ML20206C789

Gpu Nuclear Corp Memorandum Re Pending Discovery Motions.* Util 870204 Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Should Be Granted & Attachments to 870204 Motion Should Be Issued. Exhibits Encl

ML20206C789
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/06/1987
From:	Jim Hickey GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20206C803	List: ML20206C789 ML20206C874
References
CON-#287-3047 CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8704130163
Download: ML20206C789 (275)

Text

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• 0 00CMETED USNRC Ap l fjgp}@7P2 d9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0FFICE cf r;pg,.a g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CXETim; . m f,a

?RM;cq Before the Administrative Law Judge In the Matter of )

) g ,v PE N GPU Nuclear Corporation ) Docket No. 50-320

) EA-84-137 (Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 2) )

GPUN'S MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PENDING DISCOVERY MOTIONS I. Introduction This memorandum addresses, in light of subsequent develop-ments and a conference call discussion with the Presiding Officer on March 23, 1987, the status and context of pending discovery disputes.1/

1/ This Memorandum addresses GPU Nuclear Corporation's Motion to Compel NRC Staff to Produce Documents and Request for Oral Ar-gument (Feb. 4, 1987) (hereinafter "First Motion to Compel"); GPU Nuclear Corporation's Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas (Feb. 4, 1987) (hereinafter " Motion for Subpoenas"); and GPU Nuclear Cor-poration's Second Motion to Compel (Feb. 24, 1987) (" hereinafter "Second Motion to Compel"). The NRC Staff responded to these mo-tions in NRC Staff Response to GPU Nuclear Motion to Compel NRC Staff to Produce Documents (March 3, 1987) (hereinafter "NRC Re-sponse to First Motion to Compel"); NRC Staff Response in Opposi-tion to Issuance of Subpoenas (March 3, 1987) (hereinafter "NRC Response to Motion for Subpoenas"); NRC Staff Response to GPU (Continued Next Page) l l

8704130163 870406 PDR ADOCK 05000320 G PDR o

q l Since the filing of GPUN's First Motion to Compel, the Staff has made a number of previously withheld documents available to GPUN. See Letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (March 2, 1987). The NRC Staff also'made available to GPUN boxes of docu-ments which according to the Staff constitute, with the exception of documents that the Staff have removed and identified as ex-empt,2/ all of OI's files on the Parks, King, and Gischel allega-tions. In addition, shortly before making these files available, the Staff produced a number of documents in the NRC Staff's Fifth Supplemental Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (Feb. 19, 1987). Finally, the Staff informed GPUN on March 19 that four additional boxes had been found. Those were made available to GPUN on March 24.

(Continued)

Nuclear Second Motion to Compel NRC Staff to Produce Documents (March 10, 1987) (hereinafter "NRC Response to Second Motion to Compel"). The NRC Staff's Response to GPU Nuclear Corporatien's Second Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Request for Production of Documents (March 18, 1987) and related NRC Staff Motion for Protective Order (March 18, 1987), which are also before the Pre-siding Officer, are addressed in GPUN's Response to NRC Staff's Motion for Protective Order, filed contemporaneously with this Memorandum.

2/ See NRC Response to First Motion to Compel at 3 n.1; Affida-vit of R. Meeks (Mar. 3, 1987), 1 10 (attached to NRC Response to Motion For Subpoenas); Letter from C. Barth to J. Patrick Hickey (Mar. 18, 1987).

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i The newly-produced documents and the Staff's affirmations that all documents in particular categories have been produced or

identified as privileged moot aspects of GPUN's First Motion to j Compel. The only issues remaining relate to a few documents that the Staff claims are privileged but that GPUN believes should be i produced. These are identified and discussed in Section III below, and GPUN requests that the Presiding Officer review these J

documents in camera to facilitate a ruling.

j The responses and production of documents by the Staff have not mooted GPUN's Motion for Subpoenas or Second Motion to Com-pel. To the contrary, the non-retention of notes of OI inter-b views with Parks and others makes the requested depositions of 9

Mr. Meeks of OI and Mr. Feinberg of DOL, and the discovery of OI procedures governing record retention, all the more important to GPUN's defense. This subject is discussed in Sections'IV and V 1

below.

t i.

II. The Significance of GPUN's Discovery Requests to the Issues in this Case 1

4 j Before the specific disputes are discussed, an explanation of GPUN's view of the significance of the discovery requests in i

light of the facts of this proceeding is appropriate. As sug-gested during the March 23 conference call between the Presiding Officer and parties, we have attempted to state more fully the l

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context in which these issues arise, in order to demonstrate the relevance of our requests and to facilitate a ruling on'the appropriate scope of discovery. Further, placing the issues in context is necessary to permit the Presiding Officer to rule on privilege claims, since whether documents are "necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding" is a consideration under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.744(c)(3).3/

In addition, in responding to present discovery and seeking to prohibit future requests, the Staff has questioned the purpose of GPUN's requests. GPUN is attempting to ascertain the in-formation in the NRC's possession that relates or may lead to ev-idence which GPUN reasonably expects the Staff may use at hear-ing, or which GPUN may wish to offer. Of particular interest to GPUN is information obtained from Richard Parks or bearing on his credibility. The NRC intends to present Mr. Parks as a witness in this proceeding. Witness credibility is relevant in all pro-ceedings, and full discovery concerning it is commonplace. While Parks' credibility is incontrovertibly relevant, the particular significance of his testimony in this proceeding, and consequent-ly the extent to which discovery should be permitted, warrant 3/ This discussion is also pertinent to the interrogatories and document requests that are the subject of GPUN's Response to NRC Staff's Motion for Protective Order, since whether those requests are necessary to a proper decision is again a consideration. See 10 C.F.R. $$ 2.720(h)(2)(ii), 2.744(c)(3).

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h emphasis. GPUN anticipates that Parks will portray, as he did in

.a f his March 1983' affidavit, certain events and conversations, and i

that largely on the basis.of his testimony, the NRC Staff will

ask the Presiding Officer to infer retaliatory animus on the part i

of GPUN and Bechtel employees. Whether Parks' descriptions are l- inaccurate or portray events in a false light is therefore a i

} critical issue.

i i

For-example, the first charge against GPUN involves Parks' removal as alternate Startup and Test (SU&T) Supervisor, which i Parks claims was in retaliation for raising safety concerns l' regarding the polar crane on February 17, 1983. On February 18, i

1983, Edward Kitler, the SU&T Supervisor, appointed Dwight Walker.

as his new alternate. Parks was the previously designated alter-

! nate. Kitler has testified during deposition that this action

was initiated in January (before Parks commented on the polar crane load test procedures). Deposition of Edward J. Kitler (Jan. 13, 1987) at 34-35. Parks was not directly under Kitler's t

supervision, since Parks was assigned to a different department, i and Parks had been unavailable to assist Kitler in December.

Walker, newly-arrived on site, was assigned to Kitler's depart-ment and was more experienced. See id. at 32-35, 54-55. Fur-l ther, Kitler believes the memorandum appointing Walker as

! Kitler's alternate was drafted before Kitler became aware of f Parks' polar crane load test comments. See id. at 41, 43.

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s The NRC's responses to GPUN's interrogatories and NRC depo-sitions indicate that the Staff intends to use Parks' character-

.ization of a conversation between Parks and Kitler in the TMI-2 parking lot on the morning of February 18 to suggest that Kitler was improperly motivated. According to Parks, Kitler asked "What the hell are you doing?" Parks states he asked what Kitler i

meant, and Kitler purportedly replied, "You have upper management pissed off at you, to the point where I've been asked what has to be done to get you transferred off the site." Parks also states that Kitler attributed the " threat" to Richard Gallagher (then the Assistant Director of Site Engineering). Affidavit of Richard Parks (March 21, 1983) at 20. Parks insinuates that this i

1 conversation was prompted by his comments on the polar crane load test proceeding, which he had just sent to the Polar Crane Task Force.

Kitler, in his recent deposition, discredits Parks' charac-terization. Kitler states that Parks approached him in the park-ing lot and asked Kitler what was going on, why was "everybody down on" him. Kitler, replying, told Parks that Parks was being uncooperative, people were becoming annoyed, and that " people are even talking about transferring you." Kitler explains that he was not yet aware of Parks' February 17 polar crane load test comments, but had previously heard that Parks was behaving uncooperatively. He did not tell Parks that Gallagher was the l l

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person who had suggested transferring Parks, and had heard no such threat from Gallagher. Rather, Kitler's comment stemmed from an incident when Tom Morris, a member of the Head Lift Task Force, had become upset with Parks in January as a result of Parks' uncooperative attitude displayed at a meeting.4/ Morris 4

had approached Kitler about the matter and had commented "Can't we get rid of that guy" or something to that effect. See Deposi-tion of Edward J. Kitler (January 13, 1987) at 64-69, 79-80.

The February 18 parking lot conversation is significant in evaluating Parks' (and the Staff's) claim that Parks' removal was retaliating. The Presiding Officer will have to decide whether to believe Kitler or whether to believe Parks. GPUN believes '

that Parks' acocunt of the conversation is inaccurate.

As is ev- ,

, ident, the resolution of this issue will depend on the credibil-

)

ity of the witnesses. .

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i 4/ Morris believes the meeting was one held on January 20, 1983. According to Richard Sieglitz, the Manager of Plant Main-tenance, Morris twice asked Parks when a procedure that Site Operations was drafting would be ready and Parks would not give Morris a date. Morris states that Parks was always complaining I and objecting that he could not do any number of things and never suggesting how to get things done. Morris told Sieglitz that Parks should be counseled for his negative attitude, which Sieglitz later did. E. Stier, "TMI-2 Report -- Management and Safety Allegations" (Nov. 16, 1983) (hereinafter "Stier Report"),

Interview of T. Morris (July 25, 1983) at 12-14; Id., Interview of R. Sieglitz (Sept. 6, 1983) at 20-25.

,...____y_ - _ . . _ - . . . . , , _ m. _ -._.....__._.._,..r_e_

Another example of the significance of Parks' credibility is found in the third charge against GPUN, which relates to Parks' removal on March 17 as primary Site Operations Department repre-sentative to the Test Working Group (TWG) for the polar crane project. In his affidavit, Parks states that at about 1:00 o' clock, he informed Joseph Chwastyk (then Acting Site Operations Director) that he could not approve the polar crane load test.

According to the affidavit, Parks was called to Bahman Kanga's (Director, TMI-2) office at about 3:30 p.m. for a meeting with Kanga and Chwastyk on the subject of a memorandum, dated that day from Chwastyk, stating that effective immediately, Walter Mar-shall would replace Parks as the primary Site Operations member on TWG for the Reactor Building Polar Crane project only. Parks states that Kanga asked Parks twice to agree that his removal was not an act of intimidation, to which Parks responded, "In my opinion, the intent is well defined." Affidavit of Richard Parks (March 21, 1983) at 52.

Parks told the Department of Labor Compliance Officer a somewhat different story. In his DOL statement of May 2, 1983, (provided to GPUN in January, 1987), Parks stated that he met with Chwastyk and told Chwastyk that he could not sign the polar crane procedure. Chwastyk purportedly said he would try to fig-ure out a solution, and Parks suggested that perhaps his alter-nate, Marshall, would sign the procedure (facts omitted from Parks' affidavit).

According to Parks, Chwastyk then wrote a memorandum, which he told his secretary to type and bring to Kanga's office. Parks states that Chwastyk then left the room and Parks asked the secretary to let him read the memorandum (whereas Parks' affidavit suggests that Parks never saw the memo-randum until he met with Kanga). Parks states that he was then called to Kanga's office (no two hour interval indicated), and was met outside by Chwastyk who said the memo would take care of the problem. DOL Report, Interview Statement of Richard Parks (May 2, 1983) at 2-3.

Even Parks' moderated account to the DOL Compliance Officer is irreconcilable with the testimony of Chwastyk and Kanga. Ac-cording to Chwastyk's interview by Edwin Stier and his recent deposition in this proceeding, Parks came to Chwastyk to discuss concerns Parks thought he had with the reactor building polar crane. They discussed the concerns and Parks then suggested that he might be so close to the project that he could no longer dis-tinguish real problems. Chwastyk suggested as a solution remov-ing Parks from the project, and Parks thought it was a good idea.

Stier Report, Interview of Joseph Chwastyk (Aug. 4, 1983) at 156; Deposition of Joseph Chwastyk (Dec. 1, 1986) at 108. Chwantyk told Parks, "Okay, I'll draft up the letter and we'll go over it and make sure you agree with it and I'll put it out." Parks re-viewed the memorandum and may have made some comments or changes to it. Stie{ Report, Interview of Joseph Chwastyk (Aug. 4, 1983) at 156.

According to both Chwastyk and Kanga, Chwastyk then called Kanga and told Kanga that he felt Parks was somewhat nervous and irritated and felt it was wise to relieve the pressure by having Parks take the secondary position on TWG for the Polar Crane (leaving him in the primary position for other activities).

Kanga asked whether Chwastyk had talked to Parks, and Chwastyk replied he had. Kanga asked what had been Parks' reaction and was told that Parks had agreed. Kanga states that Chwastyk said he had drafted a memo that Parks had examined and on which Parks had made minor changes. Kanga, reacting to an earlier meeting he had had with Parks that day about Parks' feeling intimidated, met with Parks to be absolutely sure Parks felt no intimidation.

Stier Report, Interview of Bahman Kanga (July 25, 1983) at 73; DOL Report, Interview Statement of Bahman Kanga (May 4, 1983) at 2.

According to Kanga, Parks affirmed that he understood what the memo said and that he was not interpreting it as intimidation or a reflection on his work. Ibid. Chwastyk states he too un-derstood that Parks was agreeing. Deposition of Joseph Chwastyk (Dec. 1, 1986) at 114.

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b Parks' statement to the DOL Compliance Officer provides some further insight. Parks states that on March 17, he had already

agreed with GAP to file a DOL complaint, and indicates he pro-vided a "non-committal" answer to Kanga's questions to avoid dis-crediting his complaint. This suggests that Parks, with an eye toward prospective litigation, may have deliberately misled Messrs. Kanga and Chwastyk. Parks states he called Tom Devine of GAP later that day and it was decided to include the " demotion" in the complaint.

In substance, Parks portrays the events on March 17 as an unexpected and deliberatively retaliatory action to eliminate him 4

from further contact with polar crane issues. Chwastyk and Kanga 4 describe a well-intentioned effort to help Parks, discussed twice t

I with Parks in advance and agreed to by him. If the latter ver-sion is believed, the charge in NOV relating to this event cannot i be sustained; and a major consideration in evaluating the con-t j flicting versions will be the credibility of the witnesses.

1 The NRC and DOL investigations of Parks' allegations are very important to an assessment of Parks' credibility, for two reasons. First, those investigations pre the only real source of relatively contemporaneous testimony by Parks, inconsistencies in which would indicate lack of credibility. Parks would not submit to a full on the record interview by Mr. Stier,5/ but NRC and DOL i

5/ See E. Stier, "TMI-2 Report -- Managerial and Safety Allega-

tions" (Nov. 16, 1983), Vol. I at 6-7.

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investigators had access to Mr. Parks and interviewed him at length. OI investigators J. Vorse and R. Meeks interviewed Parks on April 27, May 2, and May 3, 1983.g/ OI Director Ben Hayes told the Commissioners on June 6, 1983, that OI's first interview of Parks lasted ten hours.7/ Parks stated on May 10, 1983, that OI had interviewed him for twenty-four hours.g/ Second, the in-vestigations are sources of evidence showing that many of Parks' allegations were inaccurate. For these reasons, GPUN has active-ly pursued discovery of the material gathered in these investiga-tions.

This discovery has revealed that notes of OI interviews with Parks have not been retained. GPUN has been provided only with written statements, some or all of which were apparently prepared l by Mr. Parks or GAP after careful review. See discussion at page 38 infra. The Staff indicates that no other records. exist.

GPUN has also sought to ascertain the findings of investiga-tors examining Parks' allegations. The first step in this g/ NRC Staff Partial Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories and NRC Staff Partial Response to GPUN's First Request for Production of Documents (Sept. 23, 1986)

at 39.

7/ Commission Meeting " Discussion of Pending Investigations" (June 6, 1983), Tr. at 39 (attached as Exhibit 1 hereto).

g/ Stier Report, App. C., Statement of Richard Parks (May 10, 1983) at 75.

j i

l inquirywas}odeterminewhatallegationswereinvestigated, and next, what witnesses were interviewed, what evidence was gathered, and what conclusions were reached. This effort has raised more questions than it answered, chiefly because it re-

/

vealed an unexplained dearth of invesdigative material on key al-legations made by Parks. The findings on those of Parks' allega-tions that were addressed, however, give substantial reason to question Parks' credibility.

The first NRC investigation of a Parks allegation was con-ducted by Joel Wiebe, the Senior Resident Inspector at TMI-2.

Parks had alleged on February 18, 1983 that because of his com-ments on the Polar Crane Load Test procedures, Bechtel Engineer-ing management wanted him transferred off-site. After in-vestigating the allegation, Mr. Weibe "found no evidence to support Parks' allegation and it appeared that all comments on the Polar Crane were receiving adequate management attention' and were being addressed."9/

9/ Memorandum from J. Weibe to R. Christopher, " Allegations from Rick Parks, Dated February 18, 1983" (March 10, 1983)

(attached hereto as Exhibit 2). Mr. Weibe and Lake Barrett, Dep-uty Director of TMIPO, met with Parks on February 25, 1983, and informed him of these findings. They asked if Parks wanted the matter pursued further by an OI investigation, but Parks de-murred. Parks replied that QA had agreed to review the applica-bility of administrative procedures to the polar crane test pro-cedures, that he was satisfied his concerns were being addressed, and he felt no further action was warranted at the time. See (Continued Next Page) i Following the release by Parks and GAP of Parks' 56-page af-fidavit on March 23, 1983, NRC Chairman Palladino directed OI and OIA to initiate an investigation.10/ OIA was assigned the inves-tigation of Parks' allegations of NRC misconduct at TMI-2. OI apparently segmented its investigation to examine separately 1)

Parks technical allegations (relating generally to the reactor building polar crane); 2) Parks' allegations of harassment and

~

intimidation; and 3) Parks' allegation that George Kunder was the mystery man who had shut off high pressure injection pumps in the morning of the'TMI-2 accident.11/ After interviews with Mr. Parks, another phase of the 01 investigations was added to examine an allegation by Parks that site employees had plotted to (Continued)

Exhibit 2. Neither Parks, Barrett, or Weibe say that Parks made any complaint about his replacement by Walker as alternate SU&T supervisor, which Parks characterized in his March 21, 1983 affi-davit as retaliatory.

10/ Memorandum from N. Palladino to J. Cummings and B. Hayes, "TMI-2 Allegations" (March 25, 1983).

11/ See Commission Meeting, " Discussion of Steps to Decision in TMI-1 Restart Proceeding" (April 15, 1983) at 6 (attached as Exhibit 3 hereto). The " mystery man" allegation was specifically added to the list of issues to be investigated, perhaps by OI Di-rector Hayes. Compare Memorandum from J. Vorse to B. Hayes, "Three Mile Island - Investigation of Allegations Based on GAP Affidavit" (March 30, 1983) (Exhibit 4 hereto) with Memorandum from B. Hayes to Chairman Palladino, "OI Work Plan Regarding Issues Raised by the Richard Parks Affidavit" (March 31, 1983)

(Exhibit 5 hereto).

s conceal "una ceptable" levels of cesium-137 in a TMI-2 sewage tank.12/

The investigation of Parks' technical allegations resulted in a September 1, 1983 OI Report.13/ The NRC Staff reviewed this report, disagreed with a number of OI's findings, and issued a Notice of Violation (severity level IV -- minor safety signifi-cance) to GPUN for not following certain administrative proce-dures.14/

12/ This allegation is contained in Parks' June 6, 1983 state-ment to OI (Exhibit 26 hereto).

13/ OI Investigative Report 83-002, "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 -- Allegations Regarding Safety Re-lated Modifications, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane" (Sept. 1, 1983).

14/ SECY-84-36, Staff Review and Response to OI Report on TMI-2 Cleanup Allegations (Jan. 25, 1984); Letter from R. DeYoung to P. Clark (Feb. 3, 1984) (transmitting NOV). Debate over the val-idating and significance of OI's findings continued for a consid-erable period. The NRC Staff review and disagreement prompted retort by OI. Memorandum from R. Walker and A. Beach to B.

Hayes, " Assessment of Staff Review and Response to OI Report on TMI-2 Cleanup Allegation" (Feb. 24, 1984); Memorandum from B.

Hayes to W. Dircks, " Staff Actions Regarding OI -- Report on TMI Cleanup Allegations" (March 2, 1984). The Staff and OI subse-quently met and reached a consensus on the safety significance of the allegations. Memorandum from B. Snyder, A Beach, W. Rogers and R. Walker to W. Dircks, " Safety Significance of TMI-2 Allega-tions" (April 11, 1984) (sometimes referred to as the " Peace Treaty"). Thereafter, by letter dated June 4, 1984, Dr. Henry Myers, the Science Advisor of the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, asked a series of questions relating to the Staff's and OI's positions. These questions prompted further consultation. See Memorandum from W. Dircks to B. Hayes, "Inves-tigation of TMI-2 Polar Crane Allegations" (Sept. 26, 1984); Mem-(Continued Next Page) s ,

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OIA's-investigation into Parks' allegations of NRC miscon-duct culminated in the issuance on September 7, 1983 of an in-vestigative report entitled " Parks' Allegations Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2)." OIA concluded that although Parks had alleged " numerous instances of reported extensive NRC employee impropriety / misconduct," OIA's investigation had "not identified any information, or otherwise obtained any evidence, indicative of possible NRC misconduct or impropriety."15/

Mr. Parks and GAP subsequently assailed the conduct of OIA's investigation. Parks alleged that OIA had " violated the condi-tion of his interview," had " failed to investigate two of Parks' most significant allegations," had "made findings of suspect ac-curacy and exhibited bias through failure to interview essential witnesses," had " endorsed suspect policies," had " failed to address the most basic question of the case," and had " failed to recomend any corrective action."16/ These allegations were also i

(Continued) orandum from B. Hayes to W. Dircks, " Investigation of TMI-2 Polar Crane Allegations" (Oct. 18, 1984); Memorandum from W. Dircks to the Commissioners, " Investigation of TMI-2 Polar Crane Allega-tions" (Oct. 29, 1984); Letter from C. Kammerer to H. Myers (Nov.

2, 1984).

15/ Sept. 7, 1983 OIA Report, Summary at 2-3.

16/ Letter from T. Devine to the Commissioners (Nov. 10, 1983)

(Exhibit 6 hereto).

e-s investigated. The investigation again concluded, "The allega-tions provided by GAP to the Commission in their November 10, 1983, letter were not substantiated."17/

Shortly after the initial OI and OIA reports, Edwin Stier issued his report, which addressed inter alia Parks' polar crane and mystery man allegations. Mr. Stier concluded that "the evi-dence gathered in the course of this investigation demonstrates that the allegations, in their broadest sense, are unfounded."

Stier Report, Vol. I at 13.

On December 21, 1983, OI issued its report on its investiga-tion of Parks' cesium allegation. The report demonstrated that.

Parks' allegation was without merit.

Our investigation established that the pres-ence of detectable levels of cesium 137 in the PAF was documented and reported to the .

NRC in monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual reports. It.further established that the NRC TMI Program Office had been orally advised when these levels were detected, and that I

these initial oral reports were subsequently documented by the licensee in formal reports.

No evidence was developed indicating that ei-ther Mr. Thiesing or Mr. Hildebrand concealed or attempted to conceal this information.

Additionally, the consensus of technically knowledgeable persons contacted during this investigation was that the cesium levels were ,

quite low - less than 10% of the Maxiumum I Permissable (sic) Concentration allowed by 17/ Memorandum from S. Connelly to the Commissioners (January 16, 1986) (Exhibit 23 infra).

o O

TMI-2 Technical Specifications and as such, are; consistent with the activities of the PAF Holding Tank.

Memorandum from B. Hayes to the Commissioners (Dec. 21, 1983)

(Exhibit 7 hereto).

Thus, the record provides strong evidence that by the end of 1983, there were substantial bases to question Parks' veracity.

i The TMIPO initial investigation, the OIA investigation of Parks' allegations against the NRC (later reconfirmed by follow-up in-vestigation), the OI investigation of Parks' cesium allegations, and Stier's investigation had all concluded that Parks' claims were not supported by evidence; and while OI had apparently reached a different conclusion on the validity of some of the technical issues raised by King, Gischel and Parks, there was a substantial differences of opinion about the significance of those issues.

The next phase of OI's investigation -- the investigation into Parks' harassment allegation, which should be of greatest significance to the present charges -- is enigmatic. Although DOL had made a preliminary conclusion in May that Parks had been harassed, OI apparently felt it needed to pursue the matter fur-ther. The September 1, 1983 OI Report indicated that OI's inves-tigation of the harassment allegations was continuing.lg/ In 18/ Sept. 1, 1983 OI Report, $$ C-3 at 2, C-33 (Exhibit 8 hereto).

October, OI Director Ben Hayes informed the Commissioners that OI was "well into" phase two of its investigation on " Parks-Gischel, which is the intimidation and harassment."19/ On January 10, 1984, Mr. Hayes informed the Commissioners that there were four individuals to whom OI "would like ~to speak to conclude the in-timidation/ harassment aspect of Parks and Gischel."20/ On March 23, 1984, Mr. Hayes told the Commission that OI "will have concluded the balance of [the Parks and Gischel) investigation, namely the intimidation and harassment aspects, by the 15th of April."21/

However, after these numerous indications that OI was pursu-ing an investigation of Parks' harassment allegations, the OI report eventually issued on this matter 22/ merely stated that the May 1983 DOL Report had been reviewed by OI and was being sub-mitted for NRC regulatory and enforcement consideration. In 19/ Commission Meeting, " Report on Investigation at TMI and Report on Adjudicatory Matters at TMI" (Oct. 6, 1983), Tr. at 7 (Exhibit 9 hereto).

20/ Commission Meeting, " Investigations and Enforcement Matters Involving TMI Units 1 and 2 and their Impact on TMI-1 Restart" (Jan. 10, 1984) at 43 (Exhibit 10 hereto).

21/ NRC Meeting, " Discussion of Pending Investigations at TMI" (March 23, 1984) at 39 (Exhibit 11 hereto).

22/ OI Report, "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, Allegations Regarding Discriminatory Acts for Raising Safety Concerns on Safety Related Modifications, Quality Assur-ance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane" (May 18, 1984).

contrast, the.same report contained extensive factual findings, 31 pages and 20 pages respectively, relating to OI's pursuit of the allegations of harassment of Edwin Gischel and Lawrence King.

No conclusion was offered, nor did the OI Report disclose any in-formation concerning any OI investigation of the matter. In a briefing before the Commission on May 23, 1984, Mr. Hayes told the Commission that OI had " looked at their [ DOL's] investigation and we felt it met our regulatory needs."23/

The Staff informs us that "No investigation of Mr. Parks' discrimination allegations was conducted by OI and no findings

! were made."24/ However, the August 12, 1985 Notice of Violation on which this proceeding is based, states that in addition to the DOL investigation of Parks' conplaint, "OI also investigated Mr. Parks' allegations of discrimination."25/ In addition, no record of any review or evaluation by OI of the DOL Report has been identified or produced.

23/ Commission Meeting (May 23, 1984), Tr. at 27. An ambiguous memorandum from Mr. Hayes to the Commissioners transmitting the report implies that OI. concluded that King and Gischel were ha-rassed. Memorandum from B. Hayes to the Commissioners, "Three Mile Island NGS, Unit 2, Allegations Regarding Discrimination For Raising Related Safety Concerns" (May 18, 1984). If that was the ,

OI view, it was rejected by the Staff in their evaluation in l NUREG-0680, Supp. 5 (July, 1984).

24/ NRC Response to Motion for Subpoenas at 3, citing Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 2.

25/ Letter from J. Taylor to GPUN (Aug. 12, 1985) (Exhibit 12 hereto). ,

l I

The cirgumstances and results of OI's investigation of Parks' " mystery man" allegations are equally enigmatic. As noted above, this issue was specifically added to the list of issues to be pursued. See note 11 supra. The September 1, 1983 OI Report indicated that OI's investigation of Parks' " mystery man" allega-tions was continuing.2p/ A September 20, 1983' Memorandum from R. Meeks to W. Ward proposed interviewing individuals on a number of issues, including the mystery man allegation. Exhibit 13. On October 28, 1983, OI sent NRR an analysis prepared by Parks crit-icizing a study by EDS, Inc., which had determined that HPI did not actuate on the morning of the accident (and therefore could not have been shut off).27/ NRR met with Dr. Henry Myers of Con-gressman Udall's staff on November 3, 1983, to discuss Dr. Myers' comments on HPI actuation.2g/ NRR subsequently met with Mr. Parks on November 22, 1983, but no formal account of that in-terview has been found. Affidavit of Robert A. Capra (Nov. 6, 1986), 11 4-5. NRR ultimately concluded that it was extremely unlikely that HPI had actuated.29/

2p/ Sept. 1, 1983 OI Report, $ $ C-3 at 2, C-33. See Exhibit 8.

27/ Memorandum from B. Hayes to H. Denton, "EDS Nuclear, Inc.

Analysis of High Pressure Injection Pumps" (Oct. 28, 1983)

(Exhibit 14 hereto).

2g/ Memorandum from R. Capra to R. Mattson, " Meeting with Dr.

Henry Myers" (Nov. 7, 1983) (with attached questions) (Exhibit 15 hereto). -

29/ Memorandum from H. Denton to B. Hayes, "NRR Evaluation of HPI Actuation at TMI-2 About 5:41 a.m. on March 28, 1979" (April 24, 1984) (Exhibit 16 hereto).

The NRC Staff informs GPUN that after referring the issue to NRR (apparently in. October, 1983), "OI-conducted no further ac-tivities on Mr. Parks' ' mystery man' allegation."30/ However, the October 28, 1983 memorandum from B. Hayes to H. Denton, which forwarded to NRR Parks' criticism of the EDS study, stated that "The OI investigation of the " mystery man" issue is ongoing."

See Exhibit 14. The OI Report written by Mr. Meeks on Parks' ce-

~

sium allegation states that OI's " investigation continues in a l pending status until investigations of the harassment /

4 intimidation and ' mystery man' issues are complete."31/ A January 4, 1984 Memorandum from R. Christopher to B. Hayes j (Exhibit 18) lists Mr. Kunder as one of four individuals to be interviewed on Parks /Gischel allegations.32/ The status of: the

" mystery man" allegation was apparently discussed at a Commission meeting on March 23, 1984, but the NRC Staff has not provided GPUN with pertinent portions of the transcript.33/ Following the i

30/ Affidavit of R. Meeks (March.3, 1987), 1 4 (emphasis added);

Affidavit of R. Meeks (Feb. 26, 1987). No results of the earlier investigative activities have been found, except for a draft af-

' fidavit, about which the Staff has refused to answer any ques-tions. See GPUN's Response to NRC Staff's Motion For Protective 4

Order (April 6, 1987).

31/ December 21, 1983 OI Report, Summary at 2 (Exhibit 17 hereto). l

• 32/ GPUN believes that the " mystery man" issue would be the most l likely topic related to Parks' and Gischel's allegations which  ?

! would have prompted OI to question Mr. Kunder.

i 33/ See Commission Meeting, " Discussion of Pending Investigation 1

! on TMI" (Mar. 23, 1984), Tr. at 43 (Exhibit 11 hereto, indicating j i

(Continued Next Page) 1 4

6 l

i

)

_ _ _ . . _ _ _ , , _ . .a _ , . _- ,r , ,

meeting, the Commission issued a memorandum instructing OI "to concentrate its (mystery man) investigation on change of operator

) testimony," which indicates that an investigation then still ex-isted.34/ But the May 1984 OI Report, without.a mention of the mystery man issue, lists the " investigations" as " closed,"

There, the trail ends, with no explanation of the change in focus or the investigative results up to that point.

As explained in GPUN's Response to Motion for Protective Order, which accompanies this Memorandum, Parks' mystery man al-legation is particularly significant to this proceeding. Not does it bear on Parks' credibility, but it figured prominently in the decision to suspend Parks with pay after Parks publicly re-leased his affidavit (the fourth charge in the NOV).

In our view, the investigative record reflects serious grounds for questioning the accuracy and in some cases the motive of Parks' charges. The two crucial aspects of these charges --

the harassment allegations and the mystery man allegations -- are (Continued)

I that the " mystery man" issue had been discussed earlier in the i meeting).

34/ Memorandum from S. Chilk to B. Hayes, " Staff Requirements --

Discussion of Pending Investigation--TMI, 2:00 p.m. Friday, March 23, 1984 Commissioners' Conference Room, D.C. Office (Closed --

Ex. 5 and 7)"-(April 2, 1984) at 2 (Exhibit 19 hereto).

1

- _ - -_ ~

conspicuous by the unexplained termination of the investigation and the absence of data to resolve the claims. These questions cannot be left unanswered without casting doubt in the accuracy and completeness of the evidence which will be offered at the hearing. The Presiding Officer cannot confidently assess Parks' version of the February 18 parking lot conversation with Kitler, or the events of March 17 with Kanga and Chwastyk, without having available all possible information concerning Parks' prior ver-sions of these events. If Parks deliberately fabricated the claims in his sworn statement regarding Kunder being the mystery man, his credibility is diminished. We believe the hearing must address these points, and we seek the Presiding Officer's assis-tance in the discovery process for our attempt to unearth the facts relevant to these questions.

III. Identification of Resolved and Remaining Issues Pertaining to the Production of Documents A. Complete Accounts of NRC Interviews of Parks At pages 25-29 of the First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought all accounts of NRC interviews of Richard Parks. In response, the NRC Staff has produced three additional draft Parks sta,te-ments prepared by OI35/ and a draft interview summary. The NRC 35/ Letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (March 2, 1987),

attached documents numbered 030287020 to 030287022. The three (Continued Next Page) l

e Staff further states that the notes of OI's interviews with Parks a

were discarded and represents that otherwise "all notes, draft statements, and other materials in OI files relating to Mr. Paths have been found and have been or are being made available to GPU Nuclear." Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 11.

Notwithstanding an untimely relevance objection,3s/ the Staff has represented that all responsive documents have been produced and also has committed to supplement its answer should additional documents be discovered. See Letter from D. Lewis to G. Johnson (March 20, 1987) (confirming a March 18 telephone con-l versation). Based on these representations, this portion of the (Continued) statements comprise a 13-page statement, which apparently is the initial draft referred to in paragraph 6 of the affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), a 10-page statement, and a two page statement.

The NRC states that the three summaries, though located by Mr. Meeks in November, were not then produced because they were recognized by Mr. Meeks as " duplicates of Parks' statements al-ready in the possession of GPUN Nuclear." Affidavit of Ronald Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 11. This statement is incorrect as to the 13-page statement. The 13-page statement is not a duplicate of any statement in GPUN's possession or in the public domain and contains text, including two full paragraphs related to Parks' mystery man allegations not found in subsequent drafts or the final statements in the OI Report. See note 41 infra.

3p/ The NRC Staff has objected to the underlying document re-quests as irrelevant. NRC Response to First Motion to Compel at 11-12. This objection was not raised in the original response to the requests. Further, the assertion that records of Parks' l statements to the NRC are irrelevant is without merit. l l

1 l

$ i l

First Motion to Compel and the Staff's objection are currently moot.

The NRC Staff's response, however, raises.a number of ques-tions that necessitate a deposition of Mr. Meeks. Since contem-poraneous records of Parks' interviews have not been maintained and since such statements are fundamental to an assessment of Parks' credibility, GPUN should be afforded the opportunity to depose Mr. Meeks to attempt to reconstruct what Parks said. This issue is discussed fully in Section IV infra.

B. Complete Accounts of Other Relevant Interviews At pages 29-33 of the First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought the production of complete accounts of other witness statements relating to Parks' allegations. In response, the NRC Staff has produced those specifically-identified statements previously withheld (see First Motion to Compel at 30-31). Further, Counsel for the NRC Staff has confirmed that the NRC's search for inter-view notes was not limited to interviews of Parks, but encom-passed interviews of any other person pertaining to any of Parks' allegations; and Counsel for the Staff indicated that all such notes of which the NRC is aware have been identified and made available to GPUN. See also Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 11 (averring that "all notes, draft statements, and other materials in OI files relating to Mr. Parks have been found and have been or are being made available to GPU Nuclear").

, - -- _ - - -- m_, m_

As a result of these responses, and notwithstanding a new, untimely objection,37/ the motion to compel complete accounts of other relevant interviews is currently moot. Again, however, the non-existence of notes or other complete accounts of relevant in-terviews underscores the need to depose Mr. Meeks.

C. The Prior Testimony of Lawrence King, Whom the NRC Staff Has Designated As a Witness At pages 33-34 of the First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought production of a June 7, 1985 OIA interview of Lawrence King, whom the NRC Staff had identified as one of its witnesses. The NRC Staff has produced this transcript and also now states that it does not intend to call King as a witness. Accordingly, this controversy has been resolved.

D. Documents Impeaching Parks' Credibility.

At pages 35-39 of the First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought production of certain documents prepared by the NRC in the course 37/ The NRC Staff has objected to the production of notes of in-terviews as "innerently" predecisional and exempt from disclo-sure. NRC Response to First Motion to Compel at 14-15. This ob-jection is untimely, since it was not raised in response to the original request. Moreover, it is without merit. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cited by the Staff, does not hold that an investigator's notes are exempt.

Coastal States does not address investigator notes, whereas Poss

v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 654, 659 (10th Cir. 1977) holds that interview notes taken by an investigator are not exempt.

)

9 of any investigation of Parks' allegations of misconduct by the NRC at TMI. The NRC Staff produced three documents sought by GPUN, but withheld four others. The documents remaining at issue are:

(1) SECY-84-65 dated February 9, 1984 for the Commissioners From James A. Fitzgerald, Ass't. General Counsel,

Subject:

GAP Request for Investigation into Richard Parks' Allega-tions; (2) SECY-84-65A dated June 5, 1984, for the Commission from J. A. Fitzgerald,

Subject:

SECY-84-65 -- GAP Request for Investigation into Richard Parks' Allegations; (3) Memorandum dated March 19, 1984, for Commissioner Bernthal from G.H. Messenger,

Subject:

SECY-84-54; and (4) Memorandum dated December 21, 1983, for G. H. Messenger, through H. Bowers from C.

McKenna, Jr.,

Subject:

" Parks Allegations Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2)."

First Motion to Compel at 36-37.38/

As explained in the First Motion to Compel, these documents may contain information or evidence affecting Parks' credibility.

" elated documents that at first were heavily expurgated by the Staff in response to GPUN's document requests but were subse-quently provided in more complete form in response to GPUN's 38/ GPUN previously received expurgated copies of these docu-ments from the NRC Staff. Letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (Nov. 13, 1986).

e Motion to Compel support this claim. For example, the NRC Staff originally produced a March 22, 1984 Memorandum from F. Herr to File 83-45,

Subject:

SECY-84-65, with all but the introductory paragraph deleted. See Exhibit 20, which was provided by letter a from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (Nov. 13, 1986). The com-plete version (Exhibit 21), which was provided to GPUN by letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick' Hickey (March 2, 1987), provides  :

factual information relating to a number of Parks' allegations.

In particular, Parks in this 56-page affidavit had alleged that Lake Barrett, the NRC Deputy Director of TMIPO, misled the Con-cerned Mothers of Middletown (CMM), in a statement to CMM on April 22, 1983 that there were no problems with the polar crane; and Parks subsequently attacked OIA for not having interviewed CMM members. In response, OIA Investigator McKenna provided the following explanation:

Mr. McKenna said there were several factors that led him to believe it was not necessary to contact CMM. First, Barrett had not addressed CMM on the date Parks had stated and in fact Barrett was in Washington at-Com-

! mission meetings all that day. The only time

Barrett addressed CMM in April was much ear-lier in the month and Barrett does not recall '

Parks being at that, or any other, CMM meet-ing. Second, it was likely that Parks was confused and actually referring (sic] to statements by Barrett before the House Sub-committee on April 26, 1983. Third, the al-legation was that statements before the CMM and NRC's approval of the functional descrip-

+

tion of the polar crane were inconsistent with NRC's disapproval of the polar crane

! operating procedures. Mr. McKenna had 1

J i

s determined that the two NRC documents were not", in fact, contradictory. In sum, Mr. McKenna said Parks' allegation regarding CMM was falling apart on all fronts and "after going nine yards and coming up with nothing" he did not believe it was necessary to "go the tenth. yard and talk to CMM."

Similarly, in January, the NRC Staff provided39/ GPUN with an expurgated version of the January 16, 1986 OIA report, from which the investigative conclusions were deleted. See Exhibit 22. A more complete version provided to GPUN on March 2, 1987, (Exhibit 23) contains the following finding:

Based on information developed during the OIA investigation, the allegations provided by GAP in their November 10, 1983, letter to the Commission were not substantiated. It should be noted that during a sworn transcribed in-terview on June 25, 19815, OIA provided Parks, with Devine present, the opportunity to make corrections to the Report of Inter-view which had been prepared by OIA to docu-ment the initial interview of Parks on June 23, 1983. In doing so, Parks made no new al-legations. Additionally, during the June 25, 1985, interview, Parks declined to provide complete information concerning his allega-tions. Although Parks agreed to provide a detailed analysis of his allegations to OIA within 30 days, he has not done so to date.

The Staff argues at pages 20-21 of the NRC Response to First Motion to Compel that the documents are deliberative and that 39/ NRC Staff Third Supplemental Response to GPU Nuclear Corpo-ration's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production-of Documents (Jan. 5, 1987).

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their, production would harm the deliberative process. The argu-ment is conclusory and contains no specific factual justification for withholding. As GPUN has previously stated, the documents appear to be po'st-decisional, and there is no indication that their release would be injurious to the Government -- i.e., that the documents contain personal opinion so candid that release would subject the author to ridicule or would mislead the public.

First Motion to Compel at 37. GPUN submits that these docu-ments should be provided by the NRC Staff to the Presiding Offi-

.I l cer for his in camera inspection and ruling.

)- E. Other Investigative Documents Concerning-Parks' Allegations j

1. Documents Prepared During OI Investigation At page 40-42 of its First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought production of three documents which the Staff had identified as being prepared by OI during the course of the OI investigation into Parks' allegation of discrimination referred to in an August 12, 1985 letter from James R. Taylor to P. Clark (transmitting

. the Notice of Violation in this proceeding). The NRC Staff sub-sequently produced two of the documents, and also now disavows the existence of any OI investigation on this subject. The third document (a Memo to File by William Ward of OI entitled, "Analy-sis of Affidavit by Richard D. Parks") may indicate areas to be

covered by the investigation and provide a basis to question Mr. Meeks. GPUN believes this document should also be reviewed for producibility by the Presiding Officer.

2. Documents Reflecting NRC Analysis of Parks' Alleged Safety Concerns At pages 42-52 of the First Motion to Compel, GPUN sought a number of documents reflecting NRC analysis of Parks' alleged safety concerns. The NRC Staff has produced a number of the d

documents at issue, but continues to withhold:

(1) Two undated drafts of Memorandum from Harold Denton, NRR, to William J. Dircks, EDO, enti-tied " Response to OI Review of SECY-84-37:

Staff Review and Response to OI Report on TMI-2 Cleanup Allegations," with attached draft Staff positions; (2) Note dated July 24, 1984, to Ben Hayes, OI, from Bernard Snyder, TMIPO, entitled, " Draft Response to June 4, 1984 H. Myers' Questions" -

with draft response to questions 2 and 4 attached; and (3) TMIPO Staff drafts of input to SECY-84-36 evaluation of various OI findings and of Parks' safety allegations).

Motion to Compel at 50-51.

GPUN believes that the documents above may reflect the fac-tual observations of members of the NRC Staff -- particularly, the NRC's TMI Program Office (TMIPO). Members of TMIPO had direct, personal knowledge of facts and issues related to Parks' l

I I

allegations. They conducted the first investigation of Parks' allegations, which they found unsubstantiated. They were aware of the polar crane issues, but were also aware that such issues were being properly addressed and resolved (a fact which belies the significance of Parks' comments and therefore the likelihood that such comments would prompt retaliation). These personal ob-servations of the events provide a third-party view to assess the i accuracy of Parks' allegations and the motives of GPUN and i Bechtel employees.

I The Staff addresses the withholding of the first two sets of documents at pages 18-19 of its Response, but makes no mention of the third. Citing Coastal States v. DOE, it argues that all drafts are " inherently" predecisional and exempt from disclosure.

GPUN disagrees with the NRC's interpretation of Coastal States. The Court did not hold that all drafts are exempt.

Rather, the Court stated that the exemption covers drafts "which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the poli-cy of the agency" and protects those that "would inaccurately re-flect or prematurely disclose agency position." 617 F.2d at 866.

Similarly, GPUN disagrees with the NRC's reference to the foot-note to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.790 for the proposition that' drafts are ex-empt. GPUN submits that the footnote merely limits the documents that are automatically to be placed in the NRC's public document I

.. i room. The " exemptions" that limit discovery are those provisions specified in 10 C.F.R. $ 2.790(a)(1) - (9). Compare 10 C.F.R.

5 2.790(a) (". . . documents shall not be exempt from disclosure

. . . except fo'r matters that are (subject to subsection (a)(1) -

(9)]") with 10 C.F.R. S 2.744 (b)(2) (permitting objection to production of documents " exempted from disclosure" under section 2.790(a)).

The documents above appear to be post-decisional documents that are not exempt from disclosure under section 2.790(a)(5).

Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 N.R.C. 1333, 1342 (1984). They were authored after the NRC's investigative findings and after final agency action on Parks' technical and procedural allegations to which they relate. An agency has a heavy burden to show that documents which evaluate past agency practice play a part in the deliberative process. Ashley v. Department of Labor, 589 F.Supp.

901, 907 (D.D.C. 1983), citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Even if predecisional, there has been no showing that their release would inaccurately reflect or prema-turely disclose agency position -- i.e., that release would be injurious to the consultative functions of the NRC -- and this showing is a prerequisite to non-disclosure. Moreover, irrespec-tive of the exemption, documents must be produced if disclosure >

is necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding.

i i

e Without having seen these documents and in the absence of better description of their content from the Staff, GPUN is dis-advantaged in further arguing the relevancy of the documents.

GPUN requests that the Presiding Officer direct the NRC Staff to produce the documents to the Presiding Officer for the Presiding

-Officer's in camera inspection and ruling.

IV. The Presiding Officer Should Issue a Subpoena for the Deposition of Mr. Meeks and Grant GPUN's Second Motion to Compel Despite the NRC Staff's supplemental discovery responses and Mr. Meeks' affidavit, questions remain concerning the information that was obtained in NRC interviews of Parks and other witnesses.

GPUN also needs to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the discarding of interview notes, since such action may constitute a defense for GPUN or entitle GPUN to other equitable relief.

Deposing Mr. Meeks is still essential.

The Staff opposes GPUN's motion. The thesis of the Staff's opposition appears to be that Mr. Meeks' affidavit and the docu-ments produced by the Staff obviate GPUN's need to depose Mr. Meeks. Mr. Meeks' affidavit and the documents produced, how-ever, raise more questions than they answer.

First, neither Mr. Meeks' affidavit nor the Staff responses resolve GPUN's questions concerning the various accounts of l

i

Parks' interyiews. For example, at pages 27-28 of GPUN's First Motion to Compel, GPUN identified a Commission meeting on June 6, 1983, during which OI Director Ben Hayes indicated the existence of memoranda prepared after Parks' interviews. Exhibit 1 at 41.

The Staff has ignored this reference.

Similarly, GPUN inquired about a complete statement of Parks' interviews mentioned in a May 5, 1983 telephone conversa-tion between Mr. Meeks and Tom Devine of GAP. Exhibit 24. This document indicates Devine's agreement that " Parks entire state-ment to NRC" could be referred to the Department of Labor. First Motion to Compel at 28. The NRC Staff has ignored this refer-ence, and provides no explanation what " entire statement" oxisted or was referred to DOL.

The documents that have been produced to date with the DOL Report do not include a statement from Parks to the NRC. GPUN wishes to ask Mr. Meeks if he did indeed refer a statement to DOL, as the telephone record suggests. If so, the documents pro-vided to GPUN with the DOL report are incomplete.

It is conceivable that a 13-page statement provided to GPUN on March 240/ is the " entire statement" to which the telephone  !

1 40/ Letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (March 2, 1987)

(document numbered 030287022).

l l

record alludes. According to Meeks' affidavit, information that was furnished by Parks during interviews with Meeks was recorded on notes (no longer in existence) and reproduced in an " initial draft" statement. Meeks states that the draft was then broken down into four separate statements, three of which were included in the September 1, l'983 and May 8, 1984 OI Reports, and the fourth of which (addressing the " mystery man" allegations) was never finalized. Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 11 3-4,

6. The 13-page statement appears to be such an initial draft.

GPUN should be provided the opportunity to confirm whether or not the 13-page statement, if it is the " initial draft," is the "en-tire statement" that was referred to DOL.

GPUN is also puzzled by differences between the 13-page statement and subsequent separate statements included in the OI reports. Mr. Meeks' affidavit suggests that all information -

obtained from Parks was recorded in the initial draft. Meeks' Affidavit, 1 6. The subsequent separate statements in the OI Re-ports, on the other hand, contain approximately 110 lines of text that appear nowhere in the 13-page statement.41/ A possible 41/ Copies of the initial 13-page statement and of the 3 sepa-rate statements included in the OI Reports are attached as Exhibits 25 through 28. The lines highlighted on the 13-page statement are information and assertions omitted from the subse-quent separate statements. The lines highlighted on the 3 sepa-rate statements are information and assertions that do not appear in the initial 13-page statement.

explanation},sofferedbyarecordofaJune14, 1983 telephone conversation between Meeks and Tom Devine of GAP.42/ Exhibit 29.

According to this document, "Meeks telephoned Thomas Devine about the status of three statements Richard D. Parks was preparing for submittal to NRC." GPUN wishes to inquire concerning the prepa-i ration of these statements. If Parks or GAP did indeed prepare

, or edit and add to the statements (after possibly as much as one to two months review 43/ and after having met with the DOL Compli-ance Officer to hear and respond to Bechtel's answer to Parks' l DOL complaint 44/ those statements must be viewed as crafted j

pieces of advocacy rather than candid, spontaneous responses to an investigator's questioning.45/

1 42/ Letter from C. Barth to J. Patrick Hickey (March 3, 1987),

attachment.

43/ The OI interviews were conducted on April 26, May 2, and May 3, 1983. The Meeks to Devine telephone call occurred in June i

over a month later, and the two Parks' statements eventually in-cluded in the OI Report on harassment allegations were not signed until July 25, 1983. It is possible that Parks and GAP set con-ditions for interviews with Parks. Cf. Letter from T. Devine to Chairman Palladino (March 23, 1987) at 2 (attached as Exhibit 30 i

hereto).

44/ See DOL Report, Interview Statement of Richard Parks (May 2, 1983) (discussing Bechtel's responses to Parks' complaint, with Tom Devine of GAP present). >

45/ An example is found on the first page of 13-page draft statement (Exhibit 25). There, Parks states that a threat to fire an employee is many times just "an every day expression used by Barton." This admission is deleted from subsequent state-ments. Compare Exhibit 27.

(Continued Next Page)

Conver's%1y, the NRC Staff represents that "all information which may have been recorded in such preliminary versions (of Parks' OI statements] was faithfully included in the final re-ports." NRC Response to Motion for Subpoenas at 12. The 13-page statement, however, contains approximately 50 lines of text, i

including two full paragraphs on the mystery man allegations, that do not appear in any final report. Some of this information may appear in a " fourth [ separate] statement" that Mr. Meeks identifies (Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 4), but no such statement has been produced by the NRC Staff.41/

other documents indicate it is unlikely that all information obtained from Parks and recorded in Meeks' interview notes was (Continued)

If the only record of Parks' statements to OI are in fact statements prepared or edited by Parks and GAP and if those statements were not available for two months, it would be all the i more reason for Meeks to preserve his original notes. How did OI i pursue interviews of other witnesses without a proper record of Parks' testimony?

i 4s/ According to Meeks' affidavit, the fourth statement was sub-mitted to Parks, who added to it and returned it to Meeks in draft form. Affidavit of R. Meeks (March 3, 1987), 1 4. GPUN is not certain whether it has been provided this revised statement.

i The NRC Staff has produced a document entitled " Draft for Mystery Man Affidavit." Exhibit 31. This document could be the version of the fourth OI statement which Parks reworked, but the NRC Staff has refused to answer any questions concerning the author-ship or preparation of this document. See GPUN Response to Mo-tion for Protective Order.  ;

1 l

1 I

1

reproduced in.the 13-page draft statement of Parks' interviews.

As already noted, OI Director Ben Hayes has stated that Parks' initial interview lasted ten hours and two additional interviews followed. Parks has stated that he was interviewed by OI for twenty-four hours. Given the extensive length of the ques-tioning, it is difficult to believe that the 13-page draft contains all the information provided by Mr. Parks. In addition, the NRC produced during discovery written questions to be asked of Parks. See Letter from G. Johnson to J. Patrick Hickey (March 2, 1987), attached document 030287007 (Exhibit 32 hereto). See also attached document 030287009 (Exhibit 33 hereto). The 13-page draft and subsequent statements do not reflect answers to these questions.

1 GPUN wishes to ask Meeks whether these and other questions

were asked of Parks. If they were, GPUN will seek to elicit from Meeks the responses that Parks gave. GPUN will pursue with Meek any corroborating documentary evidence or witnesses that Parks cited, or the absence of any such evidence, the circumstances of the interview, Parks' demeanor, and Meeks' efforts to verify Parks' information.

GPUN wishes to make similar inquiries concerning the state-ments and testimony other witnesses gave to OI. The OI inter-views of other witnesses (the approximately 20 persons listed in l

l l

l

l 3

l the Table of Contents of the September 1983 OI Report) are re-flected only by brief interview summaries and signed statements by some witnesses. Parks' statements provide a measure of the completeness of the interview summaries; the summary of Parks' interviews in the September 1983 OI Report condenses three days of questioning into two pages (Exhibit 34). Parks' prepared OI statements provide a similar indication of the completeness of sworn statements in the OI Report. Parks' initial 13-page state-ment was broken into four separate statements, only one of which (Exhibit 26, which is six pages in length) was included in the September 1983 OI Report. The September 1983 OI Report in fact indicates that " additional information" not contained in the Report had been obtained and was "being evaluated." September l',

1983 OI Report, S C-33 (Exhibit 8).

GPUN has already discussed other indications that pertinent information was obtained but is not reflected in interview summaries. GPUN points specifically to Mr. Meeks' interview with Edwin Gischel on April 7-8, 1983. In his original affidavit (Exhibit D-5 to the OI Report), Gischel had claimed that Mr.

Kanga of Bechtel, in a March 23, 1983 meeting, suggested that Parks could be put on a leave of absence and then "[gotten] rid of . . . quietly," and that Mr. Barton of GPUN urged that Parks be fired. These statements are cited by the Staff as support for the claim in the Notice of Violation that the decision to suspend Parks was regaliatory.47/ The OI Report provides a two-page summary of Meeks' interview with Gischel, and a statement dated April 8 and typed by Meeks, but not signed by Gischel until May 10.48/ Nei~ther the April 8/May 10 statement nor the summary refers to any notes of the March 23 meeting. However, during the deposition of J. Chwastyk in this proceeding, the NRC Staff pro-duced a set of notes of Mr. Gischel relating to the meeting, which had been provided by Mr. Gischel to OI. See Exhibit 37.

While the notes purport to quote. numerous statements made at the meeting, there is no reference to the Kanga statement or the Barton statement alleged in Gischel's affidavit.

These facts prompt numerous questions. Did Meeks ask Gischel for notes of the March 23 meeting? What else did Meeks ask Gischel? Surely an investigator would have asked when the notes were written 49/ and whether the notes were complete. Who else did Meeks interview about the March 23 meeting? In light of 47/ NRC Staff Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories . . . (Sept. 23, 1986) at 26.

48/ See September 1, 1983 OI Report at C-10 and D-6 (Exhibits 35 and 36).

49/ Mr. Gischel stated in his deposition in this proceeding that he thought he jotted down the notes after the meeting. He later i stated that he.was not entirely sure if he prepared them in his office later that day or at home that evening. Subsequently, he stated that it may have been a couple of days later. Deposition of Edwin Gischel (Jan. 15, 1987) at 86, 90, 100. Mr. Gischel, as a result of a stroke in 1982, suffers from memory problems.

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such fundamental, unanswered questions, the Staff's opposition to Meeks' deposition is unsupportable.

It is thus indisputable that many substantial questions remain unanswered both concerning the existence and location of discoverable information and the substance of relevant in-formation provided to the NRC. The answers to these questions reside with Mr. Meeks.

In addition, GPUN wishes to depose Mr. Meeks concerning the retention of evidence. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971) holds in the context of a criminal proceed-ing that sanctions are appropriate for nondisclosure based on loss of evidence unless the Government can show that it has pro-mulgated, enforced, and attempted in good faith to follow rigor-ous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discov-erable evidence. An appropriate sanction could be the exclusion of testimony. Further, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), if suppressed evidence is material and favorable to an accused, the suppression violates due process irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the government. In such case, dis- l 1

missal of the proceeding may be the appropriate remedy. l l

Mr. Meeks has admitted discarding notes of interviews. He claims that retention of his notes was discretionary under OI policy, but the NRC Staff has declined to produce such policies A _

as; irrelevant.and

exempt from disclosure. See GPUN's Second Mo-t ,.

. tion to Compel. On the other hand, a memorandum from S. Chilk to B. Hayes (March 4, 1983) (Exhibit 38 hereto), approved by the

Commission within a month of this investigation, encloses OI Pol-icy Statements, and Policy 8 states that " investigators . . .

shall . . . preserve evidence relevant to investigations which i' would have potential value in an enforcement'or other proceed-ing." Policy 20 states, " Investigators will thoroughly and accu-rately document their. investigative efforts and substantive in-formation developed during the investigation." Also, in OI's files recently made available to GPUN for inspection, other notes of interviews conducted by Meeks in January-March 1984 (inter-I views pertainir.; to Edwin Gischel's allegations 52/) have been carefully preserved in a sealed envelope. This is also indica-tive of retention procedures inconsistent with the discarding of I

notes.

e The policies and procedures governing the taking and reten-tion of investigative notes and records are clearly relevant, their production is necessary, and GPUN's Second Motion to Compel should be granted. Further, GPUN should be afforded the cpportu-4 i 1

nity to inquire concerning whether Meeks' discarding of notes

{.

complied with applicable policy. GPUN should also be afforded

50/ See, e.g., Exhibit 39.

d.t 1

4 4

. _ , _ , , , _ ,-, , ~ . - . . .- - ~ - - - ~ ~

O the opportunity to determine whether the notes contained material information favorable to GPUN, the suppression of which'could warrant dismissal irrespective of whether Meeks acted in good faith.

GPUN submits that Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961), which the NRC Staff cites at page 15 of the NRC Response to Motion to Compel, supports GPUN's entitlement to this inquiry.

Killian involved notes of a paid informant's expenses, which notes had been destroyed. The Court remanded the case to the District Court for a hearing on whether there were facts not transcribed from the notes and whether the notes were destroyed in good faith.51/

Mr. Meeks has direct, personal knowledge of these matters, which are certainly material. Given this fact and the exception-al circumstances inherent in this proceeding, Mr. Meeks' deposi-tion is appropriate under 10 C.F.R. $ 2.720(h)(2)(i).52/

51/ The Staff cites Killian for the proposition that "[a] party is not entitled to an investigator's rough notes where the in-formation contained in the notes later was transcribed and made available to the requesting party." The Staff overstates Killian. The Court remarked in dicta that if it appeared that the data from notes of the informant's expenses had been trans-ferred to other records and the notes destroyed in good faith in

. accord with normal practice, the destruction would not deprive the defendant of a right. The Court, however, remanded the case to provide the defendant a hearing to determine whether indeed all information in the notes had been transcribed and whether the government acted in good faith. GPUN seeks the same opportunity.

52/ The NRC Staff attributes to GPUN the argument that 10 C.F.R.

5 2.720(h) does not apply to this proceeding. See NRC Response (Continued Next Page) s V. Tne Presiding Officer Should Issue Subpoenas for the Deposition of Mr. Feinberg and the DOL Case File on Parks GPUN still maintains that it needs to depose former DOL com-pliance officer David Feinberg and obtain the Parks' case file from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor (DOL).53/ GPUN has reasonable ques-

, tions about the information and evidence gathered by Mr. Feinberg and the contents of the DOL files on this matter. The DOL's ar-gument that its departmental regulations shield its files, employees, and former employees from such discovery is without merit.

Questions similar to those proposed for Mr. Meeks are equal-ly appropriate for Mr. Feinberg. Additional details of his in-terviews with Parks, any attempt to elicit corroborating in-formation, indications effecting credibility in the demeanor of (Continued) to Motion for Subpoenas at 7. GPUN does not make this argument.

Compare GPUN Motion for Subpoena at 7 n.1.

53/ In response to GPUN's Third Request for Production of Docu-ments, which requested inter alia documents relating to DOL's in-vestigation of Lawrence King's allegations, the NRC Staff replied that OI may have reviewed the DOL files, but if so, such docu-ments were not retained by OI. The Staff stated that GPUN will l

have to go to DOL for the requested documents. GPUN may apply for a subpoena duces tecum for this purpose. If so, the Presid-ing Officer's ruling will bear on the request.

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s o '

Parks or other witnesses, and any information obtained contra-dicting or calling into question Parks' claims could all consti-tute or lead to admissible evidence. If Parks at the hearing de-viates from his statement to Feinberg, Feinberg will be a necessary witnese to impeach Parks, by describing the circum-stances of the interviews and the accuracy of the interview statements. With regard to the case file, the principle issues are whether Mr. E'einberg took any notes of his interviews and whether he received a copy of Parks' " entire statement to the NRC" referred to ols the Meeks-Devine telephone conversation of May 5, 1983.54/

The DOL asserte that its departmental regulations, 29 C.F.R.

SS 2.20-2.25, prohibit DOL employees (including former employees) from furnishing any information in response to a subpoena without the authorization of the Deputy Solicitor of Labor. Further,.the DOL indicated that approval of the Deputy Solicitor woulo not be forthcoming in this case.55/

DOL's reliance on 29 C.F.R. $$ 2.20-2.25 and United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) is misplaced. The regulations and Touhy only support the proposition that agency heads may promulgate " housekeeping" statutes establishing the 54/ Exhibit 24, discussed at page 36 supra.

55/ Letter from G. Coleman to Judge Smith (March 31, 1987).

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mannerinwh{chdiscoveryrequestsonemployeesarehandledto ensure consistent treatment. See Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co.,

Inc., 626 F. Supp. 12 (D. Colo. 1983). Touhy establishes that.a subordinate government official will not be compelled to testify and produce documents in private litigation where a department or agency regulation forbids such disclosure except upon express permission of the head of the respective department er agency.

See Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, 66 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. Mo.

1975). The validity of the regulations in Touhy was not upheld on the ground that the regulations enacted a privilege for offi-cial information but rather on the ground that, in furtherance of the good housekeeping envisaged by the statute, they reasonably relegated to the head of the department concerned the question whether privilege would be claimed. Id. DOL's regulations do not constitute a privilege from discovery. Mr. Feinberg and the Administrator have personal knowledge of relevant evidence.

Therefore, a subpoena should be issued.

Even the rationale underlying the DOL's regulations is not applicable to the present situation. "The policy behind prohibi-tion of testimony is to conserve governmental resources where the United States is not a party to a suit, and to minimize govern-mental involvement in controversial matters unrelated to official i business." Hotel Employees-Hotel Association Pension Fund v.

Timperio, 622 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D.C. Fla. 1985) quoting

4 1

o e

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Crowther, 572 F. Supp. 288, 290 (D. Mass.

1982). First, this case is' distinguishable from both Hotel Employees and Reynolds Metals. Both of those cases involved pri-vate parties. Here, one of the parties-is an agency of the gov-ernment bringing a quasi-criminal action against a private party.

See Drukker Communications, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 700 F.2d 727 (1983) (distinguishing a private action from an agency proceeding). In addition, the DOL has coordinated its activities with the NRC in this case.

DOL, has the responsibility under section 210 of the Reorganization Act to investigate employee complaints of discrimination and may, after an investigation and hearing, order a violator to take affirmative action to abate the violation, reinstate the com-plainant to his or her former position with backpay, and award compensatory damages, including attorney fees. NRC, though without direct authority to provide a remedy to an employee, has independent authority under the Atomic Energy Act to take appropriate en-forcement action against Commission licensees that violate the Atomic Energy Act, the Reor-ganization Act, or Commission requirements.

Enforcement action may include license deni-al, suspension or revocation or the imposi-tion af civil penalties.

Although each agency will carry out its stat-utory responsibilities independently, the agencies agree that administrative efficiency and sound enforcement policies will be maxi-mized by cooperation and the timely exchange of information in areas of mutual interest.

_ . . , - - - - . - - - - - - - - - . - - = , . . , = . - - .

.-- m,.-------- .-

o-.

I e

i See Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Department of i

Labor; Employee Protection (Memorandum of Understanding), 47 Fed.

Reg. 54,585 (1982). The government should not be allowed to in-vestigate in tandem and then attempt to limit disclosure of its findings because they may be in the possession of the in-vestigative agency instead of the prosecuting agency.

The injustice of the DOL's position is further illustrated by the fact that DOL would have to release the information GPUN requests if the NRC sought it. Nor can there be any doubt that if the NRC wanted to call Mr. Feinberg as a witness, he would be

.l made available. Under the Memorandum of Understanding, "(ejach I agency agrees to share and promote access to all information it obtains concerning a particular allegation." 47 Fed. Reg.

54,585.

Fundamental notions of fairness dictate that GPUN should-be afforded equal access to the facts. See Drukker, supra.

This case involves the official business of DOL. The. basic issue in this case is whether or not a contractor employee of a

i NRC licensee was discriminated against because he engaged in pro-tected activities. "The NRC and DOL have complementary responsi-bilities in the area of employee protection." 47 Fed. Reg.

54,585. Therefore, the subject matter of this proceeding in-volves the " official business" of the DOL, and it is appropriate for DOL officials to testify.

6

. The circumstances of this case clearly warrant compelling Mr. Feinberg to testify and the Administrator to produce the re-quested documents. Mr. Feinberg's. testimony and files have unique value. Mr. Feinberg made a contemporaneous investigation I of Parks' allegations. The NRC brought this enforcement action against GPUN, in large part, on the basis of the DOL Report. It is inconceivable to GPUN that it should be denied the opportunity to conduct discovery relating to the investigation which the 3 Staff states was the only investigation into Parks' harassment allegations and the basis for this enforcement action. GPUN be-i lieves it is entitled to probe the accuracy of the interview statements and the existence of exculpatory factual information and other relevant evidence gathered by Mr. Feinberg.

s VI. Conclusion i

For the reasons stated above, GPUN submits that the Presid-ing Officer should grant GPU Nuclear Corporation's Motion for Is-suance of Subpoena and issue the subpoenas attached to that mo-tion. GPUN also asks that the Presiding Officer review in camera i

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a, these few documents identified above as still in dispute and rule on GPUN's motions to compel.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

~d.A b Lw b /Ap J. Patrick Hickey, P.C. 4 David R. Lewis Counsel for GPUN Dated: April 6, 1987 4

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Administrative Law Judge In the Matter of )

)

GPU Nuclear Corporation ) Docket No. 50-320

) EA-84-137 (Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 2) )

'l EXHIBITS TO GPUN'S MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PENDING DISCOVERY MOTIONS a -

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Exhibit 1

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.e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In thematter of:

COMMISSION MEETING Docket No.

DISCUSSION OF PENDING INVESTIGATIONS EXIMPTIONS 5 & 7 j

CLOSED SESSION Location: Washington, D.C. Pages- 1 - 49 Date: Monday, June 6,1983 l i

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I s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Court Repo,ters 1623 I Street. 4.W. Sese 1004 Washasesos. D.C. 31006 (202) 33.WSO

W t

1 UNITED STATE 5 CF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR FEGULATCRY COMMI53!Cfl

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3 4 CI3CUS5!Ctl CF PENGING INVE37IGATION5 5

CLOSED MEETING - EXEMPTICN NCS. 5 AND 7 o

7 Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn 8 Room 1130 1717 H 5treet. N. W.

9 Wasnington, D. C.

13 Mencayi June 6, 1332 11 The Commissten canuene:. sursuant :s n:ti:e.

12 at* 2:03 p.m.

13 l' CCMM!i3ICHER5 PoE3ENT:

15 flVN !O DALLA 0!!IO, Chateman of tne C:.miszt: 9 JCHN arEAFNE. Ccmmissioner la THCMA5 RCEERT5, Commisst:ner Jet'E3 A33EL37IrlE. C:mm'ss'sne-17 57AFF AND PRE 3EriTERS SEATE0 47 CCMMI!!*0N a5 E:

18

3. CHILK 19 H. PLAINE J. IEREE 20 E. HAfES J. CUMMING5 21 AVOIENCE SPEAKERS:

22 M. MALICH 23 E. CASE V. OIPCUS 24 M. DENTON TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 29996 (182) 293-3958

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1 PR0CEEO ING3 2 CSAIRMAN PaLLACINO: Gooc n+ternoon.

3 The C mmissicn meets t.1 s afternoon to receive 4 3 sriefing on the status of t n r e v. Invest 13attons involving 5 TMI.

6 The first is the inquiry into tne Farks-Gishei 7 allegations, the seconc is the renewec Hartman 3 investigation anc the tntrc is the invest 1;atton cf the allegations notec in Ecarc Nottft:ation 33-7* of May lit 9, la ..

i: 3. As part of :nese investigations tnere was also :Pe il question of the so-callec mystory man.

10 Sefore reginning the discussions -- wnere ts 13 tne General Counsel?

14 00MMI53I0flEP aHEARNE: I sm very uneasy a:: t 15 that ceing uncer some kinc of a ::urt ::nstrs 9t.

16 MR. CHILV: They are on tnete way :ver.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLAOINC: T'ils is a serf tu;rt3-t 18 part cf my presentation.

19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: fasi I was woncertng "O wnether there was something significant a: cut the General i 01 Counsel not meing here.

22 (Laugnter.)

23 CHAIRMAN PaLLA0!flO: I say nere ced:re teatnntng 24 the discussion I wculd ask the General Counsel to cei. ment.

".5 COMMIS3ICHER AHEARtlE: 3ee, tne can full say tne TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3958

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. 'l 1 any clue as to which way it came out. It implied tnat they 2 said two nours, and 11 it clen't take two hours, they 3 still markec two nours.

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• MR. HAfE3: Anytnins else on tne trainins q

5 allegation at this time?

o CHAIRMAN PALLA0ING: Now tnat is tne one inat 7 referrec to the Searc nottf cation.

3 MP. HAYE3: Yes, sir, 33-71.

9 CHAIPMAN PALLADINO: Okay.

10 MR. HAfE3: The ne.:t investigation involves :ar 11 progress on Mr. Parks' anc Mr. Gischel's allegations 4

12 concernins alleagations involving tecnnical concerns, a 13 mystory man, if you will, anc Intimication anc harassment.

14 I have breken it into those three named cateacries.

15 The technical team composed of memters :1 tne 16 E00 staff has easically conclucec its revtow anc n da:t 17 has written their reports. I have askec CFE to p*:vice 19 technical and managertal overview on those repor: anc 19 Jack has been gracious enough to ask a mem er ed n1s staff 23 to work with OI anc co that analysis and revtow. Tnat s 21 currently in progress.

i 22 CHAIRMAN PALLACINC: What Cic tne stadf res:*

23 on, the technical acequacy of work tnat was centsinec *n 2' the Parks /Gishel allegation?

25 TAYLCE ASSOCIATE 5 1625 ! Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3H50 l

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1 MR. HAfES: We broke cewn as best we coulc 2 :32se afficavits anc mealec away :ne tecnnical concerns 3 anc ashec :ur :e:nn* cal susper: untt to accress inese.

' CCMMIS3:CNER arEARNE: Sy tecnnt al :encerns f:u 5 mean, for est a m p l e , was the polar crane *ualifiec?

a MR. WAYE3: No. Ve s:3psed snort sd say193 yes 7 cr no. What we have a:*empte: t3 cc 15 t3 analy:e the S allegtson of violations of safety procecures, GPU 9 trececures, NFC retutrements or wnst-naet-ysu, and nave 12 t ais en it from tnts step to wnst we saw anc cocumen*a: as 11 ts actually what nappened and then accressed it in terms 12 cf wnst should nave nappened 11 in fact the management 13 chain had been usec tne way it was desig ed to ta'use: at i

i 14 least on onper.

15 I :an't ce tos inf: mat 1ve nere.  : na.e a t: ed d

is warolc Canton to provice for me t .e gut:elines. i fsu 17 will, as to wnat TH1-2 is in terms af 's it a lice se:

19 p' ant or 1sn't 1t and, if it is, wnst crtierta s a. ; u ' : we 19 use anc what authorittes were given to the TMI rec:very "O team up there to cevinte or provtce assistance t: GFV.

21 ln other worcs, we can't say some 9* 3 is amiss 22 until we see what criteria we are measuring inat agatnst, 23 we are currently awaittna tnat particular memerandum from 2' Harold.

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25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Eut rou are not t s e n i n g ts 4

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162S ! Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 l

Washington, D.C. 20096 l

C92) 293-3958 t

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I whether or not the polar crane is adquates but were the 2 procacures that are outlined, were they f ; 11 c.e c *-

3 MR. hAYE3: That is correc . If f:u will 4 rememoer. Mr. Parks was e::: r e me l y cancernec aoout oting 5 cut out of those proceourts. In many instances in its 6 affidavit he attempts to say we are violating 3Coc 4

7 engineering standards ey not followin2 the precise steps 4

2 :nat should oe taken.

9 COMMI55ICHER a.- E A A h E : Eut : en :o I sa:her na:

13 this invest 13ation is not gotng to have as a part of it an 11 NRC jucement as to the adecuacy of the polar crane?

12 MR. HAYE3: I woul:: think not. What I hope t cc 13 is lay out some areas. In fact, on the polar crane matte-a 14 there are about 10 or 12 areas that Fred has inotcatec i 15 :ma: we cuant to take a look at.

10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That wn: nas *n=tcate:*

, 17 MR. HAYE5: Our polar crane fell:w :na: 1s IS participattng with us on the O! team?

19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Who is that' 20 MR. HAYE3: Fred Clemmons. New he has locke: at 21 1: anc he has a very thick report wnicn is sti'l in 134 22 rough oraft stage and it is still cein3 reviewe: .' FE.

23 So ! can't really speak for i: r e d nor do I want to sugies:

24 I am goin2 to provide something then ! may n:t ::wn the 25 road.

l TAYL0E ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1004 Washington, D.C. 23004 (292) 293-3958

l 23 1 CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE: I am not sure to wnom 2 this ~ question snould be accressec. 3111 is procacy tne 3 Dest one. Is there then any =rececure 1sr recnecking :na 4 aceauacy sf :ne polar crane, or is tnat in :ne ncrmal NF8 5 approval process w1:n the TMI Program Cffice?

6 MR. DIRCA3: That is in tne nstmal NRR approval 7 process. The strange outrk is that I :n*nk the tecnnical 9 capability restces with Clemmons.

4 (Laughter.)

10 CCMMI55!CNER AHEARNE: I see. So y:d techn es it competence to do tne review is with OI which is net soins 10 to co a jucsment of the tecnnical ---

13 MR. OIRCV3: I am sure we w1'1 nave to finc la somebocy to cc it. There is not muen of a :emanc for ;;1st 15 crane specialists and we only have essentially : e.

16 (Laughter.)

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But :nen I t..c u s e : /cu .. a :

19 said the staff has written reports sn tec.9n ca' matters.

19 Now what sort of reoort did the staff write' Am I cseree:

10 in note?

21 MR. HAYES: The staff means t9e CI mar: c pa: n; 20 people, O!. I am sorry.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADING: Ch. O! staff.

24 MR. HAYE3: Little (s). O! staf*.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I see.

TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 1 Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3958

3n ---

1 MR. HAYE3: What I tried to co was treak this i

j 2 thing down ints two areas. The Office of Invest 13aticn can 3 ceal with tne intimioation and narassment 1spect. 8 ut e a crou3nt it technical people to assist us in 1 coking at ,

3 whether or not the procecures were followed, at wnetner or 6 not appropriate engineering practices were followed and 7 wnether or not safety stancarcs were followac anc, if not.

S wnat actually happened.

9 I want to st:p snort of telling 3111 Dircks 12 that, look, your polar crane is socc or your polar crane 11 1s bad. I am not s u r,e that we have that e :per t ist. There 12 are many other things tnat have to te resolved.

13 CCMMI53IONER AHEARNE: What Joe saic is if ye 14 nassen to have it.

13 (Laughter.)

16 CHAIRMAN PALLADIh0: Eu: no-mally /su w:uic mare 17 tnat cetermination, would you not, 5111' ,

l 19 MR. DIRCKS: That wcule normally se cone witnin l

19 the staff, right.

29 CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE: Ane as seen as Frec gets 21 tack you can co it.

22 (Laugnter.)

23 MR. DENTON: Actually we have retatnac an O' outside consultant to assist in review of this area, mut 25 we are hc1 ding any final views until the results of tne TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 162S I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3T59

31 1 investigation are complete.

I don't whether I am going O CHA*RMAr4 PALLACINO: .

3 to me legal or not, but I will try to te legal by first

• asking Sen. You implied that pernaps tne staff may have 5 given autnority o tne TMI-2 NRC office, authority to 6 watve or cismiss with certain procacures, and you sats fou 7 were waiting for a meme from NRR to say that.

S But asica from waiting der the memo, did you G get any inc1:ation from them as to whether cr not they 13 na3 given that office autnority to waive certain i

11 procedures?

12 MR. HAYES: Well, tnere were various amenoments.

13 I think there are maybe eight amencments. and you mtsht 1* nelp tie nere, =*arold, eight 3r ten amen ments to the 15 criginal license e :empt ing GhV ft:m some Sing. Te :n n t :a ' ',

16 I Just can't answer that.

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, .sarcic has s:me 17 18 answers for you.

19 MR. DENTON: We will have a response to S111's You may r e : a l '. t$at t%e 20 cuestion in the next day or two.

as intet:e:

21 Commission issued a new itcense in 1330 '=nt:n 22 to take the Commission's regulations and as:ly t iam t: a 23 plant that had had an accident. So with tne C:mmissi: 9s 24 approval, I issued a new license for tnat plant in 1910.

25 Since that time we have issuec a number .s f e::emp t i ons o r TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3959

32 I 1 orders that subsecuently modified it.

^

2 What Sen wants is a list of the actual 3 regulatory concitions that currently analy to that plant 4 anc tney are not the same as to what appliec to a plant is 5 normal operation. Tnen from that ne can Judge wnetner or 6 not the conc 1tions are oring met I presume.

7 MR. HAYES: Whether or not the procedures are B teing followed and what-have you.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLAC*NO: Eut ycu are 1mslying snat 10 perhaps some of tnese procedures tnat Parks found nct 11 consistent with what he believed was right, that seme of 12 these might have been allowed by the amendments. Is that a 13 messittlity?

14 MR. HAYE3: That is a possibi* tty. That wtuld :e

• 5 .1 c e to see 11 it in fact it ts there.

Io CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well. I am not sa/1 g tnat 17 1s what it ought to be. I am just aseing is tnat tne 18 possiellity you are exploring?

19 MR. HAYES: What I am trying to de is determine 2D as best we can the criteria of the' operating etncitiens cf 21 that plant, the licenstng conditions so that we :an use 22 that as the standard to determine whether or set 23 procedures were or were not violated and oy wnom ans 24 what-have you.

25 I also may nave to make some ad;ustments after 1

1 1

TAYLCE ASSOCIATES

• I 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 i Washington, D.C. 20006 C92) 293-3950

Y 33 1 the technical review is completec. Jack's person, 1

2 Gene Galiaaner, nas been with us about two se three :ays .

3 15 all, and the rougn craft of inat report is accut t5ree l

He is now going over

• ano a nalf to four inches tnick.

5 that, and he eearessed to me tnis morning some concerns l

6 about some of the conclustons or what-have-you that have 7 teen crawn already. So after nts in-cepth review we may S have to 30 Dack up on the site to resolve some of these .

9 issues.

10 I had, I believe, given to the Commission an l

11 estimated completion date of first June 6th and then June 12 20th. From 01's stancoctnt we are castes 11y cone, but the 13 tecnnical thing may hold us up untti July sometime. I 14 con't want to speculate. I think it ts im'portant that tnts

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15 'esort te as well foundec as we can posst:1y maPe St. 3o :

la con't want to rush Gene nor my techntcal sesple.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLA0!NC: Now the tacon1eal 18 investigation has determined what pro:ecures we*4 19 followed, where there were caviations er wnere there were 20 things that needed checking out.

21 MR. HAYE5: tes, along tne Itnes of

• arts-22 allegations that procecures were not foll wec, that ne *ns i 23 cut out or they were cut out or what-have-you.

24 Now I was in hopes of getting out tne tecn-t:31 25 section as quickly as possible when compared to "t..e TAYLCE ASSOCIATES

• 1625 1 Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. *.9996 (282) 293-3950

V j-.

I mystery man." To be very candic with you, I con't know 2 wnat we are gotng to do there yet. The 3 intimidation /nartssment thing of c:urse is r i s..: cown Our a siley. Once we have resolved the technical portion of tne

! report and issued that to you, tnen the a intim1 cation / harassment thing snould come alons fairly 7 rapidly.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLAO!rlo: What are you goins to co 9 neat asice from the ---

13 MR. HAYE5: The intimication,narassement 11 allegations will be accressac as soon as we close out tee 1

12 technical report.

13 CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Os t ity necessar11y have 1" to be cone sequentially or is that a escurce prs:lem' 15 MR. HARE 5: It boils cown a resource pre:1em. !

l lo just ton't have the staff to cc it ail.

17 COMMI55IONER AHEARt4E: fes.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I am tryin2 :o sea what 19 options we might have to acc to it. I guess it is the 23 Sevill Committee that has us constrained.

21 MR. HAYES: On tne mystery man issue. ! ::n't 22 know what we are goint to do there, sentlemen. 'wnat I am

- 23 going to suggest to my staff is to gather up volumincus 26 cocuments that entst alreacy on this area sne take a 25 look/see at it and try to map out some s/stematic azer:s:n i

TAYL0E ASSOCIATES 1625 1 Street, N.W; d Suite 1904 Washington, D.C. 20996 (292) 293-3930

p 1 to try to once and for all try to put this issue to ted.

2 Right now I can't tell you that we will or we won't, but I 3 may come cack to the Commission anc say we nave lo:Pec at

= "X" numcer of documents anc we can 30 3ut anc attempt to 5 resolve it, Dut it ts going to take "X" amount of a resourtes and is it really something that we want to 7 resolve anc tt is cost-teneficial and what-nave ycu. 33 !

9 may come back to you on that issue.

9 CHAIRMAfl FALLADINC: The e::1s t en:e o f a mystory 10 man is I believe at least in part basec on the sresumptitn 11 that one can interpret these up and down curves on tank 12 level versus time.

13 Looking at those I asked the people that are le trying to interpret the downward slope anc say this one is 15 different from that one and therefore tatt o"e must Pa se Ib Deen taking water down faster and theredere they must have 17 opened an injection system, but I askec the taest*:n tut l 19 the curves also go up. They said they are soing up to:ause 19 they are. adding water.

'O Well, if you are adding water an: y0w are 21 taking away water, how do you know wnether tne :nange in 22 slope is not due to the fact that you are a: ding at the 23 same time you are taking away or not accing at the save 24 time you are taking away7 25 The answers ! got from the peopla I was askiS3 TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 ! Street, N.W. - Suite 1904 Washington, D.C. 29996 (282) 293-3958

l 36 l 1

I leave me cold. Assarently people are trying to draw 2 implications fr:m changes in s12pe tnat is resulting frem 3 not only taking away water and putting it into tne 4

in ection system Dut also accing water anc they unich was 5 201ng on as far as I can tell. Maybe tne staff has a 8 little more onckgrounc on tnat.

7 MR. CENTON: I think the main genesis is tne 9 fact that GPU hac in thetr sequence up un*11 the time of 9 the lawsuit the fact that tne pumps were turnac on at 10 about 5: 41 anc the operators testiftec to tant in many 1

11 forums and then chan2ed their view at abcut the time Of

~

12 the lawsuit. It was even in one of the early drafts ed the 13 NRC secuence and you =an find many referen:es where the 14 caerators said they did turn tnem onck on. Eut now the 15 same seccie say they aren't su e.

la CHAIRMAN FALLA0!NO: Eut there nave teen 17 attempts to draw conclusions basec on the si:.:es :+ :n:se 19 curves, anc the one I was referring to was tne ene that 19 Fraley's people put tosether. I don't see how anyoo:7 in 20 Goc's green earth could ever craw a conclus1:n fr:m that.

21 MR. DENTCN: That ts also the one >unere the 22 Commission nas been asked I guess ey Congressman 'J :311 ::

23 obtain the B&W views on the same topic, and Mr. Mayers P.as 24 asked me now and then wnat does the Commiss1:1 inten:  :

l f

25 co with that.

• TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (282) 293-3958

37 1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: GPU sot its feeling from 2 onat people told them, cut not from these curves; 1s tnat 3 rignt?

• COMMIS3IONER A33EL3 TINE: GPU usec tne E33 5 nuclear analysis, as I recall, in the trial to try anc a support their new version.

7 ccMM!s31:rlER 4HEARNE: Wasn't it, .- a r : 1 : , that 5 eack in the first few days in the or131nal writta; 31 the 9 GFU's secuence they out tnat in?

13 HR. CENTCfl: That is correct. It nas teen in tne ,

11 GPU sequence since the first day or'few days after the 12 accident, riant up to the time cf the lawsuit in which te 13 E33 analysis came out anc the operators succenly 24;an to la back off from their original views.

1 15 CHAIRMAN PaLLADINO: Eut ees EC5 tr7 o : Paw to conclusions from tne slopes of nose curves" 17 MR. DENTON: fes, they do.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Oc tney nase kncwledge 19 about what is being added?

23 MR. DENTON: I haven't seen the ED3 report. That 21 1s part of tnis volumincus record. I t a.* n e tne E23 *es:rt 22 concluded tnat the pumps had not been ta*94c Dn.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, wnat I was interested 24 in is can you draw that from lookin; at tnat *: ?nd of :sta' 25 MR. DENTON: I don't know. We have not taamine:

TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 1 Street, N.W. - Sulte 1904 Washington, D.C. 20996 (292) 293-3958

l' 33 1

it in NRR.

2 COM{lI55IONER AMEARNE: As you say, up your

,/ 3 alley, fan, wou1c te the uestion of try ng to figure out 4

who to ask what' 5

MR. HA(E5: Well, certainly right 3'1 the cuff, 6 we would not :ero in on the tecnnical graphs and 7 what-nave you.

We are a stopie type of thing. We wout:

8 1dentify who was in the control room at the time anc wh:

9 1s responsible for this and that and :ere in on tneir 10 previous testimony curtns the various mission stuctes, tne 11 GPU, et cetera, and analy:e testimony as opposed te 12 technical data and then try to factor in what outsttens we 13 should ask or shoulcn't ask :r wnere should we 90.

14 That is the appr:acn that O! woulc use tc at '

15 least try to get a handle on wnat to do anc wn: :: :o it 16 to.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Een. I gather Sarts sato 18 some words about the mystery man and everybo:y knows he is 19 a mystery man.

Are you planning to interview or have ycu 20 interviewed Parks?

21 MR. HAfES: We have interviewee Parts 22 entensively in the offices of CI cne day for over ten 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> and followed up subsequent to that with additicnal 24 interviews.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: 2td he ment'1on =eople wne

! TAYL0E ASSOCIATES 1625 1 Street, N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3950

9 __ .

I would know or who nave saic this fellow is ---

0 COMMI55ICNER AHEARNE: We n a v e h a c 4:: t e n s i v e 3 investigat*en. Were /cu talkin-* aseg. ..e

• .s mystory man or was that on :ne ---

5 MR. HafES: We interviewac Parks himself.

6 CHAIRMAN PALLACINO: But I meant on the mystory 7

man issue cic Parks say everybocy knew ---

9 MR. HAYES: Everybody knew it was Gecrge Kuncer.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLACIMO: Oan /:u 31 e e me a few 13 e:: a mp l e s of sther people wnc th1nk it ts Georse tunter" 11 MR. HAYES: I can't remember, Mr. Chairman. I

,, ,12 would have to go back and look at *ne ---

13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But co yce plan to cursue le that, at least to talk'to a' variety of people?

15 MR. CENTON: This was coverec 'n the tetai te 16 tne e :t ent that tne trial went on. The :u:se 11c ecam ne 17 tewee anc others as to what their perscnal newlec3e was 19 of this at the time. So there is e ,: t e n s i v e testim: /.

19' I think the reason some people finc it 20 interesting 15 that it would have been GP'J ' s interest to 21 not have been found turning them on and tarning nem Off 22 again in a lawsuit against B&W.

23 COMMI55IONER AHEARNE: It mignt ce in the NRO's l'

interest also to have them found turning them on an: cff.

25 MR. OENTON: That is right, and I uncerstanc TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1024 Washington, D.C. 23206 (102) 293-3950 1

J 9

40 i

1 there is in this amount of paper somewnere, there is even 2 an earfy setuence wner e 3ecr ge Vunter has written in a 3 sequence. So there is an awful lot of paper entsting on 4 this particular topic anc ! 2cn't 1,now that we can 5 techntcally add anything to it otner tnan wnat 9as alreacy 6 been :tscussed.

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Vell. I am net sure whether B tt is good or Dad re3nrdless of which fiadin; tecause if 9 tney shoul: nave turnec them on and they didn't. I think 12 tnat is as bad as turnin2 them on an: .thee shutting ther.

11 off. Either way, I don't see how GPU can gain a benefit 12 from that, but I don't know.

13 So you are soins to feel your way an: 1:entify 14 people ---

15 MR. HAYES: On tnat ene. I guess so u t 1 we 16 finally get there.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: One of tne prc:le.is is if 18 there ever was a mystery man. Have you talke: te tunder 19 himself?

20 MR. HAVES: Not on this issue, no.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINC: Oo you plan to*

22 MR. HAYES: Well, like I say, whe9 we set t.ere l

23 and we have looked at everythin2, wnich will tsat s: .e 24 time, then we will have to lay out an investi2ative same l 25 plan here.

1 l

i 1

l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1904 Washington, D.C. 20096 (292) 293-3958

O ._

/

/

/ *

/

41 - -

t i

/ 1 CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Mr.last ouestion on innt

/ 2 1ssue is *nen you,talkee to Parks in tais ten hours, et:

3 you also :over tnis particular issue or was it solely an 4 tne polar crane?

5 MR. HAYES: I can't answer that. I woul: have to a look at the memorancums that we prepared after that 7 interview. But I de know the ten hours went into ;ast a 5 litany Of areas.

9 Mr. Parks is very astute. He II a very 3.9 a r p 13 inciv1:ual ano certainly impressec my staff witn c.ange

. 11 order numDers and who was there. I mean he had it all 12 cown with 30 nctes in frent of him. He went into ciner 13 areas that were not accressed in nts aff*:avit.

14 In fact, in my cointon, if we went t him 33a19 15 today, *1e could give us other areas  : 1000 ints. I t *. i n k a la the polar crane is strictly in his view the sympt:m :1 a 17 greater illness at TMI-2, and that was his acint. ne -

18 polar crane in and of itself 1s not the issue. :t sces 19 much coeper than that, and he used tne polar crane as an 20 e:: ample of the problem and that is bas 1cally the st'aw 21 tnat Droke the camel's tack, if you will, as far as ne is 20 concerned.

22 CHAIRHAN PALLADINO: 01c he give you any e t '. e r 24 a:tamples in addttien to the polar crane?

25 MR. HAfES: Yes, he die.

TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street N.W. - Suite 1994 Washington, D.C. 20006 (292) 293-3950 ,-_'l

4 ,.

, 1 CHAIPHAN PALLACINO: He wa3 390arent1y cut out of some procecure, or ne says ne was.

/ .

3 MR. HAYE3: Yes, he did.

4 CHAIRMAN PALLAC!.'lO: Vas ne also cut cut od 5 other procedures?

o MR. HAfES: He was cut out of other procecures.

7 Things were going on in his view new, anc tnis is nts S view, if I may, tnat it Enould have scne thecu3n Safet/

I Review Boarcs and nere shoulc have been en;*neering 10 studies, and wnat-Save you, that were not done, anc ne

!! felt as though they' should have bean done.

12 He was casically concerned because the 5echtel 13 Corneration has taken over the containment room in almcst '

14 toto, and yet ne was respons1cle for everyth ng t. si ue .:

15 on t..e r e from tne safety standacint, but he .ac :t ss/ in le it.

17 CHAIRMAN FALLAD*tlO: wnen he is s:43,in; t ..a t 15 tnis is symptomatic of.a problem or wnstever e says. :c 19 ne limit his comments to THI-2 or die he give otner 23 implications?

21 MR. HATE 3: To my knowledge, TMI-2. I 1m u9 aware 22 of anytning Mr. Parks or Mr. G1snel told us that ref'ects

~3 en TMI-1.

24 COMMI53IOtJER AHEARNE: Are you sayin; inat t ..e i r 25 comments never set to the management chain tnat is : e 1

i l

l TAYL0E ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1904 Washington, D.C. 22896 (282) 293-3958

/'

43 1 umbrella organ 1:ation?

2 MR..HA(ES: The logical e:: t e n s i o n is $1 and 3 tnis is ssme of my opinion, if inere has :een scme 4

wrsngcoing on the part of TMI management at 2. the

! ques:1on then is wno above TMI-2 was aware of it anc 6 allowed it to go on anc wnat-have yor That is always 7 :nere and there 's always that ootential *mplicat'o7 i d

9 you will.

9 -e gave us no details of sometning 3: :na sian 13 site at 1.

11 CCMMJ53ICHER AHEAPNE: Yes, I understand.

12 MR. MA1'E3: Any cther quest 1cns on the 13 Parks /G1snel matter?

!* (No response.)

15 MR. HAYE5: I will then go en : .e -a*: 1" lo allegation, the falsift:ation of leak rate tests. *

'1 17 te very suick about that.

15 (Laughter.)

19 MR. HAYES: We nave Just been recently :narged I.D by the Comm1ssion to look into this matter anc as :f 21 Fricay we got custocy anc contrcl of :ne prev 1:as 92 22 investigation. I have not seen tne rec;rds and m/ staff 23 started to look at tne records this week, :: cay.

24 CHAIRMAN PALLADIMO: When you say re::r:2. : .ese

!.5 are NRC recorcs?

TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1904 Washington, D.'C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

1 43 1 CHAIRMAft PALLADINO: Al'1 r1gnt.

2 well, think you very muen, Sen.

3 MR. H4;E5: Thank ysu.

• 2HAIRMAN R A L L A O .'4 0 : We will stans a:J urnec.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the meeting 6 scjeurnec.)

7 - - -

l 9 7

la

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11 12 13 14 15 lb 17 19 19 20 21 23

• 4 25 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1904 Washington, D.C. 20006

(?m?) 791-39=m

Exhibit 2

. \' ....

c.

r tiarch 10, 1983

~

• t, .

a -

hE!"0RidDU;* FOR: R.K. Christopher, Director '

Office of Investigations .

THRU: A.N. Fasano, Chief . .

Three Mile Island-2 Project Section FROH: J.S. Wiebe, Senior Resid'e nt Inspector (THI-2)

Three Mile Island-2 Project Section SUNECT: ALLEGATION FROM RICK PARKS, DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1983 As detailed in the P.eport of Allegation, dated February 18, 1983, Rick Parks alleged that because of his commer.ts on the Polcr Crane Load Test procedure and the Polar Crane Functional Test procedure, Bechtel Engineering Management i

~ wanted him transferred off-site. Without revealing names or specifics involved, I discussed General Public Utilitie.s (GPU) handling of internal -

corments with "several GPU employees. This letter documents these discussions.

Park's supervisor, Larry King (Dire.cter, Site Operations), indicated that Parks had told him that he (Parks) had been told that he (Parks) would be transferred from precedures.

Test the site because of the cocr.cnts he (Parks) had made on the Polar Crane King believed that it happened as related by Parks. When asked if managament at THI-2 tried to suppress safety concerns, King said he.

would not go that far but only that connents were not well received. King also indiccted that Ed Gischel, Manager, Plant Engineering, had brought up cocraents concerning the Polar Crane Load Test. These ccoments, in King's and Gischel's cpinion, were not cdoquately addressed. Upon reviewing the subject of the con.cnts with Ed Gischel, I noted that these ccer.ents were similar to issues ccncerning the adequacy of the Polar Crane Load Test which nore being ccr.sidered by the NRC ar.d HRC consultants.

Ed Kiticr, Startup and Test Superviscr, was qdastioned concerning the Startup and Test Group involvement in reviewing the Polar Crane Test Procedures.

Kitler indicated that the Test Working Group is reviewing the test procedure t (one of Rick Park's cocnents was that the Test Working Group was not involved  !

with reviewing the test procedure) to determine the applicability of  !

Adr.inistrative Procedures 1047 and 1043 to the Polar Crane Test procedure l (tlautiner of rdrK* 5 CutimttitL3.). t'lleri abKetd If litt Alsttw of my lus tatttes ateet e l individual's jobs were at stake because of coments they rade, Kitler said he ATTACHMENT 1 H.............................................................................................. ..

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R.s. ChristopheF 22- 1: arch 10,1983

. did not know of any. Kitler then brought up Parks name by saying that he .

(Kitler) was leaving his present position and that Parks may be transferred into the vgcant' position. Kitler indicated that this would be a promot'1on for Parks.  ! -

u.

Charlie Haisen, c Bechtel Licensing Engineer, involved in the Polar Crane Test, was asked if he knew of any instances where an individual's employment had been -

threatened. Charlie Hansen said he had no knowledge of such an instance. When asked if he knew of any instances where it could have been perceived to be so, Hansen said no. Hansen went on to say that Gischel's coments came after the issues brought up had already been addressed '(Gischel had just returned to work after an extensive illness) and the reluctance to re-address these issues may have been nisinterpreted as a reluctance to address them altogether. Hansen indicated that a letter had been sent to Gischel explaining that his cocrnents had already been addressed (1 verified this by reviewing the letter). Jim Theising, Manager cf Recovery Programs, was asked if he knew of any instances where an individual's job was threatened because of coments which had been made.

Theising indicated that he knew of no such instances and went on to say that Bechtel and GPU manageocnt would not knowingly allow such a practice.

Following the above discussions, I discussed the situation with Parks, indicating that I could find no evidence,to verify or refute his allegation. 1 inferr.ed him that I would inforr; the NRC'0ffice Of Investigations of my findings.

I asked him if he wanted the HRC to take any additicnal action.

Parks indicated that he was in a meeting (which included Bahman Kanga, Director of TM1-2, and B. Ballard, Manager of Quality Assurance Modifications /

Operations), in which.Ballard agreed to review the applicability of Administrative P,rocedures 1047 and 1043 to the Polar Crane Test procedures.

Parks indicated he was satisfied that his concerns were being addressed (possibly because the HRC was asking questions), and he felt no further NRC, action was warranted at this time.

In conclusion, I found no evidence to su that all ccm.ents on the Polar Crane weipport Parks allegation and it appeared e receiving adequate management t.ttsntion and were being addressed.

J.S. Wiebe Senior Resident Inspector (THI-2)

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1 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V' 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 DISCUSSION OF STEPS TO DECISION IN TMI-l RESTART PROCEEDING 5

CLOSED PORTION -- EXEMPTION 10 6

7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1130 s

1717 H Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

9 Friday, April 15, 1983 ID 11 The Commission convened in closed session at 12 2:45 p.m.

13 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

f- 14

(; NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 15 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner JOHN AHEARNE, Commissioner 16 THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 17 la STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:

19 S. CHILK H. PLAINE 20 B. HAYES R. LEVI 21 J. MONTGOMERY M. MALSCH 22 A. KENNEKE 23 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:

J. CUMMINGS 25

<d@(' TAYLDE ASSO CI A T ES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1004 W eehington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

~ - -- ._v-- -- , -

2 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We will continue with the 3 closed portion of the meeting and Mr. Herzel Plaine will 4 continue with his presentation.

5 MR. PLAINE: In this closed session, members of 6 the Commission, we will have OI give a discussion of the 7

progress in the matters that it is dealing with. When that 8 is over with, we will have to excuse OI so that we can go 9

into a further closed session and ---

13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You mean inner inner.

II (Laughter.)

12 MR. PLAINE: --- so that we can continue, Mr.

13 Hayes, with the TMI restart discussion. So if you won't 14 mind going ahead with whatever you have or any of your 15 colleagues have.

16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I gather you are going to 17 cover not only the status of your ongoing investigation, la but the existence of pending nature of any other 19 investigations.

20 MR. HAYES: Yes. Presently we have three 21 investigative matters that are a part of the TMI et al, if 22 you will.

23 The first, of course, is the Parks Gischel 1

2a matter which we are presently pursuing. The OI staff 25 members have been at TMI since Tuesday of this week.

l TAYLOE ASSO CI A T ES

, , 1625 I Street, N.W. . Suite 1004 l W sehington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 in -

. 3 s

1 I presented to the Commission a work plan asking 2 for 45 days to complete that work plan. We are in hopes of 3 resolving the first three items on that work plan dealing 4 with the technical area procedures and what-have-you as 5 quickly as possible.

6 Right now with only 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> into the 7 investigation I cannot really give you a firn. commitment at 8 this point.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Both of these, you say Parks 10 Gischel, both of them relate to Unit 2 specifically?

Il MR. HAYES: Yes, we are looking at both of those 12 affidavits as one investigation.

13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Who is Gischel?

la COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: They relate to Unit 2, but

("

15 the questions of the management flow over to Unit 1.

l' MR. HAYES: That is correct.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Possibly.

la COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The allegations, because 19 the allegations certainly. Now whether they actually do is 20 something that Ben 'will have to find out.

21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That is right.

22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I don't recall Unit 1, 23 except from the general top management level.

~

24 MR. HAYES: That is correct, the top.

25 TAYLDE A S 5 rJ C I A T E S 1625 I Street, N w. Suite 1004 w eehington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

5 1 Mr. Cummings' comments are valid, reopen and do additional

@ 2 inquiries in the psychological testing area.

3 I hope to have within the next five to seven 4 work '*ys that staff work done. At that time, I will sit 5 down ---

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: When you say you will have 7

the staff work done, you mean the reopened investigation or a whether or not to reopen it?

9 MR. HAYES: The decision or at least my la recommendation as to what we should do from the standpoint 11 of OI. At that point I intend to meet with Jim Cummings and 12 discuss it. We have gotten together and we have hopes of 13 resolving it among ourselves.

i 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let's see, with all due C. 15 respect to him, why is he involved?

I' MR. HAYES: He has oversight responsibility or 17 did have oversight responsibility.

18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When we set up OI one of 19 the things that we did at the same time was to task OIA to 20 review their operation on a semi-annual basis.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We gave them two charges.

22 One, we said would they until the end of fiscal '82 look at 23 each investigation. Since there were none before the end of i

24 fiscal '82, we felt that they ought to wait until they get 25 a few under their belt and they have been giving comments, TAYLOC ASSO CI A T ES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 1004 w eehington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

6 1 on that. l

' h2 2 The second thing we said was I believe it was 3 every six months they were to make an audit of their 4 operation, and I don't know whether we had a time frame on 5 that or not.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: This is basically their 7 auditing role?

8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes, right.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: They have also been looking 10 at these specific cases in the spirit of our request that 11 they look at the first six months of the investigations.

12 MR. RAYES: So every product that we have 13 generated up until a few weeks ago has gone to Mr.

14 Cummings' shop for his review.

15 That, gentlemen, concludes the three l'

investigative matters that we are currently looking at.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Now on the Parks' le investigation, as I recall, there were three parts to it at 19 least, and I would be inclined to Call it four parts.

20 One involved technical issues. One involved 21 harassment and intimidation, as I recall. One of them 22 involved possible collusion by the NRC and then there was 23 one that was inferred, but I think should be identified, 24 the mystery man issue.

25 I wasn't sure what you said about each one of TAYL0E ASSO CI A T ES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 2004 w ashington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

7 I them. The technical you are doing first.

I) 1# 2 MR. HAYES: Yes.

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And you expect to have that

• completed within your 45 days?

5 MR. HAYES: Hopefully. That is what we are 6 striving for.

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Okay. Then there was the 8

intimidation and harassment.

9 MR. HAYES: That would be the next priority that 10 we would look into. At the same time, Jim Cummings' staff,

31 they have their role in the collusion aspect and, as a 12 matter of fact, we had a briefing today jointly from the OI 13 staff people at TMI this morning at 9 o' clock for about an

- 14 hour to keep Mr. Cummings well read in on what we are 15 doing.

16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I wrote down 45 days and i 17 wasn't sure what that meant.

18 MR. HAYES: Well, 45 days, Mr. Chairman, as I 19 remember, was for us to resolve is possible the technical 20 issues dealing with procedures, whether or not they were 21 violated, who did and who didn't and who authorized, that 22 sort of thing.

23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But I was wondering, do you 24 expect the intimidation and harassment also to be in that 25 category?

TAYLDE ASSO CI A T ES 1625 I Street, N.w. - Suite 1004 w eehington, D.C. 20006 -

(202) 293 3950

8 2 . MR. HAYES: No, sir.

5)#

2 C.HAIRMAN PALLADINO: When might those come about?

3 I am not trying to get a commitment out of you. I am trying l l

4 to get a feel for ---

5 MR. HAYES: Yes, you are.

6 (Laughter.)

7 MR. HAYES: I would think if we can meet the 45 s day schedule, then I would think it shouldn't take more 9

than 45 days to hopefully resolve the other aspects.

30 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: An additional 45 days.

11 MR. HAYES: Well, we may during this 45 days pick 12 up testimony that would shorten that, but our thrust is to 13 try to resolve the procedures and what-have-you. So it is 14 difficult. We might be able to do both in 45 days, but at 15 the moment I can't say.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And the collusion ---

17 MR. HAYES: Well, the collusion I would have to le turn to my colleague back here, Mr. Cummings.

19 MR. CUMMINGS: I think what we are trying to do 20 is to let the OI investigation go forward and get 21 developed. Then when it is developed we are going to try to 22 reach a point where it makes sense for us to start our part 23 of it, so to speak, in the collusion aspects without 24 interviewing people one right after another, that now you 25 talk to him and now to me. We are trying to phase it in and TAYLDE ASSO CI A T ES 1625 I Street, N.W. - Suite 2004 w ashington, D.C. 20004 (202) 293-3950 ,

-- - . - . , ..-n.,- , . . . . , .- -

9 1

l 1

I hope that once we start on it, which will maybe be next )

@ 2 week or the week after, I don't expect that it is going to I 3

take us more than two or three weeks to finish that up.

4 MR. HAYES: I would think that our technical 5

aspect and his collusion aspect would probably be completed 6

on or about the same time frame hopefully.

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: What about the mystery man e issue?

9 MR. HAYES: Mr. Chairman, I haven't the faintest 10 idea on that yet.

Il CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: It will probably be longer.

12 MR. HAYES: I would think so since it has been 13 lingering for many years. Whether or not we will ever 14 resolve that I question.

15 I might add that at TMI now there are three 16 investigations ongoing, ours, the Department of Labor and 17 their own internal Bechtel investigation. So the people 18 there, the employees, the affected people are being queried 19 numerous times by different governmental agencies as well 20 as their in-house investigation.

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: =^ %  !

22 23 MR. HAYES: l 1

25 l G

e 1

T A Y t. 0 E ASSO CI A T ES 16251 Street, N w. . Suite 2004 W sshington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

0 CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

= ~

q9.,

3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 NRC COMMISSION 3 In the matter of: TMI-1 -- Exempion No. 10

, Date of Proceeding: ' April 15,'1983 7 Place of Proceeding: Washington, D.C.

a were held as herein appears, and that this is the original

, transcript for the file of the Commission. ,

io Mary C. Simons Official Reporter - Typed 12 .

h 3 I

._.' /d (j h L- MM

,, Officiad Reporter - Signature 1 SS 16 17 is 19 no 21 22 )

23

{$.,

2S i

TAYLOE ASSOCIATE 5 l REoisTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS NORFOLK. VIRGINIA 1

a

Exhibit 4 I, s-. 1 3s.,-

' MEMORANDUM FOR: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations THRU: William J. Ward, Director Division of Field Operations Office of Investigations FROM: James Y. Vorse, Director Office of Investigations Field Office, Region II *

SUBJECT:

THREE MILE ISLAND - INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS BASED ON GAP AFFIDAVIT Pursuant the NRC Chairman's memorandum dated March 25, 1983, OI has initiated an investigation into subject matter. The team will consist of three NRC technical specialists and two investigators. -

The scope'of the investigation will relate to the following categories:

1) Safety related modifications to equipment and components without full prior engineering and approval.

2) Quality assurance violations through issuance and test and administrative procedures without prior review and approval.

3) Plans to use the polar crane without conducting all necessary safety' tests and conclusions. ~

4) Harrassment and intimidation of those who internally challenged the alleged violations.

5) Alleged NRC collusion with the misconduct.

Items 1 through 3 will be addressed by the three technical specialists. Item 4 will be pursued by OI and item 5 by OIA.

During the week of April 4-8, 1983, the team members will review the affidavit and relate'd documents and define each issue.

On April 11, 1983, the team will assemble at the East-West Towers OI office i

spaces to participate in final discussion. On Tuesday, April 12, 1983 the team will arrive at the TMI site to conduct the following review:

a) Overall QA requirements b) Requirements for test and modifications for the polar crane c) Quality Deficiency Report Findings I I

030287005  !

j

1 l

i d) QA Audits e) NRC review of allegations regarding QA at IMI The team will evaluate potential violations of NRC requirements based on testimony of Parks. If the team can show that Parks and King were correct, then the intimidation issue becomes much stronger and will be vigorously pursued. This aspect of the investigation will include interviews of CPU and Bechtel personnel. Two additional investigators will probably be required.

OIA will pursue the collusion issue at the completion of the initial phases of the investigation by OI.

e

. - - - - . - , - w

vps'q -

UNITED STATES Exhibit 5

[ w [g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, .- E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k;..o ,/ ...

March 31, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino -

FROM: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations

SUBJECT:

OI WORK PLAN REGARDING ISSUES RAISED BY THE RICHARD PARKS AFFIDAVIT Purusant to your March 25, 1983 Memorandum to me, O! has prepared a Work Plan for addressing the subject issues. Based on our preliminary analysis of the subject affidavit, we have identified the following issues:

1. Possible quality assurance violations through issuance of test and administrative procedures without prior review and approval, to include refurbishment of the polar crane.

2. Alleged plans to use the polar crane without conducting all necessary :afety testing conclusions.

3. Alleged harassment and intimidation of persons who internally ch,allenged the foregoing alleged violations.

4. The so-called TMI " mystery man" issue, i.e. , whether a GPU employee turned off the High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps the morning of the accident.

5. NRC collusio'n with the alleged misconduct.

We will remain alert to any infomation developed during our investigation concerning these issues that may indicate safety related modifications to equipment and components without full prior engineering and approval.

At this juncture, the team will consist of three NRC technical specialists, two investigators, and appropriate clerical support. It is possible that the large number of interviews that may be required to resolve the " mystery man" issue will require the assignment of additional investigators.

Based on my review of the Parks Affidavit I have initiated an investigation.

We will begin field work at TMI during the week of April lith, and initially will focus upon the applicable requirements pertaining to Issues 1 and 2. It is likely that our firs.t series of interviews will be conducted -this same week.

030287006

. . ~ '

Chairnan Palladino I am striving to complete our effort by June 30, 1983. Obviously, there are i

many variables which could affect this completion date. One of them would be our identification of other issues that need to be resolved during the course of this investigation. Another would be the possibility that the " mystery man issue" will require not only a large number of interviews, but the analysis of previous testimony of many individuals.

There is yet another exceedingly important variable - the level. of support that can be provided OI by the Staff. I have asked for three technical support people based on the assumption that I will be able to request and receive specific individuals by name. This assumption flows from the promise that Bill Dircks made to me on March 24 (to provide me any member of his staff that I desired).

I am appreciative of this support and concur that the sensitivity of this matter requires technical support personnel be compatible with this type of activity and capable of providing independent advice and counsel to 01.

OI and OIA have agreed to coordinate their investigative efforts regarding these is s.ues. OIA, of course, will be examining Issue No. 5. I have asked OIA to hold their interviews in abeyance until such time as 0! has had-an opportunity to determine whether any projected OIA interviews would have an adverse impact upon Ol's ability to complete its investigation. I foresee no problems in the two offices coordinating their activities without eroding the independence that OIA must have in its endeavors.

I am still evaluating several options for a mechanism to ensure the technical adequacy of our investigation. I will advise you of which option I select in the very near future.

Please note that the above information, if prematurely disclosed, could have an adverse effect on our investigation. Accordingly, I would appreciate this document being accorded the level of protection that its sensitivity requires.

cc: Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Ahearne Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine W. J. Dircks, EDO J.J. Cummings, OIA

, Distribution OI-s/f TMI - Work Plan OI-c/f OI-r/f I am

,h OI '< OI P. ' OI WJWard/jh RAForhuna BBHayes 03/31/83 p3h(83 03/5 /83 P

l

xhibit 6

, C-OkERNMENT ACCOUNTADidTY PROJECT ins::tu:e for Pohey 5:vdes ,.

1901 Que 5:ree:. N.W.. Woshington D.C. 20009 (202)234 9362

~

Novembe- 10, 1983

[ .

Honorable Nunzio Palladino {

Honorable Victor Gilinsky .

Honorable Thomas Roberts Honorable James Asselstine Honorable Frederick Bernthal .

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Kashington, D.C. 20555 a

Dear Commissioners:

On behal.f of Mr. Richard Parks, the Government Accountability Project submits these comments on the September 7, 1983 Office of Inspector and Auditor (CIA) Report of Investigation - ," Parks Allegations *

/

Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2. (TMI-2). (OIA Report). In sum, the CIA ef fort f ails to meet the minimum staridards for any government investigation and report. OIA's performance on the case illustrates why the office has achieved neither professional respect, nor legiti-macy as an agent of a.ccountability with4.n the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) .

In order to obtain ju'stice in his own case, and to establish a credible system of internal NRC checks and balances against agency r.isconduct, Mr. Parks requests that the Commission' seek the services of a respected government investigative organization.ihdependent of the NRC, such as the IRS c individual military investig. aid.ve units, to fulfill the CIA's mission. He requests that the investigative . unit be assigned to --

1) Reopen the investigation .of Mr. Parks ' allegations against the NRC;

2) Expand the investigation to include th's allegations against OIA

$ presented below, and to resolve ~the contradictions in f act-

% finding and conclusions between the simultaneously-released OIA g and office of Investigations (OI) Reports;

3) Ivaluate the adequacy of the CIA investigative methodology and k reporting format as compared to the OI Report; 2- 4) Recommend corrective action to address the causes and prevent recurrences of deficiencies in the NRC's performance regulating k the TMI-2 cleanup; g

5) Recommend structural and/or organizational reforms to address the causes and prevent recurrences of any deficiencies; and

6) Recommend minimum methodological and reporting standards for all NRC investigations, Mr. Parks recognized the seriousness of his requests. He does not lightly seek appointment:, of an outside agency to perform a task which should already have been, accomplished within the NRC. However, the c

f.3 -( ,

i .

ombarrassing degreo to which OIA abdicated its rasponsibilitios on

such a significant investigation requires drastic acticn. More specifically,Mr.ParksfhargesthatOIA--

1) .viclated the conditions for his interview. OIA failed to ootain a signed statement from Mr. Parks, as promised. Instead,'

the Report summarized a June 23, 19 83 interviewiwids Mr. Parks -

and counsel. Neither was given the promised ch ince to review the summary for accuracy. Consequently, it does not accurate-ly reflect either the facts of the case or the presentation made to the CIA by Mr. Parks and his counsel. ,

2) f ailed to investigate two of Mr. Parks' most significant allegations. Fundamental misconcuct by the NRC forced Mr. Parks to go public with his complaints about the cleanup in order to obtain enforcement of nuclear safety laws. First, Region I

personnel ref used to investigate violations of 42 U.S.C. 5851, yhich prohibits retaliation against employees for disclosures which lead to NRC investigations. Second, the Three Mile Island i- Program Office (TMIPO) sunmarily rejected his allegations on j

inaccurate grounds without first conducting a full or objective inquiry. OIA f ailed to address either of these basic issues.

The ef fect is to send a message to nuclear whistleblowers: it is inef fective and professionally dangerous to disclose illecal-ities to the RRC on-site. -

3) made findings of suspect accuracy andd exhibited bias through f ailure to interview essntial wrtnesses. For example, CIA i accepted without question TMIPO;. Deputy Director Lake Barrett's i self-serving denial that he misled the Concerned Mothers of Middletown (CMM). The OIA did' not ask the Concerned Mothers of Midcletown what Mr. Barrett had- told them. Similarly, OIA's explanation why it did not intervi~ w e utility or Bechtel persennel l about NRC confidentiality breaches defies reason. OIA explained that the interviews would " positively compromise Parks."

, (OIA Report at 3) . But Mr. Parks' allegation to the OIA was that he already had been compromised by confidentiality breaches.

4 If there were any validit'y to the OIA position, the OI probe i and Report would have inevitably compromised Parks, which they did not. The OIA Report also dismissed Mr. Parks' allegation i that draf t versions of NRC reports had been provided to the utility. It did so without interviewing Mr. Larry King, who testified in support of Mr. Parks ' charge on that issue in Congress.

4

4) endorsed suspect policies. OIA accepted the practice of TMIPO staf f members to informally review and approve cleanup pro-cedures before the same procedures were submitted to the . Site Operations. Department. OIA endorsed this as an " authorized

~,

practice," .although OI had identified the same practice as a contributing f actor to the disintegration of the '.TMI cleanup.

OIA explained that the practice was acceptable, since NRC approval was not official. (OIA Report at 2). That policy judgment is highly suspect, for it.would mean that NRC-licensee collusion which renders the licensees' administrative controls unenforceable and undercuts the independence of quality assurance is acceptable, as long as the misconduct is " unofficial." The NRC would never permit an "unof ficial" QA program that neutral-l i

izod compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appandix 3. It is inexcusable that OIA sanctioned an " unofficial" regulatory program that helped to produce the same illegal result.

5) faiIed to address the most basic cuestion in the case. OIA ,,

f alled to even ask the question which demands an answer:

) How and why did the TMIPO approve a program thaq, was comprehen-

• sively illegal? As a result;, there was no attempt by OIA to determine the NRC's role in causing the cleanup violations.

6) failed to recommend any corrective action. As a result, the OIA Report is an invitation for repe ition of misconduct by NRC personnel such as that engaged in by the TMIPO.

In short, Mr. Parks,is concerned that the poor quality of the CIA roport illustrates an ironic weakness that should be addressed:

the agency's structural safeguard for accountability has been its vaak link. Mr. Parks is aware that OIA Director James Cummings was romoved from his position shortly after release of the' TMI report published by his office. He urges the Commission to demonstrate its co..T.itment to structural reform,at OIA, rather than mere.

personnel reshuffling, by correcting the record in his case and cooking independent review of the NRC's program for internal

' ~

accountability. - -

flespec fully submitted,  !

- Th mas Devine 4 hw b*

Legal Director

• , 9 L

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• l Exhibit 7

/f or .

'o UNITED STATES g

8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g .r WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

% l '

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December 21, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairnan Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts '

Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM: en B. Hayes, Director

h. Office of Investigations SUBJECi: :HREE MILE ISLAND NGS, UNIT 2 - ALLEGATION OF CONCEALMENT OF DETECTABLE CESIUM 137 IN THE PERSONNEL ACCESS FACILITY HOLDING TANK On September 1,1983, OI released its first report of investigation of the allegations raised by Messrs. Parks, King, and Gischel concerning the TMI-2 Recovery Program. That report, although it primarily dealt with alleged administrative and technical deficiencies, documented all of Mr. Parks' cen-cerns, some of which will be covered in future reports in accordance with the OI investigative plan that I previously furnished to the Comission. One.of Mr. Parks' concerns that surfaced during the investigation was clearly a catter

.of OI interest, viz that Mr. James Thiesing, then TMI-2 Manager of Recovery Prograns, in conversations with James E. Hildebrand, THI-2 Radiological Contrcis Director and Laurence King had explored ways to conceal in a January 1983 NRC Ouarterly Report the presence of detectable quantities of cesium 137 in the Personnel Access Facility (PAF) sewage holding tank.

OI elected to pursue this allegation as a separate matter prior to addressing the remaining allegations both because of its intrinsic importance, and our sensitivity to the fact that the NRC had a clear obligation to substantiate or refute the allegation.

Our investigation established that the presence of detectable levels of cesium 137 in the PAF was documented and reported to the NRC in monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual reports. It further established that the NRC TMI Program Office had been orally advised when these levels were detected, and that these -

initial oral reports were subsequently documented by the licensee in formal reports.

No evidence was developed indicating that either Mr. Thiesing or Mr.

Hildebrand concealed or attempted to conceal this information. Additionally, the consensus of technically knowledgeable persons centacted during this investigation was that the cesium levels were quite icw - less than 10% of the Maximum Permissable Concentration allowed by TMI-2 Technical Specifications and as'such, are consistent with the activities of the PAF Holding Tank.

, - . _ . - . + s -

I

,' Chairman Palladino 2 December 21, 1983 OI plar.s no further investigation of this allegation, cc: W.J.Dircks, EDO (3 copies)

T.E.Murley, RA:RI R. K.Christopner, 01: RI J

4 O

m.

N Distribution NOI:s/f H-83-002 OI:c/f OI:r/f

• WJWard

. RAMeeks

\

01 A OI WJhar jh RAFortuna 3BHayes 12/20 83 12/y,//83 12/ /83 e

Exhibit i

+  %, UNITED STATES

[ e_ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s- e .

wAsumarow.o. c. noses *

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/ '

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION Office of Investigations l TITLE: Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Allegations Regarding Safety Related Modifications, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane.

SUPPLEMENTAL:' Docket No. 050 320 DATE: September 1,1983 CASE NUMBER: H-83-002 STATUS: PENDING '

REPORTING OFFICE:

01:HQ PERIOD OF 1NVESTIGATION: March 25 - August 10, 1983 REPORTING INVESTIGATOR: A James Y. Vorse, Directof-Office of Investigations Field Office, Region II/ Team Leader O PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL: Bruno Urye, Jr. , Investigator Detailed from Physical Security Section, Region II Ronald A. Naks, Investigator Office of Investigations Roger D. Walker, Chief, Projects Section 2C, Division of Projects and Resident Programs, Region III Arthur B. Beach, Senior Reactor Engineer Office of Inspection and Enforcement Walter G. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector Davis Besse, Region III O .0 I

REVIEWED BY:

A44 Wrliism 8. Aard, Director Division of Field Operations .

Office of Investigations c ) ~f l ['

he,4. l AL RogeT p. F rtuna, Deputy Di ctor Office

• nvesti ons APPROVED BY: -

bTn'B. Hayes, pfrfc r //

Office of Investig to o

O 4

I

SFv .

.c l

C-3 BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATION i

l 9

O 1

1 ,

~

Background

L

{

In February,1983, Mr. Richard Parks, then employed as a senior start-up

{

engineer by the Bechtel Northern Corporation (BNoC) at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2) approached NRC personnel and alleged that his management wanted him transferred offsite due to certain concerns that he . raised regarding Polar Crane Test Procedures. In March, 1933 Mr. Lawrence King, TMI-2 Director of Site Operations (an, employee of GP) Nuclear Corporation) was teminated by GPUN for an alleged conflict of '

interest violatien. Messrs Parks and King subsequently made allegations re; arcing the way in which GPUN/BNoC were conducting recovery operations at TM:-2 (these allegations are set forth, infra).

On March 25, 1983, the Chaiman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the concurrence of the Comission, requested that the Office of Investigations (01) and the Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA) initiate investigations of the above mentioned concerns. OI was to provide overall coordination of NRC's response to these allegations with the assistance of the Executive Director for C;erations (EDO). OI was to be responsible for addressing the allegations toucning on the conduct of the licensee and its contractors; OIA was to 1: dress allegations touching on the conduc of NRC employees.

Due to the technical nature of the allegations, 0I requested certain technical personnel with appropriate engineering backgrounds be. detailed to OI by the EC . The Director, OI then detailed Mr. James Vorse, the Director, 01 Field Office, Region II to head this multidisciplinary team which ultimately censisted of two 0I investigators (plus the occasional use of former 0I ir.vestigator on detail from Region II) and four engineers. OI also arranged  ;

for an engineer on detail from the Office of Policy Evaluation to review the OI report for technical adequacy due to 0I's lack of technical expertise. l The allegations were reviewed and categorized into five general areas of concern:

1) Safety related modifications to equipment and components without full prior engineering and approval.

{

1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - J

• (

O

2) Quality Assurance program non-compliance through issuance of test and i administrative procedures without prior approval and review.

I

3) An inclination by TMI-2 management to overlook the TMI-2 safety checks and balances on work programs in order to meet scheduling deadlines.

4) Harassment and intimidation by Supervisors as a result of the allegers' interral challenging of perceived procedural violations.

5) Collusion by NRC personnel with GPUN and BNoC.

6) The so-called " mystery man" issue, i.e. whether a particular employee turned off the safety injection pumps the morning of the TMI-2 accident.

This report deals only with issues 1-3. Issues 4 and 6 will be dealt with separately by 01 in subsequent reports of investigation. Issue 5, as noted, supra, is to be addressed by OIA.

I l

l 2

l

I 1

C-33 STATUS OF INVESTIGATION O

e

Status of Investigation This investigation report is submitted in a PENDING status. Additional information has been obtained and is being evaluated. Additional effort will be directed at the harassment, intimidation and " Mystery Man" issues brought forward by the allegers.

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[i CECSED MEETING - EXEMPTICNS 5 ASD 7 i

B Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission 9

f Room 1130 10 1717 H Street. N. W.

.' Wa s '. . i r.g c . , D. C.

'l 1

l 11 i Thursday, October 6, 1983 l

12 The meeting convened in closed session at 13 '

10:45 a.m.

I 14 '

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

1 15 l NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Com=ission i

VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissicner 16 i 1 i

1 THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner 1, i THOMAS ROBERTS, Cc== ssioner 1 1

FREDERICK BERNTHAL, Commissioner 18 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AC COMMISSION TABLE: )

19 l S. CHILK g i H. PLAINE

3. HAYES J. ZERBE 21 R. LEVI 22 J. MONTGOMERY l

1 D

24 i

25 1 t

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4 ,

t ,I ll

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1 l

PRCCEEDINGS -'

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~

2 CEAIRMAN PALLADINO: We will convene the first par: l 3 t' q of the closed meeting. At this . cart cf the closed meetinc, l

l h

4 y 4

I would like OI to brief us on the status of TMI-l related .

I 5 t' investigations, particularly in view cf the new information  !

i. I 6,', provided by the staff as a result cf reviewing the trial I

- if .

o cocuments.

I 6- We are interested in what investigations are 9

pending and the O! strategy and schedule for cc=pleting the  :

J t

10 r '

el investiga:: ens, together with some indication en the extent

\;

i 11  ! to which the strategy and schedule are firm or nc: f;rm.

.l 12 l Do other Cc==issioners have opening re= arks?

h 13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No.

i fi '

14 i

(No response from the other C0==issioners. )  ;

i 15 j CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Then let =e turn j i

16 ;., ,

the meeting over to Mr. Hayes. l 17  !

MR. HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 As of this =cment we have five open investiga icns!

19 and earl.y this =crning I was briefed c. a situation which I I

j . <

20 I we are evaluating and let me cove- 'k=- '

1. irst.

21 We haven't opened an investiga:Len, but apparentlyl i

i 22 an employee, and presumably a licensee employee, whose res, coni i

23 sibilities included the moni oring of radioactivity emissions' 24

. in and around the facility and .cre.carinc. a re.ccrt, which  ;

l S -is filed with presumably readings as to what was or was not. I l

.1

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'er J Vg... @ l l i I.

i  ;

I I indicated, and we received information that :he particular f f

i

• 2 i em lovee's files indicated readines were taker on a Sunday,  ;

il 3y ,

when in :act tne em:loyee was never at the plant site and  ;

s 4 never went through the gate ---  ;

t 4

5 .: COMMISSIONE? GILINSK':: These are current readings?

L '

6 .

MR. HAYES:  ! would presume sc, C :..issioner c ,

li 7

1 Gilinsky. This is real sketchy. I ds ust cc:

a three-minute 3 i  !,

8 brief before I came down here. In essenca ' could  !

t 9 summarize it, we have an employee who has filed false reports, t

i 10 l, with GPT on those readincs. " He was not at the plant site i i:

d 11 .f, a t. a r e n t l .'. and at. arenti.v has indicated that he was no:

'i i

12 there and the readins were not taker on the date indicated b:

13 i,, . '. . . = .

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. e.

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i 14 j i

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, since you are not i 15 I,! sure of the details, there is not much point ir getting

• O 16 3, diverted on that one.

b.

17 (Laughter.)

[d ,i 18 i MR. HAYES: Well, I am just asserting it as it t

,' I.

19 is under active consideration and it will be evaluated.  !

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Ckay. .

i 6

21 MR. HAYES: The remaining ongoing ivnestigations. !

t 22 The Parks-Gishel investigation, as you know, we have $

1 23 completed phase one of that investigation. We are contem-24 plating putting Parks-Gishel, TMI-1 leak rates, SETA-RHR, 25 Keaton and Hartman all together and I hope to form a task l t

l l

. . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . .. _. _ .__ ._._...a . _, ,, -

II -

i I

e i 7 .

1'.t s

1 . a-ll of the documents. This is the best I can tell you  !

i 1r 2 i as of today, i

3 -

COMMISSICNER ASSELSTINI: I;culd ycu 00.. sider b.

I i

4.

! issuing reports in each of these individual areas serially I i

5 )! when you get one done, or are you talking abcu: one bic i i

h

,I i

6

.rackac.e in March? '

i 7

J-

! MR. HAYES: I would ho e to dc it as we cc= _ete

(

8 l it. The first one to be completed would probably be chase t.

two on the Par <s-Ca.she.s. wnicn is the int = cation anc 9

10 harassment. We are well into that aspect of it. .

I i

11  !

I TMI l leak rates we have ye: to cpen up and 60 .

I 12 . s0=ething. Keaten and SETA-RER is the same. We have yet '

13 l

te c0= le:e our analysis as te wha: :he sctpe is cf those l L

14 inquiries.

I 15 l Hartman we are well into. We have made some I

16

, intersviews and conducted interviews las: week 1.. response i

17 i to cur subpoenas, but we are alsc on notice that we are I

i 18 .

ceing to have to have those enforced and we are in the I

? .

i 19 i process of working with OGC cn that matter.

. l l I.

20 CO*1MISSIONER GILINSKY: How does that estimate 21 track with the assumptions you used in earlier estimates?

22 liR. ZIAsE: You mean in the schedules. Well, 23 we had some dates earlier and some dates later. Our most i

24 recent schedule, we talk about later which has this 1

25 particular objective.

I I

I I

.m . . , . _ . . - _

. _ _ - . - , - - . . _ , . - .-m , . _ _

I I

e2

t. ,

t 1 , 3 we Can't 60 with that number of *eople.

2 CHAIFJiAN PALLADINO: I would also intend to I

r .

3 $ go back :c Se'til and see if we can't break the :.Ce. '

\.c 4

Cmu . ". 'a . .e. .c..' *s".r r ., .t -.r. :.N m. . -. .' . . . . . = . 4e a..-=-.- way to i

t go at it.

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- ' li these'should be dealt with.  !

i 8.

l Are there any other cc=ments or cuestions? ,

g j CC.'".'.'.SS.**.N'a  : n' S S ..".' S

• I ".. ~r *. "c.

's 10 i JNo ec= ment from the other Cc==issioners.)

I CHAIF.!:AN PAADINO: All right. hen why don't 11 i i

12 I t

we adjourn this part of the closed meeting and as soon as ,

' 13 the room is cleared we will go c: the next part.

e~ [ .

14 i1 0hereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the meeting i

,t b,,i gl 15 !lI' adjcurned.)

i i..l 16 bi. - - -

Y 17 h l'

18 19 20 21 i

22 l

4 24

< /

Y I CERTITICATE OF FRICTE ;I::GS

~

, 2 l .

3 This is to certify that the attached procesfings before the 4 NRC CO.'01ISSION 3 In the matter of: Report on Process on going Investigation Date of Proceeding: October 6, 1983 7

Place of Proceeding: Washington, D. C.

a were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 9

transcript for the file of the Commission.

10 Mary C. Simons Official Reporter - Typed

!2 13 We M Sm Officiad Reporter - Signature 3,

15 16 17 33 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TAYLOE ASSOCI ATES REGISTERED PROFESSION AL REPORTERS NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

s

.. i CERTIFICATE OF 3RCCEEDISGS o?

l 2 -

., This is_ to certify that the attached proceedings before the l 4  ::RC COtetISSION

'~

In the matter of:

Investigations & Enforcement Matters 3

Involving TMI Units 1&2 and their Impact on TMI-l Restart.

, Date of Proceeding: 1 Tuesday, January 10, 1984 7 Plc.ce of Proceeding: .

Washington, D.C.

, were held as herein appears, and that this is the original

, transcript for the file of the Commission.

io

,, Suzanne Young

, Official Reporter - Typed f2 s /

~t3

_-d

,, Of ficidd Reporter' - Signature 15 16 t7 18 19 20 21 22

~

23 n .

24 l 2

TAYLCE ASSOCIATES ~

RecisritmEc PMortssioNAl. REPORTERS NoRroLK, VIRGlNIA

-. _ . - . . - ,m

i E:chibit 10 I .i h. k b 0

• tmii20ll1 bJi;f d Q!J lW0$.'&r,(?. ,, ll3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of: -

l INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMINT MTTERS INVOLVING TMI UNITS 1& 2 AND THEIR Docket No.

IMPACT ON TMI-l RESTART

~

CLOSED MEETING Location: Washington, D. C. - 62 Pages:

Date: Tuesday, January 10, 1984

_ TAYLOE ASSOCIATI5

s. Coun Repersers to:3 i serm..N w s teos

• .in acon. o c. :coes e:02) .%)990

SYl,syL 1

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 INVESTIGATIONS & ENFORCEMENT MATTERS INVOLVING TMI UNITS 1&2 AND THEIR IMPACT ON TMI-l RESTART l

5 6

Closed Meeting 7

8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission g 1717 H Street, N.W.

Room 1130 10 Washington, D.C.

11 Tuesday, January 10, 1984

! 12 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at u

13 10:05 a.m.

14 COMMISSIONER,S PRESENT:

a

_ 15 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner

• 16 JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner 17 FREDERICK BERNTHAL, Commissioner 18 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT TABLE:

ig H.E. PLAINE S. CHILK 20 J. ZERBE B. HAYES 21 K. CHRISTOPHER J. MONTGOMERY 22 R. LEVI ,

24 ***

25

(

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , - - - _ _ _ _ , - - - ~ _ ,

2 1

EEEEEEEEEEE 2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Good morning, ladies and 3 gentlemen. The purpose of this meeting is to consider the 4 Department of Justice's December 14, 1983 request that NRC 5 stay further administrative proceedings related to the opera-6 tion of Unit 2 until the conclusion of the criminal trial of 7 Metropolitan Edison.

8 This stay request was later expanded in the DOJ g letter of December 27th, 1983 to include the investigation of 10 Unit i leak rate testing as well as other investigations gg involving TMI-1.

g We have received two memos from the General Counsel 1

13 n this subject dated January 3rd and January 4th, 1984.

9 34 As background, let me also note the General Counsel memorandum 15 of January 5th, 1984, forwarding a copy of OI's report to 16 DOJ on the TMI-l leak rate investigation.

17 At the close of the meeting today I would like to 18 determine whether there is agreement among the Commissioners 19 on which one of the three options OGC suggested or some 20 modification thereof to follow on the DOJ request.

21 Ben Hayes and Keith Christopher of OI are available 22 and will join the meeting for : discussion of the investiga-23 tion involving TMI-l when we wish to do so.

24 Do other Commissioners have opening remarks?

15 (No response.)

I

'3 1

If not, then, I would propose to turn the meeting 2

over to OGC to lead our discussion.

3

, MR. PLAINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The 4

Commission is being asked by the Attorney General to stay-its 5

civil investigation related to the past operation of Three 6

Mile Island Unit 2 until the ccnclusion -of the cri'minal trial 7

of Metropolitan Edison.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How long.is that going 8

to take?

10 MR. PLAINE: It's conjecture, Mr. Gilinsky, because 11 there are preliminary motions to be disposed of which have i 12 not yet been disposed of, and the court calendar might 13 vary, there's just a single judge there and she may find 14 3 that something else comes ahead of it. I don't knew. We're 15 really not certain and I know the Justice Department people 16 are not certain.

17 Once it gets rolling, there's speculation that it 18 could -- if it's not disposed of by motion or some other 18 i

means, there is speculation that it could be terminated in 20 two months. But again, that's speculation. We can't tell about 21 requests for interim adjournments and things of that sort.

u So we're talking about a considerable period of 23 time, running into many months.

24 I was about to say that while the request relates M

principally to the suspension of the Hartman leak rate f

t

4

! I a11egations at TMI-2, also involve.d are related investigations 2 that involve questioning of cany of the same individuals, 3

employees and managers who are' potential witnesses in the 4 criminal trial. These investigations relate to principally i

5 the TMI-1 leak rate t'esting but might also involve beta,'RHR i

6 false statements, Keaton, the internal study of the accident 7 and alleged management attempts to soften the report, the 8 King, Parks and Gischel allegations re: clean-up of TMI-2.

8 Obviously, the Justice Department concern is 10 avoidance of conflicts of testimony of witnesses, because so 11 many of the same people are involved. Let me note briefly 12 how we arrived at this juncture.

13 The Harman allegations came to light in late 1979 14 or early 1980 and following referral of them to the Justice 15 Department in early 1980, the Department asked NRQ to withhold 16 investigating further while it pursued its investigation, 17 looking for criminal charges and indictments.

18 Suspension of the NRC cit il investigation continued i

18 until the summer of 1983, although a dif ference of opinion i

20 between Justice and NRC arose in May 1983 as to whether we, 21 NRC, were told in October of 1981 that we could proceed --

! 22 that is their view -- or that we were free to resume the 23 l civil investigation.

i 24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Is that reduced to writing E or was this verbal?

5 1

MR. PLAINE: No, this was in writing. This differ-ence of opinion I helped reduce to writing with the Justice 3

Department in connection with a reply to Congressman Udall.

i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes, but it was reduced to 5

writing after the fact.

MR. PLAINE: After the fact, yes.

7 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: It was who said what.

8 MR. PLAINE: The record material is vague, elusive, 9

non-existent in some cases. It's not a clear record at all.

10 But in any event, it was clear that the Justice II Department told us in May of 1983, you're free to go ahead, 12 and we told you to go ahead earlier. And we thought they were 18

/ telling us to continue the suspension. But be that as it may, 14 we did resume the civil investigation in the summer of 1983.

e That was temporarily blocked by counsel fo r the 16 witnesses who claimed that their witnesses would be damaged, j

would be put in jeopardy in connection with possible criminal 18 indictment of them. And after we denied their request for 19 quashing of subpoenas, they refused nevertheless to answer i M

subpoenas and we had to take them to court to enforce the 21 subpoenas.

22 In that connection, the Justice Department Civil Division, as distinct from the Criminal Division, assisted 24

[

1 and we got a ruling out of the judge that would indicate that' their objections at that time were not well founded.

i 6

I The Justice Department continued with the Grand 2

Jury and was able to produce an indictment in early November 3

of 1953. It was sometime in early December that the U.S.

~

4 Attorney, who will be the chief prosecutor in this case, 5

Mr. David Queen, becoming conscicus of our pursuit of these 6

witnesses by subpoena and, hopefully in some cases by actual 7

• consent of the witnesses without necessity for having the 8

subpoenas enforced, became concerned and notified the Depart-8 ment here in Washington that he would like to see the NRC 10 investigation be suspended so as not to interfere with his 11 conduct of the trial. And I was asked to come down to the 12 Department in early December to discuss this with them.

13

, They pointed out what their concerns were, the 14 question of raising conflicts in connection with witnesses' 15 testimony already given either to the Grand Jury.or to 16 criminal investigators and other concerns of that nature 17 which I have outlined in the paper, and asked how we would 18 I feel. I told them at that point that I can understand your i

18

! concerns, but considering all of the delay that has ensued, 20 the difficulty in coming to an understanding with where we 21 stood, that if they. wanted any such arrangement made they 22 would have to put their request in writing from the Attorney 23 General or from the Associate Attorney General, Lowell Jensen, 24 who was the gentleman who signed the last letter telling us 25 i that we had the right to go ahead.

1

- - - - - - , , , - - - - , - , - , - - , - , + , . - - . - - , . , - , , - - - - --,.--_,,,,,.7. , , - , ,-w ,,-,,,w-,n - - - _ , - ,n..., ,>--.n.7,-,

l

( 7 I

. They thought that was a reasonable request and

, they proceeded to do that.

1 3

) CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That was also in accordance 1

4 i

with the agreement you had reached that these things would be 5

, put in writing.

t 6

MR. PLAINE: Oh, yes.

7 In connection with my discussion with them, I 8

pointed out one of the main concerns that -- well, not 9

necessarily the main concern but a concern of this -- that -

' 10 might affect the Commission, and that is that we were conductir. .

a proceeding relating to the startup of TMI-l which had not 4 12 been involved in the accident, and that it would be useful 13 if they could find a way not to delay the Commission's I'

proceeding with that investigation.

15 At that point, I think they believed that was a I'

reasonable request, and indeed, included in their letter to 17 us a statement that wenight continue with our investigation 18 affecting TMI-1. I guess they didn't know, and maybe we

didn't know, and naybe I personally didn't know and maybe i

M some of our peopic didn't know at that point that there ware

! 21 1

any number of people on the potential list for TMI-l 3

22 i

investigation who had a dual role at the TMI reactors, 88

servicing both at the same, or sometimes servicing one and 24 j

then moving over to the other and then moving back. And it 25 turns out that that was a considerable list, and that was made

... ,i.-..-- - - , . , . . -

__.--,_-..,_....,,-y, mm, _ _ , . . . , - . - . - + - - . , , ,,___-.,,.,,..--,m.--.-, , - - , - .

8 1

known to the Justice Department a day or two after their 2 letter came over here. And it immediately created the 3

necessity to rethink what they had actually said in their 4 letter to us.

5 So again,'I met with representatives of their 6

department and it turned out that they really would like to i

7 have us not continue with any of these key witnesses who will '

8 be testifying in the TMI-2 criminal case.

9 We've actually identified these people by name, and 10 they have provided a list. They did indicate the possibility 11 that on a more or less name-by-name basis if we wanted to go 12 ahead with partially completing, if not wholly completing, 13 some of these other investigations -- in particular, the 14 TMI-l leak rate investigation -- they would concede on certain 15 people. But on a certain few, numbering at least,10, they 16 have a strong feeling totally against their being involved 17 in civil investigation questioning until their testimony is 18 completed in the criminal trial.

19 That means, in effect, that the written letter of M

Associate Attorney General Jensen has been somewhat expanded, 21 and as you saw in the draf t letters I showed you, a subsequent 22 letter would be forthcoming to express that. It hasn't been 2 actually set because it was suggested that if we like, we 24 might discuss it first and decide and need help in the drafti.nq 25 of that letter so that it would not be objectionable to us.

? -

l 9

1 So at this juncture, until the Commission makes up 2

its mind on which way it would like to proceed on the three 3

options that seem to be presented, we don't have any further 4

correspondence and we won't until the Commission'comes to some 5

judgment as to which way we should go. There are these three 6

possibilities, although when you boild them down the business 7

of declining to accept the Justice Department proposal is 8

fairly limited, and their constraints are laid out in the 8

memorandum and I guess I would only be repeating what's to written here if I continued further along that line.

11 I do have the feeling that perhaps the key issues 12 would be whether or not we think we would be able to continue 13 with a restart proceeding to a possible finish if we don't 14 have all of the investigations related to integrity and

- 15 possibly other things in hand, or whether we could proceed 16 with some of those partially completed.

17 If we're in a position to do that, then there 's no 18 need to deny Justice its request. perhaps an even more 18 important key question is whether or not we think completion 20 of the criminal trial is essential to our proceeding. Again, 21 if that's the case, then there's no reason why we should not 22 accede to the Justice Department request.

23 When you're dealing with those considerations you're 24 dealing with something rather considerable in terms of what 25 you think the equities are, what the public appearance would

!E 1

be and to forth. ,

- 1 2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Herzel, with regard to these ,j 3 two people that DOJ said we might interview, was that put in *l 4

writing or did you learn that --

5 MR. PLAINE: Yes, they're in that list in connec-6 tion wa.th --

I 13 Was that something they told you?

" MR. PLAINE: Well, they told us that, and they is also noted in that dr,af t le.tter that they might -- let's see I

what the words were.

i 17 Let's see, do we have any COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

18 real options here o.ther than to try to work some deal with the Justice Department and just try to do the best that we can?

MR. PLAINE: Would you say that again?

21 I would be interested, before  !

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

i 22 making a decision, to know from OI where we stand on the 23 J.

TMI-1 leak rate falsification investigation.

24 MR. PLAINE: That would be helpful to you I think.

25 At least it would be helpful CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

l P - -- . . . . . . . . _ _ . c. . l

~

i l

[ l

' l -

11 i

1 .to me.

And when the Commission is ready, I propose that we I i

2

( .

i call them in and ask them for a status of who they interviewed

[- 3 I don' t know if they interviewed Ross, Herbein and Miller ,

4 for example.

These are three people that I gather they were 5

authorized to interview based on your understanding of DOJ .

6 L

And whether or not they have found anything out from the se 7  !

people that indicates that there was falsification.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let's see, where would 9

that lead you any different than simply acting on th e 10 basis of what Herzel has laid out?

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:

12 Well, it might influence =c to the following extent.

e I'm gcing on the premise that for t

13 the moment, we could go along with DOJ.

14 I would pick Option 2 because that gives us the o'pportunity to go as far as we can 15 on TMI leak rate falsification question.

16 And if it' looks like there are real serious concerns about the TMI-l leak 17 18 rate falsification, it might cause me to think a little harder before I reach this decision.

19 And I'm going on the basis that both the NRC Staff 20 i and OPE have taken the position that the significant issue 21 for restart among the pending OI investigations is a possible U

falsification on leak rate at Unit' l. And if I voted for 23 Option 2, I would go on the basis that 24 it did not necessarily preclude making a restart decision, but it would depend on 25 where we stand --

< 2 .F 12 1 COMMISSIONZR GILINSKY: Option 2 is what, working 2 something out'with DOJ?

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yes, working out the 3 plus i

4 the 2, and if they're willing to give anybody else --

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I don't see that we have 6

any other option. I mean, what else would you do?

7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I still would like to bear OI 8

for a few minutes.

8 MR. PLAINE: In that connection in answer to your 10 question, Mr. Chairman, they are willing to state in the 11 next exchange of letters that there are ten people -- without 12 identifying who they are -- who are presently under subpoena 13

, for the Commission's Unit 1 inquiry who also had responsibilit:.c 14 at some point related to the operation of Unit 2. These 15 individuals are well known to your Office of Investigations is and it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for 17 '

the Commission to interview these employees concerning leak 18 rate testing without listening to the conducted operation 18 of Unit 2.

20 So by exclusion of 10 or less, depending.on the 21 number we arrive at, you could have a written understanding 22 that you might partially proceed if that is meaningful, 23 that is worth something, in terms of what OI feels in 24 light of that.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I would .say that I think the

_ .. L

, i

! 13 1 OI ought to go as far as possible as it can as far as inter-

, 2 vie' wing people with DOJ and saying we can interview without 3 damaging their case.

-4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why don't we just agree 5 on that?

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Do we disagree?

l 7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No. I said why don't we t  ;

8 just agree on that. #

9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Except I'd like to hear where 10 we stand from OI on TMI-l leak rate falsification. It

11 I doesn't have to be long, but --

12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let me ask a question that

t. 13 I'm sure reflects -- manifests legal naivete but I'll ask it 4

14 anyway. Why is it so impossible or unthinkable that somehow, 15 one could proceed questioning these witnesses in tandem with 1

16 1

DOJ? Presumably, the question before us whether we back off 17 and let DOJ go first. Is it utterly impossible that you would 18 proceed expeditiously to talk to these people in some sort of 19 joint effort?

20 MR. PLAINE: The problem is the effect on the 21 witnesses and their showing in court. For example, if you 22 get contradictory statements, if we get contradictory state-d nents from some of these witnesses, those statements are going 24 to be available by discovery or demand from the other side.

M They can use them to c,ontradict the witnesses' --

I i

_ _ , _ _ . . _ - -. - _ . . . _ _ _ _ , - . - _ . _ _ , . . ~ _ , _ _ _ _ , ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ . _ _ . - _ _ - , _ - _ _

' l' l 14 f

1 ' -

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: No, I'm talking about 2

literally -- and I'm sure there's a reason why you can'd do

! 3 t

this -- but literally, in the same rocm at the same time with 4

DOJ and our people, perhaps with one having the floor first 5

and then the next. Is that simply --

6 MR. PLAINE: They don' t want to do it for several 7

reasons. One of them includes the fact that these people 8

have testified in secrecy before the Grand Jury and they don't 8

want to have any revelation of that, or have any accusation 10 that people in the Justice Department are prompting these 11 people, or they're intimidated by Justice Department 12 representatives. '

13 These things are all a matter of perception at triatl I ~

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay.

15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: IW3uld propose we' call OI in 16 and have them give us a brief status report and respond to any I

questions that the Commission has. And I would suggest that 10 we focus solely on TMI-l leak rate falsification.

19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why only on that? Because 20 that's the only one that conflicts with Justice --

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That's the one that seems to 22 conflict most with Justice.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why do you want to limit 24 it just to that?

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Because I was going on the l

O 15 s

1 basis of OPE and the . staff both saying that's the one that 2

they would like to see most complete.

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, that's their view.

4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I made my proposal and 5

you can make yours.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: If you're going to have 7

them in I'd like to hear about all of them. I'm prepared 8

not to have them in at all and just proceed on the recommenda-8 tions.

10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, in exchange for having 11 them in I'm willing to go to the others.

U Can we get OI in?

13 (Pause.)

14 Herzel, you had identified several -- Keaton, 15 Parks, Gischel, and what was the other one?

16 MR. P LAINE : The beta, RHR, false statements, 17 Keaton, the internal study for the accident, King, Parks 18 and Gischel and clean-up.

19 CHAIR >mN PALLADINO: Okay.

20 MR. PLAINE: Keep in mind now that there are 21 people in these that are also common denominator type peop .

22 and they all --

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think that's the key 24 question. Which of those investigations, from which of those 25 are there people on the prohibited list. That's why I think

- - --y-----+r - - ,e

16 l

0 1

he . asked to talk with them.

2 MR. P LAINE : That's right.

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I would just add in passing 4 that -- I think maybe I'll make my comment later. I'll wait 5 until af ter 3en has spoken.

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Ben, the Commission would like 7 to get a status report on investigations related to TMI-1, 8 particularly TMI-1 leak rate falsification questions. The 8

Keaton report, the Parks, Gischel allegation and the beta, RUR 10 and falsification question, or reporting question. And then 11 respond to questions on each one as we go along.

12 I think of particular interest are who, in each of 13 these cases, do you want to interview that might be on the-14 prohibited list arising from the Meted trial.

15 MR. HAYES: All right.

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Thumbnail versions.

17 MR. HAYES: Have you been furnished the list of 18 individuals that we received from the Department of Justice?

19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yes.

M MR. HAYES :- We have taken that particular list and 21 noted those individuals that would be affected by the 22 respective investigations. Have you been furnished with that j

23 list?

24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: No , I don' t think we have.

25 MR. HAYES: Let me, if I can, give this to you,

, i 17 l I l '

l I

l 1 our discussion paper.

2 (Handing document to Commission. )

3 What we have attempted to do is to note by the 4 respective names those investigations where we feel to do a 5 thorough, complete investigation we have got to talk to.

6 The importance of it and the significance of these particular 7

individuals with respect to these innestigations, of course, 8 would depend upon the testimony elicited from them, and that 9 is pure speculation at this point.

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: These are their positions 11 at the time of the accident?

12 MR. CHRISTOPHER: That's correct. ,

13 MR. HAYES: All of the individuals on the first 14 listing starting with John Blessing, control operators have 15 been subpoenaed by the Commission for testimony, and they 16 were part of our subpoena enforcement effort. And approximate 1 17 half of the individuals on the second page are under subpoena 18 to the Commission.

19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE : If I read this chart, 33 none of the people that you think you have to talk to on the 21 TMI-l leak rate investigation have been interviewed, since 22 none of them have little asterisks?

23 MR. CHRISTOPHER: That's correct.

24 MR. HAYES: That's correct, Commissioner.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Where are the asterisks? Oh, I

P

. /t 1

I see them.

2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: There's a footnote on 8

the second page.

4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Are these people shift 5

supervisors that are shown for the TMI-1 leak rate investigatio 6

are they on the list of the 10 provided by DOJ?

7 MR. CHRISTOPHER: They are.

8 CEAIRMAN PALLADINO: Okay. Is there a who 8

was on the list of 10? I don't see him'.

.10 MR. HAYES:

11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: he doegr . seem to be U

on th e list of 10.

13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think he's on both.

14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, the list of 10 that I 15

- have was I ,

16 I

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Is the plan here to get 18 the exact --

19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I was just trying to see -<

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think we want to get a ,

21 sense for where things stand.

22 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Mr. Chairman, that was a

_ preliminary list that they gave us. This is a final list.

_ --/ 24

'he second list, the more extensive list, is their final list.

T 25 The one with the X's and asterisks.

l i . 19 i

~

CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right, thank you.

2 Are you through? Why don't you go ahead before we  !

l ask questions. 1 4

MR. HAYES: We've used some general discussion as 5

l to what we feel the effect might be on the particular investi-6 gations, if that would be of interest to the Commission.

7 ,

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Tell us that.

8 MR. RAYES: It's obvious, of course, with respect 9

to TMI-2 leak rates, the Hartman matter, we can't conclude 10 that. With TMI-1, we had interviewed just about everyone 11 exclusive of these particular individuals on the list, and 12 given permission to interview these individuals we could 13 probably conclude TMI-l within the tineframe of April 1st or 14

end of March, as we predicted las t year.

P 15 MR. PLAINE: Which are these? '

16 MR. HAYES: Basically, the shift supervisors, 17 Judge Plaine. We've interviewed many of the control room 18 operators, in some instances twice, and three times in a 19 couple of instances. But we're at that preliminary level, 20 without going into the management aspect. '

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Have you interviewed Herbein, 22 Miller or Ross on TMI-l leak rate investigations?

23 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ross is going 24 to be scheduled probably in the next week to 10 days. The 25 preliminary indications from Department of Justice were that

l

. 10, 43 l l

1 interview any one of those individuals about Unit 1 without 2

talking to them about Unit 2 would in my mind be a waste of 3 everyone's time. You can't make a distinction between the p 4 two with this particular group of individuals.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO

I don't follow that. If they 6

have something to say about Unit 1, you could find that out. j as '

7 MR. OHRISTOPHER: Given the fact that they' re '

8 preparing to testify before a judge and jury, I don't expect 9

them to tell me something of an added nature about TMI-1, 10 given the overhang of TMI-2. Yes, I could try that but I i

11 don't truly believe that it would be a proper and complete 12 interview and would not be doing a service to what you're i 13 looking for.

14 COMMISS,IONER GILINSKY: Could we deal with the 15 other investigations just briefly? Could you just run over 16 them, 30 seconds apiece?

17 MR. HAYES: All right. The Parks, Gischel affair, 18 there are just four individuals as I remember that we would 19 like to speak to, to conclude the intimidation /harrassment 20 aspect of Parks and Gischel.

21 And if you remember, the Commission has asked us 22 to look into the " mystery man" matter.

23 On the Keaton investigation, as noted, there are 24 only two individuals with Keaton.

25 I think it's going to boil down to this, gentlemen:

11 , l 44 I

will the Commission accept less than a total, thorough, 2

complete investigative report --

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What's the significance of 4

these two individuals?

5 MR. HAYES: I don't know.

6 MR. CHRISTOPHER: There are two individuals I've 7 .

asked my staff about --

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Would you identify them so 9

that I may --

10 MR. HAYES: On the second page, the engineering 11 group, Ivan Porter and Thomas Hawkins.

i 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Okay, thank you.

13 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Mr. Hawkins is the Manager of 14 Startup and Test at TMI-1. Mr. Porter, if my memory ser,ves 15 me correctly, Supervisor of Instrumentation -- ,

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: He was that at Unit 2.

17 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Yes, sir. He is still in a 18 like position, if my memory serves me right. Mr.Hawkins 19 was Manager of Startup and Test. My staf f feels that both i

N of those individuals with respect to a certain particular 21 portion of the Keaton investigation, are key individuals.

l 22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are there any other 23 investigations that are affected by the recuests of the 24 I Justice Department? No, that's it. i 25 MR. HAYES: Not that I'm aware of.

l 1

l 1 1

1,2 45 1

COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: How about the significance 2 of the four people on Parks, Gischel?

3 MR. EAYES: According to the investigator, we 4

could probably conclude Parks, Gischel, if we accepted the 5

testimony of these four individuals as given to Steirs, who 6 was commissioned by the Licensee to conduct an internal i

I 7

investigation -- if we'd adopt that testimony without-doing 8

it ourselves, then we could use it in our report.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Isn't that a report that 10 cleared the Licensee?

11 MR. HAYES: Yes. That is a Licensee-instigated, 12 internal investigative report.

13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Isn't the Parks, Gischel 14 matter sufficiently removed from any of the substance of the 15 testimony that might be involved in the TMI-2 leak rates, ,

1 16 in the criminal trial, that that's an area where we might 17 have a possible appeal to Justice about talking to those 18 four people?

19 MR. PLAINE: The concern is not with that investi-20 gation per se. The concern they have is are there witnesses 21 in common.

1 22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I realize that. But I j

l 23 guess-if their fundamental concern is they d'on't want these l 24 people telling us something that might contradict what they've 2 already told the Grand Jury and what Justice hopes to elicit

?

13 46 l

1 from them in the criminal trial, if the focus of the intervie w 2

is really on Parks, Gischel and doesn't stray beyond Parks, 3

Gischel, isn't that sort of a low-risk proposition that would ,

4 justify at least an appeal to Justice on those four.

5 MR. PLAINE: Yes. One of the things that we would 6

try to do is to have an arrangement on a man-by-man basis.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why don' t we just agree to 8

go forward on a best-efforts basis.

9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Why don't we see if there are 10 anymore questions and then we'll go back.

11 Thank you, gentlemen. Now we can go back to what 12

, we want to do.

13 O

COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Joe, I just would like to 14 make the comment that I would like to see comparative data 15 for sister plants of this type, because I think that does 16 matter here.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It's not a simple thing, 18 I think, to bring it together.

19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It probably is not. It may 20 be an unreasonable thing to try and get in a short period of 21 time. But if you're trying to decide if someone is driving

22 under the influence, you exercise a judgment in whether the 23 weaves in the road are comparable to a usual pattern, or 24 whether they're outside the usual pattern. Everybody may be 25 driving drunk, so to speak, here, but I -- .

14.

47 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think examining those 2

records -- and you'd have to do it in some detail and be sure 3

you got it right --

4 MR. CHRISTOPHER: There is the existing report 5

done at our request regarding Davis-Besse and Rancho seco.

6-Again, I would suggest that it is significant, but I think 7

there are some questions in that it does not directly address 8

a specific hydrogen addition, or what it addresses is -- it 9

primarily addressed whether or not those plants were in a 10 positica where they'd have motive. In my mind, it seems to II have addressed whether or not there would have been a motive --

l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why don't we have OPE 13 take a look at that report?

14 MR. HAYES: That was done by the staff at our 15 request.

16 CHAIR N PALLADINO: Did you get that, Jack?

17 MR. ZERBE: Yes.

18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Anything more? Okay, thank 19 you very much.

20 (Pause.)

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Getting back to what we 22 ought to do, let me make a couple of observations. It seems 23 1

to me that Option 2 does give us an opportunity to interview 94

~

more people than any of the other options do. And I would 25 accept the suggestion and implication by both Victor Gilinsky l

5 '.

48 c .

1 i and Jim Asselstine that this be viewed more as a Let's 2  !

! Negotiate kind of thing so that if possible, we can -- see if l 3

we can get the DOJ to agree to interviewing these four, people 4

on parks, Gischel, taking advantage if they're willinglto 5

give us _ and I'd say take advantage of it.

6 Because I would like to proceed with an Option 2

\ 7 approach, but I would say that in my mind, this does not 8

necessarily proclude a TMI-l restart decision before the 8

Meted.

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I have to say I have a 11 comment on that. You know, we 're worried about these various .

12 operators, and I have to tell you I'm a lot less worried about 13 these operators than if the Commission approves the operation 14 of this plant under the direct control of the s'ame people that 15 were in charge of Meted, the chief executive offi-cer and his 16 chief assistant, who were -

you know, the company was just 17 subject to criminal indictment.

18 And the fact that they indicted not individual 19 operators, but the company, means you've got to be a lo:/$oEe%

,0 s

concerned about the people who are in charge of the company.

21 Because what the Justice Department is saying is we're not 22 going after some little operator that manipulated data or 23 pumped in some hydrogen; we think there's a real problem here.

24 And if there's a real problem, you've got to hold 25 the people at the top responsible. And yet, you're going-to i.

I

g 61 )

1 illusion here that somehow we're going to solve the restart 2

problem by talking to two people.

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I agree with that, too.

4 I'm all for going forward on a best --

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Incidentally, Option 3 also 6

included Herbein, Miller and --

7 MR. PLAINE: I don't think Justice is necessarily--

8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I say that was inpart of 9

your Option 3. It's Option 2.

10 Well, let me add a caveat to yours and say all 11 right, I'll go along with that. I would encourage them, if 12 they see any value, to do the investigation. And if, when 13 we see the interim report, we determine that we want to do 14 something different, we still have that option.

15 Is there agreement to this approach?

16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay.

17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Okay.

18

. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's fine.

19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Sure.

20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Have we concluded what we 21 intended to conclude?

22 MR. PLAINE: I think so. And I will try to work

%3 out a suitable letter that will come probably from the 24 associates to the individuals.

25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I want to make sure that what l

23 d 62 1

we're doing is understood. You are going to.try to work with 2

[hemtosee,onacase-by-casebasis,whocanwetalkto, 3

including the Parks, Gischel people because they may not be 4

related to the indictment anyhow.

5 MR. PLAINE: Right.

6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And notify OI on the things 7

that they're permitted to do. If they feel that it's not 8

worth doing, they can so decide, but they should look very 9

carefully at that issue.

10 Anything more?

11 (No response.)

12 We'll stand adjourned.

13 (Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Commission meeting 14 was adjourned.)

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

• J l

ORIGHat l UNITID STATIs or AMrarcA  !

NL'cLIAA RICULATORY COMMISSION l i l

1 In the matter of:

DISCUSSION OF PENDING INVESTIGATION - TMI D W No.

CLOSED MEETING Location: Washington, D. C. Pages: 1 - 72 Date: Fridiy, March 23, 1984

~

i TAYLOE A550CIAT13 cow nnenne re: i sum..N w s=me teos Sainsion. D C l cons e:22133 MSS *

- - - - er y w - - - -~ 'w--vww

e nn /rst 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 --

4 DISCUSSION OF PENDING INVESTIGATIONS - TMI l'

5 ---

6 CLOSED MEETING - EXEMPTIONS 5 AND 7 7 ---

8 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.

9 Washington, D.C.

10 Friday, March ~23', 1984 11 Tne Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.

12 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

13 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner THOMAS ROBERTS , Commissioner 14 JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 15 FREDERICK BERNTHAL, Commissioner 16 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:

17 SAM CHILK KEITH CHRISTOPHER 13 BEN HAYES WILLIAM RUSSELL 19 JOdU ZERBE j HERZEL PLAINE i 20 l AUDIENCE SPEAKER:

21 -

JOE FOUCilARD 22 l

l 24 25

39 1

1 3 l 4

5 l

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

'MR. HAYES: The next investigation is the Parks 22 and Gi.schel investigation on which we issued an interim 23 report, as you are aware. We will have concluded the 24 balance of that investigation, 'namely the intimidation and i

25 harassment aspects by the 15th of April. What has held me

40 1

up there is, the agent assigned to that particular case 2 I transferred to Region V.

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: As opposed to 4-13?

4 MR. HAYES: I'm sorry.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: If we have to change the date, 6 we'll change the date. I was just trying to find out how 7 precise it is.

8 MR. HAYES: Well, I think by the 13th, if you 8

don' t have a written product in front of you, certainly, we 10 are going to be in a position to give you a summary -- if 11 not oral -- about the case.

12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, the other problem is, 13 if we start to get a lot of things right around the 15th, 14 you know, we are not going to be able to absorb them quickly.

15 You tell us the dates, then we will determine 16 what .we will want to do.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What is the status of your 18 interaction with NRR, whoever seemed to take exception to 18 your earlier results?

1. COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I guess it's the NRR 21 determination of the severity level.

22 MR. HAYES: The firsc report? l 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes. l l

24 MR. HAYES: The ataff responded back to our i 25 first report. I called together the technical team that the-l

_~

. 41 1

staff furnished us and asked them to review the staff's 2 paper and the OI paper. They, in turn, sent a memorandum 3 to me setting forth their position of the staf f's paper.

4 I, in turn, submitted it to the EDO on a trans-5 mittal letter and it currently rests with the EDO. I don't 6 know --

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Was it Bernie Snyder that a wrote the other one, is he the author, is his name on it?

9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think it is.

10 MR. KAYES: Well, I don't know if Mr. Snyder's 11 name is on it or not. I thought it was a staff position, U2 signed by Bill Dircks. I am not sure.

~

13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The contact, I think, 14 was --

U5 MR. HAYES: Certainly, it is Bernie Snyder's 16 staff, probably, who did the work.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You took your group of 18 persons that were loaned to you and had them review?

19 ngl. HAYES: That's correct. The technical team i

i 20 that Dircks assigned to us to work the first report, I 21 pulled together to review Bernie Snyder's analysis of our 22 report and sent that back to Mr. Dircks.

M COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How would you characterize 24 that response? Do we have that?

1 l 25 MR. HAYES: No, sir; you don't yet.

42 i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Do we have the other one?

2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: We have the.information 3 from the staff.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So why don't we get this 5 one?

6 MR. HAYES: I will send that down to the Commission.

7 Our second report to Mr. Dircks is under review by the staff.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: .Do you still have,those 9 several people, are they still loaned to you?

10 MR. HAYES: No, sir. When we issued the 11 September 1st report on the Parks-Gischel procedural a allegations, they went back to their respective responsi-13 bilities. Then, when I got the SECY paper I asked them to 14 reconvene to review the matter and they did so.

15 We have a memorandum of their observations. I 16 just transmitted that to Mr. Dircks.

17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But now you are going after 18 the intimidation.

19 MR. EAYES: Yes, sir. That investigation is 20 basically complete. The investigator is in the process of 21 writing his report. It has been delayed because I trans-22 forred him to Region V to assist in the Diablo Canyon a investigation.

~

24 So, it is my understanding the Commission would 25 like a second report that we prepared?

l

43 1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:

Yes.

2 MR. HAYES: Continuing on, the next investigation 3 is the Keaten investigation.

4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: On this mystery man question, 5 are you going to go back and do anything more to determine 6 whether the Keaten report covered the mystery man?

7 MR. HAYES: Well, I didn't -- I was not aware of 8 that question until just a few moments ago.

i 9

10 11 12 13 14 ,

15 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, go aheitd, 5 hat were ~

17 you going to say more about?

18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It sounds like it would be 18 interesting.

F MR. HAYES: The Keaten investigation. This, by 21 far, is "the" most complex TMI investigation that we have 22 undertaken. Currently, about a third of our investigative 23 report has been written. I cannot have this report to you 24 in April, as I had hoped. I am projecting a report to you in 25 May on this particular investigation.

. ~. - . ___

70 1 (Laughter) 2 -

CHAIPMM4 PALLADINO: Well, then he holds them up 3 all until . April 15th or whatever this date is.

4 COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL: May.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Oh, except for the one. There 6

is a bunch that will come around the middle of April. We 7 can release them all at once.

8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It depends really, I think, 9 on many of the other . factors. But it clearly depends partly 10 on whether there are interlocking factors at all.

11 I don't feel qualified to comment on that at u this point.

13 CHAIRFEN PALLADINO: But do I understand, except 14 for the matters affecting the Keaten report you are going M to have essentially all of yours done by the middle of 16 April; is that right, or did I miss something?

17 MR. HAYES:

18 l -- but we will have, certainly, by

'19 the middle of April we will'have the TMI-l leak rate test, i

20 the BETA-RHR, and the Parks-Gischel probably completed, and '

21 a subset of the Keaten report, the training issue. That is 22 really just a subset.

! 23 '

We will be prepared to give those to the Commission.

l l

24 l COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL': But you clearly would not 25 be prepared to make some broad recommendation of any kind l

n -.

71 1-until all of your investigative work is finished; isn't that --

2 that seems like a reasonable -- -

3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, he doesn't make --

4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Ben doesn't make broad 5 recommendations anyway.

6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Broad characterizations, 7

sorry, on all of your investigative work.

8 MR. HAYES: I try to give that to the staff so 8 that they can make those characterizations.

10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But suppose that is ready 11 by the middle of April, we were given it at that time, give U

us several days -- I still think a week is all right, but 13 whatever the period is , then release them.

14 Then, in May, the middle of May, we may have 15 some others. I was hoping two batches will do it.

16 Jim, you were starting to say something.

17 COMNISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I was just going to say, 18 i

I am not all that concerned about our difficulty to keep 18 those things in-house for a week. I agree with you, I 20 think a week is realistic.

21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, we get a little more 22 I

time to deal with that.

But I still think we need a week.

E MR. FOUCHARD: Then take a week, sir.

24

, COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: You want to bet a milkshake?

25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I'll bet a milkshake.

72 1 MR. FOUCHARD: I assume when we mean keep it

• 2 in-house, we mean in-house.

3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes, yes. I think we 4 can keep it in-house a week. I'll bet you a milkshake, Fred.

5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Anything more we should t

6 discuss on this subject?

7 Wait, let me get your attention because I am 8 about to close the meeting, unless somebody speaks up. Is 9 there anything more that we need to discuss on this matter 10 today?

11 Okay, well, then thank you v'ery much, and we 12 will stand adjourned.

13 MR. HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m. the meeting of the J

15 Commission was adjourned.)

16 17 18 19 20 21 i

N 23 24 i

l I N

, CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDING I

i 4 l

, This is'to certify that the attached proceedings before the [

NRC COMMISSION  !

3 i

, In the Matter of:

Discussion of Pending Investigations-TM-

, Date of Proceeding: 23 March 1984 f' Place of Proceeding: Washington, D. C. j 7 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original

!i I

transcript for the file of the commission.

d f I

l e  ;

to Elizabeth Hansen 1 Official Reporter - Typed I

~

/ k M 83 Official Reporter - Signature:

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Exhibit it g Y

8

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• o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

{ $, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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\

,/ AUG 12 WE

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Docket No. 50-320 License No. DPR-73 EA 84-137 GPU Nuclear Corporation ATTN: Mr. P. R. Clark, President 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Gentlemen:

Subject:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY (NUREG 0680, SUPPLEMENT 5)

The NRC Office of Investigations (01) conducted nine investigations into allegations of various matters involving General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (GPU Nuclear) management integrity. The NRC staff reviewed the reports of investigations and concluded that several violations of Comission regulations by GPU Nuclear had occurred. The NRC review and a list of the reports of the investigations are documented in Supplement 5 to the Safety i Evaluation Report (SER) on TMI-I Restart (NUREG-0680, Supplement 5). One of I

the violations is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). The other violations will be dealt with in separate correspondence.

The violation in the enclosed Notice involves acts of discrimination against Richard D. Parks, a Bechtel employee, for raising safety concerns associated with the THI-2 polar crane refurbishment. These safety concerns were related to various failures to follow GPU. Nuclear approved procedures during refurbish-ment of the crane. GPU Nuclear was subsequently cited for failures to follow procedures in a Notice of Violation issued on February 3,1984. Mr. Parks claimed that as a result of his exposing the safety concerns to his management and the NRC, he was (1) relieved of his duties as Alternate Startup and Test Supervisor at THI-2, (2) subjected to improper and intimidating interrogation by his management, (3) removed as the primary Site Operations Department representative for the Test Working Group, and (4) ultimately placed on leave of absence.

The Department of Labor (DOL) conducted an investigation into the complaint filed by Mr. Parks. 01 also investigated Mr. Park's allegations of discrimination.

After reviewing the D0L and 01 investigation reports, the NRC staff determined that a violation of the Comission's regulations occurred. Specifically, the four discriminatory acts against Mr. Parks are a violation of 10 CFR 50.7.

CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

\

GPU Nuclear Corporation -

2-Acts of discrimination, whether comitted directly or through contractor personnel, against an employee who raises safety concerns or who communicates with the NRC, will not be tolerated. To emphasize this, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Commission, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of Sixty-Four Thousand Dollars ($64,000) for the violation involving the acts of discrimination against Richard D. Parks. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, 47 FR 9989 (March 9,1982), which was the policy in effect at the time of the violation, (Enforcement Policy) the violation has been categorized as a Severity Level II violation. A civil penalty of $64,000, the base civil penalty for a Severity Level II violation at the time the discrimination occurred, is being proposed to make clear the significance which the Commission places on any violation involving employee discrimination. The escalation and mitigation factors in the Enforcement Policy were considered and no adjustment has been deemed appropriate.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including the corrective actions you have taken, the NRC will detennine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with 1 NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Sincerely, J es M. Tay1 Director j ffice of Ins'ection and Enforcement V

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty 1

i i

i NOTICE OF VIOLATION j AND PROPOSED IMPOSITI F 0F CIVIL PENALTY GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION ), Docket No. 50-320 Three Mile Island, ) License No. DPR-73 Unit 2 ) EA 84-137 Thc. NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) conducted nine investigations into allegations dealing with various items involving management integrity at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. The NRC staff subsequently reviewed the reports and other pertinent materials and documented its review in Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on TMI-1 Restart (NUREG 0680 Supplement 5).

As a result of the review, an apparent violation of NRC requirements was identified.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions " 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, 47 FR 9989 (March 9,1982),

which was the policy in effect at the time of the violations, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation, and the associated civil penalty, are set forth below:

10 CFR 50.7 prohibits discrimination by a Comission licensee, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee, against an employee for engaging'in

\ certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other j actions that relate to compensation, tenns, conditions, and privileges of employment. The activities protected include but are not limited to providing the NRC information about possible violations of NRC requirements and requests to the NRC to take action against an employer for enforcement of NRC requirements.

Contrary to the above Richard D. Parks, a Bechtel employee, was discriminated against for engaging in protected activities in reporting safety problems to his management, requesting assistance from the NRC, and commencing a proceeding with the Department of Labor. Parks reported safety concerns to his management on February 13, 1983. Parks contacted the TMI on-site office of the NRC on February 18, 1983 and on March 10, 1983, complaining first that his management was threatening to have him transferred and then that GPU Nuclear management was trying to implicate him in a conflict-of-interests charge because he had reported safety concerns. He also initiated a proceeding pursuant to Section 210(b)(1) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5851, PL 93-438, on March 23, 1983. At least partly due to these activities, Mr. Parks, during the period between February 23, 1983 and March 24, 1983 was (1) removed as Alternate Startup and Test Supervisor, (2) subjected to improper and intimidating interrogation, (3) removed as the primary Site Operations Department representative for the Test Working Group, and (4) ultimately placed on leave of absence. These acts of discrimination were described in a U.S. Department of Labor i

'\

Noticeofliolation investigation (DOL Case 83-ERA-8) which was reviewed during an NRC OI investigation (0I Report H-83-002), and discussed in Section 10 of NUREG-0680, Supplement 5.

This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII).

(Civil Penalty - $64,000).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, GPU Nuclear Corporation is hereby required to submit to the Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission, Washington, D.C. 20555, within 30 days each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation, if admitted (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, the Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, may issue an order to show cause why the Itcense should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.

} Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affinnation.

S Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR j 2.201, GPU Nuclear Corporation may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, with a check, draft, or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative

(

amount of Sixty-Four Thousand Dollars ($64,000) or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Should GPU Nuclear Corporation fail to answer within the time specified, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, will issue an order imposing the civil penalty in the amount proposed above. Should GPU Nuclear Corporation elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, such answer may:

(1) deny the violation listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.

l In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the five factors addressed in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate part of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. GPU Nuclear Corporation's attentico is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205 regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.

l m

i Notice of violation ~

3-Upon failure to pay the penalty due which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MISSION

/

%.-W mes M. Tay1 , Director ffice of Ins ection and Enforcement Dated aj Bethesda, Maryland this la day of August 1985 f

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. l GPU Nuclear Corporation

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Distribution PDR -

LPDR NSIC SECY CA JTaylor, IE RVollmer, IE JAAxelrad, IE EHoller, IE JLieberman, ELD JGoldberg, ELD VStello,DED/ROGR FIngram, PA HDenton, NRR RStark, NRR BHayes, OI SConnelly. OIA JCrooks, AE00 TMurley, RI Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV EJordan, IE JPartlow, IE BGrimes, IE BSnyder, NRR WTravers, Deputy Program Director TMI Program Office ES File EA File EDO Rdg File DCS .

Public Utility Comission Ms. Mary V. Southard, Co-Chairman Citizens for a Safe Environment T. H. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Harrisburg, PA 17120 l

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J

i Exhibit 15

'8 [' %g o

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7; E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

[ September 20, 1983 g Wl & -

/

MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Ward, Director /U 1,\

' h /1 h/

Division of Field Operations Office of Investigations [7 / f FROM: RonaldA.Meeks,Investigatork Division of Field Operations Office of Investigations

SUBJECT:

THREE MILE ISLAND NGS-UNIT 2 (H-83-002) /

Now that the report on the initial phase of the captioned subject has been submitted, investigation of other allegations can commence. These allegations involve discriminatory acts by senior TMI-2 management against the allegers for pointing out procedural control deficiencies, the " mystery man" issue and an allegation by Richard D. Parks that a Bechtel North American Power Corporation employee wanted to conceal, in a quarterly report to the NRC, traces of cesium 137 in a TMI-2 Personnel Access Facility (PAF) sewage holding tank. .

In part, these allegations, if confirmed, involve possible violation's of Section 210 of the Energy Reor acts),10 CFR 50, Appendix B independence (ganization Act of and 10assurance quality CFR 50.7authority (discriminatory and functions),10CFR21(reportingdefectsandnoncompliance),Section186ofthe Atomic Energy Act 18 and USC 1001 (false statements) and 10 CFR 50.36a (tech-nicalspecificationsoneffluents). To confinn the validity of these allegations V

s-jill involve approximately_ thirty five interviews of licensee and Bechtel em-and review of Department of Labor's (DOL) Wage and Hour records on the

' ,;NNu ployees G Parks Qc

' isnited Jimje of.5'mplaint.

" comp 1 < Fir;4 6ne cinvEstigato'r assign the' ittention;d to thisfincludin investigation, the reportsf'ii_s.approximately Wels.stilfibfoTniisti rs re a i e.coinpletion ' M;.

)py ey 'ned full.tisie$

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g Fy,of g Te~d k ndivjduals can be interviewed m ' '$E'Is, sues :c

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abbidf.CFoMh,ii VeTsdn';ib,irt co3 junction with two ,or more .of'y.:4 ilIrecoiiinen&d 'tha't'th'is'lhhe^bf 5. r '

the ' invest'igatiori incorpofate all' of the' above allegationi.- The es'timate TDY

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a'nd,tir factors are based on' combining the allegations into this phase of the

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s M'r. 'K'ing'scim'pla' int to'the DOL resulted in a finding against King. - Mr. King

' has appealled this finding and. p~ossibly the' Administrative Hearing on this will be scheduled in October. However, the reprisal issues of the investigation should not be delayed pending the outcome of the~ King matter becausCof the.,

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uncertainty on when the Admir,istrative Hearing will be conducted and the duplication of interviews and travel that would be required if the investigation were further segmented.

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.h UNITED STATES

[?'fp y f 7 i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,.Q f.  ! .. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 s Ng ,

September 20, 1983

E!';RAN:UM FOR: William J. Ward, Directcr Division of Field Operations Office of Investigations PROM: Ronald A. Meeks, Investigator Division of Field Operations Office of Investigations 5CEJECT:

THREE MILE ISLAND NGS-UNIT 2 (H-83-002)

New that the report on the initial phase of the captioned subject has been i submitted, investigation of other allegatf or.s can commence. These allegations ir.vcive discriminatory acts by senior TMI-2 maragement against the allegers for

cinting out procedural control deficiencies, the " mystery man" issue and an l

allegation by Richard D. Parks that a Bechtel North American Power Corporation E

em?loyee wanted to conceal, in a quarterly recort to the NRC, traces of cesium 137 in a TMI-2 Personnel Access Facility (PAF) sewage holding tank.

'n part, these allegations, if confirmed, involve possible violations of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act and 10 CFR 50.7 (discriminatory tcts), 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (independence of quality assurance authority and functions),10 CFR 21 (reporting defects and noncompliance), Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act 18 and USC 1001 (false statements) and 10 CFR 50.36a (tech-r.ical specifications on efflJents). To confim the validity of these allegatiens

. will involve approximately thirty five interviews of licensee and Bechtel em-playees ~and review of Department of Labor's (DOL) Wage and Hour records on the Parks' complaint. For one investigator assigned to this . investigation, the '

estimated time of completion, including the written reports, is approximately ten work weeks. If two investigators are assigned full time, the completion time will be approximately seven to eight work weeks. Most of the interviews will be conducted at Three Mile Island and Parsippany. 1ne interview is ex-pected to be conducted at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Approximately twenty five TDY man days will be needed for this phase of the investigation.

Many of the individuals can be interv'ewed in conjunction with two or more of the issues cited above. For this reason it is recommended that this phase of the investigation incorporate all of the above allegations. The estimate TDY and time factors are based on combining the allegations into this phase of the

, investigation.

Mr. King's complaint to the D0L resulted in a finding against King. Mr. King has appealled this finding and possibly the Administrative Hearing on this will be schedeled in October. However, the reprisal issues of the investigation should not be delayed pending the outcome of the King matter because of the

I I a-4 uncertainty on when the Administrative Hearing will be conducted and the duplication of interviews and travel that would be required if the investigation were further segmented.

i I

i Eistribution V OI-s/f HQ-83-002 OI-c/f OI-r/f RAMeeks 09/20/83

'- Exhibit i4 o .

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UNITED STATES ,

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- e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (, d---

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wAssancTON,0. C. 20555 l

..... /g }gy44 , October 28, 1983

o. ,

liEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director j'. Reapr%wktion j

FROM: Be . a 8,'0i#

Office of Investigations

SUBJECT:

EDS NUCLEAR INC. ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMPS Laurence P. King, former Site Operations Director at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2), and Richard D. Parks, former Site Engineer at TMI-2, have made allegations that the analysis presented in the GPUN/B&W trials by EDS Nuclear on the THI-2 High Pressure Injection (HPI) Purps activity is not correct.

Messrs. King and Parks have stated that they would be willing to explain to NRC the weaknesses in the EDS analysis and show from the analysis that the HPI pumps were turned on and subsequently turned off at critical time periods.

Nr. King did not provide further information or details on the EDS analysis.

However, a su". mary of Mr. Parks' assertions on the EDS analysis is included as an attachment to th's memo. Per the suggestion of. Mri William T. Russell, Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors Safety, this memo and its attachment are being sent to you so that it can be passed to your group considering the EDS matter. Contact point in my office is Ronald A. Meeks. 492-7246.

The OI investigation on the " mystery man" issue is ongoing; therefore, the contents know basisofamong this memo and the to those assigned attachment should be* disseminated on a need to the EDS review.

,? Attachment as srtsted 5

\

\

RICHARD D. PARKS' OVERVIEW OF THE EDS NUCLEAR INC. ANALYSIS D

, THE HIGH PRES 5URE INJELi10N ACIlVITY DURING THE IM1-2 ACCIDENT l Richard D. Parks raised the " mystery man" issue, in part, because he was con-disclosed to the public, the NRC, and later in the GPUN/B&W trial.c Mr. Parks knew that at the trial an anlaysis from EDS Nuclear, Inc. was intro-duced to conclude that the HPI pumps were not turned on at 5:41 A.M. According to Mr. Parks, the EDS analysis had unproven, incomplete and inaccurate assumptions, which make it especially questionable as a basis to effectively rewrite the history of Sequence of Events (SOE) already published by GPU and, to Parks' knowledge, not yet amended.

Mr. Parks' own review of the EDS report suggests that its conclusions are pre-mature conclusions. but access to the relevant supporting data is necessary for more definitive its premise. Mr. Parks' evaluation of the EDS report is based on the adequacy of The analysis basically rests on the premise that the level of the makeup tank also determined whether the second HPI pump, makeup pump "c",

was initiated at 5:41. EDS analyzed and prepared graphs for the makeup tank levels surrounding two times that it concluded HPI pumps were initiated, at 4:02 and 7:20 as well as for 5:41. The ' graph for 5:41 did not exhibit the same characteristics.

Although the EDS analysis is reasonable, it's signifi-all biased in favor of thethe cance is limited due to selective EDS use of data and unjustified assumptions, premise.

According to Mr. Parks there are a series ofgquestionable factors with respect to in the its EDS report. claim that turning on the HPI purhps at 4:02 accounts for the graph In some intstances the facts as reported are suspect. For example, time of the EDS' assertstrip.

reactor that an operator- started MUP 1-A and opened MU-VI6b at the , ,s y But the SOE reports that the evolution did not occur until 41 seconds after the reactor trip, or 4:01:31 A.M. Similarly EDS offers no citation for its claim that the BWST suction valve, Dt!-V5A, opened at 4:02:13.,

, u - This assumption also is not verified in the SOE.

t o gg '

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In fg t, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), which' includes the HPI

'? characteNstics on the EDS graph. pumps', did not have to be turned on /s Alternate sources better explain the at'al increase in, pressure. '.

EDS did not analyze whether the increase in press _ure at 4:03 could have come from opening the MUT Level Control Value (MU-V-9) to refillHPI the thepumps.

tank from the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBT), instead of from emergency. procedure This explanation would be consistent with the requirements in 2202-1.3 for operatorsJ In other words, EDS failed to consider the possibility that the operators followed the procedures at 4:02.

Similarly, EDS failed to consider whether at 4:02 water was drawn automatically through assumption. the makeup level control valve, again as an alternative to the HPI These alternative explanations are even more persuasive when the EDS assumptions are compared with the capacity of the HPI pumps and the data provided by EDS.

l

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t.c The EDS graph ^ discloses a four inch rise (approximately 280 grams per minute) in the makeup tank during the 26 seconds from 4:02:13 - 4:02-39. That is a substantially higaer rise than is achievable solely from HPI pump recirculation flow.

Finally, even if EDS' assumptions and facts were accurate, the results demon-strate that conditions were not analogous at 4:02 and 5:41. For instance, different pumps would have been involved.

been used. At 4:02 the A&B pumps would have At 5:41 the A&C pumps would have been running. The C pump can only draw from the BWST.

switching on two pumps. Even more revealing, the 4:02 incident would have involved the C pump. The 5:41 event would only have involved switching on

, 7,  ?

Mr. Parks relates that the EDS analysis of events at 5:41 is no more definitive.

To illustrate, in some cases the analysis is incomplete. On page 12 of its report, EDS states thati upon ECCS actuation DH-VSA was opened. On page 13, EDS states that the injection valves MU-V-16a and B also opened.

the report effects on afailed to identify graph.

• when they were shut after 4:02 and plot theUnfortunately, Zn addition, the EDS analysis concerning 5:41 concludes that the HPI pumps could not have been turned on at 5:41, since the makeup tank level was only at 59".

such as increased letdown flow, lowered reactor coolant sy higher temperatures than normal.

Most report. persuasive, EDS' conclusions about 5:41 contradict other data in its PSIG would have been necessary to achieveBut the 59" level.On page 1 figure 14 in the same report indicates that the 59" level as pchievable with 31.5 PSIG.

Finally, the EDS analysis of conditions at 7:20 assumes an initial makeup tank pressure of 27 PSIG only nominally higher than normal. This assumption fails -

to analyze the severe effects of the accident; which between 5:30 and 7:20 had in a steam-void condition by 6:00 A.M., to two-thirds of.the uncovered by around 6:20, to hydrogen generation and half the reactor coolant

~

- system free volume in a steam hydrogen mixture by around 7:00 A.M. These j condtlipns could well have led to abnormal overpressurization due to steam  !

1 and/or EDS. hy,drogen in the top of the makeup tank, a possiblity not considered by

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Exhibit if

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/* 'c UNITED sTAJEs NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

" [{9. gf,j wasecron. o. c. 20sss Q'hi.]j November 7, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger J. Mattson, Director Division of Systems Integration FROM: Robert A. Capra, Technical Assistant Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

MEETING WITH DR. HENRY MYERS On November 3,1983, Norm Lauben (RSB), Chuck Dobbe (EG&G) and I met with Dr. Henry Myers of Congressman Udall's staff regarding his cor:raents concerning the B&W-prepared analysis associated with possible HPI actuation at THI-2 about 0541 on March 28, 1979.

Dr. Myers answered s,ome clarifying questions regarding his inferral comments forwarded to RSB (copy attached). In addition, two important points came to light during the meeting.

1. Dr. Myers does not believe we will be able draw any firm conclusions

~

regarding the HPI actuation on or about 0541 without additional -

technical information which does not appear to be available (i.e.,

valve positions for make-up tank outlet, safety-injection valves.

HPI recirculation valves, and letdown valves).

2. Dr. Myers' belief.that .there was a ."myst.ery man" may have been fostered to a large degree by the " Parks Affidavit" that "...everyone at the plant knew that this person was George Kunder." While Dr. Myers did not give any details, it appears that he no longer believes the source of Parks' knowledge regarding Kunder being the mystery man.

In sumary, while Dr. Myers was glad that we were reviewing the B&W and EDS reports, he does not believe that we will be able to come to any firm conclusions regarding the HPI actuation issue.

TeL20.C&

Robert A. Capra, Technical Assistant Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

As stated cc: W. Houston B. Sheron N. Lauben H. Denton

._ _, - - - . ____ ~ ------- ,-

s[t*'Q gpy> f 7~ i P:BWHPIRT ,

p. g3

.' unat i s date of report?

hhswers to April 1983' questions appear in letter from BW f ,L:

cated May 6, 1983. See Ref. 1, p. 56. Does~NRC have April letter-from GPU to BW7 D,oes NRC have May 6 response from GPU7 Where are the April and May 6 letters? s Does recent SW report consitute totality of response to questions posed in May 20, 1982 letter from EW? Where is May 20 letter?

Is calcul ati on ref erred to in A-3 a credibl e basi s' for

' conclucing that HPI was not initiated at 5: 41 A.M7 If not, not where in BW repor.t is rationale provided as to why HPI was not i ni ti,ated at'5:41 A.M? Note statements on ,

. ;.K. : .~ .';-l- ~ ,, ,,

Note'.second i' tem'in Section

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1.0, Executive Summary. Does this' e::clude possibility that full HPI flow e::isted for some . . .

-* number.~of minutes after.;5:41 A.M7 c v ,

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• Q ?:.*. d'?' 15. ;T  %.*y .,: 7.

Saction 3.1,.pT M .

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"For the 94 minutes hetween 5: 4 A. M. - . ' ' ' '

I and 6: 49 1.M. .on March 28, 1979, output from the alarm '

printer at TMI--2 was not av ail abl e.

W.

As a result, data '.e-l showing component status that could have provided direct . . . ]., . .

inf ormation about HPI actuation was also unavailable. "

What does this' say about Rogovin's having used the utility lI.:

printer data as the basis f or his conc.usion that an HPI -

~ initiation did not occur at 5:41 A.M? -

., {,'i  ;. , - 2 7c . , i j . *. ; .. . #

'f Figure 3-10, MU tank level shows approximately 720 gallon _

drop in about 20 minutes; i.e. Ik_ggm s.

Section 4.1.4., p. 23. "Little offect of HPI is expected on tho MUT l evel because it was assumed that the HPI pump 'C' i s not aligned to the MUT." Assumes that 'A' HPI pump is open to the MUT. Why?

Section 4.1.2., p. 24 C = 520 - 540 gpm.

gpm. A = E'60 - 460 Section 4.2.2., p.25.

the HP1 onl y anal ysi s. This swetion contains the result of The section contains a cualifying statement: "It is bealieved that further refinement of the MUT anal ysi s col d result in #1ows consistent with those j obtained from the energy b' alance model.* Howsever, based on analyses performed to date,'it appears that, at least for this time period, some additional cooling is being provided by the EFW system."

Section 4.3.2., p. 26. "Thi s HPI onl y scenari o resul ts. in increased li quied mass in the RC system. Other investigations CNSAC, NUREG/CR-1219,NUREG 06003 have not

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j . predicted significant HPi .addi ti on 16 the 94-100 minute  ;

persoc. However, the accuracy of thece inventory l

' predictions. rel ative to the TMI-2 acci dent is unknown."

. Section 4.4 p. 28. Scenario 1: Summary and Conclusions.

Full actuation of HPI could account for observed data, but it is more lil:ely that a combination of HPI.and EFW did it CScenario 3.3 Section 5.4.2. p. 43. .BWST Volume. Problem with EFW only =

sconario, is that it leaves 5000 gallons f rom the BWST ..

~

unaccounted for. Does this mean they discount the -

possibilty that flow from BWST avaraged 70 gpm until about - ,

7:30 A.M? -

Section 5.5., p.45. "Thus it has been judged that the EFW only cooling scenario, while possible, probably did not occur at TMI-2." -

... . 1 .

S s e t i~o n 6 . 1 .' 1 7' ..,"p.

V. -

50. ' " Analyses showed that an HPJ only . f#

cooling scenario, wi th some small supplemental- cooling from . . -

EFW in the per.i.od f rom 94 to .95.. .1/2 minutes, can explain thei

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observed RCS cocidown..'4..:. a .

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Saction 7.0. . Summary and Conclusions, p. 54. " Full HPI actuation did not occur at the time the 'A' loop RC pumps were tripped (5: 41 A . M .' ) . "

WHAT IS BASIS FOR THIS . '-

STATEMENT 7 W.7,,.

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Ibid. "It wai not possible to conclusively determine which

" cooling scenario caused the plant cocidown over this period. '

However, the , evaluation suggests that Scenario 5'(both HPI .;,-

7 and EFW) best satisfies the behavice aof primary and secondary parameters."

Ibid. "...HPI only, is the least probably cooling model; Scenario 2, more probable; and Scenario 3, a combination of EFW and HPI, most probable. A detailed evaluation of the actual HPI fl ow f or Scenario 3 is not possible. However, the results indicate that a flow capacity of at 1 eat one HPI pump, and possibly two, was provided between 94 and 100 minutes." /*

)~

Page A-1.2 is a " General Outline of the MU-HPI Model."

Compare with Figure 3-13, HPI, Makeup and Letdown Systems.

WH4T IS BASIS FOR ASSUMING (f or any of the scenarios) THAT HPI IS NOT ISOLATED FROM MAKEUP TANK 7 NOTE THAT SINCE MAKEUP.

Ap p er.d i n 4 contains lists of the April 1997. and May 20, 1983 GPU questions.

Appendix 4, p. A-4.4, Question 5 asks BW to " State .

exp12 c2 tl y whether,f in BW's techni cal judgement, there was either a full or partial HPI initiation at 5:41 A.M."

't-5.2., par a 2. 3 (b) . Jone's written testimony to the TMI-1 Appeal Boar-d contains statement "Even if one assumes that f ull HPI was Activiated at 101 minutes, the BWST level i espense f or the accident suggests that HPI could only have bean maintained for appecximatel y 6 minutes. " DO WE HAVE THIS TESTIMONY?

A-5.0. Section 2.0(c) reference to Jones oral testimony at ,

526/9 where minute period. Jones ta2 ks about EFW in the 94 minute - 101 BW says the EFW was "probably insuf ficient .

to cause the observed plant cocidown. .. However, suppl ement al ecoling via HPI (scenario 3) i s required. "

A-5.5. Reference to Zewe IE Int. 5, Tapes 6,7 and Faust, IE Int. 9, Tapes 35,36,0,7 re initiating 150 - 200 gpm/ loop at about 93 minutes. '

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Exhibit !'e 2

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,A APR 2 4 1984 MENORA.HXPt FOR: Ben 8. Hayes. Of rector Office of Investigation FRM :

Harold R. Dentnn. Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

HRR EVA1.UATION OF HP! ACTUATION AT THI-2 AB0tlT 5:41, A.H. ON MARCH 28. 1979

Reference:

1) Analysis of Reactor Coolant System Hake-up During the TMI-2 Event, by EDS Nuclear. Deces6er 29,1982.

2) Response to GPUN Ouestions concerning HP! Actuation at Tit!.? about 5:41 a.m. on March 28, 1979 B&W UPGD.

3) Ittgh Pressure Injection Hear 5:41 a.m. During the TMI-2 Accident by C.B. Davis EGAG Idaho. Inc..

Deceeber 1983 NRR has evaluated references 1 and 2 to determine the extent to which they support or refute whether full or partial HP! actuation occurred on or about 5:41 a.m. during the TMI-2 accident. . We contracted with EGAG Idahc to ,tn contained assist us in3.this effort. The result's of that work are rgference forner $tt'e En We also interviewed Mr. Richard O. Parks technical info oeer at THI-2 to determine if he could identify specific i evalua tion. tton which could be used to assist us in our It is ourgo'nclusion that actuation of IIPI tesnedtately after the last  :

l reactor coolant puros were tripped at 5:41 a.m. is extremely unlikely.

Analysts and e*31uttton of the information contained in references 2 and 3 indteate that cooling was in progress and Partial actuation prior to '

that tis =:-(at possible. about 5:34 a.m.) for a short time (about 6 minutes) is However due to (1) the unavailability of the alarm printer at i the tine. (2) uncertainty in system boundary conditions and (3) uncertainttes in analytical red *11 tog techniquest it is not possible to conclustvely 5:41 a.m. affirm or reject limited HPI actuation teveediately prior to 1

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Ben 8. Hayes - N We have enclosed reference 3 for your information. Our evaluation is also enclosed.

This completes what we can learn from technical analysis of the data from the accident. Further insight concerning HP! actuation. if needed.

would have to core from the ongoing investigation of the testimony of individuals involved in the accident. This view eas previously discussed with the Cornission on March 23. 1984 The April 2.1984 meno from Mr. Chilk confirms the Countssion's intentions in this regard.

Or4=al Ege*d *r E a. hetse Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosures :

As stated ec: D. Eisenhut R. Meets. O!

K. Christophers. 0!/RI W. Dircks V. Stello Distribution

1. Centra 1Jilet J RSS R/T RSD S/F TMI 1 N. Lauben {

8. Sheron  !

R. Capra I R. W. Houston *

• R. Mattson 1

' W. Russell Es G. Case H. Denton i

i l

• 0RIGIMAL CONCURRENCE TO BE RETAINED BY

/ RETYPED IN R. TSON'S OFFICE 4/23/84 0 .oSt:Rs8 .ost I .A .oSt:

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,J-1 EVALUATION REPORT ON EDS NUCLEAR REPORT AND B&W REPORT

-i CONCERNING HPI ACTUATION AT THI-2 ABOUT 5:41 A.M. ON ttARCH 28. 197 -

1.0 Introduction I

l l

HRR with the support of EG&G Idaho has reviewed references 1 and 2 1

to determine the extent to which they support or refute full or i -)

1 partial HPI actuation on oa about 5:41 a.m. during the TM!-2 accident. EG1G (Ref. 3) also perfortnad fndependent sensitivity

?

calculations to evaluate uncertaintin in analyzing the available

(

data. )

}

i

?

2.0 HPI Actuation Near 5:41 a.m. d i

j 4

j The EDS report (Ref.1) examined mkeup tank level behavior at 5:41 '

a.m. to determine if the response exhibited characteristics of ECCS j actuation. EDS neither addressed actuation at any other time, nor f did i w.they examine other data which might be effected by ECCS j actuation. Two hydraulic models were used to predict makeup tank 5 j

t level based on certain assumptions regarding the makeup systems and

, j the Borated Water Storage (8WST).

The two models were benchm rked

.k i

against, data taken at times when ECCS actuation was known to occur.

-)

Because alarm printer data was not available between 5:14 a.m. and $

6:48 a.m. It cannot be known with certainty if an ECCS actuation cecurred around 5:41 a.m.. EDS appiled the benchmarked nodel to

}

the $:41 time period assuming a constant letdown flow of 62 gpm.  !

i

s *

> i Two different makeup tank pressures were used. Both calculations indicated a sub".tantial surge in flow from the makeup tank would occur with an eventual balancing of the make up tank and the BWST hydrostatic heads. Actual makeup tank data did not indicate this behavior. Instead a continuous drawdown of makeup tank level was observedfrom5j35a.m.to5:53a.m.. Based on this, EDS concluded that no ECCS actuation occurred at 5:41 a.m.,

Mr. Richard Parks, fermer THI-2 site engineer, suggested other possible sources of water to the skeup tank but was not aware of other specific technical date that was available. In particular, i

he suggested that the letdown wf have been circulating through the l bleed hold-up tanks and that emergency boration coulj have been occurring throug.. the makeup tank. . We do not believe that changes ib the makeup or letdown flow prior to actuation would alter the conclusion reached by EOS. A distinctive signature of makeup tank behavior would be expected during HP! actuation uhless compensating

, changes in mkeup and letdown flow were made at the same time. t That would seem to be all too complex a maneuver in light cf 1 everything else going on in the control room at that time.

In. reference 2, BW perfonned mass and energy balances on the )

system af ter 5:41 a.m., assuming various r.edes of HP! actuation, in order to predict system pressure.

l l

8 1

--#-- , ..---.v.,- -, c., --...-- , ,,-x-- $.-e. --- , , .-,,-, - -..-.----~y -- -- - - - , e---+ -- .rw ---+ a.-- --

. F For all HP1, modes analyzed, the B&W calculations indicate that a i

more rapid primary system depressurization would have occurred then was observed. Since the calculated pressure behavior did not match the data. B&W concluded the HPI pumps were not actuated after 5:41 i 4.m. when the last reactor coolant pumps were tripped. After reviewing references 1 and 2. EG8G also concurred with a high degree of certainty that HP! was not actuated at or imediately af ter 5:41 a.m..  !

NRR concludes there is no basis to conclude that HPI actuation occurred at or imediately after 5:41 a.m..

t 2.0 Analysis of Cooldown Between 5:34 and 5:40 a.m.

I Prior to the reactor coolant pump trip, from 5:34 a.m. to 5:40 a.m.

L a reactor system cooldown was observed, characterized by falling reactor coolant system temperatures and pr, essure. EDS Nuclear did '

not address this time period. Based on an analysis of the EDS report. EG8G has concluded that E05 would probably have concluded that no HPl actuation occurred during this cooldown either. B&W, I y however, did analyze this cooldown by examining three possible '

W.

scenar;jos to account for this behavior. The three scenarios assumed the cooldown was caused by (1) HP! only. (2) Emergency '

feedwater (EFW) only, or (3) a combinetton of HP! and EFW, B&W used much of the available data to evaluate the three scenarios.

3

. _ , ~ . . , _ - . _ , , . . _ , _ _ , _ . _ . . . . , _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ . , _ . _ _ , , _ _ . . - _ _ - . , , _ - _ , , _ . - , . - - , . _ _

-2 2.1 Scenario 1: HPI Only One important feature of this cooldown is that it began about li minutes prior to an observed decrease in makeup tank level. Thus, if HP! only (scenario 1) was responsible for the cooldown, HP! was not aligned to the makeup tank at the beginning of the cooldown (5:34 a.m.).

To account for this. B&W initiated HP! in scenario 1 at 5:34 a.m. with HP! pump "C" not aligned to the makeup tank. At 5:35:30. HP! pump "A" was allowed to start and draw from both the BWST and the makeup tank. Makeup and letdown flow were adjusted frequently during the cooldown analysis, so that the resulting makeup tank level response matched the data. The required letdown and makeup flows show a large variation but these flows would not ' )

t be impossible to achieve. EGAG noted that to match the data the B&W analysis assumed HP! pump "A" actuation and simultaneous increase in letdown flow at 5:35 a.m.. T,hese would normally be conflicttng operator actions.

B&W performed an energy balance calculation to determint what HP!

( flows

.W . would be required to match the observed cooldown. The '

analysis required more HPl flow between 5:34 and 5:35:30 than was required to match the makeup tank data.

BLW also reviewed other data (RC flow. SRM signals. BWST volume, and RCS inventory) and concluded that while the scenario involving only the HP! is possible, it is unlikely.

1 e

h 4

- - - - . ,_ _ _ _ _ . __ - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

i

- . . l Based n'the evidence presented, NRR has concluded that the scenario of HPI only is the least likely explanation for the RCS

, cooldown between 5:34 and 5:41 a.m.,

2.2 Scenario 2: EFW Only l

Based on heat removal requirements, B&W concluded that the capacity of one motor driven EFW pump would be more than sufficient to cause the observed cooldown. Flow it 360 g.p.m. would be required, whereas the capacity of one EFW pump is about 500 gpm. B&W i compared the steam generator level and pressure behavior during the cooldown to a similar condition when EFW was initiated into a dry steam generator at 4:08 a.m..

The behavior in both cases was simi.lar, indicating that significant heat removal can occur before

+

the, secondary level begins to rise iri the steam generator. Thus, the cooldown cormencing at 5:34 a.m. is cenststent with EFW initiation at that time and with the delay in secondary pressure

, and the level rise in the "A" steam generator.

e.

B&h analyzed the response of the "A" steam generator usino the l

AUX-!! code. The same delay in pressure and level rise was ob-served, at 4:08 a.m. and 5:34 a.m.. In order to match the pressure aad level data reasonably well, an EFW flow of only 200 gpm was required. However this would not be enough to cause the cooldown andwouldrequiretheatmosphericdumpvalve(ADV)'tobealmost 5

i wide open. B&W suggests that this indicates that a more likely j

scenerio is that in addition to EFW, some HPI was being added between 5:34 and 5:40 a.'n. (Scenario 3). EG&G determined that B&W had not considered the cooling effect of makeup and letdown flow.

Based on a series of RElt.PS calculations with simplified nodalization. EG&G estimated that an EFW flow rate as low as 220 gpm would be adiquate:to cause the cooldown if a reasonable amount of makeup and letdan ww e assumed. Since this is fairly close to the 200 gpm determined b3 the AUX-II analysis. EGAG concluded that the EFW only scenario es somewhat more likely than indicated by B&W.

EG&G's analysis of calculated uncertainties suggests that a fully open ADV may also not be needed to support this scenario as suggested by B&W.

B&W also concluded that the assumption of only EFW only is not inconsistent with most of the other available data.

NRR has, reviewed both the B&W and EGAG anaYysis and has determined L

that the 'EG&G analysis accounts for makeup and letdown in a reasonable way. We the efore conclude that the EFW on y scenario I

., is somewhat more likely than indicated by B&W.

' y w.

I.

2.3 Scenario 3: Combination of EFW and HP! '

i Neither B&W nor EG&G performed scecific analyses for scenario 3.

B&W believes that this scenario addresses th6 main questions raised by the other two. That is, the added inventory of scenario 1 l

6 I

i

_ .- ~~~

.o .

seemed somewhat inconsistant with the data, and the apparent requirement for a wide open ADY in scenario 2 is eliminated in

, scenario 3. EG&G sgreed that scenario 3 is the most likely scenario.

3.0 Additional Analysis Because of the uncertainties in boundary conditions and in analyt-ical models. EG1G did not recommend additional analysis. NRR agrees that additional detailed analysis would not be worthwhile.

4.0 Conclusions Based on the material presented in th'e three reports, there is no clear evidence of HP! actuation at any time between 5:30 and 5:50 a.m.. However some partial HP! actuation cannot be ruled out between 5:35:30 and 5:41 a.m. while the RC pumps "where" still W unning. The evidence is strong that after 5:41 a.m. EFW Flow to l

steam generator "A" was the only major heat removal mechanism causing the cooldown until 5:50 a.m. when hot leg temperature began to increase. EFW may also have exclusively been responsible for the kooldown prior to reactor coolant pumpHowever trip. NRR believes, that it is equally likely that some l'P!, although throttled, may have contributed to the cooldown between the 5:34 and 5:40a.m.

7

Exhibit ~7

,/ o UNITED STATES g

2 e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p '2 i wasmuorow, o. c.acess

. i., .

f-REPORT OF INVESTIGATION DEC 211983 .

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS TITLE: THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, Unit 2 ALLEGATION REGARDING CONCEALMENT, IN A QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE NRC, OF DETECTABLE CESIUM 137 IN THE PERSONNEL ACCESS FACILITY HOLDING TANK. -

SUPPLEMENTAL: NRC Docket No. 050320 DATE:

NRC Report of Investigation dated September 1, 1983, Case No. H-83-002, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-320/83-07 dated June 23, 1983 CASE No.: H-83-002 STATUS: PENDING REPORTING OFFICE: OI Headquarters PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: September 13, 1983 - October 25, 1983 $.

C.. - A REPORTING INVESTIGATOR: M ~ ~

rTonald A. Meeks, Investigatot Office of Investigations .~_. g PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL: James Y. Vorse, Director hi Office of Investigations Field Office Region II Arthur B. Beach, Senior Reactor Engineer Office of Inspec ion and Enforcement REVIEWED BY: 8A M M lam J. Wafd,' t7f rector' '

Division of Efeld Operations -

Of'd ~ af Invettteaticns

/3X wm n Roger (A - rtbna , (Teputy '0 ec+ r Offic Investi ti s APPROVED BY: . N MrHI.' Maye5, Di r o

Office of Investi i ns

q .

i --

m

. Summary -

1 A former Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) Senior Start-up Engineer made a'n allegation that the former TMI-2 Manager of Recovery Progams and the Radiolog-

, ical Controls Director at TMI-2 discussed in a meeting in January 1983 how to conceal, in a quarterly report to the NRC, the amounts of cesium 137 detected in the Personnel Access Facility (PAF) Holding Tank.

The PAF Holding Tank (synonomous with the Gate 7 Sewage Tank) became operational at TMI-2 in December 1982. The Personnel Access Facility is a !uiting and -

staging area for personnel making entries to the Containment Building. The PAF tank has a 1,000 gallon capacity and receives waste from toilets, shower:s and washing machines in the Personnel Access Facility.

Discussions were held by the above named officials in early Janaury 1983 on the detectable amounts of cesium 137 in the PAF tank for December 1982 and January 1983. These discussions centered around how to incorporate the detected

I cesium 137 in the Radiological Controls Department monthly, quarterly and semi-annual reports to the NRC since the cesium 137 was being released to a pa

hway _

other than the pathway detailed in the Quarterly Dose Assessment Report. It was decided that the amounts of the cesium 137 in the PAF tank would be included in j the appropriate standarr' reports as if they were released through the pathway detailed in the Quarterly Dose Assessment Report. .

1 2

l In addition, notations and footnotes were included in the monthly, quarterly I

! and semi-annual recorts indicating the cesium 137 frem the PAF Tank was incer-parated into the amounts and calculations shown in the respective reports.

Although the footnotes in the monthly, quarterly and semi-annual, reports do _

not specifically refer to the PAF tank as being a rielease point for the cesium i 137, it does point out that sanitary wastes are accounted for in the report.

l  ;, ,[' None of the concerned reports provide for reference to the specific release C', points and scecfic amounts from these release points. The cover memos for the

( *.

Cecember 1982 and the January '983 Effluent Release reports do mention the PAF i

,,,.) as a Unit 2 Sewage Tank liquid release point. The cover memo for Decemcer in-1 48 dicates that the PAF Holding Tank was being added for that month.

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. d,C 7' -

_ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . .__.e .. . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . . . ._ _

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The TMI-2 chemistry precedure on Administrative Controls for Sewage Pumping requires that the PAF tank be sampled for detection of radionuclides prior to _

pumping the contents to a vendor tank truck for transport to a sewage t'reatment ,

plant. TMI-2 Technical Specification 2.1.1, Radioactive Discharges - Liquid Effluents, requires that the NRC be notiffed when radionuclides are detected in liquid effluents above the lower limits of detectability (LLD). The detect-able amounts of the cesium 137 in the PAF tank was reported by the TMI-2 Chemistry Department, both verbally and in weekly written reports, to the NRC TMI Program Off,1ce for the detections in late December 1982 and early January

~ ' '

1983. -

When radienuclides are detected by the TMI-2 Chemistry Department, even when just above the LLD, the reporting of this detection to the TMI Program Office is independent of the Radiological Controls Department reporting mechanisms. Thus, I the TMI Progra.n Office has two separate avenues for receiving reports on de-  !

tected radionuclides that will be released to unrestricted areas. The licensee

. used both means to report the detected cesium in the PAF Tank.

The TMI-2 Program Office reports that the amounts of cesium 137 in the PAF tanks .

are within the amcunts allowed for discharge of a license material into a sani-tary sewerage system under 10 CFR Part 20.303 - Disposal by Release into Sani-tary Sewerage Systems. A Region I inspection of the Recovery Program in June 1983, reported that the cesium 137 concentrations in the PAF tank from Decemoer 1982 to . June 1983 represent 0.0025 percent of the maximum')ermissible concen-tration (MPC) for unrestricted areas; and these levels are consistent with the activities of the PAF. The repart further relates that ' samples of sewage from the Lancaster Sewage Treatment Plant, which receives holdings from the PAF Tank, were analyzed by the Environmental Protection Agency and no gansna emitting radioisotope activity was detected. _ . . - -

This investigation continuas in a pending status until investigations of tha harassment / intimidation and " mystery man" issues are completed.

l ee . 4 ee e se.. ew ee_e.e se een

--- , - - - , - , - - _ - . _ . . . _ - - - - , . --- ,-.,--,,.e, - -- - -- ,, -_ -,- ,,-- ,_ , , - - , - . --- +-

':: :E i::' . E: :i"E E:.

"u Exhibit .T -

f.I / "'% UNITED STATES

" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d

5 -l _ . . OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONE FIELD OFFictMC)@l y

/ sai PAnn AvtNut xlNo or PRusslA, PENNSYLV&t u

i Jaruery4,19{;;;jjgg,.7; M '

KC.ViU R

I2 MEMORANCUM FOR: Ben B. Hayes, Director l Office of Investigations j ,

t, iL.C j FROM: R. Keith Christopher, Director F q

Office of Investigations Field Office, Recion I 5

SUBJECT:

GPUN EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO INTERVIEh DURING ONGOING Of t

INVESTIGAT!0NS 3

$ The attached listed individuals wculd be subject to interview during the s course of at least one of three investigations currently ongoing by OI:RI.

These investigations include the TMI-1 and TMI-2 leak rate ir.vestigations and the Keaton investigation.

Attachment:

?

As stated cc: R. Fortuna w W. Ward i

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022587028 l

- *, :: :E:-:: 2 E: :: E 5:. ,g

,)// s a . nffb h i Af a .e -

$9ftlS C9ntrol Room TMI-2 Leak Rate

.Qaerators Investigation TMI-1 Leak Rateg p uj Keaton Investigation g,% Investigatit Blessing, Jahr X Booher, Raymond X Coleman, Mark X Congdon, Joseph X Cooper, Ma' tin X Faust, Craig X Frederick, Edward X Germer. Leonard X

- H, Earl X Ihillaes, theodore X Kidwell, John X Mell, Charles X Olson, Dennis X j Phillicoe, Mark X f /g Wright, Lynn X

! Shift Foremen

Adams, Charles X

[ Guthrie, Carl X i

Hoyt Dick X

! Hutchinson, Richard X Miller, Adam X

$ 'Scheinann. Fred Shift Supervisors i Bryan, Kenneth X X

'Chwastyk, Joseph X X y Conaway, William X X Hitz, Gregory X X Mehler, Brian X X L Smith, Bernard X X 7 Zewe, William X X Supervisor of Operations 1 Floyd James X X Superintendent --

Techrical Support Seelinger, James X X (until 12/78)

% Kunder, George * **

X 1., (after 12/78) x 31 fo ta l g e

:::-:y. ; ic:  :"I E:,

c . C.:

>I p/ ge Spaew e

M" L

4 D

3/  %# @

Director of Maintenance TMI-2 Leak Rate TMI-1 Leak Rate fkus Keaton Fi, Investigation Ir.v e s ti g a ti on me t. Investigatie 4 l

/ 'lSieglitz, Richard X X X i Engineering Group L

Beeman, Robert

• Bensel, Richard

• X J Bezilla, Mark j .,

Hawkins, Thomas Marshall, Walter X

X*

X t

Norck, Thomas Porter, Ivan * **

X

, , ' Stair, James X*

f ' Warren,_ Rog1d, * **

x

..I Computer Engineer

$ Fels, William X X 2 Good. Davir!

i i

• Mave been interviewed by O! already

• • Have been interviewed by O! but are sub,iect to pessible reinterview i N3 We/

1 i

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4 I t ii l.

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c . . _ - - - _ . __ - ._ - - - - - - - - _ . .

Exhibit 1 7

g4 ."A G t cy"'o, UNITED STATES l' ,

4. ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

\

( '$ W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 I {YtJ$d[,f a

%, w e U.S. HRC

• ....,e April 2, 1984 OFFICE OF THE G IfR -3 FM 2: 29 SECRETARY

..s

,S '

i.:.m 2l".ii .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations William J. Dircks, Execu ve Director for Operations  ; ,

FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretl

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - DISCU@SION OF PENDING INVESTIGATION -(TMI, 2:00 P.M.,

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1984, COMMISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, D.C. OFFICE (CLOSED--EX. 5 AND 7)

The Commission was briefed by OI on investigations related to Three Mile Island and provided the following guidance.

I. Hartman Allegations (Falsification of Leak Rate Data)

OI will not duplicate matters resolved in the criminal trial.

OI is to present all Hartman material to NRR. NRR is to screen the material and refer back to OI any matters that warrant further investigation.

OI is to identify in its report to the Commission any individuals that might be culpable or may have had knowledge of the falsification of TMI-2 leak rate data.

A --

OI is to determine if TMI management created a

( climate that encouraged leak rate falsification to

', occur, including interviewing Mr. Ross if necessary.

II. Leak Rate Unit-1 OI is to complete its basic report on leak rate k falsification at Unit 1 by the first week of April; complete the report of 11 additional interviews by April 16, 1984 and submit one report to the Commission.

[ III. BETA and RHR Reports OI is to finalize this inve.stigation and forward its final report to the Commission by April 16.

022587025 l

E 2

l IV. -Mystery Man OI is to concentrate its investigation on why Messrs. Zewe and Frederick changed their testimony (including why GPU altered its position on the sequence of events during the TMI-2 accident) and why Mr. Faust was not presented as a witness during the GPU v. B&W trial.

V. Parks /Gischel ll 7

(,

g OI is to complete its final report on this investigation by April 16. The Commission requested OI forward to the vj/' Commission its response' to EDO criticisms of the earlier OI draft Report.

(Subsequently, on March 27, 1984 OI provided copies of the document to the Commission.)

VI. Keaten OI informed the Commission that it could not meet the anticipated April due date for completion of this investigation and that it would submit its final report in May. OI will submit a report regarding training in April and is to determine whether other portions of the

' investigation (e.g. , the Clark matter) can also be presented in a partial report.

The Commission requested reports on the investigation, TMI-1 leak rate, BETA /RER, Parks /Gischel and a partial report on the Keaten investigation by Mid-April and the remainder of the reports by mid-May. The Commission stated its general plan to release the reports to the public in two increments; one during the latter part of April and one during the latter part of May after the Commission has had the opportunity to review the reports for a period of one week to 10 days.

cc: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal l Commission Staff Offices l

l

', 8~ .

Exhibit 20 <

g j!g UNITED STATES h 3 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• L E W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20655

% $ \/

'% , , , , , ,o#

- March 22,1984 l 1,

1 MEMORANDUM FOR: File 83-45 FROM:

fehNb W. W Frederick W. Herr, Acting Assistant Director for Audits Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

SECY 84-65 On March 16, 1984, HollisBowers,AssistantDirectorforInvestigationjandI

- called Patrick McKenna, Jr., former OIA Investigator, to discuss the subject SECY paper. That paper contains the results of the Office of General Counsel's (OGC) evaluation of 01A's September 7, 1983, Report of Investigation entitled

" Parks Allegations Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2)." OGC's evaluation was in response to a November 10, 1983, letter from Thomas Devine, Government Accountability Project (GAP). Mr. McKgnna was the OIA Investigator "

assioned to investigate the Parks allegations.,

9 l

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cc: H. Bowers Distribution:

OIA Reading Herr

Exhibit 21 4

o, e  %

UNITED STATES h

r, .a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasmNG TON, D. C. 206S5

(

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\/

Y.. ... M/ March 22,1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: File 83-45 FROM:

f<ded W.&

Frederick W. Herr, Acting Assistant Director for Audits 4

Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

SECY 84-65

- On March 16, 1984 HollisBowers,AssistantDirectorforInvestigation,(andI called Patrick McKenna, Jr., fonner OIA Investigator, to discuss the subject SECY paper.

That paper contains the results of the Office of General Counsel's (OGC) evaluation of OIA's September 7,1983, Report of Investi

" Parks Allegations Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2)gation .

entitled

" OGC's evaluation was in response to a November 10, 1983, letter from Thomas Devine, Government Accountability Project (GAP), Mr. McK nna was the OIA Investigator assigned to investigate the Parks allegations. ecause SECY 84-65 is critical .

of investicative judgments made during the investigation we called Mr. McKenna to obtain his coments regarding OGC's criticisms and to disctJss the bases on which his judgments were made.

Mr. McKenna cautioned that he has not looked at the Parks file for about three months and had completed,ttfe investigation three months decisions may before that. His not, therefore, berecall of events circumstances and reasons for complete. Following are Mr. McKenna's comments relating to each OGC criticism.

OIA Did Not Interview Concerned Matters of Middletown (CMM)

I Mr. McKenna said there were several factors that led him to believe it was not necessary to contact CMM. First, Barrett had not addressed CMM on the date all thathad Parks stated and in fact Barrett was in Washington at Comission meetings day. The only time Barrett addressed CMM in April was much earlier in the month CMM meeting.

and Barrett does not recall Parks being at that, or any other, Second, it was likely that Parks was confused and actually referring to statements by Barrett before the House Subcommittee on April 26, 1983. Third, the allegation was that statenents before the CMM and NRC's approval of the functional description of the polar crane were inconsistent with NRC's disapproval of the polar crane operating procedures. Mr. McKenna had detemined that the two NRC documents were not, in fact, contradictory.

' In sum, Mr. McKenna said Parks' allegation regarding CMM was falling apart on all fronts and "after going nine yards and coming up with nothing" he did not believe it was necessary to "go the tenth yard and talk to CMM."

The March 10 Barrett " Private Note" Mr. McKenna said the March 10 note was not a private note in that it had received the same distribution as other similar notes issued by Barrett. It was an official TMI Program Office document which just happened to be in the 1

f-ci m

1 l

. 2 j

- l form of 3 Note To." Mr. McKenna said, after detemining that it was not a private note, it never occurred to him to determine whether the document was placed in the public document room. Mr. McKenna agreed with my statement that even if it had occurred to him it was really a policy question (utside the investigative scope of whether or not Barrett had acted impropefly.

Handwritten Notes in GAP's Possession 1 Mr. McKenna did not recall exactly what he had done in regard to trying to get the handwritten notes between Barrett and GPU supposedly in GAP's possession.

Mr. McKenna said he recalls talking to Thomas Devine, GAP, on the telephone and them.asking for the handwritten notes but that Mr. Devine could not produce Mr. McKenna said he believed Mr. Devine did not have the documents.

Breach of Confidentiality Mr. McKenna said that based on interviews of NRC personnel, Parks allegations were not confimed and there was no basis for proceeding.

with Mr. Bowers' comment that even though Parks had gone public with hisMr. McK allegations and had testified before Congress it was 01A's judgment that we should tions to not NRC. positively confim to GPU and Bechtel that Parks had made allega-Company Review of Draft Report '

Mr. McKenna said first that OIA had been trying to interview King regarding his general allegations and that King would not talk to OIA.. Second OIA had access to the Office of Investigations' extensive interview of King. More importantly, however, Mr. McKenna made a judgment that neither King nor Kanga needed to be interviewed because Barrett did not deny the conversation Parks alleged took place, but confimed it. Moreover, Barrett expanded on the l conversation to provide more details and explain the context in which it trok place. Because Barrett confimed the conversation, Mr. McKenna did not  ;

believe it was necessary to confim it with King or Kanga, t Mr. McKenna advised that he would be unable to come to 0!A's office on Monday, March 19, 1984, to review the draft DIA response to Comissioner Bernthal because he would be out of town all day. He did indicate a willingness to

! discuss the details of the investigation with the Comission at a later date if they request a briefingg cc: H. Bowers 1

Distribution:

OIA Reading -

Herr

- . - - - . - - . _ _ . . , - - . - - - - - . . - - - - , , - - . _ . __ . . - , . . _ _ . - - . - . _ _ . w,-- - -- - - < ,- 3

'~ '-

_ Exhibit 22

{ -:

.,,,,  ? 5? &'

January 16, 1986

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MEf10RANDUli FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Connissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM: Sharon R. Connelly, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor SURJECT: SECY 84-65 " GAP REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO RICHARD PARKS' ALLEGATIONS" Attached is the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) ffemorandum Report regarding SECY.84-65, " GAP REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO RICHARD PARKS' ALLEGATIONS."

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- In a letter dated November 10, 1983, Mr. Thomas Devine, Government Accountability Project (GAP), addressed allegations by Richard Parks concern-J, ing purported inadequacies in OIA Report of Investigation (80-45), " Parks Allegations Regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2)." The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) reviewed these concerns and recommended additional investigation by OIA in a February 9,1984, Policy Issue SECY 84-65. A June 28, 1984, memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission, requested that DIA conduct an inquiry into Parks' allegations.

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Attachment:

1 As Stated

' cc: Samuel J. Chilk, SECY, w/o attach V. Stello, Acting EDO, w/ attach i 1I. Magee, OCM, w/ attach T

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Distribution:

. 83-45

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Memo /Chilk/83-45/Tonyl Parks A11egations/83-45/Tonyl 1

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, UNITED STATES y ' ) >-> g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,, E WASHING TON, D. C. 20585

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l January 16, 1986 MEMORANDUM REPORT

SUBJECT:

SECY 84-65 " GAP REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO RICHARD PARKS' ALLEGATIONS" OIA FILE: 83-45 BACKGROUND On March 25, 1983, an Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigation was initiated into allegations submitted by Richard D. PARKS, a former Senior Startup Engineer, employed by BECHTEL NORTH AMERICAN POWER CORPORATION (BECHTEL) at Three Pile Island Unit 2 (TMI 2), Middletown, Pennsylvania.

These allegations were referred to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NPC) by Thomas DEVINE, Esq., Legal Director, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP), of the INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, 1901 Que Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20009, in a letter to the Chairman, NRC, dated March 23, 1983. The OIA investigation 83-45 was completed on September 7,1983.

On November 10, 1983, GAP, on behalf of PARKS, requested the NRC reopen the investigation of PARKS' allegations regarding NRC conduct at TMI 2. The Comission determined that PARKS' allegations warranted further inquiry in certain areas and that DIA would conduct that inquiry.

SUMMARY

On June 28, 1984, in a memorandum from Samuel J. CHILK, Secretary of the Comission, to George MESSENGER, Acting Director, OIA, it was directed that OIA conduct an inquiry into the allegations regarding NRC conduct at TMI 2.

} The inquiry would include contacting GAP to reinterview PARKS to determine in what specific ways the sumary of the PARKS interview in the OIA report did not accurately reflect either the facts of the case or the presentation made to OIA by PARKS and his counsel IDEVINE). PARKS would also be afforded the opportunity to provide a signed sworn statement.

Other areas to be covered in the inquiry concerned (1) providing draft

/versionsofNRC reports to the utility for coment, (2) breaching PARKS' e

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m confidential'ity, and (3) making representations to the public inconsistent -

with allegedly " private" memos to the licensee. On the first matter, PARKS' interview would include attempts to identify the several sources who had shared with PARKS their understanding that it was the practice of Lake BARRETT, former Deputy Director, Three Mile Island Project Office (TMIPO), NRC, to submit his drafts to Robert C. ARNOLD, President of GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR CORPORATION (GPUN), or Bahman K. KANGA, Operations Manager, BECHTEL CORPORATION (BECHTEL), Gaithersburg, Maryland, and former Director, TMI 2, BDITEL, for editing and coments. On the matter of the alleged breach of confidentiality, pertinent GPUN/BECHTEL personnel should be identified and interviewed to determine if this breach occurred. The third matter would include pertinent interviews of the CONCERNED MOTHERS OF MIDDLETOWN (CMM) and a determination on why notes to the licer.see were apparently not placed in the Public Document Room (PDR). The handwritten notes between BARRETT and GPU which GAP allegedly have in their files, should be obtained from GAP.

The following inquiry was conducted based on the above:

Reinterview of PARKS On June 24, 1985, PARKS, accompanied by DEVINE, was interviewed under oath, and a tratscript of the proceedings was prepared. PARKS was provided a copy of his previous Report of Interview which had been congleted by OIA and was dated June 23, 1983. This copy was provided to PARKS a:1d DEVINE on June 23, 1985, for their review. During this interview, PARKS, with the assistance of DE'/INE, was given the opportunity to make corrections to the 1983 Report of Interview and to report any additional allegations or concerns he had, allegations were presented, the transcript reflects the corrections made to the 1983 Report of Interview and discusses both PARKS' and DEVINE's concerns

. The interview established that no handwritten notes existed as previously alleged. The notes that were mentioned were the memoranda sent by TMIPO to GPUN licensing which included the March 10, 1983, note to J. LARSEN, previously Head of Licensing, GPUN, concerning the dis-approval of the Polar Crane operating procedures. At the termination of the interview, it was agreed that PARKS would provide, within 30 days, a detailed analysis of his allegations.

On July 8,1985, a copy of the June 24, 1985, transcript was provided to PARKS through DEVINE. The testimony was sworn to as reflected in the transcript.

1 Providing Draft Versions of the NRC Reports to the Utility for Coment t On June 7,1985, Mr. Lawrence P. KING, former GPUN employee, was interviewed concerning his knowledge of the NRC personnel at TMIPO providing draft ,

versions of NRC reports to the utility for coment.

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i KING related that he had no direct knowledge of any letters or reports being l.

provided irLdraf t to the utility for comment (s) prior to their issuance by

' TMIPO. Fe did overhear a telephone conversation between BARRETT and KANGA in which BARRETT had discussed a letter he was preparing regarding waste, i

BARRETT remarked during the conversation that the letter was not going to be a nice one as it was critical of GPUN. KING did not recall ever seeing the

letter or having any further conversations about it. KING further related '

i that he was present at a meeting in which an NRC representative stated that they were unhappy with a response letter prepared by LARSON. The discussion concerned the fact that all of the correspondence would wind up in the PDR.

! ARNOLD had directed that in the future LARSON discuss his remarks by telephone

} prior to putting them in writing, i

On December 11, 1985, KANGA was interviewed concerning his knowledge of NRC employees providing copies of draft notes and reports to BECHTEL and GPUN for comrents and/or concurrence prior to their finalization. KANGA denied ever i

receiving any draft documents from the NRC personnel at THI 2 and stated that revi.ew of NRC draf ts by BECHTEL and GPUN did not occur.

Breaching PARKS' Confidentiality i

On December 9,1985, Mr. James J. BYRNES, Licensing Manager, TMI 2 GPUN, was interviewed and related that he was not aware of any NRC employee mentioning PARKS' name in relation to any allegations he made or informing GPUN personnel i that PARKS was an alleger. PARKS was considered to be a very vocal individual

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4 about his concerns and he was not shy in expressing them during BECHTEL/GPUN meetings. PARKS had made it well known that he had problems with the Polar i

Crane and in other areas. BYRNES further related that his first knowledge that PARKS was an alleger was when PARKS gave a press conference with GAP.

j On December 9,1985, Phil GRANT, Section Chief, Technical Support Group. "

l TMIPO, was interviewed and related that he did not believe that any NRC i

employee had violated PARKS' confidentiality. PARKS had used GRANT to estab-

! lish contact with Joel WIEBE, fonner Senior Resident Inspector, NRC, at TMI  :

l about safety concerns PARKS had.

PARKShadtoldGRANThis(PARKS) concerns that his job was in jeopardy as he had talked with someone (name unknown) who had informed PARKS that BECHTEL and/or GPUN were out to get him. This conver-i sation and meeting with GRANT occurred prior to PARKS discussing his allega-tions with WIEBE. l I

! On December 11, 1985, KANGA was interviewed and related that to the best of his knowledge no person em l that PARKS was an alleger. ployed by the NRC had stated to him or anyone else Making Representations to the Public Inconsistent With Allegedly " Private" Pemos to the Licensee (Gncerned Mothers of Middletown) l were interviewed concerning BARRETT's I

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meetings with them and the alleged misrepresentation by him of the Polar Crane issues. All of the CMM members interviewed considered BARRETT's integrity above reproach and did not believe that he had been untruthful with them.

They all related that BARRETT had called the Polar Crane issue a " Turf Fight" .

at the 10 a.m. meeting with them on April 5, 1983. They all interpreted the

', meaning of a " Turf Fight" to be disputes among the various contractors, subcontractors and the licensee at TMI. There was no neeting held with BAPRETT on April 22, 1983, and a meeting which was scheduled for April 25, 1983, was cancelled due to BARRETT having to testify before a Congressional i Comittee on April 26, 1983. None of the CMM members interviewed recalled BARRETT stating that there were no problems with the Polar Crane.

A calendar sheet for April 1983 was p'rovided by which showed that the meeting with BARRETT and the CMM occurred on April 5,1983. It further disclosed no meeting was scheduled on April 22, 1983.

Determine Why Notes to the Licensee, Such as Disapproval of the Polar Crane Procedures, Were Not Placed in the PDR

!' On December 9, 1985, GRANT, TMIPO, was questioned about the notes not being placed in the PDR. GRANT, who had been present at TMIPO in the 1983 period in t

question, related that the March 10, 1983' note to J. LARSON from Lake BARRETT 1

was not a " private" note. It was an informal response by TMIPO to the licensee on the Polar Crane procedures. This type of response was and still i is not normally placed in the PDR or provided a docket number. The March 7, i

1983, letter concerning the Polar Crane refurbishment frem Bernard J. SNYDER, TMIPO, to 8. KANGA, BECHTEL, was a fonnal response and did receive a docket number and was subsequently placed in the PDR. According to GRANT, it was not-a normal procedure then, nor is it now, to place procedure cocinents and reviews in the PDR. In early 1984 a form titled Procedure Coninent Sheet was placed into use in lieu of the notes. This form is also not placed in the PDR; however, a copy of it is available for review by interested parties in l the NRC Middletown Office.

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Handwritten Notes in Possession of GAP On June 25, 1985 DEVINE and PARKS related that GAP does not have any hand- l 1

written notes in its possession. The notes referred to in the PARKS' inter- l

view of June 23, 1983, were the typed notes to LARSEN from BARRETT. These j notes were considered improper by PARKS and DEVINE because they were not i listed on the docket or placed in the PDR.

CONCLUSION i

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Anthony Ward, Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor

${ACh N GTorge/G flulley, Jr.,' Acting Assis%nt Director for T OfficeofInspectoranc/nvestigations Auditor Attachments:

As Stated i

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Exhibit 23 h Y (,h !, b

[I h January 16, 1986 MEMORAt:DUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech FROM:

Sharon R. Connelly, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

SECY 84-65

" GAP REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO RICHARD PARKS' ALLEGATIONS" Attached is the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) Memorandum Report ALLEGATIONS."regarding SECY 84-65, " GAP REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO In a letter dated November 10, 1983, Mr. Thomas Devine, Government Accountability Project (GAP), addressed allegations by Richard Parks concern-ing purported inadequacies in OIA Report of Investigation (83-45), " Parks Allegations Regarding Three Mile I, land, Unit 2 (THI-2)."

General Counsel (OGC) reviewed these concerns and recomende investigation June 28, 1984,by OIA in a February 9, 1984, Policy Issue SECY 84-65.A requested that OIA conduct an inquiry into Parks' allegations. mem OIA viewsinvestigation of Parks; Concerned into theMotherallegations of Parks and GAP is complete. Inter-Island Project Office (THIPO)); Lawrence P. King (former General Pub Utilities jt uclear Corporation ( PUN) employee at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (THI 2));)qames J. Byrnes (GPUN); Bahman K. Kanga (BECHTEL)); as well as

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alter the findings of the original OIA investigation (83-45). re '

Conclusions Based on information developed during the OIA investigation, the allegations provided by GAP in their November 10, 1983, letter to the Comission were not * .

substantiated.

June 25, 1985, It should be noted that during a sworn transcribed interview on' OIA provided Parks, with Devine cresent, the opportunity to '

nake corrections to the Report of Interview which had been prepared by OIA to document the initial interview of Parks on June 23, 1983. In doing so, Parks -

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, _ M' made no new' allegations. Additionally, during the June 25, 1985, interview, Parks detlined to provide complete information concerning his allegations.

Although Parks agreed to provide a detailed analysis of his allegations to 0IA within 30 days, he has not done so to date.

Pending this theisreceipt inquiry closed.of any further information from by Parks or Devine (GAP),

Attachment:

As Stated cc: Samuel J. Chilk, SECY, w/o attach V. Stello, Acting E00, w/ attach W. Magee, OCM, w/ attach l

THIS REPORT IS BEING PROVIDE 0 FOR THE COMMISSION'S INFORMATION. NO ACTION BY THE COMMISSION IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.

Distribution:

83-45 Roeding i

Memo /Chilk/83-45/Tonyl Parks Allegations /83-45/Tonyl I

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1. ( ^4^ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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..... January 16, 198A MEMORANDUM REPORT 1

SUPJECT: SECY 84-65 " GAP RE00EST FOR INVESTIGATION INTO RICHARD PARKS' ALLEGATIONS" CIA FILE: 83-45 BACKGROUNO On March 25, 1983, an Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigation was 1

initiated into allegations submitted by Richard D. PARKS, a fomer Senior Startup Engineer, employed by BECHTEL NORTH AMERICAN POWER CORPORATION (BECHTEL) at Three File Island Unit 2 (TMI 2), Middletown, Pennsylvania.

l These allegations were referred to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) by Thomas DEVINE, Esq., Legal Director, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP), of the INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, 1901 Que Street, N.W.,

Washington, 1983 D.C. 20009, in a letter to the Chairman, NRC, dated March 23, The OIA investigation 83-45 was completed on September 7,1983 1

On November 10, 1983, GAP, on behalf of PARKS, requested the NRC reopen the investigation of PARKS' allegations regarding NRC conduct at TMI 2. The Comission determined that PARKS' allegations warranted further inquiry in  !

certain areas and that OIA would conduct that inquiry.-

SUMMARY

On June 28, 1984, Comission, to George MESSENGER, Acting Directorin OIA, a memorandum it was directed that fro OIA conduct an inquiry into the allegations regar, ding NRC conduct at TMI 2.

< The inquiry would include contacting GAP to reinterview PARKS to detemine in what specific ways the sumary of the PARKS interview in the OIA report did ,

! not accurately reflect either the facts of the case or the presentation made to 0!A by PARKS and his counsel (DEVINE).

i opportunity to provide a signed sworn statement. PARKS would also be afforded the  :

l Other areas to be covered in the inquiry concerned (1) providing draft versions of NRC reports to the utility for coment, (2) breaching PARKS' ,

}

THIS REPORT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR.

IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCEO OR PLACED IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM WITHOUT WRITTEN PERM!$$!ON.

Freedom of Information/ Privacy Act (b)(5)(6)(7)(C)

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. with allegedly " private" memos to the licensee. confidentiality, and ( .

interview would include attempts to identify the several sources who hadOn th i shared with PARKS their understanding that it was the practice of

Lake BARRETT, fomer Deputy Director, Three Mile Island Project Office (TMIPO), NRC, to submit his drafts to Robert C. ARNOLD, President of GENE i t

PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR CORPORATION (GPUN), or Bahman K. KANGA Manager, BECHTEL CORPORATION (BECHTEL), Gaithersburg, Maryland, and fo Director, TMI 2, BECHTEL, for editing and coments.

On the matter of the alleged breach of confidentiality, pertinent GPUN/BECHTEL personnel should

! identified and interviewed to determine if this breach occurred.

matter would include pertinent interviews of the CONCERNED MOTHERS OFThe third 4

MIDDLETOWN (CMM) and a determination on why notes to the licensee were 1 apparently not placed in the Public Document Room (POR). The handwritten

! notes between be obtained BARRETT and GPU which GAP allegedly have in their files, should from GAP.

1 The following inquiry was conducted based on the above:

Reinterview of PARKS On June 24, 1985 PARKS, accompanied by DEVINE and a transcript of the proceedings was prepare,d.was interviewed under oath, of hisJune dated previous 23, 1983.Report of Interview which had been completed by O!A and w 1985, for tha 4 review.This copy this During was interview provided to PARKS and DEVINE on June 23, DEV!NE, was given the opportunity to make corre,ctions to the 1983 Repo Interview and to report any additional allegations or concerns he had, allegations were presented, the transcript reflects the corrections made to i

)' the 1983 Report of Interview and discusses both PARKS' and OEV!NE's concern notes existed as previously alleged.The interview established that no handwritten memoranda sent by TMIPO to GPUN licensing which included the MarchT l note to J. LARSEN, previously Head of Licensing, GPUN, concerning the dis-10, 198 approval of the Polar Crane operating procedures. ,

At the temination of the '

analysis of his allegations, interview, it was agreed that PARKS would p j

! On through July 8,1985, a copy of the June 24, 1985, transcript was provided to PARKS DEVINE.

1 On September 20, 1985, The testimony was sworn to as reflected in the transcript.

j DEV!NE was informed b was not willing to p ovide this information,y O!A O!Athat since would PARKS proceed withapparently the information on hand.

i Providing Oraf t Versinns of the_ NRC Reports to the Utility for Coment On June 7,1985, Mr. Lawrence P. KING, former GPUN employee, was interviewe concerning his knowledge of the NRC personnel at TMIPO providing draf t j j versions of NRC reports to the utility for coment. 1 I

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KING related that he had no direct knowledge of any letters or r eports being provided in draft to the utility for concent(s) prior THIPO.

which BARRETT had discusse1 a letter he was preparing regarding wa 1

BARRETT remarked during the conversation that the letter was nice one as it was critical of GPUN.

letter or having any further conversations about it. KING did not recall ever se I

KING further related they were unhappy with a response letter prepared by .

I ARNOLO had directed that in the future eLARSON prior to putting them in writing.

ephone i

On December 11, 1985, KANGA was interviewed concerning his knowledge of NRC i

employees providing copies of draft notes and reports to BECHTE coments and/or concurrence prior to their finalization.

i KANGA denied ever review of NRC drafts by BECHTEL and GPUN did not o

_ Breaching PARKS' Confidentiality 1

4 On December 9,1985, Mr. James J. SYRNES, licensing GPUN, Manager, was TMI 2 PARKS' that PARKS was an name alleger. in relation to any allegations nnel he m about his concerns and he was not shy in expressing them meetings.

i Crane and in PARKS had other areas. made it well known that he had problems with the Po that PARKS was an alleger was when PARKS gave a press .

On December 9,1985, Phil AAAAT, Section Chief. Technical Sup 1

TMIPO, was interviewed and employee had violatec PARKS' confidentiality.

related that he did not believe that an

' about safety concerns PARKS had.lish contact with

, NRC, Joel WlEBE at TMI PARKS had told GRANT his PARKS concerns hadand infnmed PARKS that BECHTEL and/or GPUN w 4

! o sation meetin .

This conver-tions with WlEBE.g with GRANT occurred prior to PARKS discussing his alle

! On December 11, 1985 his knowledge no pers,on emKANGA was interviewed and related that to the best of

, that PARKS was an alleger. ployed by the NRC had stated to him or anyone else f Making Representations to the Pub Memos to the Licensee (concernes "lic Inennsistent With Allegedly " Private"

, nthers of Middletown]

On December 9,1985, Mrs, and all members of CMM, were interviewee con {cern I

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meetings issues. with them and the alleged misrepresentation by him of the Polar Cran above reproach and did not believe that he had been unt They at all a.m.

the 10 related thatwith meeting BARRETT them on April had 5,1983 called the Polar Crane issue a " Turf F They all interpreted the meaning of a " Turf Fight" to be disputes among the various contractors, subcontractors and the ifcensee at TMI. There was no rieeting held with BAPRETT on April 22, 1983, and a meeting which was scheduled for April 25, 1983, was Comittee oncancelled due to BARRETT having to testify before a Congressional April 26, 1983.

a BARRETT stating that there were no problems with the Polar Crane,N A calendar sheet for April 1983 was provided by meeting with BARRETT and the CMM occurred on April 5,1983which showed that the It further disclosed no r'eeting was scheduled on April 22, 1983.

i Determine Were Procedures, Why Not Notes to the Placed Licensee, in the PDR Such as Disapproval of the Polar Crane i

placed in the POR.On December 9, 1985, GRANT, THIPO, was questioned a i

question, related that the MarchGRANT, who had been present at TMIPO in the 19 was not a " private" note. 10, 1983' note to J. LARSON from Lake BARRETT licensee on the Polar Crane procedures.It was an informal response by TMIPO i, is not nomally placed in the POR or provided a docket number.This The March 7, type of r TMIPO, to 8. KANGA, BECHTEL, was a 4 mal respo number and was subsequently placed in the POR.

, reviews in the POR.a normal procedure then, nor is it now, to place proc placed into use in lieu of the notes.In early 1984 a form titled Procedure Com

This form is also not placed in the PDR; however, a the NRC Middletown Office.

copy of it is available for review by interested parties in '

Handwritten Notes in Possession of GAP I

On June 25, 1985 written notes in its possession.DEVINE and PARKS related that GAP does not ha  !

view of June 23, 1983, The notes referred to in the PARKS' inter-were the typed notes to LARSEN from BARRETT. These notes were considered improper listed on the docket or placed in the POR.

by PARKS and DEV!NE because they were not CONCLUSION Comission in their NovemberBased on the foregoing information the alleg 10, 1983, letter were not substantiated. PARKS, i *

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with DEVINE present, was provided the opportunity to correct his June 1983, interview in a sworn transcribed interview on June 25, 1985 He declined to provide complete information ut that time and date.

has not don Pending closed. any further allegations by PARKS or DEVINE (GAP), this in

_. Anthony Ward, Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor J2(ACh M GYorge/a. ttulley, Jr. ,' Acting

! Assisent Director for f Office of Inspector anc/nvestigations Auditor Attachments:

As Stated 4

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Exhibit 25 Page 1 of 13- Place:

Date:

I, RICHARD D. PARKS, hereby make the following voluntary statement to Investigators J. Vorse and R. Meeks, who have identified themselves to me as Investigators with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me. Investigator Meeks has typed this statement for me.

On page 8 of my affidavit, I state that Tom MORRIS told Richard SEIGLITZ that I should be counseled for my negative attitude and that SEIGLITZ related this 2OM to a group of Site Operation members, including myself. Those in Site Operations that were present when SEIGLITZ related this were Larry KING, Joe CHWASTYK, Bubba MARSHALL, John PERRY, Joe SMITH, Linda NAGLE, Joyce WENGER, Madan KARR and Swede HOLTMAN of Recovery Programs (RP). In fact, HOLTMAN stated in an ensuing conversation at the time that Site Operations was meeting schedule dates better than anybody else on site. HOLTMAN was the representative of RP on the Head Lift Task Force (HLTF). j Concerning the above matter, I am not aware of the personnel procedure that should be used for counseling employees on negative attitudes at TMI-2, whether C*IW they be Bechtel or GPU-N employees. I did not receive any written memo's on M

this matter from Bechtel or GPU. I do recall that on my last performance evaluation Ed KITLER had given me ratings ranging from excellent to outstanding. This performance evaluation was done around the January / February time period of 1983.

On page 18 I mention that Larry KING, on 2/11/83, informed the Site Operation staff about the contents of a meeting between KING, KANGA and ED GISCHEL on the 6 k f*y Polar Crane SER. Those 50 staff members present at that meeting, to the best of Ak my recollection, were Messrs. CHWASTYK, MARSHALL, PERRY, SMITH, KARR and Linda NAGLE and Joyce WENGER. In response to a question by Mr. Meeks I would describe BARTON's personality or character as it relates to his daily mode of doing business as that of a intimidator. BARTON shouts and is a brusk individual who often threatens to fire an employee if that employee does not follow through with BARTON's wishes or desires. Many times this is just an every day expression used by BARTON. However, if necessary, in my coinion BARTON would follow up with his threat to fire an employee if he thought it was necessary.

030287022

Page 2 of 13_.

BARTON doesn't like to leave a paper trail. When'he disagrees with a -

memo, he will write his comments on the original memo and return the memo to its author.

BARTON, in a February 23rd meeting, asked me if the Revocery Operations Test Manual (AP1047) was the same as the pre-accident test manual. I told BARTON p h that generically the two were the same. BARTON had approved administrative procedures AP1043 and AP1047 for the TMI-2 Recovery Operations. In reference to his stand on the Polar Crane, BARTON turned his back on his previous experience at TMI-2, and more soecifically, on procedures that were followed on the SDS.

BARTON was the Start Up and Test Manager for Unit-2, and possibly at Unit-1, before his duties as Director and Deputy Director of Recovery Operations, g On page 19, I mention a meeting in Room 201 and 203 on 2/14/83 on the Polar AM Crane Load Test. I was not present at that meeting and the primary source of my information was Larry KING.

On page 20, I mention my conversation with Ed KITLER cn February 18th regarding KITLER's statement that he had been asked by Rich GALLAGHER to look into trans-

,_ ,9 ferring me off site. Those in the Site Operations office who heard me comment h about the conversation with Ed KITLER, in addition to Larry KING and Joe CHWASTYK, where Messrs. MARSHALL, PERRY, SMITH and Secretary, Joyce WENGER.

When KITLER saw that I was taking his comments very seriously, he tried to down-play the issue in an attempt to cool down the matter. It was also KITLER's responsibility to originally bring us the issues that I had made concerning the l Polar Crane Load Test and the application of procedures AP1043 and AP1047. l l

On page 23 I discuss the BLIZZARD phone calls to Larry KING, Gloria KING and g % , Benjamin SLONE. BLIZZARD also made phone calls to Ronnie MUCHA in Iowa about

'M the same matter. MUCHA, at that time, was SLONE's fiance. In my conversations to SLONE about the BLIZZARD phone calls, SLONE had mentioned to me that on or about February 23rd he talked to RIDER about BLIZZARD's offer. According to

. Page 3 of 1r SLONE, RIDER stated that Bechtel was interested fri having Quiltech consider-e j consulting contract on an upcoming reorganization at TMI-2.

On page 27 and 28, I discuss KING's suspension from THI-2 for his alleged conflict of interest due to his association with Quiltech. Concerning Quiltech, in the July / August 1982 time frame, Ed KITLER asked me if I would talk to Larry KING about lining up a job for KITLER with Quiltech at the PALATKA Coal Fire

[ Plant in Florida. I called SLONE on KITLER's request and SLONE handled the matter with KITLER from that point on. Also, during the July / August 1982 time frame, Larry KING asked me to line up a typist for some resumes for Quiltech.

I obtained the services of Rose LITTLE and she typed up various resumes that were generic in nature. I recall that some of the resumes were those of Larry KING, Bill AUSTIN, Kingsly DRAPER and possibly Ken LYON-ARENDS. Also during the July / August 1982 time frame, I recall Rich GALLAGHER asking me when KING wts going to leave for Quiltech. I told GALLAdHER to ask KING.

Around the November / December 1982 time period, I rerramber Ben SLONE talking to me about Joe CHWASTYK's involvement with Larry KING and CHWASTYK's attempt

_ w. g to obtain a position with Quiltech. I know that CHWASTYK attended a Quiltech Ah1r meeting with XING, SLONE and Gloria XING at the KING's house during this time period. It was also during this time frame that CHWASTYK went to Beaver Valley with John H0AG, a relative of KING's and also a member of Quiltech. At Beaver Valley, CHWASTYK contacted Don SKIDMGRE of Duquense Light Company, the licensee at Beaver Valley, about a Quiltech proposal and possible contract at Beaver Valley, CHWASTYK has since told re that when Beaver Valley comes through none of us will have to worry about the way Bechtel is trying to move the schedule ahead and take over things. The 50 staff was generally aware of CHWASTYK's and KING'S involvement with Quiltech. It was also during this time frame that KITLER made a comment to me that Larry KING should be careful because it was starting to get around about KING and Quiltech. I told KITLER that KING was not the most discreet individual in maintaining a low profile en the Quiltech matter.

Around February 1983, I recall that Jim THEISINS and Bill AUSTIN went on a T 46 P-v At skiing trip. During the Congressional hearing on April 26th, it was stated that

l Page 4 of 13-in February THEISING, while on a business trip, was told a second time about KING's involvement with Quiltech. Possibly this was the business trip that was refer-enced in the congressional testimony.

Sometime during the latter part of 1982 or the first part of 1983, Dick JUBBA pyg.gg of Nine Mile Point, an employee of Bechtel, phoned Larry KING and asked him

$h* some questions about Quiltech and KING's involvement with Quiltech. I recall, from conversations with Larry and Gloria KING, that there were two phone calls from JUBBA on this matter. I was present in KING's house when the second phone call was received.

I feel that the Quiltech matter was definitely blown out of proportion. In the

g. nuclear energy industry one is always mindful of the various opportunities avail-AkW able for advancement and promotion at other, nuclear sites. In fact I was first hired by GPU to work at TMI-2 in a manner dimilar to how Quiltech operates.

While I was working for Energy Consultants, Inc., NUS sent a proposal that in-volved my resume to GPU. NUS is a job shopper similar to Quiltech, GPU did not condemn my hiring but has condemned KING and Quiltech.

It was during the first part of February that Ed KITLER told me that his transfer to Florida had been arranged. KITLER asked if I would take over his u

'~ BPS position as Start-up and Test Manager. I immediately talked to Dave BUCHANNON, AW who was head of Design Engineering for GPU, and told him that I would take KITLER's job only if it were transferred to Site Operations. BUCHANNON stated that he didn't know anything about the KITLER transfer and that he would look into it. KITLER did stay on site. However, he was absent from TMI-2 the week after KING's suspension.

KITLER returned on or about March 8th or 9th. After he returned I asked Dave BUCHANNON how he got KITLER to stay. BUCHANNON stated that he worked out a deal with BARTON to get KITLER's per diem taking care of.' Dwight WALKER headed up a Test Work Group meeting while KITLER was gone.

l l

l l

Page 5 of 13-KANGA, in his testimony before Congress on April 26th, stated that he first j heard of KING's involvement with Quiltech on February 24th and that he, KANGA, l was on sick leave that day. KANGA stated that he received a phone call on the i

matter while he was at home. The phone call was from BARTON, and was made at

$ " j approximately 6:00 p.m. I recall Larry KING telling me about a meeting that he had with KANGA, on site, on February 24th at 1:00 p.m. on the containment entry procedure, and that this meeting was cut off for a fire safety meeting. It was during this meeting that XING told KANGA that he was supposed to run the recovery operations at TMI-2 but that it was apparent that THEISING wanted to run the show.

LARSON, who was head of Licensing, had earlier informed KING that he was in charge of the recovery operations. At that meeting, KANGA told KING that he was the boss and this fact was to be put in writing. This was in reference to KING being made the alternate to KANGA and thus putting someone in upper site management on record who met the ANSI standards as site director, or alternate site director.

In reference to KANGA not being qualified by ANSI standards to be site director, I recall from conversations with Larry KING that both he and Joe CHWASTYK, on or g about the middle of September of 1982, went to Lake Barrett of NRC and complained A that the Safety Review Group was to report to KANGA but that KANGA, according to ANSI standards, was not qualified to receive an operator's license. Through the grapevine, I heard that BARRETT went to GPU and complained that the internal matters CHWASTYK and KING had brought up to BARRETT should go through the chain of command. It is my understanding that the NRC has never approved the reorgani-zation. I also recall that GPU in testimony to Congress on or about ,

stated that the reorganization had never been approved.

At this point I would like to mention a meeting that was held in early January '

on the Sewerage Tank Test Procedures. That meeting which was with KING and (a THEISING, concerned how to conceal in a quarterly re~ port to NRC, the amounts of cesium in the storage tanks. I know that Larry KING had objected to the way the procedures were handled on the sewerage tank. KING did sign the procedure when a GPU Enviornmental Inspector reversed his earlier standing and stated that the procedure was legal. Ed GISCHEL, Ken HOFFSTETTER, Cary HORNER, Pam Stoner-COOPER and Carl HARBAC are familar with the sewerage tank matter.

i

l Page 6 of 13, On page 31, I make mention of the minutes kept by' Ken PASTOR of a 2/28/83 meeting on the Readiness Review Committee. There is no formalized procedure for taking minutes at TMI-2. The established practice is for the organization

$ calling the neeting and in charge of the meeting to keep the minutes. The minutes are then typed by this organization and circulated to the attendees.

If there are any disagreements on the contents of the minutes then the person disagreeing writes a memo on his objections. I recall that KING had done this on occasion and BARTON took exception to KING documenting his objection to the minutes.

The minutes of the 2/28 meeting showed that NRC approval should ge quickly since NRC comments are already available and should be resolved by the time the Polar ud Crane Operating Procedure is submitted to the NRC. I can think of two instances where site management has used prior NRC approval in an attempt to obtain Site Operations approval on a specific procedurd. The first instance occurred when Mike RADBILL handed me the Polar Crane Load Test Procedure and stated that it was the hottest thing on the Island. RADBILL also explained that the PORC and the NRC had been involved with the test all along and that neither had- any problems with what was in the Load Test Procedures. This happened toward the end of January 1983.

Also on March 3rd, during a second meeting on the Readiness Review Committee presentation, THEISING stated that to move structural steel with the Polar he Crane had been signed off by everybody and his brother, including NRC. At that point I stated that the procedure should be looked at by the Test Work Group. I have never seen NRC involvement on procedures used at other sites like it is at THI-2. I have never seen this buy off procedure used in this way at other nuclear sites.

I also recall that I was given the procedures on the Reactor Vessel Internal w6 Radiation Measurements and told that PORC had already approved the procedures 3

and that I should go ahead and sign off. I noticed that the procedures had not gone through the proper review cycle and I, therefore, wrote a Site Operations

t Page 7 of 13-Problem Report on this. I cannot recall the name'of the person that gave me-the procedures and asked that I sign off, but his name is listed in my comments on the problem report.

Concerning that meeting on 2/28 and the conference afterwards between myself, Jim THEISING and Ron WARREN, I received the distinct impression that THEISING gg was trying to convince us that this matter was going to be taken care in S

THEISING's own way. During that conference, THEISING wanted to know why Site Operation was trying to assume authority now when they had given it up on things such as the Quick Look. I told THEISING that Site Operations is the responsible group under the license. THEISING then explained that in an accident or deficiency involving matters handled by Engineering, that Engineer-ing would be the responsible party, and would have to assume blame.

By way of explanation on the Quick Look Prdcedures, I recall that Larry KING wrote a memo that Site Operations would cut back on non-vital areas in order to 7 1 come up with the funds necessary to handle the Quick Look Operation. KING stated in thct memo that Site Operations was preparing the methodology and software to handle the Quick Look. BARTON replied that Site Operations was to stay out of the Quick Look, that it was Bechtel's and the Technical Advisory Group's responsibility.

Also in the 2/28 meeting, THEISING made a statement that he could understand why a.g certain people were afraid of a transfer. That comment came about as a result AW of our discussion on NRC examining the Polar Crane Issue at that time and Ed KITLER being called in by NRC and interviewed by Joel WEIBE. We were also talk-ing about Larry KING's suspension in the same context. THEISING's transfer coment came about as a result of comments on these topics.

On page 32, I began a series of comments on memos that Joe CHWASTYK and I

[M] wrote, basically concerning the application of AP1043 and AP1047 to the Polar Crane Load Test. CHWASTYK was in full philosophical agreement with those memos.

I feel that CHWASTYK believed that he was going to be Acting Director of SO 9

l Page 8 of 13_

for only two or three weeks. In fact, in a meeting with the 50 staff right after he assumed the acting position, he stated that the KING incident would be over in two or three weeks and KING would be back on the job. However, af ter two or three weeks had passed I got the impression that CHWASTYK's opinion of the KING matter had changed. I also believe that CHWASTYK, as he attended the var-ious recovery meetings, realized that KING was not going to return and that I was considered an obstacle the same as XING had been. CHWASTYK knew that my wife was dead, as did most of the Site Operations staff. When CHWASTYK made that phone call to Gloria KING and stated that my wife was trying to dig up something on the child custody case, I feel it was CHWASTYK's indirect way of trying to tell me that I was targeted as KING had been.

I believe that CHWASTYK was replaced as Acting Director of Site Operations by 3

sh g* BARTON because the KING investigation by GPU had revealed CHWASTYK's involvement with Quiltech. I also understand that it das during this time period that Joe CHWASTYK was taken off a TV commercial that GPU was to put on the air.

On page 33, I mention that BARTON accused Joyce WENGER of xeroxing and taking my to Larry KING a memorandum that had been missing on February 28, but that had AW reappeared on the morning of March 1st. The memo in question was the so-called

" Smoking Gun Memo" that KING had wrote to KANGA and BARTON on his concerns on the Head Lif t Schedule and the way things were done. I think the memo no. was around 069 but I am not sure of this. I recall that on Monday morning, February 28th, Joyce WENGER had made the comment to the 50 staff in general, that the memo was missing from the file and that she was looking for it because KING wanted the memo. On Tuesday morning, the memo appeared back in the file.

On page 35, I discuss a meeting on March 3rd concerning the agenda for the d Readiness Review Committee. It was in this meeting that Mr. THEISING stated that only a person of limited intelligence would think that the whole Polar Crane aparatus was important to safety. In response to a question by Investi-gator Meeks on my description of THEISING's personality and method of conducting his daily business, based on the meetings that I have attended with Jim THEISING, I believe he is a dynamic person and would remove all obstacles to get the job

Page 9 of 13-done. In response to Investigator Meeks' question to describe KINGS persona.lity and methodology of operation, I would state that KING is also dynamic; he has a great deal of fortitude. KING also does whatever it takes to get the job done.

However, KING is concerned in achieving his job objectives within clearly defined boundaries and if necessary KING would changes those boundaries so that procedural adherance is maintained while still achieving the objectives of the program.

On Page 36 and 37, I discussed George KUNDER as being the mystery man who ordered the safety and injection pumps turned off during the March 1979 accident. Most of my information on KUNDER, as the mystery man, is based on the several conversations I had with Joe CHWASTYK on this matter. It was CHWASTYK's impression that KUNDER was in charge of the operating room, or rather of the ad hoc in-charge committee, until about 7:00 a.m., when Gary MILLER arrived and assumed responsiblity. CHWASTYK, himself, arrived around 10 or 11:00 that morning. CHWASTYK has to7d me basically two stories about KUNDER's actions on the morning of the accident. One, that KUNDER shut down the reactor coolant pumps because of t' heir vibration. Two, KUNDER shut down the injection pumps due to the indicated high level in the pressurizer. Upon CHWASTYK's arrival in the control room he had to argue to get the ad hoc in-charge committee to restart the injection pumps. At least it was my impression that CHWASTYK was referring to the injection pumps. In addition, the Concerned Mothers of Middletown knew approximately six months ago about the possibilities of George KUNDER being the mystery man and that they relayed this information to Lake BARRETT of the TMI Program Office.

On page 37, I state that Larry KING, Joyce WENGER, Joe CHWASTYK and myself were all present when I made my threats to notify the local newspaper identifying KUNDER as the mystery man. I stated that only CHWASTYK has not suffered systematic repraisals as a result of this. Those systematic repraisals _

are the reprisals that I have outlined in my affidavit.

On page 38, I make mention of another meeting on March 4th concerning the W:.6 WW containment entry procedure dispute. It was my impression that Charlie HANSON

l l 1 l

Page 10 of 13 of Recovery Programs actually agreed with the stand of Site Operations but -

could not contradict the personal preferences of Mr. THEISING. Also in this meetingBijlKELLYmentionedthatearlierKANGAhadorderedtoleavetheissue of who is in charge of containment entry as written by Recovery Programs, i.e.,

that Dave BLAKE was in charge of Containment. By way of information, before January 15th, all containment work was done by work packages. After January 15th, it was a shift foreman that signed off on UWIs.

gg.g On page 45, I explained that on March 10th I had a discussion with CARL HARBAC, 5A* Ed GISCHEL, and another member of the Plant Engineering concerning the fact that ARNOLD had asked Larry KING about my involvement with Quiltech. The other member of Plant Engineering was Jim HENDERSON.

On page 46, I mention a 1:30 p.m. meeting that I had with Joe CHWASTYK on 3/10/83.

P~ % Y That meeting was held in CHWASTYK's office'and the only other person that heard

%'%t part of the conversation was CHWASTYK's Secretary, Bonnie. CHWASTYK started this conversation as we were walking into his office and Bonnie was sitting right there and would have heard the{first part of the conversation before CHWASTYK had closed the door to his offjce. I also recall that on the morning of March 10th CHWASTYK had a meeting wign the Site Operations staff. In that meeting CHWASTYK stated that somebody IDd been communicating to NRC on a daily basis.

CHWASTYK reminded us that we slhuld be mindful of the story of the boy who cried wolf.

On page 47, I make menjion of Joe CHWASTYK's 3/10/83 phone call to Gloria KING g and stated that to my v fe trying to dig up some negative information for the l ahr child custody case. Afger I was put on leave of absence, I remember talking to CHWASTYK by phone and I g:old him that I considered this statement to Gloria KING wasmeantasafriendly(arningtome. CHWASTYK did'not make any reply. CHWASTYK had originally called Gloria and asked her about leaks to the press. The press leaks were in reference to an article in the Washington Post, by Susan Stranahan, on the Polar Crane issue. The article appeared before the suspension of Larry KING.

ret On page 49, I discussed my March 15th meeting with Messrs. SANFORD, WHEELER and d H0FFMAN. I did not observe any notes being taken during that meeting. However, l _ ._ _ _

Page 11 of 13.

Mr. HOFFMAN was sitting behind me and it was possible that he took notes during this meeting. When I arrived for the meeting that morning Mr. SANFORD asked me when had I arrived in Gaithersburg and what time I had left Middletown and whether it was the night before or that morning. I told SANFORD that I lef t that morning.

H0FFMAN then asked me what time I left and I told him about 6:30 a.m. I thought these questions were strange, especially in light of the fact that I had been meeting with representatives from the Government Accountability Project Office on the evening before the meeting. I would also like to point out that on Monday afternoon, March 16th, I was cleaning out my desk at work. Bubba MARSHALL, Jim

__ FLOYD and Joe CHWASTYK, as well as Bonnie, the temporary secretary, were present M at the time. I had asked CHWASTYK earlier in the day if I could use the Site

• 'd Operations staff to go through work documents on the head lift and show the hours expended by Site Operations. I wanted to show the ineffectiveness of Site Operations methodology of work because of t,he conflicting head lift and polar crane schedules. CHWASTYK told me that a task force was going to come up with a total integrated schedule and that the work would not be needed.

Also, on or about the March 16th time frame, I attended a meeting on the Inte-grated Schedule with Joe SMITH of Site Operations, Mike SMITH of RD&D and Butch DAUBERT of Recovery Programs. This meeting was set up the day of Larry KING's suspension and after KING had made the headlift schedule a known issue. During that meeting, Mike SMITH stated that in October of 1982 he had wanted to put out an integrated schedule but that Site management wanted to work off the head lift schedule. Mike SMITH also stated that RD&D had not received any notification that the June 30th head lift schedule had been relaxed. DAUBERT stated that the relaxation of the June 30th date was not yet out but that it would be out that week.

f he-a On page 50, I made mention of the break-in of my apartment. I left my apartment locked up on Monday evening at 9:00 p.m. and I arrived back and found my apartment broken into on Wednesday mornina at about 7:30 a.m. To l this date, there has been no disposition on this burglary investigation by the Middletown Police.

Page 12 of 13 On page 51, I mention a March 17th morning meeting,with Mr. KANGA. During that meeting, KANGA told me that he would have licensing and QA respond to my concern on the polar crane.

On page 52, I make mention of a 1:00 p.m. meeting on March 17th with KANGA and

/34.g CHWASTYK concerning my removal as the primary site operations member on the sh* Test Work Group for the polar crane project. With respect to KANGA asking me twice to agree that my removal was not an act of intimidation I will add that after the second time, KANGA gave the memo authorizing my removal to CHWASTYK and asked him to sign this statement. In regards to my signing the Load Test Procedure based on technical content of the procedure only, on the morning of 3/17/83, I had requested from Mike RADBILL more documents on the polar crane

_ matter. RADBILL, at that time, told me that my personal vendetta was holding everything up. It was at this point that I then decided to sign the proceaure with the technical content proviso. /

On page 55, I stated that several sources had shared with me their understand-bb ing that prior to issuing formal NRC letters, Lake BARRETT would submits drafts of these letters to ARNOLD or KANGA for editing or comments.

My knowledge of this practice comes from conversations with Larry KING. KING g has stated that the contents of proposed memos are massaged over the phone M between BARRETT and ARNOLD or KANGA. KING was present on one occasion when BARRETT called ARNOLD and the conversation was put on the squawk box. The matter concerned GPU-N's response to a low rated item on the SALP Report.

According to KING, ARNOLD and BARRETT discussed the contents of the memo and how it should be worded. It was also agreed that the GPU wouldn't publicly critize the NRC without first talking to NRC about the matter.

On page 4 of my second affidavit, I stated that on March 22nd, I had a meeting with Mr. KANGA, Andy WHEELER and Bechtel Public Relations Officer, Doug BEDEL, wherein I was asked if I had a news conference scheduled for March' 23rd. I do not know how Bechtel found out about my new conference on March 23rd. I know '

that Joel ROTH of had told me that he had received a copy of the

l Page 13 of 13 -

affidavit the day before the news conference. I assume that ROTH probably got ~

his copy of the affidavit from a Congressional source. Possibly, Bechtel found out about the news conference through that same or a related Congressional i source.

Also on page 4 of the second affidavit, I state that Mr. KANGA, at a press conference, asserted that the Polar Crane had been originally load tested to b}]{lgfjp 500 tons. Based on conversations that I have had with those associated with the pre-operations test and the fact that I could not find any documents on the pre-operation load test for the polar crane, I disagree with KANGA's assertion that the polar crane had orginally been load tested. In fact, when the Site Operations staff was doing research work on the taped drains, referred to in Mr.

GISCHEL's affidavit, we found that many of the originals on the pre-operation test procedures for TMI-2 were missing. It is my understanding that these pro-cedures should be kept in fireproof vaults./ I am talking about approximately four years of procedures and test documents, etc., that could not be found.

Also missing was the master punch list for open items on pre-operation tests.

It is my understanding that the master punch list is required by law to be kept on site for five years.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 13 typed pages. I have made and initialed any necessary corrections and have signed my name in ink in the margin of each page. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and correct.

Signed on at .

SIGNATURE:

RTCRAIT D. PARKS Subscribed and swor n to before me this day of , 19__,

at .

INVESTIGATOR:

Name:

WITNESS:

Name:

Title:

Exhibit 26 i

L i

i I, Richard D. Parks, hereby make the following voluntary statement to Investi-gators J. Vorse and R. Meeks, who have identified themselves to me as Investi-gators with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions. At the request of Messrs.

Vorse and Meeks, the following sta ment is one of four separate statements that I will be submitting on 0; r:: = : :t THI-2.

This statement covers technical concerns connected with organizational violations in the cleanup. I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to me.

John BARTON, in a February 23, 1983 meeting, asked me if the Recovery Operations Test Manual (AP1047) was the same as the pre-accident test manual. I told BARTON that generically the two were the same.

~

BARTON had approved administrative procedures AP1043 9 agd AP1047 for the TMI-2 Recovery Operations. In reference to his stand on the Plar Crane, BARTON turned his back on his previous experience at TMI-2, and more specifically, on procedures that were followed on the 50/. I s

believe that BARTON was the Start Up and Test Manager for Unit 2, and possibly at Unit 1, during their construction phase, before his duties as C'~*a- -

Deputy Director of M ;' Cpe :tf;ra.Y On page 19 of my March 21, 1983 affidavit, I mention a meeting in Room 201 and 203 on 2/14/83 on the Polar Crane Load Test. I was not present at that meeting and the primary source of my information was Larry KING.

- In reference to Bahman KANGA not being qualified by ANSI standards to be site director, I recall from conversations with KING that both he and Joe CHWASTYK, around or shortly after the middle of September of 1982, went to Lake Barrett of NRC and complained that the Safety Review Group was to report to KANGA but that KANGA, according to ANSI standards, was not qualified to receive an operator's Itcense. ,In this role the Safety Review Group was substituting for the legally approved Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), which reported to Site Operations (50). Through the grapevine, I hear that BARRETT went to GPU and complained that

\

l the internal matters CHWASTYK and KING had brought up to BARRETT should go throui, the chain of command. It is my understanding that the NRC has never approved the reorganization.

At this point I would like to mention a meeting that was held in early January on the Personnel Access Facility (PAF) Sewage Holding Tank. That meeting, which was held in KING's office, also include Jim HILDEBRAND of Rad Con and Jim THIESING.

THEISING was concerned with, in effec., how to conceal in a quarterly report to NRC. the amounts of cesium in the storage tanks. When unacceptable cesium levels

! were detected GPU was worried about an NRC fine, because the PAF was beino used before it was signed off.

I know that Larry XING had earlier objected to the way the procedures were handled on the sewage tank. He felt that the tank could not be used, because it was .not in compliance with state or local laws for control of radioactive sewage to prevent it from spreading to the environment. I believe that KING sent a memorandum to i

4 that effect to BARTON. KING told me that he refused BARTON's order to sign for_

turnover of the sewage tank and suggested that BARTON sign it himself if he felt ,

it was legal . BARTON refused. KING was basing his position on the findings from a GPU Environmental Engineer. KING did sign the procedure when the GPU Environ-mental Engineer reversed his earlier position and stated that the procedure was

legal. Ed GISCHEL, Ken H0FFSTETTER, Kerry HORNER, Pam Stoner-COOPER, Carl HRBAC, Ron WARREN and Gary CHEVALIER may be familiar with the sewage tank matter.

l j

• h h *Y On page 31(! make mention oh he minutes kept by Ken PASTOR of a 2/28/83 meeting on the Readiness Review Committee. There is no formalized procedure for taking l ,

minutes at TMI-2. The established practice is for the organization calling the i

meeting and in charge of the meeting to keep the minutes. The minutes are then type'd by this organization and circulated to the attendees. If there are any disagreements on the contents of the minutes then the per o g i g writes N a memo on his objections. I recall that KING had done this cegoccasion and BARTON i took exception to KING documenting his objection to the minutes on at least one j occasion.

The minutes of the 2/28 meeting showed that NRC approval should go quickly since j NRC comments are already available and should be resolved by the time the Polar  ;

i 1

. , . - --7 --------w , gy. %, ,--..--, - ,, .- --r-- - m-- --

,, -m -i ,we rw4----ere.+--+ea- a7

1 3,-

Crane Operating Procedure is submitted to the NRC.

where site management has used prior NRC approval a n Site in a Operations approval on a specific procedure.

The first instance occurred when Mike RADBILL handed me the Polar Crane Load e Te N was the hottest thing on the Island.

at it the NRC had been involved with the test'all along and tha er had any problems with what was in the Load Test Procedures.

should also sign off. As a result, he said Site Operations This happened around mid-February,1983.

Also, on March 3rd, during a second meeting on the Readiness Revi ew Committee presentation for the Polar Crane, I stated that the Test Work u Group s approve use of the Polar Crane before it was used to .move _I took structur this position because I believed that necessary engineeringoanalyses be performed had ande . the crane tested by a test director under controlled u_s_ed conditions

, before it was THEISING st' ated that the Polar Crane had been rybody his brother, including NRC.

signe'd and off by I

to nove structural steel, despite the absence of a Safet Operations sign-off.

valuation Report or Site M with the controls on use of the fuel handlino n 1981.

buildino was properly controlled, although it is not used for such h That crane i  % Crane. ~

eavy lifts as,the,P,olar The use of early NRC approval as a lever to pressuresign me tobb off on procedures is also new for me.

gts . I have not had that experience at other

) d I also recall that I was given two procedures on thenternal Reactor Vesse d Radiation Measurements and told that PORC had already appro ved the procedures and b that I should go ahead and sign off.

g j .

through the proper review cycle and I, therefore, Report on this. perations Problem wrote a S and asked that I sign off.I cannot recall the name of the person who i j

Report, or he may have just been acting as a go-betweenH{ .

t -

l Concerning the meeting on 2/28 and the conferencen afterwards myself, Jim betwe \

THE! SING and Ron WARREN, I received the distinct impression &that THEISING was W take'c trying own way.

to convince us that this matter was going to be are of in THEISING's During that conference, THEISING wanted to know why was Site Op  !

1

, , - - -- --- .. + -- -- _-e--,.,,vm----nn,.nw-e - -

-4

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trying to assume authority now when they had given it up on things such as the Quick look. I told THEISING that Site Operations %d to under 10 CFR 50 as the responsible group under the, license. THEIS!NG said that was an improper inter-i oretation. If there were accident or deficiency involpng matters handled by NEngineering, the NRC would go after the engineers, notthe operators. The opera-tors were just the people who signed off at the end. I did not believe him.

That was not the law at any of the other plants where I had worked. and I was not aware that the law had been changed for TNI.

By way of explanation on the Quick look Procedures, I recall that back in early 1982 Larry ;ING wrote a memo that Site Operations would cut back on non-vital areas in order to come up with the funds necessary to handle the Quick Look s Operation. KING stated in that memo that Site Operations was preparing the metho-dology and software to handle the Quick look. , BARTON replied that Site Operations

', was to stay out of the Quick Look, that it was Bechtel's and the Technical Advisory Group's responsibility. Site Operations obeyed Mr. BARTON's directive. I believe y that the NRC should review Bechtel's handling of the Quick look. Bechtel resolved the outstanding items on the Quick Look punchlist so quickl_y.that it is impossible

. to have confidence that they were crocerly reviewed.

gb M.m. t i d n 2Y 1

g On page 35(I discuss a meeting g March 3rd concerning the agenda for the

'd y Readiness Review Committee. Ihwas in this meeting that Mr. THEISING stated that

only a person of limited intelligence would think that the whole Polar Crane ap-

% paratus was important to safety. In response to a question by Investigator Meeks concerning THEISING,'s management style, my description of THEISING's personality and method of conducting his daily business is based on the meetings that I have attended with Jim THEISING. I believe he is a dynamic person and would remove all obstacles to get the job done. In response to Investigator Meeks' question to describe KING's management style, personality and methodology of operation, I would state that KING is also dynamic; he has a great deal of fortitude. KING also does whatever it takes to get the job done. However, KING only operates within the' legal boundaries. If necessary, KING would seek to change those boun-l daries so that procedural adherence is maintained wilile still achieving the ob- <

jectives of the program, rather than breaching them himself.

JJ Y On page 38(I make mention of another meeting on March 4th concerning the containment entry procedure dispute. It was my impression that Chtrlie HANSON i

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l l

l i

i of Recovery Programs actually agreed with the stand of Site Operations but could not contradict the personal preferences of Mr. THEISING. Also in this meeting Bill KELLY mentioned that earlier KANGA had ordered to leave the issue of who is in charge of containment entry the way it was written by Recovery Programs, i,.e_.,

that Dave [ LAKE was in charge of Containment. By way of information, before N W January 15 thy all containment work was done by work packages. After January 15th, */*

it was a shift foreman that signed off on UWIs.

Also, on or about the March 'Sth time frame, I attended a meeting on the Integrated Schedule with Joe SMITH of Site Operations, Mike SMITH of RD&D and Butch DAUBERT of Recovery Programs. This meeting was sat up the day of Larry KING's suspension and after KING had made the headlift schedule a known issue. During that meeting, Mike SMITH stated.that in October of 1982 he had wanted to put out an integrated

'N schedule but that Si'te management wanted to work off the headlift schedule. Mike SMITH also stated that RD&D had not received any notification that the June 30th headlift schedule had been relaxed. DAUBERT stated that the relaxation of the June 30th date was npt ye out but that it would be out that week.

g 3 in 4 On page 55h! stated that several sources had shared with me their understanding s that prior to issuing formal NRC letters, Lake BARRETT would submit drafts of TJ these letters to Bob ARNOLD or KANGA for editing or comments.

J C

'd My primary knowledge of this practice comes from conversatiols with Larry KING.

~) KING has stated that the contents of proposed communications on occasions have been massaged over the phone between BARRETT and ARNOLD or KANGA. KING was present on one occasion when BARRETT called KANGA and the conversation was put on the squawk box. VANGA told BARRETT how management would respond if the NRC cited us for some practice. To the best of my knowledge, I believe KING said BARRETT ,

backed off and we weren't cited. Another matter concerned GPU-N's response to a l low rated item on the SALP Report. According to KING, the NRC was upset with GPU-N's critical response. It was agreed that the GPU wouldn't publicly criticize the NRC without first talking to NRC about the matter, i I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 5 typed pages. I have made and initialed any necessary corrections and have signed my name in ink in 'the l

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s Km)J margin of each page. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and correct. -

Signed on im /, /983 at // .*3g 4 A4 ,

SIGNATURE:

' RICHARD 0. PARKS /

Subscribed and sworn to before me this $ ^ day of dus ( ,19 h ,

at & L13 A A E r p'7 e u) A.), _

fA .

ItNESTIGATOR: ,d df/ a/

N=:n . u mas l

WITNESS:

\ NAM E:

Ti tl e:

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Exhibit 27

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Pace 1 of 10 Place: 3 e c=scA 6

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Date: -"N Iv 2S'!*73 I, RICHARD 3. ? ARKS, hereby make the following voluntary state =ent to Investiga:::s J. Vorse and R. Meeks, who have identified tha.=selves as Investigators wi_h the U.S. Nuclear Regv.latory C0= ission. A the request of Investigatcrs Vcese and Meeks, I a= sub itting separate stata=ents f:: distinct aspects of their investigation. T.'.is cratument concerns harass =ent and retaliatica in the TM -2 cleanup.  : =ake l this statement freely with no threats c p::=ises having been made to

=e. - -

u .t v . m w .

Cn page ! cf =y l affidavit, I state that Tem MORRIS told Richard SI:3; r:

that I should be counseled f== =y negative attitude and that SI GLIO: -

related this to myself. Others in Site Operatiens (50) who might have J

, y been tresent when SIIGL O: related this were Larrv. K""NG, Joe CHWASTYK, j Subba MARSHALL, Jchs PIERY, Linda NAGLI, Jcyce WINGIR, .and Madan .KARR.

i A.

1 N Concerning the above =atter, I a= not aware of the persennel procedure

wM that sh=uld be used for cornseline. a=c. lovees . en nega ive attitudes at 1,- TMI-2, whether they be 3echtel c GPU-N a=plevees. . I did not receive

/

any written =e=cs en the =atter f::= 3echtel c GPU. I do recall tha:

g en =y last perfer.ance evaluation Ed K " IR had given =e very good l' y s.

ratings. This perfer=ance evaluatien was done around the January / February

% ti=e period cf 19 23. I can=ct be = re specific, because M . KOLER l did no: :ive me a cepy cf the evaluation.

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On page 19, ! =ention that Larry I"'NG, en 2/11/22, inf===ed the Site Operaticns staff individually and generally about the centents of a ,

=eeting between K"'NG, KANGA, and Id GIS N cn the ?clar Crane SIR.

These 50 me=bers, to he best cf =y recollection, were Messrs. CHWASTYR, MARSHALL, PIRRY, 5". 53 , KARR, Linda NAGLI, and Joyce W.NGIR. In respense

. to a questien by Mr. Meeks c=ncerning 2ARTCN's =anage=ent style, ;

would describe 3ARTON's personality c

characts: as it relates to his  !

daily mode of dcing business as that of an intimidator. BARTON shouts, I j uses foul language, and is a brusque inidividual who of ten inti=ida es an e=:leyee e. cugh threats if tha: empicyee dcas net f llcw 9.rcugh i

V:.e. 3ARTON's wishes c desires. Usually he succeeds in ge :ing his '

way with .he e=ployee. Ecwever, 3ARTON follows up his c.rea:s against a . e=picyee if he thinks it is necessary. 3ARTCN doesn': like to leave

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On i.fge 20,: =encien =y 'c.e.n9ersation with Id_ K T*.IR cn Februa..y 13 . .

regarding E "'.IR's statemen: that he had been asked by Rich GA*.~ AG:-2R

o look into transferring =e off site. He asked me if I knew what I was dein: and how hic. _hese =.ec:le were.

. I said that I cidn't care and would be p ctected by the NRO. I was upset and had KIT *IR re eat the e est in the Site operaticas effice in front of I.arry K*NG and Joe CZWASTYK. Messrs. MAP.SIA~~, ?IRR", SM!I, and Secretary Joyce WINGIR =ay have overheard parts of the conversation as they arrived der wc:k. When F.-~~ IR saw tha: I was taking his ec==ents very sericusly, he t=ied to downe.la.v the issue in an atte=.=t to eccl down the matter.

It was also KI"'LIR's responsibility to cric.i= ally brin 3 up the issues .

, S.a a.. 2 .S.ad . made

. .**. . . ..v. Feb-"a v .' 7 c~ ...e.. s c .. ice _ ...' ..g ' h e .ta.' a: C.ane

• cad Test and the an..=lica:icn of ::ccedures A? 1043 and A? 1047. _M,v Februarv. 17 cec: tents had =cflected nosa_ively en his failure to raise Y the same issues.

_ On page 23 I discuss the E **:ARD phone calls to *.arry K NG, Gieria K33, 1 N, and Ban amin d S*.,0NI.

a Open further reflection. I believe the calls

, occurred sc=etime between February 14 and the ti e *ar v K!NG was I r- escerced eff-sica. SI.ONI since has cid me -"at

,  :* - - * *. 2 9 -*a# #

'O h.1= a n"-ker of times. LL **ARD also =ade phene calls to Rennie

.'. .'CCIA in Ohio about the same matter. MTCIA, at that time, was S ONI's fiance. After a conversation on c around Februarv. 23. with S ONI aucut '

he E'.2 ARD phone calls, SI,0NI had =entioned Oc me that he talked to

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because of an um.ec=in3 recre.a .ication at "'MI-2. I advised SLO'E not o touch that cen act with a ten foot pole.

. On rac.es 27 and 28, I discuss K'NG 's susc. ensien f c= TMI-2 fe: his a 1egec ,. . ,4_3_4 . _

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=3 id I would ta'h to *arry K"NG ahCut lining up a job for E "~IR with l

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Au ust 1952 time frame, .,arr. y KC;3 asked =e .t.o_' l.i_;.e u: a vr.is: for s _ _, e _ ._ s... e s e.

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. _ o_, . ,e. ..,e se ._a,.s o.,e. se .. _. ,

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c .d she typed up various res=es that were generi in nature. :

recall that s==e of the resumes were these of !arry K2;G, Bill A;ST ;,

Kingsly DFJJIR, and possi.bly Ken ! YON-;J.I:iOS. Also during the July /

Augus: 1952 ti=e frame, I recall tha: Rich GA!LA3EER asked p.e ei-her m a..-

when K3G was gcing = leave for Ouilta=, or if KniG -w.e Cuiltec.

._o a sk., n_,.m. .

u o ., d Ga. . a.ac

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At the A:ril 26 congressienal hearing, it was stated that Mr. TEI!S3G

) first learned of Cuiltec in Neve=ber 1982. Ar==d the Nove=ber/Decerier n

q 19S2 ti=a period, I reme=he: Ben S' ONI talking to =e about Joe ChTaS"'YK's involvement with

• arrv. K3G and ChTaS"'YK's atta=s. t to chtain a position iy with Cuiltec.  :: know that C M S m attended a Guiltec meeting with I \ K3G, SLONI, and Gieria KING at the K2;35' house c = ing this ti=e t- period. It was also during this -' -e frame that CHWASTYK vent to i Beaver Valley with John ECAG, a relative of King's and also a merier of Quiltec. At 3eaver valley, C*WAS"'YK contacted Don SKC:MORI of

,2 ,

Oucuense !ight C =pany, the licensee at Beaver Valley, about a Quiltec g

'; crocosal and e.cssible centra:: at Beaver Vallev..

. . 0: GAS"YK later : ld f =e t. hat when 3 saver Valley came th:= ugh none of us wculd have to wc::y X about the way 3echtel is trying to move the schedule ahead and take over things. The 50 staff was generally aware of CHWAS-'YK's and K2iG's involve =ent with Cuiltec. It was also c=ing this time frame that K!"'*IR

=ade a c - en to =e that Larry K3G should be careful because it was starting to get around about KOiG and Quiltec. I told K-~~IR that K2;G was not the =ost dis = eet individual about maintaining a low profile c= the Cuiltec =atter, because he did ne: believe he had done anything wrong.

! believe it is signifi= ant that Mr. TEI:53G, the head of Recovery

?:cgra=s, chose no: to confront KriG for.an. explanation er to suggest co=se, ling en p Oper business practices. Instead, he sa en the 4.,4,. . . .. g __ _4 _. ..,.7.

. b a ...e

. 8 ..5e .c.'., s_a_"_.'..'.*_'_'a_..-_d..-. a.e ....' e _i ' s sh:rtcuts en the polar crane progra=, and when Kni3 was solidifying

= _ . -- -.- . . . __ . - - _ - _- - __ __

I

- age 4 cf 10 , _

his legal responsibility within tha chain =f e--e.d. Then ali cf n sudden the issue became a major scandal, and si=ultanteusly Bech:s*,

n::e=ptef to recruit K3G into engaging in serious conflic s of

_ interest with Cuilte:. Although KOiG did not responi to the i=pr per

-e:p:ation, he was fired anyway.

Aro=d February 1983 : recall dat Jim CEEISOiG and 3i11 AUST2 wen:

on a skiing : ip. OuringthecongressionalhearingenAf:i126, i was stated that in February.TEZISOiG, while en a business ::ip, was told a second time abou: KriG's involvenant with Cuilte . Possibly this was the business .:1p that was referenced in the congressional testi==ny.

Senetime during the latter part cf 1982 or the first par: ef 1953, I

q Dick JU33A cf Nine Mile ? cine, an e=ployee of 3schtel, phoned Larry

' M. K3G and asked him sc=e cuesticas about Quiltec and K3G's involve =en:

> with Quiltec. I recall, f == conversations wi.h Larry and Gieria KOiG, that there were two phone calls f == JU33A on this matter, the second around the time K2iG was suspended. I was in KOiG's house when the

> cecond phone call was received.

./

q feel that the Quiltec =atter displayed a doubie standard and was I defd-4:aly blown out of pr portion. In the nuclear energy industry one is always mindful =f the various opper: unities available f c:

advancement and pr:Eto icn at c hor nuclear sites. Only twe GPU empicyees jQ left for Quiltec, Mike I-3"C. EY and Ted RICKIRT. Both of the= were J

l \ leaving anyway, however. Furthei,~they appr ached Quiltee f== a jch.

,K3G did not re::uit them. In fact, I a= not aware of any instance where K3G sclicited or ::ied to " seduce" GPU employees to wc:k fc:

Ouiltec, as clai=ed by G?U at the April 26 congressional hearine, i

i Al hough a nu=ber of G?U employees had resu=es with Cuiltec, it was i

always at their own initiative. Fr== =y cenversa-J. ns with them, !

i k =w that they were locking for ichs at other fir =s as well. In my i

j Sh years experience with the ce==arcial nuclear industry, - "-' g l

i

.o::urred with respe : to Cuilte: that was inconsistent with ne==al

actices in the industry.

In fact, I was 'first hired by G?O in a na:ner similar to how Ouil e:

cperates. While I was werking for Inergy Censul ants, In: . , .':y subse- l eue=t a=ployer NUS sent a prep = sal that included =y resu=e to G?U l

)

l

Sage 5 of 10 ,

with ut first checking vi h Inergy 0:nsultants. NTS is a 3:b sh:pper similt.: to Ouilte:. G?T did not conde=n =y hiring but has cer.de.ned K2iG and Ouil ee. ,Further, ... TM: empicyees such as CHWASTYK and K - IR were n : fired c even efficially disciplined, to =y kn:wledge, for their a :ive efforts to ob:ain business f== Quilta=,

was during the first part cf January that Id K.T R :old me his 1 t..ansfer to Florida had been a::anged. K:- .IR asked if : would.take cyn: his position as Startup and Test Manager. I 1.:nediately talked to Dave suchannon, who was head of Design Ingineering f== G?d, and told hi= tha: I would take K!""IR's job caly if it were ::ansferred to Site d Opera:icas. SCOEANNON stated that he didn't know anything about the l N'- u K: :.IR transfer and that he would look into it. K ""IR did stay on site.

4 However, he was absent f == TM -2 the week after K2iG's suspension.

.K T .IR returned en or a.bcut March 6 or 9. After he re:urned I asked Dave SUCIA'iMON how he got K "LER to stay. SCCEANNON stated t.E.at he wc ked out a deal with 3ARTON to get K-".IR's per dia= taken care cf although it was supposed to have run cut. Dwigh: WALKIR headed up the Test Wc k G cup -- one of K "':.IR's normal duties -- while K - IR was gone.

KANGA, in his tes-' eny before Cengress en April 26, stated that he firs:

y' .

heard of K2iG's involvement with Cuiltec on Februarv '4 and that he, J

C, KANGA, was on sick leave that day. KANGA stated that he received a

\ phone call on the =atter while he was at h==e. He said the phone call  ;

was f := 3ARTON, and was made at app =ximately 6:00 P.M. to the best of =y recolle.c.. tion. o I also recall, however, that Larrv. K2iG told me l A

of a meeting had with KANGA on-site the sa=e day KANGA supposedly was i

' sick, February 24, at 1:00 P.M. The meeting concerned the containmen,_ a n. e u ~. - e + 't"

, entry p cce:iure and was cut eff f : a fire safety nee:ing;:::. was m ir% .t.P s i

dring :=te meeting that K2iG told KANGA that he was legally supposed -4e to be is charge of the "'M -2 cleanup, but that it was apparen EI:32iG z..;- : -

i warte ' to run the show. LARSON, who was head cf licensing, the same day'g,.s J :

I had earlier informed K2iG that he was in charge of the recovery e -

l .

n. . 1 operaticas. At the February 24 centainnent entry procedure meeting, -

.}j KANGA a'so Old K NG that he was the boss and this fact was Oc be put 8 .) 5.

ws l in writing. This was in reference to KING being =ade the alternate to .L}

o ~

KANGA and thus offi:ially designating s: ecne in upper managenant who

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Jage 6 of 10 '

met the A';S: standards as plant =anager c alternate plant manager.

This meeting illus :n es how TX:-2 =anagement waited to use Quilte:

egainst K3G until immediately af to: his responsibilities and authority j were finally clarified. It may also demonstrate that Mr. TXiGA was

_.less than candid with Congress about the Quiltec matter. '

I On page 21 of =y affidavit refer to a Tehruary 28 meetihg. At the '

I meeting TEEIS3G =ade a statement that he c uld understand why.certain

people were afraid of a transfer. The cc

=ent came about as a result of our discussi=n en he NRC examining the polar crane issue at that  ;

L i time and Id K ""IR being called in by NRC and interviewed by Joel WI:3E.

s I

We also were talking about Larry KING's suspension in the sara context, M We were told that the NRC was not finding any problems with the polar I: a crane. THE 53G's remark about a transfer, which I felt was obviously

9q i dire =_ad at me, was a result of co=ments on these topics.

1 on page 32 : began a series of c:=ments en mamos that Joe CHWAS"'YK and i ': wrote , basically cen=erning the application of AP 1043 and AP 1047

.' l.

l

o the Pola Crane Lead Test. CHWASTYK was in full philosophical

{. ; agreement with these me=es.

. - I feel that CHWASYYK believed he was only i u going to be Acting Site operations Director for a sher time. In a

' N, s

i. g . masting with the 50 staff right after he assumed the acting position, J+ CEWASTYK predicted that the K3G incident would be ever and K3G would

\ ba back on the job the next week. In f act, on one occasion during tha-i l

ti=e showed CHWASTYK some meeting minutes and said it was obvious that l

4 the pclar crane was not ready. CHWASTYK said I should get the infor=ation j to I,arry KUG. However, after a few weeks I got the i=pression that t

CHWASTYK's opinion of what would happen in the K3G matter had changed.

I also believe that C3WASTYK, as he attended the various recovery meetings,

) =calized that K3G was not going to retu.n and that =anagement considered l m3 as an obstacle the same as K3G had been. I believe that CZWAS*YK knew that =y wife was dead as did most of the 50 staff, because : had j _nover made a secret of that tragedy. When CHWAS*YK =ade his phone call to Gloria K3G and stated that my wife was trying to dig up something j

en the child custody case, I feel it was Cn%STYK's indirect way cf trying f, to tell me that I was targeted.as KING had been.

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/ age 7 of 10 I believe that CHk%STYK was replaced with SARTON as Acting Site Operatic =s Dire:::: because GPU investigat::s en the K2iG =atter had spoken wi_h CHWAS"YK and discussed his involvement with CC- .*IC.

-After one such meeting, CEWASTYK told me that he had,$ust w attended one cf his last meetings at TM -2. There was .e5 : :. .. a ,,,' = . disciplinary netion taken against CHWASTYK for his activities on behalf of Cuilta=,

~

however. Instead, there was a more subtle response such as making his Acting 50 Director status temporary. .I also understand tha during ,

his :1.=e period CH'ASTYK was taken off a TV c=mercial that GPU was to air.

,} Cs page 33 I mention that 3ARTON accused Joyce WENGER cf xeroxing and k6 taking to Larry K2iG a memorandum that had been missing on February  !

28 but had reappeared the morning of March 1. The memo in question was M.

the so-called "Sm: king Gun' Memo" dat K2iG had written to KANGA and 3ARTON about his concerns on the lack of an Integrated Head Lift Schedule f

[ cnd failure to meet previous == mitmemes. I think the memo number was arou ui 069, but I am not sure of this. I recall that on Monday morning ,

s February 23, Joyce WENGIR had made the cement to the 50 staff in genei zl  ;

J g hat the memo was :.issing f cm the file and that she was looking for it. .

M She also said dat K31G wanted his copy of the meme. On Tuesday l morning, the memo appeared back in the file. l N f.

Cn page 45 I explained d at on March 10 I had a discussion with Cari {

l ERBAC, Ed GISCZIL and another member of Plan: Engineering concerning the fact tha: ARNCLD had asked La.ry K2iG about my involvement with Quiltae. I believe that the other member cf Plant Engineering was Ji= EINDIRSON.

On page 46 I mention a 1:30 meeting that I had with Joe CHWASTYK on March 10, 1983. That meeting was held in CHWAS"YK's office and de only other person that heard part of the eenversation was CHWASTYK's j ,

seerstary,, 3cnnie SHIRWOC3. CHhAS"YK started this conversatica as we were walking into his offi=e. 3canie was sitting right there and may have overheard the first part of the c=nversatica before CEWAST'7-c1: sed the door Oc his office.

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I i

- age 8 cf 10_. ,_ ,

j  : also recall that == the same day OMSTYK had previously held a messing with the Site Operatiens supervis= s. In that meeting OHWASTYF.  ;

j stated that semebody had been ce==unicating to NRC on a daily basis.  !

j 4

Chn%STYK :s=inded us that we should be =indful cf the story of the bey  !.

i who cried w=1f.  !

f I

{ cn page 47 : =ade mention of Jo4 c m STYK's March 10, 1983 phone call i I to Gloria KING, when he stated that my wife was trying to dig up some '

1 negative information fc the child custody case. After I was put en  !

i leave of absen=e, I remember talking to CHWAS"'YK by phone.' I told '.

i hi= that I had interpreted this statement to G1cria KING as a friendly var =ing to me. At the time, CHh%STYK did not disagree. CHWASTYK had a criginally called G1cria and asked her about leaks to the press. The

, press leaks were in reference to an article in the Washincton Post, 1 -- 4 '

by Susan STRANAEAN, en the G7U-Babecek and Wilecx trial.- The article

appeared on February 13, less than two weeks before Larry KING was

muspended.

y

\f On page 49 I discussed =y March 15 =eeting with Messrs. SANFORD, I

WEE""4, and BOFFMAN. I did n=t observe any n tes being taken  ;

l y during that meeting. However, Mr. HOFFMAN was sit.ing behind me and

~I it was possible that he teck n:tes during this meeting. When : arrived jN a

fer the meeting tha' morning Mr. SANFORD asked me when' I had arrived 1.

!i ,

Gaithersburg, whether I had left Gaithersburg the night before c that

mer* g, and what ti=e

had left.

I

] On page 50 I made mention of the break-in of n.y apartment whi=h .

.A..P.......on Wednesday, Mar =h 16, the first"-ime :

I

{

T discovered ar.o_.d.7:30 un. .

1

, fa.t.sdned to =y' apartment a. f ter' th. e.. meeting ~with E.:. SANFORD.

- I had last

. lef t the apartment on Monday evening, Mar =h 4, around 9:00 P.M. When 4

i I returned I noticed that the deadbolt lock on the f =nt deer was cDon, nithough I always keep it locked. "'hm t ="at ha hew ^= l e da-n la" -

l . They came in through the patio door, which was still 1.5 inches open.

The lock had been tampered with the marks were still visible. ' checked i

and saw that my tax papers 'had been g:ne through and restacked neatly in

l I

i J- age 9 of 10 -

the w:=ng order. Some bachyrcund infc =ation abou: the G:ve==mant

A=cou. ability ? je

: had been lying c= the coffee table and als: had i been reshuffled.  : reper.ed this burglary investication to .he i

Middletown police. To this date, there has been no disp =sitien.

I also w=uld like to pein out that on M:nday afterncen, March 14, I was cleaning cut my desk at werk. Subba MARSEALL, Jim yLOYD, and Joe CHESTYK, as well as Bennie, the tenporary secretary, were present at the time. Earlier in the day I had asked CanSTYK if could use the Site operations staff := go through wc k documents on the head lif t

• and show the hours expended by 50. I wanted to resear=h how be conflicting head lift and polar crane schedules affected the efficiency d and effe :iveness of So wc k, which I believe had suffered because cf the conflicting schedules. CHWASTYK told me that a task force was gcing to come up with a total integrated schedule and that the work

^l d

\ would n=: be needed.

! s' on page 52 : =ade mentien of a 1: 00 p.m. meeting on March 17 with KANGA j -

and CH ESTYK concerning my removal as the primary Site Operations j member en the Test Work G =up (TWG) for the polar crane project. I will

. . N

add that earlier that day I had met with CHWASTYK on the same subject.

j~M ,

CH n STYK since has told =y atterney that at the ti=a : agreed with

,' Q j

and welcomed the decision, because I had become too personally involved l  % with and emotional about the polar crane. I can state withou: ,

I Indeed, I was

question that I did not express any such agreement.

! al sady preparing a complaint f== the Department of Labor challenging l 1

the last time my duties had been removed like that.-- on February 23 l wi h he alternate startup and tes superviser position. Further, I'

~~

ce=plained to Bubba MARSHALL that same day about 'what had happened with the "'WG.

1

! With respect to KANGA asking me twice at the Mardh',17 meef.ing to agree l'

that my removal was not an act of intimidation, I will add that after 1

1 .: refused 'the second time to sav. what he wanted, KMGA had CERSTYK

• i l

sign en the spot the memo autherizing my removal. .

i

'Dwaim $ hidw y ' a dea

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I have read the forageing statemen: consistine of 13 t?eed pa:es. :

~ ~ - ' ~

~ ~ ~ ~ -

have made a ' ' d-d aled any necessary ec:rections and hive sisned my name in ink en the margin of each page. I swear that the foregeing statement is true and cc. rect, to the best cf =y knowledge and belief.

Signed on d)j af f*tb at 'e 6 nba ' Mb .

SIGNATUPJ.: ,11,, _ _. O i.h . --L -

.% . .. . -.g .,.,

. e.s

e. ,. ..3[

~l Subscribed and sworn t5 before me this O5%

day of J wiu ,

o . ... . . .

Ot l'.> rT u es S A . . M. B. . . .

I DWISTIGATOR: t- M/

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Title:

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l Exhibit 28

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Iage 1 of 2 Place: .5,- . v e 4 l$ ' a_ l a.a -. .. ,. . c. p >

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y u.e, . ..' s s .' .. . e o _ _' s . . o _' _' _' "_ s ._ a .e , on ac.e e ."-"- *.* ~.,":

. . s e . .d .n. a.' .' .' .' a ' ~-

I state that :::. KAiGA, at a =ress conference, asserted that the colar . .

crane originally had been lead tested to 500 tons. Based en c.;.n..".e..rs.a. tie.ns s.' ' tha: I have had with those associated with the pre-cperation tests' add %-

r. s..

s

' . e _" a ~. ~. ..". a . . . -. "__' ' .. .-

. " .' .. '. an v, d ~..'. ..e.. .s .' .. .n' o .. e -c r _e a __' e .

lead test for the polar crane, I disagree with F.A::GA's assertion tha: 9

na colar crane had cri5inallv been lead tested.

. . In fact, when.the .i 7

a.

Site cperati:ns staff was doing research werk on the taped drains, ,,

_ . .. a. e4 .v. . - u 3. . e 5 a.'."..'.avi., we 'o".d

. . ..'.a . ...= . .. v o. ' *.*.e x- r.

criginals en the cre-cc.aratica test crocedures fer *M -2 were missing.

.t.-

.. _a ..y n_n a_ a_. s a.,.a..t . .,. .ga.

.. . ._.4ese f o,.e . a . es s.u. n..a. .

e ye__. .t..-

firepr ef vaults. I a= calkini about a:Orcximatelv. fcur vears verth .. .

cf racerds such as procedures and tes: docu=ents that could not be 2 ... . . m. a. .

Also missin-v was the = aster c.unch lis for open items on the .=re-epara icn

.es.s.

. . .ne .nen. _34 s 4.aan..4 .,.4 e a a.3 _3 ...no _.e..a _4 ..4.. ., _4.a s .ha.. s._4_3.,

needed to be finished er resolved after the clan: began operations.

Sin:e there already has been ene accident, I think it is i.;erative ,

i

.. .. a --k d -w.. ..he . e s . .' ..".e d c.- .a.. . ... ck.. .' e ..s .

v. " .d e. s . a .. ... .

ha: the :. aster . unch list is required to be ke : en site f:: five .vears. . 1 l

believe that the pelar ::ane is c ;1y cne example of a fundaman:al l u.,.a .

s_..,.,. . . .t . . . - . . _ _ . . , _ , , e ,. . .. e g .a .a .: , ._ _a . ., , . e , . v a ._ , ... , '._ c....o n e.. _ s ' -i

..e '*:::-2 cleanup. Ter ext =;1e, around !:Ove=ber 1930 the startu; and

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radiation detecticn er.ui=.=ent, and waste storage fa di4 d es.

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.

• wanted to i==ediat.elv set um a full testine =ro::a=, but P.r. 3AR705

._- infor=ed us of a =anagement decision with NRC aper = val shortly after

!N -he accifent to forec.o c.uality assurance for =edifications. While the de:isien =ay have been justified during the e=ergency, there was g 'no reason to =a.ke it a routine. We invited the NRC to check the tes:

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proyra= was established, but it eniv. covered =edifications af ter the

.s --approval date of the program. The =cdifications =ade prior to the

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=ade and initialed any necessarv. corrections and have signed =y name in

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.. . m_, .. .w_.r.c_ : < w.,, u RIC"ARD D. PARKS l swo.-,.. . w.. ,e _so r ._ n. -

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i, ._ __. I Exhibit 29 OFFICIAL. USE ONLY

~

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Exhibit 30 m, DENI ACCOdNTADg PROJECT {)

. f rpokw S:vdies (202)236 9382

-[' ve Street. N.W.'. Wo5h'ncton D.C. 20009

. 1 March 23, 1983 l The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairraan Palladino:

The Government Accountability Project (GAP) is representing Mr. Richard Parks, a senior startup engineer at Three Mile Island (TMI) - Unit II. Our decision to represent Mr. Parks in based on a 56-page af fidavit he provided over the weekend, as well as veri-fication intervie~ws with additional witnesses who supported both his ,

J charges and personal credibility.

In his affidavit Mr. Parks discloses, inter alia, 1) safety-related modifications to equipment and components w1thout full prior

~

engineeiing and approval; 2) quality assurance violations through issuance of test and administrative procedures without prior re-view and approval: 3) plans to use the polar crane without con-ducting all necessary safety tests and conclusions; 4) severe harass-ment 'and retaliation against those who internally challenged these violations, including investigation and dis =issal for utterly pre-textual, previously-unrefined off enses; and 5) NRC collusion with

.the misconduct. J Based on his experience, Mr. Parks believes that these practices

w. r e intentional. He also believes that they compromise the system The dispute resulted of oroani:stional checks and balances at TMI.

f rom a management attempt to conduct additional radiation monitoring without falling behind schedule after it was discovered and reported on January 6, 1983 that radiation levels under the reacter vessel are 30 times higher than previously estimated.

We are alarmed that Mr. Parks ' experience mirrors that of so many other nuclear workers who have contacted us. He reports Instead, that your agency has failed to aggressively pursue his concerns.

NRC representatives violated his confidentiality, flatly refused to investigate his charges of reprisals, and rejected his allegations j

on flatly inaccurate grounds contradicted bothPerhaps by NRCmost notes disturbing, and cor-l parate OA records issued at the same time.

' he reported a practice at TMI for NRC representatives to provide the licensee with advance draf ts of Commission documents, and vice verca. After a connensus was reached, the "of ficial" version would be relcased.

. Q March 23, 1983 Chairman Palladino '

U.S . Suelear Regulaccry CO:=.issien .

The continuing allegations of NRC-utility collusion are shate tering public confidence in the Commission. Mr . P arks , and GAP, want to cooperate with the NRC. As a result, we are submitting his

{

I affidavit for your review. Unfortunately, to date Commission rep-  !

rosentatives have not responded to Mr. Parks in good faith. As.a result, we have advised Mr. Parks not to comnunicate further with the NRC until we can negotiate with the Commission to ensure that objective, independent technical and investigative staf f will b,e ,

assigned to his case.

I look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerelyg .

-4 Themas Devine .

T/ea L'egal Director enclosure a O

e l

l l

l l

e 6

I

, Exhibit 31 5 DRAFT FOR MYSTERY MAN AFFIDAVIT On pages 36-37 of my affidavit I expressed reservation.s at George Kunder's role as Plant Operations Review Committee ("PORC")

and Safety Review Group ("SRG") chairman, in light of the significant nature of those jobs and Kunder's performance during the TMI accident.

l I also disclosed that Kunder had been identified in discussions at r

Site Operations ("SO') offices as the man who shut off the High Pressure Injection ("HPI") pumps.

This portion of my affidavit was an extremely condensed introduction to iny concerns, both about Kunder's role in the cleanup and the events surrounding the damage to Unit II during the accident.

s.

i Since investigators Meeks'and Vorsh are investigating the issue this statement will fully disclose my concerns. I am available for further interviews with the NRC on the relevant underlying analysis.

Initially, certain statements from my affidavit must be clari-fled and presented in their proper context. General Public Utilities Nuclear ("GPUN") -- in congressional testimony summarizing the pre-liminary findings of the Stier investigation for which it contracted -- l attempted to rebut my disclosure by dissecting the literal meaning of individual phrases examined in isolation. By expanding my dis-  !

closure through this statement, this confusion should be eliminated. l For instance, Bernie Smith discussed Kunder's activities at the accident in much more general terms than Joe Chwastyk, who identified the safety injection pumps. Further, the discussions about Kunder and the pumps involved several different actions -- shutting down the Reactor Coolant Pumps ("RCP") and the HPI, or safety injection pumps. (The HPI pumps are also known as the makeup pumps) .

f 1

4

, l The time fr'ame that I recall Kunder being identified as the man l l

who shut 'eff the safety injection pumps was during March 1983.

Earlier conversations involved his actioni turning off the RCP's.

To the best of my recollection, the specific language from i OHWASTYK in March involved a statement that George " shut off the i

safety injection pumps." I am not sure whether he also used the

{

words " mystery man" in reference to Kunder. My affidavit should not be read as a quotation in this respect. I did intend to dis-l close the meaning of what I had heard, however. It meant that,

' if true, Kunder was the " mystery man" written about in the press 4Camd d ok

'- - the GPU - Babcock and Wilcox ("B&W") trial. The trial and news accounts naturally were discussed on site, and the term had come up dn discussions at the 50 office area.

In addition to clarifying the details, I wish to remove any lack of clarity about my motives in raising the issue. I do not and did not harbor any dislike toward Mr. Kunder. We have had a i

professional working relationship since 1980 and only had hard feelings once. That occasion was around last Christmas and 2E' apologized to him within a few minutes. My grumbling at the time was soon forgotten.

j While I do not wish Kunder ill, I felt that his unique position in the TMI cleanup raised a serious question about management i

competence and/or integrity. The PORC committee which Kunder led j had the responsibility to review procedures, although final approval was through Larry King as SS Director. In this role Kunder and PORC still reported to the 50 Director and was one of the resources for the department in TMI's checks and balances. While I was sometimes irritated at delays, it was part of -the job.

l .

l l

,.-...-.-...-,,--,.,--._,..-..-_---..,-.--.--,-,.--_,,,,...-.-,.,,-m,,- .

-,-,,,n-- , - , - , . .- - ,.,.,.,n,

5 hhenKunderbegantoserveasSRGChairman,however,his qualifications assumed increased importance. SRG would have more legitimacy than PORC, because the members'would work full time.

Mos t significant, in my opinion and detailed in another statement, SRG represented an illegal attempt to bypass SO without Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval. The new committee would report to Mr. Kanga. It could now be a resource to rebut the SO position, W40 which simultaneously was stripped of the review base PORC4formerly represented.

This organizational switch to SRG occurred around the time pressure was building on SO to approve the polar crane and headlif t procedures before our concerns and comments were properly addressed.

Due to'SRG's questionable legality and role motivation, the cleanup could be significantly compr'[ sed if the chairman were not sufficienti:

objective and invulnerable to management pressure j in order to provide an independent review. In these respects, Mr. Kunder's record, especially at the accident, made me doubt whether management had good faith motives to place him in charge of the SRG.

To illustrate, Mr. Kunder did not appear objective. He accpeted procedures from Recovery Programs ( " RP " ) with cursory reviews but subjected the SO efforts to unnecessary scrutiny on occasions, sugh as with procedures that I prepared and were eventuall3 approved for draining the "A" Steam Generator. I felt that Kunder's quick approvals of inadequate headlift procedures could lead to ,

i safety hazards, while his meticulous reviews of other procedures i

created unnecessary burdens on well-controlled programs within the -

cleanup.

)

l 1

W

I questioned management appointing Kunder to this position in light 'of his record at the accident. My concerns about his i appointment go beyond whether Mr. Kunder was the " Mystery Man. "

At the accident he also followed procedures literally and shut off l

the Reactor Coolant Pumps, although there were conflicting signals and indications that literal procedural compliance could be a mis take at the wrong time. In short, I was concerned that during the accident Kunder did not see the forest through the trees, and now he would continue that approach as SRG Chairman. I sincerely believed that the role of SRG and the qualifications of its chairman were issues about the cleanup that needed to be raised. -

I also questioned Kunder's independence from management pressure, due to the events during the accident. - ~ "" -'

) '

I was concerned' that Kunder would not feel sufficiently independent to challenge the management

pressure surrounding the headlift. He is vulnerable if he indeed was responsible for significant damage. If Kunder is also the

" mystery man" he would be even more vulnerable.

My concerns about Kunder's indepenclence were not just hypo-PaA0 thetical. I have disclosed specific questionable

• approval practices in my other statements.

' weee m.m._ e _

1

i m '

I knew that at the trial an analysis from EDS Nuclear, Inc. )

was introduced to conclude that the HPI pumps were not turned on at 5: 41 A.M. (the approximate time at issue in my affidavit). I knew that this analysis was introduced'just before operators Zewe and Fredericks, who were among those reponsible for the HPI pumps, switched their testimony in conformance with the EDS' palcula-Z sks! THAf' TM My% WhJ Sente@

tions.' Operator Faust did not, however. Orhe EDS analysis had d M y l.

unproven, incomplete and inaccurate assumptions, which make it [MA c,,ved 7,(7jff especially questionable as a basis to effectively rewrite the el Tr/e'

/ff udf f l 7A go() Ad4cyttf

• history or Sequence of Events already published by GPU and not yet amended, to my -knowledge. Finally, the trial was settled abruptly and unexpectedly-shortly af ter the EDS report was introduced.

I knew of these developments and the mystery man, because as dis-l cussed earlier the trial and its settlement was a common topic on '

site. All of these events convinced me that the " mystery man" issue should be investigated thoroughly.

My own review of the EDS report suggests that its conclusions are premature. Access to the relevant supporting data is necessary for more definitive conclusions. My evaluation of the EDS report is based on the adequacy of its premise. The analysis basically rests on the premise that the level of the makeup tank also deter-( l mined whether the second HPI pump, makeup pump "C", was initiated l at 5:41. EDS analy e and prepared graphs for the makeup tank 1

l

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t j

eevees surrounding two times that it concluded HPI pumps were initiated, at 4:02 and 7:20, as well as for 5:41. The graph for 5: 41 did not exhibit the same characteristics. Although the EDS analysis is reasonable, it's significance is limited due to j the eve-of selective use of data and unjustified assumptions, 1

all biased in favor of the EDS premise.

$ e There are a series of questionable factors with re'spect to i

the EDS claim that turning on the HPI pumps at 4:02 accounts for the graph in its report. In some instances the facts as reported 4

are suspect. For example, EDS asserts that an operator started MUP l-A and opened MU-VI6b at the time of the reactor trip. But J

j the Sequence of Events NHHH reports that the evolution did not occur until 41 seconds af ter the reactor trip jor 4:01:31 A.M.

Similarly EDS offers no citation for its claim that the BWST

] suction valve, DH-VSA, opened at 4:02:13. This assumption also is not verified in the COE.

l In fact, the Emergency Core Colling System (ECCS), which i

includes the HPI pumps, did not have to be turned on at all at 4:02 in order to produce the characteristics on the EDS graph. Alternate i nuAlq3E i

sources better explain the increase in pressure. EDS did not ---1ya.

i whether the increase in pressure at 4:02 could have 'come from oepning the MUT Level Control Valve (MU-V-9 ) to refill the tank frcu the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBT), .instead of from the l

l HP1 pumps. This explanation would be consistent with the require-i l ments in emergency procedure 2202-1.3 for operators. In other I

words, EDS failed to consider the possibility that the operators

,.-,,w__._.,,--------..-,--y -- ,--,. ,_,,,, , ,.--, - -m- ,.,-.--.-_.,,,..w.. --m. .-----,--r,

l .

followed the procedures at 4:02. Similarly, EDS failed to

! consider ithether at 4:02 water was drawn automatically through the makeup level control valve,. again as an alternative to the HPI -

assumption.

These alternative explanations are even more persuasive when the EDS assumptions are compared with the capacity of the HPI l pumps and the data provided by EDS. The ED'S graph discloses a f four inch rise (approximately 280 grams per minute) in the makeup

tank during the 26 seconds from 4

02:13 - 4:02:39. That is a sub-stantially higher rise than is achievable ' solely from HPI pump recirculation flow. ..

4 Finally, even if EDS' assumptions and facts were accurate, the results' demonstrate that conditions were not analogous at 4:02 and 5:41. For instance, different pumps would have been i

involved. At 4:02 the A&B pumps would have been used. At 5:41 the i

l A&C pumps would have been running. The C pump can only draw from the BWST. Even more revealing, the 4:02 incident would have involved ed switchingstwo pumps. The 5:41 event would only have involved switching e/

1 I on the C pump.

i 1 The EDS analysis of events at 5:41 is no more definitive. To i

illustrate, in some cases the analysis is incomplete. On page 12 of its report EDS states that upon ECCS actuation'DH-V5A vas opened.

On page 13 EDS states that the injection valves MU-V-16A and. B i

j also opened. Unfortunately, the report failed to identify when i

they were shut af ter 4:02 and plot the offacte on* 4graph.

i j

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_-_.J.__--- .-_-- _-,_ .___.__-,-a., _ ~ _ ,._ -_,. _ _-.

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t The EDS analysis concerning 5:41 concludes that the HPI pumps could not have been turned on at 5:41, since the makeup

tank leve1 was only at 59.' However, EDS f ailed to analyse the j special circumstances then in effect, such as increased letdown

! flow, lowered reactor coolant system pressure, and higher tempera-tures than normal.

i Most persuasive, EDS' conclusions about 5:41 contradict i

i j other data in its report. On page 16 of the report EDS stated i

that a makeup tank pressure of 39 88/f would have been necessary to achieve the 59" level. But figure 14 in the same 1

, report indicates that the 59" la' vel was achievable with 31.5 AI/8, i

Finally, the EDS analysis of conditions at 7:20 assumes an initial makeup tank pressure of 27 )k/d , only nominally higher than normal.

Thisassumption'failstoanalygethesevereeffects l of the accidents which between 5:30 and 7:20 had led to superheated steam and significant portions of the reactor coolant system in a

{ steam-void condition by 6:00 A.M., to two-thirds of the reactor l core uncovered by around 6:20, to hydrogen generation and half the

{ reactor coolant system free volume in a steam hydrogen mixture by 4

i around 7:00 A.M. These conditions could well have led to abnormal overpressurization due to steam and/or hydrogen in the top of the makeup tank, a possibility not considered by EDS.

1

! I will cooperate fully with the NRC in answering specific l

{ questions in more detail about my assessment. I am confident i

! that my analysis can be expanded significantly if I can examine the underlying data relied on by EDS.

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K <,. C i & /J & 4 ,. = 9 s R - $, vcu 9 . 1  ? 34,l[/rf '" Ay A r e y , ls g / A ; .4 , ~ ,< ,. s.: , -r$n , .Lf v: C/sX4-< <t 4A<4 /zd / 4~4A (m)J,tJL 46-nO c  % - . !: / o A ~<N oJ z o 9 l 1 1 1 , - - - - - - - - . ,- ,,,-,n.- - Exhibit 34 Interview of Richard O. PARKS On April 27, 1983 in Bethesda, Maryland and on May 2 snd May 3,1983 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvannia, Investigators J. Vorse and R. Meeks interviewed j Richard O. PARKS in the presence of his attorney, Thomas DEVINE. The interview concerned allegations of deficiencies in the Recovery Program at the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Nuclear Station (TMI-2) as contained in Mr. PARKS' March 21, 1983 affidavit. The interviews resulted in Mr. PARKS' signed, sworn statement which is Attachment 0-3. Mr. PARKS was employed at TMI-2 by the Bechtel North American Power Corporation as a senior startup engineer. He has recently been transferred from TMI-2 by Bechtel. This is one of three statements Mr. PARKS has submitted on TMI-2 recovery operations. This statement centered on the technical aspect of the allegations. The other statements will be submiited in conjunction with the other phases of the investigation. Mr. PARKS stated that John BARTON, Deputy Director of TMI-2 Recovery Operations had approved Administrative Procedures AP 1043 and AP 1047 which were drawn up specifically for the TMI-2 Recovery Program. Mr. PARKS related that Mr. BARTON followed these procedures on the Submerged Demineralized System (SDS) program. However, Mr. PARKS explained that Mr. BARTON disregarded AP 1043 and AP 1047 and his experience with the 50S when it came to considering the procedures of the polar crane. Mr. PARKS also stated that Larry KING had told Mr. PARKS that Bahman KANGA was not qualified by ANSI Standards to receive an operator's license and consequently to be the Site Director. Mr. PARKS recalled from conversations with Mr. KING that both Mr. KING and Joe CHWASTYK on or about the middle of September 1982 went to Lake BARRETT of the Three Mile Island NRC Program Office and complained that the Safety Review Group was to report to Mr. KANGA but that Mr. KANGA, according to ANSI Standards, was not qualified to receive an operator's license. Mr. PARKS related two instances where site management used prior NRC approval as J a leverage for attempting to obtain Site Operations approval on a specific pro- [ cedure. Mr. PARKS related that the first instance occurred when Mike RADBILL handed Mr. PARKS the Polar Crane Load Test procedure and stated that it was the " hottest thing on the Island." Mr. RADBILL told Mr. PARKS that the. Plant Opera-tions Review Comittee (PORC) and the NRC had been involved with the test all l along and that there were no problems in the load test procedure. Mr. PARKS l said the second instance occurred during a March 3 Readiness Review Committee I meeting on the Polar Crane. In that meeting Mr. PARKS explained that the Test Work Group should approve 'the use of the Polar Crane before it was used to move structural steel. However, Jim THIESING, the Director of Recovery Programs, stated that the polar crane had been signed off by "everybody and his brother," including NRC. Mr. PARKS stated that in a March 3 meeting with Jim THIESING, Ron WARREN and himself, THIESING had asked Mr. PARKS why Site Operations was trying to assume authority on the Polar Crane when they had given it up on things such as the Quick look (video survey through Control Rod Drive Mechanism openings of reactor core damage). Mr. PARKS stated that he told Mr. THIESING that Site Operations was the responsible group under the license but Mr. THIESING said that was an improper interpretation. Mr. THIESING further explained that if there were an accident or deficiency involving matters handled by Engireering, the NRC would go after the engineers and not the operators. Concerning the Quick Look procedures, Mr. PARKS stated he recalled back in early 1982 Larry KING wrote a memo stating that Site Operations would adjust their budget in order to come up with the funds necessary to handle the Quick Look operation. Mr. PARKS stated that Mr. BARTON told Mr. KING that Site Operations was to stay out of the Quick Look and that the program was Bechtel's and the Technical Advisory Group's responsibility. Mr. PARKS also stated that Bechtel handled the outstanding items on the Quick Look punchlist so quickly that it would be impossible to have confidence that the outstanding items were properly reviewed. Mr. PARKS further explained that in early January Larry XING had a meeting with Jim THIESING and others about Mr. KING's concerns on cesium 137 indications in the Personnel Access Facility Sewage Holding Tank. According to Mr. PARKS, Mr. THIESING wanted to discuss how to conceal, in a quarterly report to NRC, the amounts of cesium in the storage tanks. 2 9 ..l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Mr. PARKS' allegations that there were possible  ! deficiencies on the handling of the outstanding items on the Quick Look punchlist and that Jim THIESING, in a January meeting, discussed ways to conceal, in a quarterly report to the NRC, indications of 4 cesiumevaluated. being 137 in the Personnel Access Facility Sewage Holding Tank are The former allegation will be forwarded to the appropriate NRC staff for consideration, while the latter will be considered by 01, i. f i 1 i i i iO i 1 I i I i l l 3 l l l l Exhibit 35 Interview of Edwin H. GISCHEL l On April 7, 1983, Investigators J. Vorse and R. Meeks interviewed Edwin H. GISCHEL, the Director of Plant Engineering at TMI-2, in Jonestown, PA, concern-ing his affidavit of April 2,1983 on deficiencies in the Recovery Program at TMI-2. Investigator Meeks continued the interview on April 8,1983 in Jonestown, PA. Those two interview sessions resulted in a signed sworn statement by Edwin GISCHEL, dated May 10,1983(Attachment 0-6). On page 2, of Mr. GISCHEL's April 2nd affidavit, he stated that there 'vas sub-stantial evidence that the Plant was placed in service before it was ready, was operating with important equipment seriously malfunctioning, that operetor train-ing and qualifications were suspect and that many improper operator actions occurred from the outset. Mr. GISCHEL explained that this information was obtained through his reviewing the various accident investigation reports of Three Mile Island, Unit 2 and that he had no new information to report on the causes or issues that led to the accident. On page 9, Mr. GISCHEL explains that he wrote a memo, dated February 10, 1983, on the deficiencies of the Safety Evaluation Report of the Po'lar Crane. Mr. GISCHEL stated that the memo was prepared by himself and was based on his extensive experience with cranes. Mr. GISCHEL suggested that an appropriate load test would be to fill tanks that are already in containment with water and lift these tanks. On page 11 of the April 2 affidavit, Mr. GISCHEL talks about a series of meetings that occurred after February 11, concerning his coninents on the Safety Evaluation Report. In one of these meetings Mr. GISCHEL made a request to review 8echtel's engineering calculation on a worse case accident. According to Mr. GISCHEL, Ron FREEMERMAN of Bechtel replied that Mr. GISCHEL did not need to see such calcu-  ! lations. Mr. GISCHEL explained to the Investigators that the licensee is always i entitled to review the client's work. Mr. GISCHEL also stated that he demanded that QA Manager BALLARD send a QA representative to review those documents in Gaithersburg, but Mr. BALLARD refused. i l l l 1 1 _ ._ i l l ~~ N t On page 14 of Mr. GISCHEL's affidavit, he stated that other Site Operations staff personnel who challenged the polar crane short cuts received harassment and intimidation. Mr. GISCHEL stated the personnel he was referring to were Larry KING and Richard PARKS. i j On page 20 of Mr. GISCHEL's original affidavit, he states thtt three of his staff I were upset because Bechtel by-passed the Plant Engineering Modifications Control j System in an attempt to downgrade safety classification. Mr. GISCHEL explained that the incident he was referring to cor.cerned a change in the size of holes for expansion anchor bolts in the concrete inside containment.. Mr. GISCHEL related  ! that Rick JACKSON, of Bechtel, wanted Plant Engineering to aoprove a field change l request which called for the size of the holes to be made smaller. Mr. JACKSON had classified the field change request as not important to safety. However, Mr. GISCHEL as well as Ron PRABAHKER and Pete PETEL of Quality Assurance and Bill REAM of Plant Engineering objected to Mr. JACKSON's classification of the Field Change Request as not important to safety, and essentially explained that even though the holes were to be made smaller procedures required that the Field Change Request be classified important to safety. Mr. GISCHEL explained that in an April 8 meeting with Mr. BARTON, Mr. GISCHEL delivered a status on the Field Change Request concerning the size of the holes l in the containment wall. Mr. GISCHEL related that during the April 8 meeting Mr. BARTON mentioned that it was necessary to get Bechtel on board and bring them  ; up to date on the procedures of the Recovery Program. Mr. GISCHEL stated that a l l training program has since been initiated 'to orientate Bechtel on site procedures. l l Mr. GISCHEL also made clarifying and additional connents on the neuropsychological examination issue which was detailed in his April 2 affidavit. Basically, Mr. GISCHEL stated that he would agree to the examination if taken under his con-ditions. Mr. ARNOLD, GPU-Nuclear President accepted those conditions in a April 4, 1983 memo to Mr. GISCHEL. This aspect of Mr. GISCHEL's allegation will be considered in a future phase of this investigation. 2 __. _ . . _ _ . . _ ._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _,_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . - . _ l Exhibit 36 Place: Jonestcwn, PA Cate: April 8,1983 I, Ecwin H. GISCHEL, hereby nake the folicwing voluntary statement to R. Peeks iro has icentified himself to re as an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear .e;ulatory Commission. I make this statement freely with no threats or cc mises of reward having been made to me. Investigator Meeks has typed this statement for me. In regard to my afficavit concerning deficiencies in the Recovery Program at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Nuclear Station, submitted to General Public Utilities *:aclear Coracration (GPU-N) President, Robert ARNOLD, on April 4,1983, I would like to make additional corrents on my concerns of the Three Mile Island Recov.ery Program. On page 2, I stated that there is substantial evidence that the plant was placed in service before it was ready, was operating with important equipment sericusly malfunctioning; that ocerator training and qualifications were suspect; ar.c that many improper operator actions occurred from the outset. This informa- -ticn was cbtained by my reviewing the various accident investigation reports of A 4 Three Mile Island, Unit 2. I have no new information to report on the causes \ cr issues that led to the accident. With respect to my statement on page 4 cancerning my initial task as Director of Plant Engineering, and the fact that I made major psrscnnel ind organizaticnal c'2rges and managament's hostility and non-support of these changes. I will state that ! .as given no written work program on what changes should be made to ' prove Plant Engineering (PE). I did receive, as stated in the affidavit, I s oral instructions from Unit 2 Ceputy Director, John BARTON, to make improvements in Plant Engineering. I learned from Larry KING that John 'SARTON, Art BRINKMAN, the Human Resources Director, and Jim TROESLINGER, the Personnel Director of Unit 2, were investigating the changes that I made. However, I never received anything in writing from the Unit 2 management concerning their disagreement with the way that I was administering Plant Engineering. With reference to the , January 8,1982 contamination release, which is on page 4 of my affidavit, and the fact that RADCON bypassed my department. The proper b , procedure would have been for RADCON to notify Site Operations (50) and Sitt ' Operations would tnen assign Plant Engineering to review and take corrective 1 action. I will also point out that the ' drain plugs should have been installed a,, W 'TH E P 1 A uT W A5 00 gin A119 b iLT. - g in the filter cabinets 2: :::- ? ~ '"e x ;i tnt n ;:S ib % }A Cn page 5, I stated that Larry KING essentially convinced the NRC not to cite due to an improved system of organizational controls which t- Id prevent this r et w .t.cWS - type of activity (the taped drain plugs) from r:0:: r" gl%sarry KING dxplained to the NRC, in a hea in King of Prussia, that Site Operations and all the depart:aentsin50,s'uknashlant[ngineeringandhanthaintenance,weretighten-ing up administratively. He also pointed out that the UWI puckages that ..ere being ir.plemanted would Selp prevent items like this from occurring in the future. With respect to my statenent en page 5, wherein I point out that the polar crane conflict had already begun during the Spring of 1982. There were several c;r:anies working on the polar crane at that time. The . Polar Crane Task Force 1 ?C F.i :: sisted of representatives frem EG&G :daho, United Engineers, Sechtel, anc rs;resentatives frcm Site 0:erations. As I recall, Site Operations did not issue any paperwork at that time which pointed out the fact that the crane was uncergoing nurercus nodifications without the procer administrative procedures. ~

.. . l ' u .

- ...a. n -": ^ th:r: i: -"wri*" ~ " :" d':::< :g:: s  :-:: bw ' ...c9a..e cwe..> o.~ ...; .:::.ca ; :;J:A g/ On page 7, I state that Sechtel representatives s:ent over an hcur with me to seek my apcreval for their modifications on a nuclear safe:y related pipeline. Dr.e of the Sechtel representatives was Rick JACKSCN of Bechtel's Gaithersburg Cesign Engineering Office. Bechtel should have all the paperwork on this pipeline. My assistants, Ron WARREN and Bill REAM, were also familiar with 31 s / the cetails of this safety related pipeline as well as other odifications that g  ; o 5echtel has made without timely review or prior apercval by Plant Engineering. spu-w I will also point out that L . tclGr has a>tterpted to transfer the Plant %erations Review C:mmittee's (FORC) responsibilities to the Safety Review Group / 1 (5;G} , but .NRC, to my recollecticn, has not apprcved this change at this point i in ti.me. In regards to .y e o en February 10, 1983, an .ieficiercies of the Safety E.aluaticn Report (SER) of the polar crane. I will ; cint out that I prepared l I that remo by myseEvith no input frcm my staff and that I have had extensive F a : :ri r :e with ~d

• Ceres. -

'31 c-d deve Np 2nd c';srvise the lif:frg and

4_ x 1 handling program for nuclear projects f +5e Electric Boat Division of RT Elmb e.BomT3 < General Dynamics, :c. th; ":. s as a ref ling director, I had direct responsibility of critical lifts. I was also involved with the certification and testing of cranes when employed in the Equipment and Facility Division for General Dynamics. It should be pointed out that the SER on the polar crane consisted of a lot of words but very little substance. The SER was phrased in such a way that it would lull one into thinking every+.hing was okay. Bechtel wanted to move the mis.sile shield as soon as possible without due safety con-sideration for the lift of the missile shield. Hopever, I was able to see through this written facade. Only Larry KING's approval as Director of Site Operations was needed on the SER. Hcwever, KING would nok sign unless I approved the SER. If the missile shield were dropped it could damaae he reactor vessel head and 3 in-cocE lu s rra.esoT Swibet TuSES ' the ".::c. ;c.; c;;; d' ::ti, .cd; canth the hn_, n ..;P n th; nf;ty :::: tad ) I M ::a. n on o a . .. nd near the bottom of the vessel. When Mr. KANGA came y ' 3 into the February lith meeting, I received the impression that he did not care \ q about my concerns. He stated in so many words that this aspect of the recovery k . program was going to be completed with or without my approval of the Polar Crane l 1 { Safety Evaluation Report. One of the tests I suggested as suitable before re- f 1 j< moval of the missile shield, was to lift tanks already in containment. These f i tanks would be filled with water, t i d On page 10 of my affidavit, I stated that after the February lith meeting, Mr. GNGA asked Larry KING and myself to stay behind for additional consultation. There was also an additional ceeting later on that afternacn with KA"GA, U.':G ar.d nysel f. ANGA was r. ore of a gentleman in this rieeting as he attempted to have us reconsider cur views on the Safety Evaluation Report. On page 11, I mentioned that Larry KING passed on to me an employee's tip that too management 2 d to fire me as so >< he Polar Crane SER furor settled l L a roto % Ki.ag Cagasctyg down.AThatytip came from Joe C...AT J s, of Site Engineering (SE). 'Tue With respect to my conments on page 11 concerning the series of meetings that occurred after February lith. I should clarify that I mentioned in these meetings that an engineering calculation on a worse case accident could take the place of a lead test.. I suggested this to both KANGA and SARTON. FREEMED' N of Eecc.ery Programs had told me that such a calculation had already been done and was on file at Bechtel in Gaithersburg. I asked to review the, calculations but

• FREEP,EDtAN stated that I didn't need to see them. However, in this industry, the licensee is always entitled to review the clients work. I asked BALLARD,

} the CA manager, to look into this matter. BALLARD eventually told me that he was told by Sechtel in Gaithersburg that the engineering calculations hac bee V f 'done. IttmAveasLT 3Ab4.s 5=no 4 QA DP 45anTrMcE To%u.e:a Teen Sr. hts, bbu Esu. @ C:ncerning my comments on page 12 on the suspension of Larry KING and his con-flict of interest through association with the QUILTECH CCMPANY. I rerecber sccet?dy telling me, even though I can't recall who, that GPU-N Sad invest' gated CG earlier cancerning his association with QUILTECH and didn't find any con-flict cf interest at that tine. In addition, those empicyees who left GPU-N to acceot empic.ycent with QUILTECH, were preparing to leave TMI ..hether they ..ere .. r$ ally e;. cloyed by QUILTECH or not. I believe GPU-N's first kn:wir:dje of QUIL TECF .s.s the end of last jear, .. hen GPU-N personnel aere starting t3 be ;5atad cut and being replacid by Schtel erployees. 7.,o ..bo cc..e to .'*id are ..G e hi;L DiY and Ted PECV,AT. ,'~~ s In regards to the committees that were set up to investigate the Polar Crane, frcm which I was excluded. It was my general impression, based on my prior experience, that these committees would not seriously consider the points becught up on the polar crane by Site Operations. It was all a word game. For example, Mr. ARNOLD, in his media releases, stated that a 210 ton headlift load test would prove that the crane is structurally fit. However, the issue that needed to be addressed first was the. load test for the 40 ton missile shield lift. , 1 In reference to my statement on page 14 wherein I state that other 50 staff ~ personnel who challenged polar crane short cuts received harassment and intimi-dation. Those other personnel were Larry KING and Richard PARKS. ') . With resoect to the March 23rd meeting at 8:30 a.m., listed on page 15 of my affidavit, wherein the PARKS aliegations were discussed. My recollection of irdividuals present at that meeting were Messrs. HUECKLE, DEVINE, THEISING, LARSON, SALLARD, CHWASTYK, FREEMERMAN, BEDEL, KUNDER, PASTOR, JACKSON, and as menticned in the affidavit, BARTON, KANGA and ARNOLD. Test.r uset.g m4 3 arg@ *>J I CA eT 7ec>ll '4% Ti4Ej WME, A In that meeting, first, Mr. ARNOLD stated the everyone on site should be co-operative but careful concerning inquiries about the PARKS allegations. ARNOLO stated that we should give PARKS the correspondence and memos, etc., that he raquests. Mcwever, after Mr. BARTON made the statements that PA.RKS shculd be fired 2.nd that Se s" Id not be alicwed on the Island, Mr. ARNOLD ..-5-::+1- 4[b i h@s -' s'.it2d. Fat 4shca[icnotbeexterdedanycooperation. Concerr.ing the Udall %I Ccnr.iittee inquiry en the allegations, it was my impression that Mr. ARNOLD had - ' ~ 7-already socken to somecite connected to the Committee in scme form or another ard that Mr. ARNOLD felt the whole matter would soon pass. ' In regards to the March 23rd meeting I had with Messrs. GRIEBE and LCWE, whicn is menticned on page 16 of my aff'i davit. It appeared that the scope of their investigation, based on tne cuestions that they asked me, centered on KING's allegation made to GPU-N's Vice President, Mr. Phil CLARK. I will state that they were very crofessional in their demeanor and it ..as my im:ression that my ccr.mants were in line with others that they had oreviously interviewed. However, I only have ::ersonal kncwledge that these gentlemen interviewed Ron WARREN and - [ Jce CHWASTYK. e Also, Mr. GRIEBE is an engineer and baseo on my prior associations s and contacts with him, I think he resoects my profa ional opinion. Both Mr. GRIESE anc Mr. LCWE, who is a lawyer, are -- M - "" %A members ) of 2PU-N's Cer.eral Office Review Scard (GCRB), Or ;3ge 17, : :iscussed tne Mcnday, " arch 2Stn meeting that Mr. AR'J0LD called in reference to the ':ew York Times Article. That meeting was called for :erscnnel af Site C;critions cnly ard was a ttended by essrs. 3ARTCN, C':GA, AR*;0LD and *he Site 0;riirs staff. UNOLD did mention that '* was i.mpor'. ant that we be care-l 3 9 1 'ul Nw e say thirgs about the recovery pecgrar~s in contacts with cutside oeople. Cn ;ija 20, I take a c ment abcut the recovery program no longer being effect- ' eely cont *olled. I stated that on " arch 30th three of my staff were upset bacause eft 21 t ptud a 'he plc.nt v;iceering odificatters centrol sys'em in an atterpt -g-to downgrade safety classifications. The incident I was referring to concerned changing the size of the holes for expansion anchor bolts inside containmer.t. which is safety related concrete. The original proposal to drill the holes had gone through the review c'ircuit as an ECM package. The bolts and the holes were to be part of a fixture for the Gantry Crane. Rick JACKSON wanted Plant Engi-neering to approve a field change request which called for the size of the holes to be made smaller. JACKSON had classified the field change request as not imcortant to safety. .In subsequent meetings that I had with JACKSON, he explained y that this was not a safety related issue because the holes were to be made smaller y ay not larger. I insisted that the field change request should be classified im- - portant to safety and go through the review circuit whether the size of th'e holes were to be made smaller or larger. In a meeting on April 7th, in

• morning, d

one of the items dj ussed was this field change request. Both nTm PRABAHKER PeTE L +

• and Pete ~~. TL: o. i A, as well as Bill REAM and myself, pointed out again why the field change request should be classified inportant to safety. JACKSON just threw up his hands and stated "I just don't understand you guys." Those three persons in 50 that were involved in this besides myself were Bill REAM, Ed MR7.ERT and Jack LAWTON.

Also on page 20, I state that ::RC should be holding out for the required tens , in pushing the utility to epgrade tachnical docurents. This expre"" is ra new.At. .,'* - figurative and refers to tiRC requiring the ultimate L.E:...o.A do ument pro-cedu es as it refers to safety related items. . \ - Cn page 20, I also discuss the fact that ranagement is considering removing the odifications Control Greuo out of Site Operations and transferring this function somewhere in Recovery Programs under Eachtel. The Modifications ,v,e m P c.cc, e o .s i4 Tn 5 P h UT C u c Control "aff is the administrative leg for 5- ~ .;r - ';;;d . ::r-

• a "ci - Or. " ::: ::.ic;' ~

r ra i n ta i nscC. m tnet.p a pe r$ ike 9 ' "_;f:V - ' J( .tice  ; :::%. e 1.M -w m ;,;, , .,;i ::H ; ; n -- . I am aware that Dave BUCHANAN of Recovery Frograms has talked to Ed MUMMERT, my Modifications Control Su ervisor, about trartsferring his functions into Recovery Programs. 7Co R_ Again en page 20, I discussed the fact tha MIRC apTroval of a procedure is one () of the tactics used repeatedly to coerce 50 approval of deficient documents. I would say that this has become the general way of doing business by Recovery , y Programs in attemoting to have 50 sign off on various documents. - j a ( Cn page 21, I state that 50 input is not accepted .. hen materiais are being pre:ared and 50 is not allowed to get involved until the eleventh hour. I will add that there is very little consultation between Recovery Pr: grams and Site C;erations on matters that I have be:ught up in my affidavit. In fact, if ae ..ere all working out of the same rule book there uould be no need far prior consultation, but this is not the case. There is another issue which I want to discuss *,hich is not detailed in my affibavit. Cn March 2tth, I discussed with Mr. 3. RTON the prospect cf receiving additiceal .unpower in Plant Engir.cering, i.-RTON asked that I put ry . el'.est and justifications on p1;er, hich I e.irtually did. Co .",pril 4th  ! cccei.ed  ;~ m a hand delivered confidential letter dated April 1st. The letter was from SARTON and concerned my manpower reouest for Plant Engineering. The letter was abusive in nature and questioned my dedication and that of my staff to work over-time. 'I assigned Ron WARREN to prepare a response to Mr. BARTON's letter. On April 6th, Mr. BARTON, in a 3:00 p.m. meeting stated that Mr. ARNOLD had asked for more details on concerns that I had raised in my affidavit. It is important to note that, Mr. BARTON's behavior, in my opinion, was changed. He g, was polite and gentlemanly. BARTON also told me not to worry about a response to his April 1st memo on the manpower reouest. BARTON stated that the manpower ~ request will be considered and stated this in such a way that it looked like , the manpower request would be granted.  % l On April 8th I gave Mr. BARTON a status on the field change reouest concerning the size of the holes in the containment wall. During that meeting EARTON mantioned that we were going to have to get Bechtel on board and bring them up to date on procedures. I will say that approximately a week ago a training. pro-gram was initiated to bring Sechtel up to par on site procedures. f would now like to make some additicnal carments on the neuro-psychological exariination which is mentioned on pages 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 19 of my affidavit. On page 8, I mentioned that a friend of mine, Jim HENDERSON, mentk ned to Dr. JENKINS the after effects of my stroke, which were the right side visicn of both of my eyes being blocked and difficulties in focusing while i o - / reading, which prevents me from speed reading. Jim HENDERSON suggested that I sceak with Dr. JENKINS about this matter, which I eventually did. At the end of January, Dr. JENKINS called and spoke to my wife and incuired as to how the exam turned out. . ': hen Dr. JENKINS was told that I did not take the exam. he acted surorised and disturbed. I thought it interesting that Dr. JENKINS was disturbed. He had previously explained to me that only Dr. GCRDON and myself would have the re i of the examination. Why would Dr. JENKItiS be d.Qturbed if he were not to be involved in the results of the examination? reason that my doctor, Doctor Jcnes of Fredericksburg, initially objected to the exam.ination, was that it was job placement test. When Dr. Jones told me this in our first consultation, he RJ , was not aware of the recovery program matter that I was involved in at TMI-2. s ( On page 12, I mentioned that I received a certified letter on February 10th from Dr. JENKINS. k I called Dr. JENKINS approximately one week later. Mr. JENKINS' demeanor was nasty. He told me that the test was important and f threa:aned that if I didn't take the test he had no choice but to report me l to GPU-N, and that I would be forced to take the test. I reminded Dr. JENKINS that the test was for my sole benefit. Dr. JENKINS reiterated that it v.as important that I get the test dcne and stated that I had two v.eeks to take the test or that he was goirg to notify GPU-N to force me. I then repeated Dr. JENKINS' words " force me" and then asked JENKINS if he had discussed this test with anyone. J: 2 INS replied that he had discussed the test with his superior. I then cues-ti; red Dr. JE'XINS about the doctor / patient relationship and Dr. JE" KINS replied that he '.as to tell e,arything to his superior. r 3 On Page 13, I also mentioned a conversation that I had with Mr. ARNOLD and Mr. KANGA concerning the examination. I felt resentment that Mr. KANGA was present when Mr. ARDOLD brought up such a sensitive issue as the examination. The first time that Mr. ARNOLD mentioned the examination he stated that Dr. JENKINS said that the test was important. The second time that Mr. ARNOLD mentioned the examination, it was in reference to my condition with memory problems and that it was important to find out what effect the stroke had on my thought process. The third time during that conversation that Mr. AR.*iOLD brought up the examination, he said that it was it'cortant and needed for job . placement. - ~ \ , On page 13, I discuss my personal doctor's phone call to .Dr. JENKINS. Dr. JONES p later told me that he could sense, in that conversation, that Dr. JENKINS was a 9 under pressure to have me take the examination. Dr. JONES stated that, if . ~ certain conditions were met, I should take the test and that he felt that I would pass the test. On the afternoon of April oth, after I delivered the affidavit to Mr. ARNOLD, the two of us had a meeting on the medical examination. AR iOLD .;as more deter-mined that I should take the examination) N eventually stated that he aculd I .a consider my conditions for taking the examination. On April 6th I received a , memo dated April 4th, from Mr. ARNOLD, which' indicated that he had accepted my conditicris, and that we should proceed with the examination. l S I would also like to point out that on April 5th I had a :: sting .with Mr. \ AR:iOLD concerningithe issues I had raised on the Polar Crane. :tr. A.:.50LD , a t l l I .. the start of the meeting, accused me of being associated with GAP. I replied trat I hac genuine safety ccncerns and that I had legal assistance in preparing t.He affidavit. AR.';0LD stated that he felt that my differences were based on T :rofessicnal jealousy at not being in a position to run the program. I discussed II at :ergth my professional concerns with Mr. ARiiOLD and I felt that he began to believe somewhat my point of view and that my concerns were genuine. \

' ave raad the foregoing statement consisting of 13 typed pages. I have mace and initia'ec any necessary corrections and have signed my name in ink in the argin of each page. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and correct!.

Signed on M_v /g J MJ at f .T.L- i\ - I  ! 5 :5.';ATURE: _Md[ _ Subscribed and sworn before me this eb % day of f%dy , 19Es , at Ti a = s-ew v. A4 .

'; VEST: GATOR: ~

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SUBJECT:

OI POLICIES f [ This is to inform you that the Comission has unanimously adopted the

  '              Policies elaborated in your February 25, 1983 memorandum, with the following exceptions:

A. Policy 4 as adopted by the Chairman and Comissioners Ahearne and Roberts should read, "01 investigations may be initiated at the request of the Comission, the EDO, or a Regional Admin- ! istrator, or on the initiative of the Director. 01. The Di-i rector, OI, will promptly inform the Chairman of all investi-gations comenced by OI."

 ',                          Comissioners Gilinsky and Asselstine would have preferred to have allowed individual Comissioners to initiate such investi-gations.

Comissioner Roberts would have preferred to have limited the Director. 01's initiation of such investigations by requiring ' the concurrence of the Chairman. B. Policy 6 should be held in abeyance pending receipt of the report of the Advisory Comittee on Rights of Licensee Employees Under Investigation and a Comission decision on this policy. C. Policy 7 should be revised to read, "0I investigators may grant . requests for confidentiality during the course of an investiga-tion. NRC will respect an OI investigator's promise of confi-dentiality unless and until the interviewee's testimony is re-quired for an administrative or judicial proceeding or the inter-i viewee discloses the testimony. The identity of persons not subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 who re-port to the Comission information addressed by that regulation will also be accorded confidentiality as required by 10 CFR 21.2." l _ _ _ _ , _ - _ . _ -- -- ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----

o i A final version of the adopted policies is attached. cc: Chairman Palladino

Comissioner Gilinsky ,

Comissioner Ahearne 4 Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine ' Comis.sion Staff Offices ASLBP ASLAP ACRS - PDR EDO l 4 i I l l

l OI POLICY STATEMENTS l POLICY 1 OI will perform thorough, timely and objective investigations. This will include investigations of allegations of wrongdoing by individuals or organizations, other than NRC employees or NRC contractors, which are within the scope of NRC authority. POLICY 2 OI investigations will be conducted in accordance with general procedures and practices of other investigatory agencies. , POLICY 3 OI investigators may be delegated authority to administer oaths or affir-mations during the course of OI investigative efforts. POLICY 4 OI investigations may be initiated at the request of the Commission, the EDO, or a Regional Administrator, or on the initiative of the Director, 01. The Director, OI, will promptly inform the Chairman of all' investigations commenced by OI. POLICY 5 The criteria established for initiating an inspection or an investigation do not preclude concurrent conduct of both types of activity. . POLICY 7 OI investigators may grant requests for confidentiality during the course of an investigation. NRC will respect an OI investigator's promise of confidentiality unless and until the interviewee's testimony is required for an administrative or judicial proceeding or the interviewee discloses the testimony. The identity of persons not subject to the reporting re- - quirements of 10 CFR Part 21 who report to the Commission information addressed by that regulation will also be accorded confidentiality as re-quired by 10 CFR 21.2.

                               ,              POLICY 8 l   Investigators and others assigned to OI investigations shall identify, collect, and preserve evidence relevant to investigations .+4c.h would have potential value in an enforcement or other proceeding.. When necessary, 0I may request orders or subpoenas to preserve or obtain such evidence.

POLICY 9 Investigators and others assigned to 0I investigations shall attempt, when warranted by the importance to the investigations, to witness and/or 4 photographically record the violation or condition that is the focus of the investigation. POLICY 10 f Investigators and others assigned to 0I investigations will be alert for indications of deliberate violations of NRC regulations or Federal statutes and will pursue relevant leads. They will also make reasonable efforts to

            -determine the extent of involvement or awareness by management of licensees, ap'licants, p           vendors or other entities in any instances of deliberate viola-tion of NRC regulations or Federal statutes.

POLICY 11 Other NRC components will provide OI with timely legal and technical assistance consistent with its impact on the overall NRC mission.

;                                                               POLICY 12 OI may use the investigative support of Federal, State or local agencies or other organizations during the course of OI investigations.

POLICY 13 The Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA) shall be the primary office responsible for referral, and related discussions of investigative matters with the Department of Justice (including the U.S. Attorneys and the Fed-

;           eral Bureau of Investigation). Emergency situations requiring prompt field referral to the 00J and/or FBI should be made without delay or con-1 i             sultation with OIA. Referrals for prosecution or investigation, inquiries

' or the transmittal of investigative information to these agencies shall be promptly documented in writing with copies provided to offices concerned.

I POLICY 14 i' Investigative activity of OI may occasionally develop information within the jurisdiction of another agency. This information will be routinely provided to that agency under appropriate controls. p0LICY 15 OI shall keep NRC components which request OI investigations informed of significant developments in ongoing investigations. POLICY 16 l The requestor of an 01 investigation and any NRC component aware of such ongoing investigation shall advise OI of any additional information it receives / develops during the pendency of the investigation.

1 POLICY 17 OI shall advise cognizant NRC components of safety issues discovered as the result of an ongoing OI investigation. POLICY 18 With the exception of significant safety issues, information regarding an ongoing OI investigation will not be disclosed by any NRC employee outside NRC without the specific approval of the.Diredtor, 01, or his designee. POLICY 19 Investigators and others assigned to an 01 investigation or inquiry will normally not discuss the substance of ongoing OI inquiries and investiga-tions with licensees or other non-NRC personnel in entrance or exit inter-views, except safety items requiring immediate corrective action. POLICY 20 Investigators will thoroughly and accurately document their investigative efforts and substantive information developed during investigation. POLICY 21 OI investigative reports shall be in sufficient detail to permit an informed managerial review of the issues under investigation, and to permit an NRC determination as to the need for enforcement or other corrective actions. POLICY 22 Reports of Investigation (ROI) prepared by OI investigators should contain an objective recitation of all relevant facts developed in the course of the investigation. They should not contain either the opinions or conclu- l sions of the investigators. Opinions or conclusions of persons interviewed i are permissible, however. In a memorandum transmitting the Report of Inves-tigation to the NRC action office, GI management will normally include over-  ! all conclusions regarding what OI believes occurred in the matter investigated or its opinion as to the weight of the evidence. 01 will not make a determin- , ation as to whether the occurrence constitutes a violation or furnish recom- . l mendations for enforcement / corrective action. l POLICY 23 i OI reports of investigation, while in preparation or review, will not be circulated outside NRC without specific approval of the Chairman. POLICY 24 OI reports of investigation, while in preparation or review, will normally not be circulated to other NRC offices. In those cases where OI perceives the existence of safety questions requiring prompt attention or determines that it would be of substantial benefit to the accuracy of the final report, 01 may have other NRC officials review, and coment, on pertinent portions of the report. Final 01 investigative reports will be provided to the appro-priate NRC officials.

                           .__   _  _ _ _ _ _ _           _ _ _ _ 1    _. _ _ _ _ . _                  _ ,  _ _

o O _, POLICY 25 The Office of Inspector and Auditor retains responsibility for investigations regarding NRC employee and contractor misconduct and interal waste, fraud and abuse. POLICY 26 OI shall be informed promptly 0; NRC employees of all allegations which involve wrongdoing, other than allegations of wrongdoing on the part of NRC employees or NRC contractors, which are the responsibility of OIA. O e n l l l . -. .- --- -_ ___ ___ . _ _ _

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