ML20235J342

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Action in Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,item 2.1 (Part 2) Confirming Establishment of Interface W/Either NSSS Vendor or Vendors of Each Component in Reactor Trip Sys
ML20235J342
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/16/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235J324 List:
References
GL-83-28, TAC-52840, NUDOCS 8902240248
Download: ML20235J342 (2)


Text

i.

b _:

/ *' Nfg .. UNITED STATE! '

[% - 'g- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 *j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 -

L:

1 k ....

[

~

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION -

RELATED T0. GENERIC LETTER 83-28r ITEM 2.1L(PART 2)-

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY.0F COLORADO FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET N0. 50-267

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 2E,1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. failed to open upon an automatic. reactor trip signal frcm the reactor protection system. This incident was. terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip s igt.a l . The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related tc the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip sigr.cl was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincider. tally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO),' directed the staff to investigate the' report on the generic implications of.these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of these events are reported in NUREG-1000 " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all

' licensees of operating' reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by Public Service Company of Colorado, the licensee for Fort St. Vrain for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references of this report.

Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to confirm that an interface program has been established with the NSSS vendor or with the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System which includes:

o periodic communication between the licensee / applicant and the NSSS vendor or the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System, and o a system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee / applicant of transmitters of vendor technical information.

8902240248 890216 DR ADOCK 0500 g7

t ..

in 2.0 -EVALUATION The licensee for Fort St. Vrain provided responses to Generic Letter 63-28, Item 2.1 (Part 2) in their submittals dated November 4, 1983 and June.12, 1985. Since Fort St. Vrain is a unique plant, the licensee stated that most information concerning plant operation and necessary improvements originates at the plant. As a result, the licensee works with the NSSS vendor to find a solution to a problem and then generates the documentation to revise plant

' drawings, vendor drawings or operations and maintenance manuals. In the second submittal, the licensee stated that they will continue to seek assistance and Equipment Technical Information (ETI) from other safety-related equipment vendors when an evaluation of an equipment or ETI problem concludes that such direct interaction is necessary, or would'be beneficial. The information gained from the vendor interface program is incorporated into the operations, maintenance, and test procedures in the following manner: (1)Allvendor information will be routed to a single esponsible organization and will be logged as it is received; (2) All vendo- Nformation will be reviewed by the plant engineering group for applicability to procedures, and will be submitted to the licensee's Operating Information Assessment Group (01AG) for action; and (3) Results and recommendations of vendor information reviews will be documented and tracked via 01AG files and the licensee's Production Commitment Log.

In addition, the licensee is currently participating in the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) to address the vendor interface issue.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review cf these responses, we find the licensee's statements confirm that an acceptable vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for the successful performance of the reactor trip function. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is, therefore, acceptable.

s

4.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction permits, "Pequired Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
2. Letter, O. R. Lee, Public Service Company of Colorado to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, November 4, 1983.

l l 3. Letter J. W. Gahm Public Service Company of Colorado to Regional Administrator (IV,,) NRC, June 12, 1985.

Dated: February 16, 1989 Principle Contributor: S. Rhow l