Letter Sequence Other |
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Results
Other: ML20099C963, ML20106B611, ML20112G495, ML20112G517, ML20133E335, ML20135G405, ML20141P237, ML20155G018, ML20212R258, ML20215J636, ML20216J199
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MONTHYEARML20097J8491984-09-13013 September 1984 Clarifies Re Method to Be Used to Enhance Moisture Removal If Request for Relief from 100 Psia Pcrv Pressure Restriction Granted.Helium Mass Flow Rate Through Circulator Differential Pressure Increased Project stage: Request ML20099C9631984-10-29029 October 1984 Ro:On 840911,moisture Discovered in Purified Helium Supply Line Wells During Installation of New Moisture Sensing Probes.Tests Indicate Leak Source Is Circulator Penetration A.Rate of Leak Approx .05 Gpm Project stage: Other ML20106B6111985-01-24024 January 1985 Informs That Concern W/Seriousness of Moisture Ingress Events & Other Impediments to Obtaining Realistic Plant Operation Prompted Corporate Mgt to Form Improvement Committee Under Chairmanship of Rf Walker Project stage: Other ML20112G5171985-01-24024 January 1985 Responds to HR Denton Identifying Requirement for Development of Plan to Implement Mods Recommended by Moisture Ingress Committee.Improvement Committee Formed to Evaluate Innovative & Substantial Plant Mods Project stage: Other ML20112G4951985-03-12012 March 1985 Responds to 850220-22 Requests for Addl Info Re Improvement Committee & Plant Mods Concerning Reduction of Primary Sys Moisture.Historical Background,Review Committee Responsibilities & Description of Helium Issues Encl Project stage: Other ML20135G4051985-09-0404 September 1985 Notifies of Mod to Helium Circulator Auxiliary Sys to Mitigate Pcrv Moisture Ingress.Digital Test Valve Removed from Main Drain Sys & Will Not Be Reinstalled Project stage: Other ML20133E3351985-09-20020 September 1985 Notifies of Change to One of Mods Provided in Re Helium Circulator Auxiliary Sys.Mod Designed to Mitigate Pcrv Moisture Ingress.Thermal Dispersion Type Flow Elements Removed for Evaluation by Manufacturer Project stage: Other ML20141P2311986-03-14014 March 1986 Forwards SER Re Util 860312 Plans for Mods to Facility in Order to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Design Mods Should Reduce Likelihood of Moisture Ingress Project stage: Approval ML20141P2371986-03-14014 March 1986 SER Re Util 860312 Plans for Mods to Facility in Order to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Design Mods Should Reduce Likelihood of Moisture Ingress.Licensee Committed to Conduct Further Studies If Ingress Continues Project stage: Other ML20155G0181986-04-0202 April 1986 Forwards Info Re Fort St Vrain Improvement Committee & Actions Taken & Under Consideration to Mitigate Moisture Ingress Into Primary Coolant Sys,Per Util 850312 Commitment Project stage: Other ML20216J1991987-02-0404 February 1987 Evaluation of Long-Term Effects of Moisture Ingress in Fort St Vrain Nuclear Reactor Project stage: Other ML20212R2581987-04-16016 April 1987 Provides NRC W/Annual Report of Actions Taken by Util or Under Consideration by Util to Mitigate Moisture Ingress Into Primary Coolant Sys,Per Item Iv.A of Encl to Project stage: Other ML20215J6361987-06-16016 June 1987 Forwards Advanced Science & Technology Assocs,Inc Rept Re Moisture Ingress at Facility.Agrees W/Subcontractor,Lasl, Conclusions Re Effects of Moisture Inleakage Occurrences Into Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel.W/O Encl Project stage: Other ML20216J1921987-06-17017 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Mods to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Periodic Insps & Preventive Maint Should Be Performed on Pertinent Components.Operational Performance Should Be Continuously Upgraded Project stage: Approval ML20216J1841987-06-17017 June 1987 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Rept Re Mods to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Lasl Recommends Operational Performance Be Upgraded & Reliability of Power Distribution Sys Be Improved to Reduce Frequency of Moisture Ingress Project stage: Approval 1985-09-04
[Table View] |
SER Re Util 860312 Plans for Mods to Facility in Order to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Design Mods Should Reduce Likelihood of Moisture Ingress.Licensee Committed to Conduct Further Studies If Ingress ContinuesML20141P237 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Fort Saint Vrain |
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Issue date: |
03/14/1986 |
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From: |
NRC |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML20141P232 |
List: |
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References |
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TAC-59936, NUDOCS 8603190175 |
Download: ML20141P237 (5) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20141K9961997-05-0505 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-34 ML20128D7191992-12-0101 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Requirement of 10CFR50.54(q) to Change to Biennial Emergency Plan Exercise Rather than Annual Following Completion of Next Scheduled Exercise at Plant ML20246J3261989-08-30030 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 72 to License DPR-34 ML20245J3781989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 71 to License DPR-34 ML20245J4511989-08-0808 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Responding to Issues Re Tech Spec Upgrade & Plant Defueling.Stated Tech Spec Sections Should Be Upgraded ML20246J3131989-07-0707 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Operators Role in Mitigating High Energy Line Break at Facility Acceptable ML20247R2261989-05-26026 May 1989 Final Safety Evaluation Re LER 87-20 Concerning Interactions Between Steamline Rupture Detection/Isolation Sys,Plant Protective Sys & Control Sys at Facility ML20245C5031989-04-18018 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 70 to License DPR-34 ML20248D6501989-03-31031 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 69 to License DPR-34 ML20236A1401989-02-27027 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 68 to License DPR-34 ML20235T4511989-02-24024 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Facility Core Support Flow Vent Sys. Continued Operation of Facility W/Current Core Support Flow Sys Configuration Acceptable ML20235J3421989-02-16016 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Action in Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,item 2.1 (Part 2) Confirming Establishment of Interface W/Either NSSS Vendor or Vendors of Each Component in Reactor Trip Sys ML20235J3841989-02-13013 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Continued Operation of Facility Not Affected by Steam Generator Tube Failures Experienced by Advanced gas-cooled Reactors ML20195D3911988-10-27027 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions of LER 86-017 ML20205G0021988-10-24024 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 65 to License DPR-34 ML20154J8021988-09-15015 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 64 to License DPR-34 ML20154J4621988-09-15015 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 63 to License DPR-34 ML20207F0571988-08-10010 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870206 Submittal Re Safe Shutdowns During Postulated Accident Conditions ML20207F0431988-08-0505 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 61 to License DPR-34 ML20207F2411988-08-0505 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 62 to License DPR-34 ML20151M1601988-07-21021 July 1988 Safety Evaluating Supporting Requirements for Redundancy in Responding to Rapid Depressurization Accident ML20151A9961988-06-20020 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 60 to License DPR-34 ML20195K0651988-06-15015 June 1988 SER Concurring W/Util Proposed Corrective Actions in Engineering Rept Entitled, Rept of Helium Circulator S/N 2101 Damage & Inlet Piping S/N 2001 Repair & Mod Activities ML20195F9661988-06-15015 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Destructive Exam Rept for Fuel Test Assembly-2.Fuel Represented by Fuel Test Assembly-2 Predicted to Be Safe for Operation in Facility for 1,800 EFPDs ML20154F8891988-05-10010 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Safe Shutdown Sys & Exemption Requests Concerning 10CFR50,App R.Licensee Request for Exemptions in Listed Areas Should Be Granted.Concept for Providing post-fire Shutdown Acceptable ML20148S6031988-04-0707 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 59 to License DPR-34 ML20151B6651988-04-0101 April 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Compliance w/10CFR50.App R Re Safe Shutdown DHR Capacity ML20150C4541988-03-10010 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Seismic Analysis Methods for Bldg 10 & Walkover Structure Conservative.Gaps Provided Adequate to Accommodate Relative Motions Which Occur Between Subj Structures & Walkover Structure & Turbine Bldg ML20147C8181988-02-25025 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Changes to Interim Tech Specs 3/4.1.7, Reactivity Change W/Temp NUREG-1220, Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Special Senior Licensed Fuel Handler Initial & Requalification Operator Training Program,Per NUREG-1220, Training Review Criteria & Procedures1988-01-13013 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Special Senior Licensed Fuel Handler Initial & Requalification Operator Training Program,Per NUREG-1220, Training Review Criteria & Procedures ML20237D7631987-12-18018 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Updating 861118 Fire Protection Sys Safety Evaluation.Util Alternate Fire Protection Configuration Acceptable ML20149E1621987-12-18018 December 1987 Marked-up Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Safe Shutdown Sys & Exemption Requests Concerning 10CFR50,App R ML20236U6961987-11-23023 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 57 to License DPR-34. Addendum to Review of Proposed Tech Spec Change:Core Inlet Valves/Min Helium Flow & Max Core Region Temp Rise,Limiting Condition for Operation..., Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20236U5761987-11-20020 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Helium Circulator S/N C-2101 Damage. Util Corrective Action Program Initiated ML20236R3001987-11-13013 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20238C7621987-09-0202 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Concurring W/Util 870702 & 27 Ltrs & 870818 Telcon Re Elimination or Reduction of Maint Requirements on Certain Fire Seals ML20235N6491987-07-13013 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 56 to License DPR-34 ML20235F5281987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Safe Shutdown of Steam Generator Matls. Under Severe Transient Conditions,Fuel Temp Can Be Maintained Under Accepted Temp Limits & Plant Can Be Safely Shutdown ML20235F5151987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Safe Emergency Shutdown of Reactor Sys. Operation at 82% Acceptable ML20235F5441987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Effect of Firewater Cooldown on Steam Generator Structural Integrity.All Tests Acceptable ML20235E5281987-06-29029 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 55 to License DPR-34 ML20216G9511987-06-24024 June 1987 Revised Safety Evaluation Re Steam Line Rupture Detection & Isolation Sys (Slrdis).Slrdis Meets Requirements of 10CFR50, App A,Gdc 20 & GDC 4 ML20216G9911987-06-24024 June 1987 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Application for Amend to License DPR-34 Re Tech Specs for Steam Line Rupture Detection & Isolation Sys ML20215J5401987-06-22022 June 1987 Draft Safety Evaluation Re Safe Emergency Shutdowns.Facility Operation at 82% Power Acceptable ML20216J1921987-06-17017 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Mods to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Periodic Insps & Preventive Maint Should Be Performed on Pertinent Components.Operational Performance Should Be Continuously Upgraded ML20214M4681987-05-20020 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 54 to License DPR-34 ML20215J8271987-05-0505 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 53 to License DPR-34 ML20209D7561987-04-22022 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870211 Submittal Re Performance Enhancement Program,Finding 4-10 ML20206J9331987-04-0606 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-34 ML20205S1141987-03-31031 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability On-Line Testing. Facility Designed to Permit on-line Functional Testing,Including Testing of Reactor Trip Contactors 1997-05-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20196G6731997-07-0101 July 1997 Informs Commission That Decommissioning Process Has Been Completed at PSC of Colorado Fsvngs,Unit 1 Located in Town of Platteville in Weld County,Co ML20141K9961997-05-0505 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-34 ML20140E1121997-04-10010 April 1997 Confirmatory Survey of Group Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas for Fsv Nuclear Station,Platteville,Co ML20134D1661997-01-30030 January 1997 Rev 1,Vol 6 to Final Survey Rept,Final Survey of Group E (Book 2A of 2) ML20137S6111996-12-31031 December 1996 Annual Rept Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of Securities Exchange Act 1934, for Fy Ended Dec 1996 ML20134G6401996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 6,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to Final Survey of Group E ML20134G6171996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 2,Volume 1,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to Final Survey Description & Results ML20134G7271996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 11,Book 1 of 1 to Final Survey of Group J ML20134G6861996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 8,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to, Final Survey of Group G ML20134G6321996-10-26026 October 1996 Rev 1,Volume 5,Books 2 & 3 of 3 to Final Survey of Group D ML20133D7831996-10-22022 October 1996 Preliminary Rept - Orise Support of NRC License Insp at Fsv on 960930-1003 ML20116A4661996-07-19019 July 1996 Fsv Final Survey Exposure Rate Measurements ML20112J6861996-05-31031 May 1996 June 1996 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning.Rept Covers Period of 960216-0531 ML20112C1531996-05-17017 May 1996 Fsv Final Survey Exposure Rate Measurements ML20101G5521996-03-21021 March 1996 Confirmatory Survey Activities for Fsv Nuclear Station PSC Platteville,Co, Final Rept ML20097E3201996-01-31031 January 1996 Nonproprietary Fort St Vrain Technical Basis Documents for Piping Survey Instrumentation ML20095K4131995-12-26026 December 1995 Rev 3 to Decommissioning Plan ML20095H7211995-12-20020 December 1995 Revs to Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan Update ML20095K9751995-12-15015 December 1995 Fort St Vrain Project Update Presentation to NRC, on 951207 & 15 ML20096C1671995-12-13013 December 1995 Rev 4 to Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan ML20094M1651995-11-30030 November 1995 Nonproprietary Fsv Technical Basis Documents for Piping Survey Implementation ML20092F3461995-09-14014 September 1995 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning, Covering Period of 950516-0815.W/ ML20137H3531994-12-31031 December 1994 Partially Withheld, Rept of Independent Counsel Investigation Concerning Issues at Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Decommissioning Project, App D,Comments by Mkf & Westinghouse Team & Responses ML20137S2331994-12-31031 December 1994 Rept of Independent Counsel Investigation Concerning Issues at Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Decommissioning Project, Dec 1994 ML20029C6031993-12-31031 December 1993 1993 Annual Rept Public Svc Co of Colorado. W/940405 Ltr ML20058Q3791993-12-21021 December 1993 Rev 1 to Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20045B3641993-06-30030 June 1993 June 1993 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning. ML20045A4291993-06-0303 June 1993 LER 93-003-00:on 930505,new Source of Natural Gas Introduced within 0.5 Miles of ISFSI & Reactor Bldg W/O Prior NRC Approval.Caused by Field Routing of Natural Gas Pipe.Well Isolated by Well operator.W/930603 Ltr ML20077D1631993-05-10010 May 1993 Enforcement Conference, in Arlington,Tx ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20128D7191992-12-0101 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Requirement of 10CFR50.54(q) to Change to Biennial Emergency Plan Exercise Rather than Annual Following Completion of Next Scheduled Exercise at Plant ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127F5691992-11-0303 November 1992 Informs Commission of Intent to Issue Order Approving Plant Decommissioning Plan & Corresponding Amend to License DPR-34 ML20101E5761992-05-31031 May 1992 Monthly Defueling Operations Rept for May 1992 for Fort St Vrain ML20096E8221992-04-30030 April 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1992 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20095E9601992-04-17017 April 1992 Rev to Fort St Vrain Proposed Decommissioning Plan ML20100R7431992-03-31031 March 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1992 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20090L0621992-02-29029 February 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1992 for Fort St Vrain Unit 1 ML20092D0081992-01-31031 January 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1992 for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20102B2241992-01-22022 January 1992 Fort St Vrain Station Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Not Requiring Prior Commission Approval Per 10CFR50.59, for Period 910123-920122 ML20094N6701991-12-31031 December 1991 Public Svc Co Annual Financial Rept for 1991 ML20091J6251991-12-31031 December 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20094D6711991-11-30030 November 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1991 for Fort St Vrain Unit 1 ML20090M1871991-11-20020 November 1991 FOSAVEX-91 Scenario for 1991 Plant Exercise of Defueling Emergency Response Plan ML20086D6891991-11-15015 November 1991 Proposed Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20085N1451991-11-0505 November 1991 Revised Ro:Operability Date of 910830 for Electric Motor Driven Fire Water Pump P-4501 Not Met.Pump Not Actually Declared Operable Until 911025.Caused by Unforseen Matl & Testing Problems.Equivalent Pump Available ML20086C5451991-10-31031 October 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20085H6611991-10-10010 October 1991 Assessment of Mgt Modes for Graphite from Reactor Decommissioning ML20091D7671991-10-0101 October 1991 Rev B to Engineering Evaluation of Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel & Core Support Floor Structures for Proposed Sys 46 Temp Change ML20085D9861991-09-30030 September 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ 1997-07-01
[Table view] |
Text
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. / %, UNITED STATES
[ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 4
.....p SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH '
Moisture Ingress Into The Primary System The Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station has had a significant history of problems associated with moisture in the primary coolant system. This moisture has almost exclusively been the result of helium circulator bearing water flowing up the shaft of the circulators during transient or upset conditions.
Numerous modifications of the helium circulation auxiliary system have been performed in an attempt to preclude or minimize moisture upsets. These included modifications performed by the vendor, Gulf General Atomic, prior to acceptance of the plant by Public Service Company (PSC) in 1979 and subsequent technical evaluations of the system and modifications by PSC thereafter.
A major plant outage took place in 1981/1982 during which a modification was made to isolate the buffer systems of the circulators of loop 1 from loop 2.
Although the primary purpose of this modification was to prevent circulator upsets in one loop from reflecting into the second, a significant goal of the modification was to reduce moisture ingress by minimizing the number of circulators responding to a system upset. Comparison of the records of circulator trips before and after splitting of the buffer loops indicate a substantial reduction in circulator trips which should result in a lowering of moisture ingress events.
However, moisture ingress events continued and the licensee has taken further actions to prevent moisture ingress. The actions of the licensee to eliminate moisture ingress events resulted in the evaluation of many possible modifica-tions to the helium circulator auxiliaries, evaluations of instrumentation hardware and software, evaluation of procedures, and evaluation of vario'us methods for improving transient analyses. Many activities were evaluated and dispositioned to include initiation of modifications which showed promise for 8603190175 860314 PDR ADOCK 05000267 P PDR
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2 reduction of the frequency and severity of moisture ingress into th9 primary system. The following are system modifications that have been initiated to reduce moisture ingress into the primary system:
- 1. The licensee has determined that a high percentage of helium circulator transients, resulting in water ingress to the pre-stressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) are related to inability to drain water from the bearing cartridge. Several aspects of the system contributed to these water ingress problems. A loop seal existed between the circulator and the high pressure separator. During transients wherein water levels in the high pressure separator were changing rapidly, water from the loop seal was forced back into the circulator, resulting in an upset of the pressure relationships of buffer and bearing water within the circulator bearing water cartridge. During the recent outage, this piping has been modified-to eliminate the loop seals.
- 2. The high pressure separator previously drained into the main drain line.
During plant transients, this drain path had considerable resistance and in effect acted as a loop seal in the drain from the high pressure separator. Fluctuations in the bearing water surge tank levels often resulted in flooding of the high pressure separator. During this outage the high pressure separator drain was re-routed directly to the gas side of the bearing water surge tank. This change should provide proper high pressure separator draining during circulator transient conditions.
- 3. Another problem relating to flooding of the high pressure separator was the insufficient piping flow capacity of the system. The old system had a capacity of approximately 5 gallons per minute. This capacity was increased to 20 gallons per minute, which should help to eliminate high pressure separator flooding during transients. ,
3
- 4. The original main drain control system was pneumatic with a pneumatic operated valve. There is an inherent system lag in this type of system due to the characteristics of an air control system. It has been deter-mined from computer model studies that if the main drain valve responds fast enough, the circulator can go through severe plant transients without water ingress. In order to speed up the response of the main drain valve, pneumatic boosters were added. Plant transients that were experienced after installation of these boosters did not result in water ingress events.
While the booster improved the main drain performance, they also intro-duced control instability problems. When the licensee attempted to slow down the system to eliminate this instability, the effectiveness of the boosters was reduced. An investigation into better main drain control showed that converting the pneumatic system to electronic controls should make significant improvements. During the recent outage, the licensee did convert the main drain control for all four circulators to an elec-tronic system.
The electronic main drain controls for the circulators may enhance the performance of the existing valves so that they provide satisfactory response. With the installation of electronic control for the main drain system, the licensee is giving the operator more control options. The high pressure separator level control now provides a feed forward signal to the main drain setpoint. With the higher response speed of the electronic control system, this may not be necessary. The licensee is providing an option where the main drain is controlled strictly from main drain to buffer differential pressure. Computer model studies performed by GA indicate that this is a more effective mode of control. The licensee is also providing a manual mode of operation where the operator can take direct control of the main drain valve position from the contro1 room.
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- 5. In the past there have been circulator trips in which analysis of the transient could not satisfactorily identify the cause of the trip or the cause of the resulting moisture ingress. In order to pursue a more intense effort to resolve these moisture ingress events, the licensee performed an in-depth analysis of all plant transients such as circulator trips, loop shutdowns, and reactor scrams. One of the items identified by this transient review was the need for additional data points at a higher sampling frequency than the plant data logger could provide. A dedicated system has been installed to provide this information and additional inputs have been added as the need has been identified.
- 6. Another item identified by the licensee as a possible source of circulator trips was the possibility of spurious trips induced into the system. The licensee identified that the signal cables for the bearing water, buffer and mid-buffer pressure differential switches were not shielded. The licensee installed shielded cables during the recent outage. The new shielded cables were connected to the buffer, mid-buffer switches and many System 21 computer data signals during the last shutdown. It is the licensee's intent to replace the bearing water pressure differential switches in the future and the new shielded cables will be connected to these switches at that time.
- 7. During normal circulator operation, bearing water for the circulators is provided from the bearing water pumps. If a pump is lost, the back up bearing water automatically comes in to provide adequate water to the circulator bearings. If the pump was restarted, a surge of bearing water to the circulator bearing cartridge occurred until the automatic control on the back up bearing water could act to reduce this flow.
After the helium circulators are operated on back-up bearing water. it is necessary for the operator to return to the normal bearing water supply from bearing water pumps. A severe transient was sometimes ind'uced if the bearing water pumps were brought on line in addition to the backup bearing water source. The operator had no control over the rate at
5 which the normal bearing water was pumped into the system. The, licensee installed controls to allow the operator to bring normal bearing water supply in gradually, and this supply will back out the backup bearing water system so that this transition can be made in a more controlled manner.
- 8. During overhaul of the control rod drives, the licensee observed indica-tion that moisture may be coming into the drive mechanism through the purified helium header. A bearing water leak from the A circulator into the penetration interspace has been identified, and this is the probable source of moisture into the purified helium header. In order to detect and eliminate moisture from any source in the purified helium header, the licensee plans to install moisture removal devices and moisture monitors in the purified helium header. The moisture removal devices and instrumentation are not available for installation during this outage, however, piping revisions will be made to allow installation of these devices when they become available.
The licensee has identified several potential paths for moisture ingress into the reactor vessel and modified the plant design to reduce the likelihood of moisture ingress through these paths. Furthermore the licensee intends to continue to analyze moisture ingress and evaluate the effects of the plant modifications on reducing this problem.
Based on our review of the licensee's submittal we conclude that the design modifications to the Fort St. Vrain Plant should reduce the likelihood of moisture ingress into the reactor vessel; however, due to the minute moisture content limit (500 ppm) and the close proximity of helium circulator bearing cooling water to the reactor vessel penetration, moisture ingress may still cause the reactor moisture content limit to be exceeded. If moisture ingress to the reactor continues to exceed the moisture content limit the licensee has committed to conduct further studies and propose further design modifications to the plant.
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