Gas Filter Train C. B Control Room Charcoal Filter Train D. B Standby Gas Filter Train Answer: A Explanation:

Both annunciators are associated with MST high temperature. (A) Comes in at 173°F and will cause an isolation of the MSIVs, RWCU, and RCIC. (B) Comes in at 144°F to signal a potential entry into EOP-3, Secondary Containment, and denoted by the double red diagonal lines.

AOP-3 states the following:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A MST steam leak is outside of Secondary Containment, and would require initiation of a Control Building Filter Train.

Distracters:

A. Correct Answer B. The annunciator is the correct associated with MST High isolations, but Standby Gas Treatment would only affect the Secondary Containment Boundary.

C. The annunciator is the one associated with EOP-3 entry and not isolations, Control Building Filter Train is the correct system to initiate in this condition.

D. The annunciator is the one associated with EOP-3 entry, but Standby Gas Treatment would only affect the Secondary Containment Boundary K/A Match The applicant must have the knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

Technical

References:

AOP-3 EOP-3 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty: 3 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 259002 (SF2 RWLCS) Reactor Water Level Tier 2 Control Group # 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the K/A A2.05 following on the REACTOR WATER Rating 3.5 LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based Revision on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those 2 abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.02 Loss of any number of reactor feedwater flow inputs Revision Statement:

Changed the second part of the question to make it SRO level based on deciding on TRM actions to use.

Rewrote the question to meet the K/A better Question: 89 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Feedwater Flow Transmitter Level, C33-FTN002A, suffers a ruptured diaphragm.

The Feedwater Level Control System will respond and cause Reactor Water Level to

_(1)_.

(2) After the Feedwater Master Level Controller is placed in manual IAW AOP-6, CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER FAILURES, what action should the CRS direct to restore the Feedwater Master Level Controller in automatic IAW SOP-9, REACTOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM?

(1) (2)

A. Increase Alternate Feedwater Level Control Signals B. Increase Transfer Three Element to Single Element Control Transfer C. Decrease Alternate Feedwater Level Control Signals D. Decrease Transfer Three Element to Single Element Control Transfer Answer: B Explanation:

From STM-107:

Loss of input signals to the Feedwater Level Control System.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination The complete loss of one feedwater flow signal causes the feedwater control system to see 50% less feedwater flow, though actual feedwater flow has not changed. This results in a large steam flow/feed flow mismatch. The Feedwater Level Control System tries to increase feed flow (by opening the FW REG VLVs) to reduce the steam flow/feed flow mismatch. This causes reactor water level to increase. Since reactor level takes precedence in this logic system over steam flow/feed flow mismatch (level dominant), the level detectors sense this increase in level, compare it to the level setpoint and create an error signal which begins to close the FW REG VLVs back to their original position.

The FWLC circuitry uses several inputs to determine the control signal that needs to be sent to the FW REG VLV controllers. The Feedwater Level Control System utilizes the following:

  • Three element control, which utilizes steam flow, feedwater flow, and vessel water level.
  • Single element control, utilizes vessel water level only as an input signal.

Distracters:

A. Plausible because water level will increase with the failed flow input. Swapping to a different level input will not remove the failed flow input B. Correct Answer C. See A and D D. Plausible because the action directed is correct, but the water level response is not.

K/A Match The applicant must have the Ability to (a) predict the impacts loss of any number of reactor feedwater flow inputs on the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

Technical

References:

STM-107 SOP-9 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)5 Level of Difficulty: 3 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO Tier 2 261000 (SF9 SGTS) Standby Gas Group # 1 Treatment K/A 2.2.25 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Rating 4.2 Technical Specifications for limiting Revision conditions for operations and safety 0 limits.

Revision Statement:

Question: 90 Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power TS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System requires _(1)_ SGT subsystems to OPERABLE.

TS B 3.6.4.3,Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, requires _(2)_ SGT subsystem(s) to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases.

(1) (2)

A. 1 1 B. 1 2 C. 2 1 D. 2 2 Answer: C Explanation:

This is directly from TS B 3.6.4.3

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function.

B. Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function C. Correct Answer D. Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function K/A Match The applicant must possess the knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Technical

References:

TS B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-STM-0257 Obj.9 Identify the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, and/or Bases requirements for the Standby Gas Treatment System. (9)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)2 Level of Difficulty: 3 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 201005 (SF1, SF7 RCIS) Rod Control and Tier 2 Information Group # 2 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of K/A 2.2.36 maintenance activities, such as degraded Rating 4.2 power sources, on the status of limiting Revisio conditions for operations. 0 n

Revision Statement:

Question: 91 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Maintenance activities have caused the Turbine Bypass Valves to fail open.

First Stage Turbine Pressure will _(1)_ as a result.

IAW TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, how will this affect the operability of the Rod Withdrawal Limiter?

(1) (2)

A. Increase It will remain OPERABLE B. Increase It will need to be declared inoperable C. Decrease It will remain OPERABLE D. Decrease It will need to be declared inoperable Answer: D Explanation:

The opening of the BPVs will rob steam flow from the Main Turbine, and the Turbine Control Valves will respond by closing to maintain Pressure setpoint. This will result in a decrease in First Stage Turbine Pressure. First Stage Turbine pressure is utilized to determine Reactor Power by RC&IS. The Rod Pattern Controller is in control of rod movements until Reactor Power reaches Low Power setpoint of 27.5%, and the Rod Withdrawal Limiter Controls rod movement after.

At 100%, the High Power setpoint (HPSP) of 67.9% power is in effect limiting rod motion to 2 notches before inserting a rod block.

From TS B 3.3.2.1

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

K/A Match A. First Stage Turbine Pressure will decrease in response to BPV opening.

B. First Stage Turbine Pressure will decrease in response to BPV opening.

C. The Rod Pattern Controller operability will not be affected by the BPV failing open.

D. Correct Answer Technical

References:

R-STM-0500 TS 3.3.2.1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE OE Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(2)

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 272000 (SF7, SF9 RMS) Radiation Tier 2 Monitoring Group # 2 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary K/A 272000 2.4.35 operator tasks during an emergency and Rating 4.9 the resultant operational effects Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 92 An instrument bus failure has caused Containment vent valves to be inoperable.

To reduce Containment Pressure per EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, Enclosure _(1)_ should be installed to vent containment locally by the building operator.

IAW EOP-2, when the building operator vents containment locally, the release will be monitored via _(2)_ radiation monitors.

NOTE: ENCLOSURE 21, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS ENCLOSURE 25, DEFEATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENT AND PURGE ISOLATION INTERLOCKS (1) (2)

A. 21 fixed B. 21 portable C. 25 fixed D. 25 portable Answer: B Explanation:

Per EOP-5, Enclosure 21, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS, provides instructions for venting the Primary Containment via the 171 Airlock inner door seals (which is operated locally by the building operator).

Per Enclosure 21 step 3.6.7 step 7. ARRANGE for RP to sample Aux Bldg. vent path release and then OPEN 171 Aux Bldg. doors to outside. By opening these doors a direct release path to outside is established. RP is the only monitor established during this release.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

(1) Enclosure 25 is plausible if applicant confuses the purpose to provide instructions for defeating the Primary Containment Vent and Purge RPV low level, High Drywell pressure AND High Radiation isolation interlocks.

(2) Fixed radiation monitors is plausible if applicant confuses airlock operation with venting the Primary Containment via the Hydrogen Purge System via the Main Plant Exhaust per Enclosure 21.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the building operator actions while installing 1 and the resulting plant lineup to determine the method of radiation monitoring.

Technical

References:

1, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-516, Upon completion of this lesson, the trainee will be able to demonstrate knowledge of the purpose and installation requirements of the EOP Enclosures and the plant response when installed as directed by the EOPs.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have knowledge of when to implement enclosures, including how to coordinate these with the building operator and RP for monitoring the release.

PRA Applicability:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 286000 (SF8 FPS) Fire Protection Tier 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Group # 2 following on the FIRE PROTECTION K/A A2.01 SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those Rating 2.9 predictions, use procedures to correct, Revisio control, or mitigate the consequences of n those abnormal conditions or operations:

0 (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

A2.01 System logic failure: Plant-Specific Revision Statement:

Question: 93 Initial Conditions: MODE 1 , 100% Power The following Fire suppression system has lost its automatic actuation capability:

A Fire watch shall be established in _(1)_.

TRM actions require a/an _(2)_Fire watch for this area.

(1) (2)

A. 30 mins hourly B. 30 mins continuous C. 60 mins hourly D. 60 mins continuous Answer: D Explanation:

1. A Fire watch must be establish within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per TRM 3.7.9.2

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination

2. From SOP-37:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

A. 30 mins would be the time required to verify a single Fire alarm IAW EIP-2-1.

This area has redundant equipment that could be affected by a fire.

B. 30 mins would be the time required to verify a single Fire alarm IAW EIP-2-1.

C. This area has redundant equipment that could be affected by a fire, thus it requires a continuous fire watch.

D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to (a) predict the impacts of a System logic failure:

on the FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

Technical

References:

SOP-37 TRM 3.7.9.2 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

Redacted version of TRM 3.7.9.2 Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)2 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

Ranked#8 Fire Zone

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative Tier 3 requirements for temporary management Group # N/A directives, such as standing orders, night K/A 2.1.15 orders, operations memos, etc. Rating 3.4 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 94

_(1)_ is an instruction to Operations personnel from Operations Management of continuing applicability.

Night orders may be written by _(2)_ based on a telephone conversation from any Operations Management.

(1) (2)

A. Night Orders any licensed operator B. Night Orders Shift Manager C. Standing Orders any licensed operator D. Standing Orders Shift Manager Answer: D Explanation:

Per EN-OP-112, Night and Standing Orders, STANDING ORDER - an instruction from Operations Management (OM/AOM) of continuing applicability to Operations personnel.

Night Orders may be written by the Shift Manager (SM) based on a telephone conversation from any of the above individuals.

Distracters:

(1) Night Orders is plausible if applicant confuses definition NIGHT ORDER - an instruction to Operations personnel from Operations Management (Operations Manager (OM), Assistant Operations Manager (AOM), which has short-term applicability (i.e., overnight or weekends).

(2) Any licensed operator is plausible if applicant confuses requirement with other licensed operator duties.

K/A Match

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination The applicant must have knowledge of the requirements for issuing night orders and understand the purpose of night orders and standing orders.

Technical

References:

EN-OP-112, Night and Standing Orders Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

None Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have knowledge of the shift manager responsibilities during the approval and issuing of night orders.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term Tier 3 relief turnover practices. Group # N/A K/A 2.1.3 Rating 3.9 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Added LOD, SRO justification, and CFR Question: 95 Per EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief, in the case of illness or unexpected absence, SM ENSURE a shift member is held over and replacement personnel arranged to restore the shift complement within _(1)_.

When in Mode 1, the following personnel assume the shift at turnover:

OSM - SRO & STA qualified CRS - SRO qualified STA - SRO & STA qualified ATC/BOP/UO - 3 different Qualified ROs If the STA must leave due to illness, will minimum shift crew composition be met?

(1) (2)

A. 1 Hour NO B. 1 Hour YES C. 2 Hours NO D. 2 Hours YES Answer: D Explanation:

Per EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief, in the case of illness or unexpected absence, SM ENSURE a shift member is held over and replacement personnel arranged to restore the shift complement within two hours.

Per TRM 5.0, The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) position may be filled by an on-shift shift manager (OSM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) provided the individual meets the STA qualifications for the dual role position specified below and five (5) licensed operators are on shift.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:

(1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is plausible if the applicant confuses the numerous required tech spec requirements to be completed in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

(2) No is plausible if applicant confuses the minimum staffing requirements and dual role position requirements for STA.

K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the minimum staffing requirements, dual role requirements, and how long the shift manager has to restore the shift complement.

Technical

References:

EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief TRM 5.0, Administration Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-HLO-02026,

6. State the normal shift staffing requirements, including titles and numbers of persons required.
8. State who may authorize deviation s in the shift complement.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)2 Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have knowledge of TRM bases and how to apply them.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.2.11 Knowledge of the process for Tier 3 controlling temporary design changes. Group # N/A K/A 2.2.11 Rating 3.3 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Added SRO justification statement.

Question: 96 Who has the responsibility of maintaining overall administrative control of installed Temporary Modifications?

A. Shift Manager B. Operations Manager C. Systems & Components Manager D. The General Manager Plant Operations (GMPO)

Answer: A Explanation:

Pe EN-DC-136, Temporary Modifications, the Shift Manager, with the concurrence of the Engineering Director, or designee, and a completed 50.59 screening prior to implementation, may direct the installation or removal of a Temporary Modification to the plant on an emergency basis without approved controlling documentation, as long as the Temporary Modification does not adversely affect nuclear safety.

Distracters:

All other distractors are plausible due to positions held in the organization.

K/A Match Applicant must know the process for controlling temporary design changes and the personnel involved in the process of getting one approved.

Technical

References:

EN-DC-136, Temporary Modifications Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objective:

Question Source:

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)3 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have knowledge of the administrative processes for temporary modifications.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability Tier 3 and/or availability of safety related Group # N/A equipment. K/A 2.2.37 Rating 4.6 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 97 If a surveillance with a 7-day required frequency was discovered on day 10 not completed, per Tech Spec SR 3.0.3, equipment should be declared _(1)_ until the required surveillance is completed satisfactorily The required surveillance should be completed within _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B. OPERABLE 7 days C. INOPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> D. INOPERABLE 7 days Answer: B Explanation:

Per Tech Spec SR 3.0.3, if it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. The frequency required frequency is 7 days which is greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Distracters:

(1) INOPERABLE is plausible if the applicant believes the equipment is INOPERABLE immediately upon discovery of missed surveillance requirement.

(2) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is plausible if the applicant confuses the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> requirement with the frequency requirement whichever is greater.

K/A Match The applicant must determine system operability based on a missed surveillance requirement and state the delay period allowed to complete the missed surveillance.

Technical

References:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Tech Spec SR 3.03 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-0416,

20. State the allowable actions if a surveillance is not performed within its specified frequency in accordance with SR 3.0.3.
21. State the basis for the 24-hour delay before entering an LCO if a surveillance frequency is exceeded in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental X Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must apply the requirements of SRs in accordance with the rules of SR 3.0.3.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring Tier 3 systems, such as fixed radiation monitors Group # N/A and alarms, portable survey instruments, K/A 2.3.15 personnel monitoring equipment, etc. Rating 3.1 Revision 1 Revision Statement:

Changed from LOD 3 to 2 Question: 98 The offsite radioactivity release rate monitored to enter EOP-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control, is _(1)_.

Per EOP-3, Emergency Depressurization should be performed before the offsite release rate reaches a _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. Gaseous ONLY General Emergency B. Gaseous ONLY Site Area Emergency C. Gaseous OR liquid General Emergency D. Gaseous OR liquid Site Area Emergency Answer: A Explanation:

Per EPSTG*0002, EOP-3, Radioactivity Release Control, the site Emergency Plan specifies Alert action levels for liquid as well as gaseous offsite radioactivity releases.

However, it is not possible for a primary system (as the term is defined in the EOPs/SAPs) to generate a liquid offsite radioactivity release. Since this subsection is based on a primary system discharging into an area outside the primary and secondary containments, the Alert entry condition only includes gaseous offsite radioactivity releases.

Per EOP-3, Step RR-4, before the offsite radioactivity release rate reaches a General Emergency Step RR-5, EOP-1 Step RR-6, Emergency Depressurization is required.

Distracters:

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination (1) Gaseous OR liquid is plausible if applicant confuses different EAL entry requirements per table A-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds. Table A-1 contains gaseous and liquid classification thresholds, but the liquid only has UE level thresholds.

(2) SAE is plausible because it is one level below General Emergency when declaring Emergencies. Applicant may confuse General Emergency requirement with SAE.

K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the radiation monitoring systems used for effluent monitoring to determine the Emergency Action Level for EOP entry.

Technical

References:

EPSTG*0002, EOP-3, Radioactivity Release Control EOP-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RLP-LO-0515 Rev 0, Objective 6: Given EOP-3 flowchart and plant conditions, determine the next action required to be implemented.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes and attach Modified Bank #93 2018 X

parent) NRC New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have the knowledge of EOP-3 diagnostic step and decision point to transition to emergency depressurization based on high offsite release rate.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

2018 NRC Bank Question

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to Tier 3 system operation/status that must be Group # N/A reported to internal organizations or K/A 2.4.30 external agencies, such as the State, the Rating 4.1 NRC, or the transmission system Revision operator. 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 99 The Long Notification Message Form (LNMF) is sent out for any significant changes to

_(1)_.

No more than _(2)_ should be exceeded between any two LNMFs.

NOTE: PAR - Protective Action Recommendations (1) (2)

A. PAR 1 Hour B. PAR 2 Hours C. Plant Conditions 1 Hour D. Plant Conditions 2 Hours Answer: D Explanation:

Per EIP-2-006, Emergency Implementing Procedure, the Long Notification Message Form (LNMF) is used for providing State and local authorities follow-up information.

The LNMF is sent out as soon as possible following a SNMF. The LNMF is also sent out for any significant changes to plant conditions that do not require an emergency escalation or change in PARs. No more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> should be exceeded between any two LNMFs.

Distracters:

Per EIP-2-002, the NRC is required to be notified immediately after notifying state and local authorities and not later than one hour after declaring the emergency.

Distractors are plausible if applicant confuses requirements for the SNMF and LNMF.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of SM responsibilities and time requirements associated with the LNMF during a plant emergency.

Technical

References:

Per EIP-2-006, NOTIFICATIONS EIP-2-002, CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

NONE Learning Objective:

RCBT-EP-SRORMED, Objective 6: State the conditions and time limit to classify an event. (6)

Question Source: Bank # 2018 NRC Exam X Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental X Level:

Comprehensive /

Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

Applicant must have knowledge of emergency plan criteria and regulator limits during a plant emergency that requires a LNMF and update.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities Tier 3 in emergency plan implementation. Group # N/A K/A 2.4.40 Rating 4.5 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question: 100 At time 1630, indications are present in the Main Control Room which require an emergency declaration.

Offsite notifications to state and local agencies must be made no later than _(1)_.

The NRC must be notified no later than _(2)_.

(1) (2)

A. 1645 1730 B. 1645 1745 C. 1700 1730 D. 1700 1745 Answer: D Explanation:

Per EIP-2-001, 5.4 The assessment, classi"cation, and declaration of an emergency condition is expected to be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications (i.e. plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports) to plant operators that an EAL has been exceeded.

Per EIP-2-002, Attachment 1, 3 Direct the Communicator to notify the following:

3.1 Offsite authorities - Within 15 minutes of the declaration using the Short Notification Message Form (SNMF).

3.2 NRC - Immediately after notifying state and local authorities and not later than one hour after declaring the emergency.

1630 + 15 minutes for declaration = 1645 1645 + 15 minutes for notification of offsite agencies = 1700

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 1645 + 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for notification of NRC = 1745 Distracters:

(1) 1645 is plausible if applicant confuses declaration time with notification time.

(2) 1730 is plausible if applicant confuses 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> start time with indications present not declaration time.

K/A Match SRO is responsible to ensure all notifications to offsite agencies and NRC must be made on time during emergency plan implementation.

Technical

References:

EIP-2-001, CLASSIFICA TI0N 0F EMER GENCIES EIP-2-002, CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:

None Learning Objective:

RCBT-EP-SRORMED, Objective 6: State the conditions and time limit to classify an event. (6)

Question Source: Bank # 2012 NRC X (note changes and attach Modified Bank #

parent)

New Question Cognitive Memory / Fundamental Level:

Comprehensive /

X Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

The applicant must have knowledge of Emergency Implementation Procedures to ensure the Emergency is classified and declared within the required time.

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:

N/A 2012 NRC Bank Question (First part of question removed to make answers more plausible. Not enough changes to label modified.)

2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







,167580(17$7,21



5HDFWRU3URWHFWLRQ6\VWHP 536 ,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ





/&2 7KH536LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQIRUHDFK)XQFWLRQLQ7DEOHVKDOOEH

23(5$%/(







$33/,&$%,/,7< $FFRUGLQJWR7DEOH





$&7,216



127(

6HSDUDWH&RQGLWLRQHQWU\LVDOORZHGIRUHDFKFKDQQHO





&21',7,21 5(48,5('$&7,21 &203/(7,217,0(

  

$ 2QHRUPRUH $ 3ODFHFKDQQHOLQWULS KRXUV

UHTXLUHGFKDQQHOV  

LQRSHUDEOH 25 

  

$ 3ODFHDVVRFLDWHGWULS 



V\VWHPLQWULS KRXUV



  

% 2QHRUPRUH  % 3ODFHFKDQQHOLQRQHWULS KRXUV

)XQFWLRQVZLWKRQHRU V\VWHPLQWULS 

PRUHUHTXLUHG  

FKDQQHOVLQRSHUDEOH 25 

LQERWKWULSV\VWHPV  

  % 3ODFHRQHWULSV\VWHPLQ KRXUV

WULS



  

& 2QHRUPRUH & 5HVWRUH536WULS KRXU

)XQFWLRQVZLWK536 FDSDELOLW\

WULSFDSDELOLW\QRW  

PDLQWDLQHG 



  FRQWLQXHG 



5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







$&7,216 FRQWLQXHG 

&21',7,21 5(48,5('$&7,21 &203/(7,217,0(

  

' 5HTXLUHG$FWLRQDQG ' (QWHUWKH&RQGLWLRQ ,PPHGLDWHO\

DVVRFLDWHG&RPSOHWLRQ UHIHUHQFHGLQ7DEOH

7LPHRI&RQGLWLRQ$%RU IRUWKH

&QRWPHW FKDQQHO

 

  

( $VUHTXLUHGE\5HTXLUHG ( 5HGXFH7+(50$/ KRXUV

$FWLRQ'DQGUHIHUHQFHG 32:(5WR573

LQ7DEOH 



  

) $VUHTXLUHGE\5HTXLUHG ) 5HGXFH7+(50$/ KRXUV

$FWLRQ'DQGUHIHUHQFHG 32:(5WR

LQ7DEOH 573



  

  •  $VUHTXLUHGE\5HTXLUHG * %HLQ02'( KRXUV

$FWLRQ'DQGUHIHUHQFHG 

LQ7DEOH



  

+ $VUHTXLUHGE\5HTXLUHG + %HLQ02'( KRXUV

$FWLRQ'DQGUHIHUHQFHG 

LQ7DEOH



  

, $VUHTXLUHGE\5HTXLUHG , ,QLWLDWHDFWLRQWRIXOO\ ,PPHGLDWHO\

$FWLRQ'DQGUHIHUHQFHG LQVHUWDOOLQVHUWDEOH

LQ7DEOH FRQWUROURGVLQFRUHFHOOV

 FRQWDLQLQJRQHRUPRUH

IXHODVVHPEOLHV





5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







6859(,//$1&(5(48,5(0(176



127(6

 5HIHUWR7DEOHWRGHWHUPLQHZKLFK65VDSSO\IRUHDFK536)XQFWLRQ



 :KHQDFKDQQHOLVSODFHGLQDQLQRSHUDEOHVWDWXVVROHO\IRUSHUIRUPDQFHRIUHTXLUHG

6XUYHLOODQFHVHQWU\LQWRDVVRFLDWHG&RQGLWLRQVDQG5HTXLUHG$FWLRQVPD\EHGHOD\HGIRU

XSWRKRXUVSURYLGHGWKHDVVRFLDWHG)XQFWLRQPDLQWDLQV536WULSFDSDELOLW\





6859(,//$1&( )5(48(1&<

 

65 3HUIRUP&+$11(/&+(&. ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP



 

65 127( 

1RWUHTXLUHGWREHSHUIRUPHGXQWLOKRXUVDIWHU 

7+(50$/32:(5t573 

 

 

9HULI\WKHDEVROXWHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHDYHUDJH ,QDFFRUGDQFH

SRZHUUDQJHPRQLWRU $350 FKDQQHOVDQGWKH ZLWKWKH

FDOFXODWHGSRZHUd573 D  6XUYHLOODQFH

 )UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP



 

65 $GMXVWWKHIORZFRQWUROWULSUHIHUHQFHFDUGWR 2QFHZLWKLQ

FRQIRUPWRUHDFWRUIORZ E  GD\VDIWHU

 UHDFKLQJ

 HTXLOLEULXP

 FRQGLWLRQV

 IROORZLQJUHIXHOLQJ

 RXWDJH





D )RUDSHULRGRIGD\VEHJLQQLQJZLWKXSUDWH&2/5LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJ

SODQWPRQLWRULQJFRPSXWHUGDWDEDQNFKDQJHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHDYHUDJHSRZHU

UDQJHPRQLWRU $350 FKDQQHOVDQGWKHFDOFXODWHGSRZHUPXVWEHZLWKLQ573WR

573

E :LWKLQGD\VRIXSUDWH&2/5LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJSODQWPRQLWRULQJ

FRPSXWHUGDWDEDQNFKDQJHVWKHIORZFRQWUROWULSUHIHUHQFHFDUGZLOOEHYHULILHGWRFRQIRUP

WRUHDFWRUIORZLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHXSUDWHG&2/5



FRQWLQXHG 



5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







6859(,//$1&(5(48,5(0(176 FRQWLQXHG  

6859(,//$1&( )5(48(1&<

 

65 127( 

1RWUHTXLUHGWREHSHUIRUPHGZKHQHQWHULQJ 

02'(IURP02'(XQWLOKRXUVDIWHU 

HQWHULQJ02'( 

 

 

3HUIRUP&+$11(/)81&7,21$/7(67 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP



 

65 3HUIRUP&+$11(/)81&7,21$/7(67 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 9HULI\WKHVRXUFHUDQJHPRQLWRU 650 DQG 3ULRUWR

LQWHUPHGLDWHUDQJHPRQLWRU ,50 FKDQQHOV ZLWKGUDZLQJ650V

RYHUODS IURPWKHIXOO\

 LQVHUWHGSRVLWLRQ



 

65 127( 

2QO\UHTXLUHGWREHPHWGXULQJHQWU\LQWR 

02'(IURP02'( 

 

 

9HULI\WKH,50DQG$350FKDQQHOVRYHUODS ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 &DOLEUDWHWKHORFDOSRZHUUDQJHPRQLWRUV ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 FRQWLQXHG 

5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







6859(,//$1&(5(48,5(0(176 FRQWLQXHG 

6859(,//$1&( )5(48(1&<

 

65 3HUIRUP&+$11(/)81&7,21$/7(67 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 &DOLEUDWHWKHWULSXQLWV ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP



 

65 127(6 

 1HXWURQGHWHFWRUVDQGIORZUHIHUHQFH 

WUDQVPLWWHUVDUHH[FOXGHG 

 

 )RU)XQFWLRQDQRWUHTXLUHGWREHSHUIRUPHG 

ZKHQHQWHULQJ02'(IURP02'(XQWLO 

KRXUVDIWHUHQWHULQJ02'( 

 

 )RU)XQFWLRQEWKHGLJLWDOFRPSRQHQWVRI 

WKHIORZFRQWUROWULSUHIHUHQFHFDUGVDUH 

H[FOXGHG 

 

 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

3HUIRUP&+$11(/&$/,%5$7,21 ZLWKWKH

 6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 3HUIRUP&+$11(/)81&7,21$/7(67 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 FRQWLQXHG 



5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







6859(,//$1&(5(48,5(0(176 FRQWLQXHG 

6859(,//$1&( )5(48(1&<

 

65 127(6 

 1HXWURQGHWHFWRUVDUHH[FOXGHG 

 

 )RU,50VQRWUHTXLUHGWREHSHUIRUPHGZKHQ 

HQWHULQJ02'(IURP02'(XQWLOKRXUV 

DIWHUHQWHULQJ02'( 

 

 

3HUIRUP&+$11(/&$/,%5$7,21 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 9HULI\WKH$350)ORZ%LDVHG6LPXODWHG7KHUPDO ,QDFFRUGDQFH

3RZHU+LJKWLPHFRQVWDQWLVZLWKLQWKHOLPLWV ZLWKWKH

VSHFLILHGLQWKH&2/5 6XUYHLOODQFH

 )UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 3HUIRUP/2*,&6<67(0)81&7,21$/7(67 ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 

65 9HULI\7XUELQH6WRS9DOYH&ORVXUHDQG7XUELQH ,QDFFRUGDQFH

&RQWURO9DOYH)DVW&ORVXUH7ULS2LO3UHVVXUH/RZ ZLWKWKH

)XQFWLRQVDUHQRWE\SDVVHGZKHQ7+(50$/ 6XUYHLOODQFH

32:(5LVt573 )UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

 3URJUDP

 

65 &DOLEUDWHWKHIORZUHIHUHQFHWUDQVPLWWHUV ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP

 FRQWLQXHG 



5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







6859(,//$1&(5(48,5(0(176 FRQWLQXHG 

6859(,//$1&( )5(48(1&<

 

65 127(6 

 1HXWURQGHWHFWRUVDUHH[FOXGHG 

 

 )RU)XQFWLRQVDQGLQ7DEOH 

WKHFKDQQHOVHQVRUVDUHH[FOXGHG 

 

 

9HULI\WKH5365(63216(7,0(LVZLWKLQOLPLWV ,QDFFRUGDQFH

 ZLWKWKH

6XUYHLOODQFH

 )UHTXHQF\&RQWURO

3URJUDP





5,9(5%(1' D $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







7DEOH SDJHRI 

5HDFWRU3URWHFWLRQ6\VWHP,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







$33/,&$%/( &21',7,216

02'(625 5(48,5(' 5()(5(1&('

27+(5 &+$11(/6 )520

 63(&,),(' 3(575,3 5(48,5(' 6859(,//$1&( $//2:$%/(

)81&7,21 &21',7,216 6<67(0 $&7,21' 5(48,5(0(176 9$/8(

     

  ,QWHUPHGLDWH5DQJH0RQLWRUV     

     

D 1HXWURQ)OX[ +LJK   + 65 d

65 GLYLVLRQVRI

65 IXOOVFDOH

65 

65

65

     

 D  , 65 d

65 GLYLVLRQVRI

65 IXOOVFDOH

65

     

E ,QRS   + 65 1$

65

     

 D  , 65 1$

65



  $YHUDJH3RZHU5DQJH0RQLWRUV

     

D 1HXWURQ)OX[+LJK   + 65 d573

6HWGRZQ 65 

65

65

65

65

     

E )ORZ%LDVHG6LPXODWHG   * 65 E F

7KHUPDO3RZHU+LJK 65 

 65

65

65

65

65

65

65

65



FRQWLQXHG 



D :LWKDQ\FRQWUROURGZLWKGUDZQIURPDFRUHFHOOFRQWDLQLQJRQHRUPRUHIXHODVVHPEOLHV



E $OORZDEOHYDOXHVVSHFLILHGLQ&2/5$OORZDEOHYDOXHPRGLILFDWLRQUHTXLUHGE\WKH&2/5GXHWRUHGXFWLRQLQIHHGZDWHU

WHPSHUDWXUHPD\EHGHOD\HGIRUXSWRKRXUV



F :LWKLQGD\VRIXSUDWH&2/5LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJSODQWPRQLWRULQJFRPSXWHUGDWDEDQNFKDQJHVWKHIORZ

FRQWUROWULSUHIHUHQFHFDUGZLOOEHYHULILHGWRFRQIRUPWRUHDFWRUIORZLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHXSUDWHG&2/5





5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







7DEOH SDJHRI 

5HDFWRU3URWHFWLRQ6\VWHP,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







$33/,&$%/( &21',7,216

02'(625 5(48,5(' 5()(5(1&('

27+(5 &+$11(/6 )520

 63(&,),(' 3(575,3 5(48,5(' 6859(,//$1&( $//2:$%/(

)81&7,21 &21',7,216 6<67(0 $&7,21' 5(48,5(0(176 9$/8(

     

  $YHUDJH3RZHU5DQJH0RQLWRUV     

FRQWLQXHG 

     

F )L[HG1HXWURQ)OX[+LJK   * 65 d573

65

65

65

65

65

65

     

G ,QRS   + 65 1$

65

65

     

  5HDFWRU9HVVHO6WHDP'RPH   + 65 dSVLJ D 

3UHVVXUH+LJK 65

65

65

65

65

     

  5HDFWRU9HVVHO:DWHU   + 65 tLQFKHV

/HYHO/RZ/HYHO 65

65

65

65

65

     

  5HDFWRU9HVVHO:DWHU t573  ) 65 dLQFKHV

/HYHO+LJK/HYHO 65

65

65

65

65

     

  0DLQ6WHDP,VRODWLRQ   * 65 dFORVHG

9DOYH&ORVXUH 65

65

65

     

  'U\ZHOO3UHVVXUH+LJK   + 65 dSVLG

65

65

65

65



FRQWLQXHG 

D $//2:$%/(9$/8(WRUHPDLQDVSVLXQWLOSUHVVXUHLQFUHDVHSRUWLRQRI3RZHU8SUDWH



5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

536,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ







7DEOH SDJHRI 

5HDFWRU3URWHFWLRQ6\VWHP,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ





$33/,&$%/( &21',7,216

02'(625 5(48,5(' 5()(5(1&('

27+(5 &+$11(/6 )520

63(&,),(' 3(575,3 5(48,5(' 6859(,//$1&( $//2:$%/(

)81&7,21 &21',7,216 6<67(0 $&7,21' 5(48,5(0(176 9$/8(

     

  6FUDP'LVFKDUJH9ROXPH:DWHU     

/HYHO+LJK

     

D 7UDQVPLWWHU7ULS8QLW   + 65 dLQFKHVIRU

65 /,61$%d

65 LQFKHVIRU

65 /,61&'

65

     

 D  , 65 dLQFKHVIRU

65 /,61$%d

65 LQFKHVIRU

65 /,61&'

65

     

E )ORDW6ZLWFK   + 65 dLQFKHVIRU

65 /61$%d

65 LQFKHVIRU

/61&'

    

D  , 65 dLQFKHVIRU

65 /61$%d

65 LQFKHVIRU

/61&'

     

  7XUELQH6WRS9DOYH&ORVXUH t573  ( 65 dFORVHG

65

65

65

65

65

     

 7XUELQH&RQWURO9DOYH)DVW t573  ( 65 tSVLJ

&ORVXUH7ULS2LO3UHVVXUH/RZ 65

65

65

65

65

     

 5HDFWRU0RGH6ZLWFK6KXWGRZQ   + 65 1$

3RVLWLRQ 65

    

D  , 65 1$

65

     

 0DQXDO6FUDP   + 65 1$

65

    

D  , 65 1$

65





D :LWKDQ\FRQWUROURGZLWKGUDZQIURPDFRUHFHOOFRQWDLQLQJRQHRUPRUHIXHODVVHPEOLHV

5,9(5%(1'  $PHQGPHQW1R

RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION TR 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation


NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

The following surveillance requirement applies to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1. Failure to meet this surveillance requirement requires entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.1.1.1 - 3.3.1.1.15 (Not Used)

TSR 3.3.1.1.16 ------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------

Enter Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1 for Functions 9 and 10 if this surveillance requirement is not met.


12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Verify that all bypass valves are closed t 40% RTP.

OR 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Verify the bypass channel is placed in the conservative condition (non-bypass).*

TSR 3.3.1.1.17 - 3.3.1.1.18 (Not Used)

  • As discussed in BASES of TS 3.3.1.1 functions 9 and 10.

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-1 Revision 127 (6i)

RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL MODES OR CHANNELS REFERENCED REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT/

OTHER PER TRIP FROM REQUIRED RESPONSE TIME SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTION D.1 CONDITIONS

1. Intermediate Range Monitors
a. Neutron Flux High 2 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 120/125 divisions SR 3.3.1.1.4 of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 3 I SR 3.3.1.1.1 120/125 divisions SR 3.3.1.1.5 of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15
b. Inop 2 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 3 I SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15
2. Average Power Range Monitors
a. Neutron Flux High, 2 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 15% RTP Setdown SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15
b. Flow Biased Simulated 1 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 (b)

Thermal Power High SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 0.09sec(c)(d)

SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b) Nominal Values specified in COLR. Nominal value modification required by the COLR due to reduction in feedwater temperature may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

(c) Not including simulated thermal power time constant specified in the COLR.

(d) Response time shall be measured from the detector output or from the input to the first electronic component in the channel.

(e), (f), (g) (h) not used this page RIVER BEND TR 3.3-2 Revision 48 (9i)

RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL SETPOINT/

MODES OR CHANNELS REFERENCED REQUIREMENTS RESPONSE TIME OTHER PER TRIP FROM SPECIFIED SYSTEM REQUIRED CONDITIONS ACTION D.1

2. Average Power Range Monitors (continued)
c. Fixed Neutron Flux - 1 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 118% RTP High SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (d)

< 0.09 sec

d. Inop 1,2 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.8 NA SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.15
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome 1,2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 1094.7 psig Pressure High SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (h)

TL < 0.35 sec

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level 1,2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 9.7 inches Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (h)

TL < 1.05 sec

5. Reactor Vessel Water Level t 23.8% RTP 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 51 inches High, Level 8(e) SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (h)

TL < 1.05 sec

6. Main Steam Isolation Valve - 1 8 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 8% closed Closure(e) SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 < 0.09 sec
7. Drywell Pressure High 1, 2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 1.68 psid SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued)

(a), (b), (c), (f), (g) not used this page (d) Response time shall be measured from the detector output or from the input to the first electronic component in the channel.

(e) This function automatically bypassed with the reactor mode switch not in RUN.

(h) TL = Tx + Tc; where:

TL = Measured total response time of the isolation system instrumentation Tx = Hydraulic response time of the channel sensor measured upon initial installation Tc = Measured response time of the logic circuit excluding the channel sensor The given numerical value is the acceptance criterion for TL.

In case the sensor is replaced or refurbished, a hydraulic response time test must be performed to determine a revised value for Tx.

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-3 Revision 142 (9ii)

RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL SETPOINT/

MODES OR CHANNELS REFERENCED REQUIREMENTS RESPONSE TIME OTHER PER TRIP FROM SPECIFIED SYSTEM REQUIRED CONDITIONS ACTION D.1

8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level High
a. Transmitter/Trip Unit 1, 2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 49 inches SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 I SR 3.3.1.1.1 49 inches SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15
b. Float Switch 1,2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.9 47.32 inches for SR 3.3.1.1.13 LSN013A, B 45.44 SR 3.3.1.1.15 inches for LSN013C, D

5(a) 2 I SR 3.3.1.1.9 47.32 inches for SR 3.3.1.1.13 LSN013A, B 45.44 SR 3.3.1.1.15 inches for LSN013C, D

9. Turbine Stop Valve Closure t 40% RTP 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.9 5% closed SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 (g)

TSR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.18 d 0.06 sec

10. Turbine Control Valve t 40% RTP 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.9 530 psig Fast Closure, Trip Oil SR 3.3.1.1.10 Pressure Low SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 (g)

TSR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.18 d 0.07 sec(f)

11. Reactor Mode Switch 1, 2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.12 NA Shutdown Position SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 I SR 3.3.1.1.12 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15
12. Manual Scram 1, 2 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 I SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b), (c), (d), (e), (h) not used this page (f) Measured from start of turbine control valve fast closure.

(g) The Turbine First Stage Pressure nominal setpoint is 188.2 psig with an Allowable value 199.4 psig.

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-4 Revision 78 (9iii)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 TR 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.2.1 The control rod block instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2.1-1.

ACTIONS


NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for the channels not required by the Technical Specifications.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required channels A.1 Enter the Condition referenced Immediately inoperable. in Table 3.3.2.1-1 for that channel.

B. As required by Required Action B.1 ----------NOTE---------

A.1 and referenced in Table Applicable if only one required 3.3.2.1-1. channel of the Function is inoperable.

Enter Condition C. 7 days AND B.2 -----------NOTE----------

Applicable if more than one required channel of the Function is inoperable.

Enter Condition C. Immediately C. As required by Required Action C.1 Place at least one of the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> A.1 and referenced in Table inoperable channel(s) in the 3.3.2.1-1. tripped condition.

OR As required by Condition B.

(continued)

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-5 Revision 5 (15i)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1.1 Verify Control Rod Block 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Action A.1 and referenced in capability is maintained for Table 3.3.2.1-1. the applicable function.

AND D.1.2 Place at least one 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> INOPERABLE channel in the tripped condition.

OR D.2 Initiate a control rod block. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> RIVER BEND TR 3.3-6 Revision 5 (15ii)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which TSRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.1 - 3.3.2.1.6 (Not Used)

TSR 3.3.2.1.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 184 days TSR 3.3.2.1.8 - 3.3.2.1.9 (Not Used)

TSR 3.3.2.1.10 -------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------

Enter LCO 3.3.2.1 Condition A if this surveillance requirement is not met.

Verify that all bypass valves are closed. Initially, prior to > 20%

RTP.

AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, thereafter TSR 3.3.2.1.11 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued)

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-7 Revision 5 (17i)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.12 -----------------------------NOTE--------------------------

Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2 (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after IRMs are on range 2 for SRMs).

Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Within 7 days prior to entering MODE 2 from a shutdown exceeding 7 days duration AND 7 days for IRMs AND 31 days for SRMs TSR 3.3.2.1.13 -------------------------NOTE------------------------------

For APRM neutron flux - High, Setdown, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.

Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days TSR 3.3.2.1.14 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Within 7 days prior to entering MODE 2 from a shutdown exceeding 7 days duration TSR 3.3.2.1.15 Calibrate the trip unit 92 days (continued)

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-8 Revision 18 (17ii)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.16 --------------------------------NOTES----------------------------------

1. Neutron detectors and Reactor Recirc Flow Reference transmitters, as applicable, may be excluded.
2. For SRMs, IRMs, and APRM neutron flux - High, Setdown, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.

Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 184 days TSR 3.3.2.1.17 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months TSR 3.3.2.1.18 Calibrate the Recirc Flow Reference transmitters. 24 months RIVER BEND TR 3.3-9 Revision 128 (17iii)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (Page 1 of 2)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL ALLOWABL MODES OR CHANNELS REFERENCED REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT E VALUE OTHER PER TRIP FROM TLCO SPECIFIED FUNCTION REQUIRED CONDITIONS ACTION A.1

1. Rod Pattern Control System
a. Rod withdrawal limiter (a) 2 ENTER SR 3.3.2.1.1 LCO 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.1.6 SR 3.3.2.1.9 TSR 3.3.2.1.7 TSR 3.3.2.1.10 (b) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.2 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 SR 3.3.2.1.9 TSR 3.3.2.1.10
b. Rod pattern controller 1(c),2 2 ENTER SR 3.3.2.1.3 LCO 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 SR 3.3.2.1.9
2. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown (d) 2 ENTER SR 3.3.2.1.8 Position LCO 3.3.2.1
3. Low Power Setpoint (b),(c),2 2 ENTER TSR 3.3.2.1.11 27.5 +/- 3% 27.5 +/- 7.5%

LCO 3.3.2.1 RTP RTP

4. High Power Setpoint > HPSP 2 ENTER TSR 3.3.2.1.11 67.9% RTP (k) d 68.2%

LCO 3.3.2.1 RTP

5. Average Power Range Monitors
a. Flow Biased Neutron 1 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.13 j j Flux - High TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 TSR 3.3.2.1.18
b. Inoperative 1,2 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.13 NA NA TSR 3.3.2.1.14
c. Downscale 1 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.13 5% RTP t 3% RTP TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16
d. Neutron Flux - High, 2 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.13 12% RTP d 14% RTP Setdown TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 (continued)

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-10 Revision 61 (18i)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (Page 2 of 2)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL ALLOWABLE MODES OR CHANNELS REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT VALUE OTHER PER TRIP D FROM SPECIFIED FUNCTION TLCO CONDITIONS REQUIRED ACTION A.1

6. Source Range Monitors
a. Detector not full in(e) 2 3 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA TSR 3.3.2.1.16 5* 2** C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA TSR 3.3.2.1.16
b. Upscale(f) 2 3 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 1 x 105cps d 1.6 x 105cps TSR 3.3.2.1.16 5* 2** C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 1 x 105cps d 1.6 x 105cps TSR 3.3.2.1.16
c. Inoperative(f) 2 3 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA 5* 2** C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
d. Downscale(g) 2 3 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 t 0.7 cps(i) t 0.5 cps(i)

TSR 3.3.2.1.16 5* 2** C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 t 0.7 cps(i) t 0.5 cps(i)

TSR 3.3.2.1.16

7. Intermediate Range Monitors
a. Detector not full in 2, 5* 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
b. Upscale 2, 5* 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 108/125 division d 110/125 division TSR 3.3.2.1.16 of full scale of full scale
c. Inoperative 2, 5* 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
d. Downscale(h) 2, 5* 6 B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 5/125 division of t 3/125 division of TSR 3.3.2.1.16 full scale full scale
8. Scram Discharge Volume Water 1, 2, 5* 2 D TSR 3.3.2.1.13 level-high TSR 3.3.2.1.15 TSR 3.3.2.1.17
a. LISN602A 18.00" d 21.12"
b. LISN602B 18.00" d 21.60"
9. Reactor Coolant System 1 2 D TSR 3.3.2.1.13 114% of rated d 117% of rated Recirculation Flow Upscale TSR 3.3.2.1.14 flow flow TSR 3.3.2.1.16 TSR 3.3.2.1.18

(a) THERMAL POWER > HPSP.

(b) THERMAL POWER > 35% RTP and d HPSP.

(c) With THERMAL POWER d 10% RTP.

(d) Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.

(e) This function is not required if detector count rate is t 100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.

(f) This function is not required when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.

(g) This function is not required when the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.

(h) This function is not required when the IRM channels are on range 1.

(i) Provided the Signal to noise ratio is t 2.0, otherwise trip setpoint of t 3.0 cps and allowable t 1.8 cps.

(j) Allowable Values and Nominal Values specified in COLR. Allowable and nominal value modifications required by the COLR due to reduction in feedwater temperature may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The trip setting for this Function must be maintained in accordance with TLCO 3.2.4.

(k) To address feedwater temperature reductions, set at first stage turbine pressure equivalent to 60.0 % RTP.

RIVER BEND TR 3.3-11 Revision 86 (18ii)

Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TR 3.7.9.2 TR 3.7.9.2 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems


NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------

The Operating License, NPF-47, may require prior NRC approval for changes to this Technical Requirement.

TLCO 3.7.9.2 The following spray and sprinkler systems shall be OPERABLE:

SYSTEM LOCATION ELEVATION IDENTITY

a. Control Bldg. Cable Chases 116'0" AS-6A 98'0" AS-6B 70'0" AS-6C, WS-6A, WS-6B, WS-6C 115'0" WS-7A, WS-7B
b. Cable Tunnels 67'6"/70'0" WS-8D, WS-8E, WS-8F, 67'6"/70'0" WS-8G, WS-8H, WS-8K, 67'6"/70'0" WS-8L, WS-8M, WS-8N
c. Auxiliary Bldg., RCIC 70'0" PS-1, WS-19 Pump Room 141'0" WS-4A, WS-4B, WS-20, AS-12
d. Diesel Generator Bldg. 98'0" PS-2A, PS-2B, PS-2C
e. Fuel Bldg. 95'0" AS-5 148'0" WS-5A, WS-5B APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the spray or sprinkler systems is required to be OPERABLE.

RIVER BEND TR 3.7-15 Revision 5 (15viii)

Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TR 3.7.9.2 ACTIONS


NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each required spray or sprinkler system.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the above A.1 Establish a continuous fire 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> required spray or sprinkler watch with backup fire systems inoperable. suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged AND A.2 Establish an hourly fire watch 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol for other areas.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.9.2.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) 31 days in the flow path is in its correct position.

TSR 3.7.9.2.2 Cycle each testable valve in the flow path through at 12 months least one complete cycle of full travel.

TSR 3.7.9.2.3 Perform a system functional test which includes 18 months simulated automatic actuation of the automatic systems and verify that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a simulated actuation test signal.

TSR 3.7.9.2.4 Cycle each valve in the flow path, that is not testable 24 months during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

(continued)

RIVER BEND TR 3.7-16 Revision 128 (15ix)

River Bend Station RO Written Answer Key Question # Answer 76 C 77 D 78 B 79 D 80 A 81 D 82 D 83 B 84 D 85 B 86 A 87 A 88 A 89 B 90 C 91 D 92 B 93 D 94 D 95 D 96 A 97 B 98 A 99 C 100 C