ML20206C874
| ML20206C874 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1987 |
| From: | Jim Hickey GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206C803 | List: |
| References | |
| CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8704130180 | |
| Download: ML20206C874 (49) | |
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00CMETED USNRC 57 AR? -7 P2 :40 A~p'r i l ' 6 , - 19 8 7
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f0CXT bfhfl'k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRANCH i
Before the Administrative Law Judae i In the Matter of )
)
GPU Nuclear Corporation ) Docket No. 50-320
) EA-84-137 (Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 2) )
GPUN'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF's q
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 4
I. Introduction l, On March 2, 1987, GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) served on the NRC Staff GPUN's Second Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Re-quest for Production of Documents. On March 18, the NRC Staff 1 submitted the NRC Staff's Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's Second Set of Interrogatories to the NRC Staff and Fourth Request I
for Production of Documents (the NRC Response), which objected to each of GPUN's requests. The NRC Staff also concurrently filed i
NRC Staff Motion for Protective Order. GPUN provides this re-sponse.1#
1/ This pleading is intended to serve as a motion to compel an-swers to GPUN's Second Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Re-quest for Production of Documents, as well as a response to the Staff's Motion for Protective Order. Previous discovery motions are addressed in GPUN's Memorandum Concerning Pend-ing Discovery Motions, filed this same date.
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M The NRC Staff asserts that "GPUN's Second Interrogatories continues a line of discovery aimed at finding out how the Staff conducted its investigation or review of allegations made by Richard Parks." According to the Staff, "This discovery seeks each and every conversation, comment, procedure, method, reserva-tion, or intention of the Staff and OI in its consideration of the safety allegations raised by Mr. Parks." NRC Staff Motion for Protective Order at 2.
The NRC Staff misconstrues the intent of GPUN Second Set of Interrogatories. GPUN's Second Set of Interrogatories inquires into the facts and circumstances surrounding three documents that were produced by the NRC Staff during discovery and that relate to Parks " mystery man" allegations.2! Two of these documents were apparently prepared by Parks or GAP and provided by Parks or GAP to the NRC. It is reasonable to expect that the NRC would be able to confirm who authored these documents and would be able to provide additional factual information relating to their prepara-tion and content,E# or at least the manner by which they came into the NRC's possession. Presumably, these documents were 2/ The three documents are a " Draft for Mystery Man Affidavit,"
a handwritten document with a cover page stating " Parks --
Disclosures Received From Anonymous Whistleblower," and a Memorandum from B. Hayes to H. Denton (Oct. 28, 1986).
These documents are attached to this response as Exhibits A through C respectively.
1/ If the NRC does not know the answers to these questions, it can simply say so.
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gathered because the NRC thought them relevant to Parks' allega-tions. Further, GPUN seeks to ascertain the evidence gathered during and the results of the NRC's investigation of the claims in these documents and of Parks' mystery man allegations in gen-eral. This was reasonable and fairly narrow follow-up discovery.
Accordingly, GPUN submits that the NRC Staff's motion for protective order should be denied and that the Staff should be compelled to respond to GPUN's discovery requests. Those re-quests are reasonable, relevant, and necessary to a fair proceed-ing and proper decision.
II. Arcument The NRC Staff argues as a threshhold matter that GPUN has failed to comply with 10 C.F.R. S 2.720(h)(2)(ii) and 5 2.744.
NRC Response at 1. GPUN's requests were provided to the NRC Staff in accordance with agreement reached during a telephone conversation on August 25, 1986, between counsel. Notwithstand-ing, GPUN submits that this pleading demonstrates that its re-quests are relevant, necessary to a proper decision, not reason-ably obtainable from another source, and thus should be answered.
A. GPUN's Discovery is Relevant The NRC Staff challenges the relevancy of the " mystery man" allegations. The Staff argues that "[t]here is no requirement under the law for Mr. Parks to have been correct in his (mystery man) allegation, only that it constitute 'information about l
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1 possible violations of requirements'. . . ." The Staff therefore l asserts that "the invalidity of the allegation is not necessary to establish that the allegation was protected activity." NRC Staff Motion for Protective Order at 4. See also NRC Response at 3.
This view is unduly narrow and errs in the implication that
' the accuracy of Parks' allegations is irrelevant to this proceed-ing. To the contrary, the falsity of Parks' mystery man allega-tions is material and important to GPUN's defense for several e
j reasons.
First, courts have held that, as a matter of law, malicious falsehoods are not protected conduct. See e.q., Linn v. United d Plant Guard Workers of America. Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966); NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284, I
291 (2d Cir. 1983)(N.L.R.A. protection is forfeited by one who circulates a false statement with malice, that is, with' knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it is true or false.) Similarly, there is precedent that abusive and dis-i ruptive conduct that impedes activity necessary to protect the public health and safety justifies certain personnel actions, de-spite its association with otherwise protected conduct. Dunham' l
- v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1986)(Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act does not protect an employee who, during i'
otherwise protected activity, was obscene, uncooperative and in-j subordinate); Bauch v. Landers, 79-SDWA-1 (U.S. Secretary of
, Labor, 1979)(attached as Exhibit D).
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Statements in the record indicate that such considerations figured prominently in the decision to suspend Parks with pay after Parks made his affidavit public. Parks' mystery man alle-gations accused George Kunder of being "the ' mystery man' who shut off the safety injection pumps" on the morning of the TMI-2 accident and who was thus responsible for "much of the damage at the original accident." Mr. Robert Arnold, who was President of GPUN when Parks released his affidavit, was confident based on his intimate involvement with investigations and reviews of the TMI-2 accident that no " mystery man" had ever existed -- HPI was not in fact shut off -- and recognized that Parks was maligning the integrity and competence of Kunder. Arnold knew that Joseph Chwastyk and Bernard Smith, who Parks claimed were the source of the allegations, had each been interviewed under oath and in-t formally on several occasions and had made no such claim.
These and similarly distorted and malicious allegations in Parks' affidavit played an important role in the decision that Parks' return to TMI-2 would be disruptive. It was Arnold's in-formed opinion that Parks' personal attacks on his co-workers would cause those with whom he would have to interact to feel vulnerable to similar false charges and would create a poisonous atmosphere. Mr. Arnold therfore concluded that Parks' return presented an unacceptable impediment to the progress of important I
elements of the decontamination and defueling of TMI-2 to the l
clear detriment of legitimate public health and safety issues, j Similarly, John Barton (then the Deputy Director of TMI-2) 1 questioned on March 23 each of*the individuals whom Parks identi-1 I fled as the source of the mystery man allegations. These indi-viduals uniformly informed Barton that they had not stated or
! heard that Kunder had turned off HPI on the morning of the acci-dent, and that Parks' affidavit was untrue.
There can be no doubt that the Staff will seek, when it de-poses Arnold and Charlas Sanford of Bechtel, to probe the basis 1
for the decision to suspend Parks, and to attempt at the hearing to rebut any justification offered by the witnesses if the Staff's evidence lends weight to a rebuttal. Any evidence in the l
i Staff's possession which supports GPUN's claim is equally rele-i vant and should be produced.
i Secondly, the falsity of Parks' mystery man charges is a crucial factor in evaluating Parks' credibility. If these Vere l
deliberate falsehoods in a statement made under oath, and if they were motivated by personal spite, this evidence would seriously undermine Parks' account of other events.
There is evidence of personal animosity by Parks toward Kunder. At a Christmas luncheon in December 1982, Parks s threatened to " smash (Kunder's] face." Stier Report, Interview of I George Kunder (April 15, 1983) at 11, Id.,' Interview of Joseph Smith (March 31, 1983) at 10-11. He also threatened on one or
! more occasions (prior to any of his polar crane comments) to write to a local newspaper, the Paxton-Herald, and expose Kunder i i
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as the mystery man. Id., Interview of Joseph Smith (March 31, 1983) at 10; Interview of Walter Marshall (April 6, 1983) at 12-13; Deposition of Walter Marshall (Jan. 14, 1987) at 56-58.A#
The documents subject to GPUN's Second Set of Interrogato-ries are relevant to the intentional falsity and malice of Parks' mystery man allegations. The document with the handwritten cover page entitled " Disclosure Received from Anonymous Whistleblower" (Exhibit B), which the NRC Staff has stated was provided by Tom Devine of GAP to Ronald Meeks of OI, was apparently prepared ear-lier, probably in January or early February 1983, and GPUN pre-sumes by Parks. Perhaps the cocument is what Parks intended to send to the Paxton-Herald. If Parks is indeed the author of this document -- one of the questions GPUN is asking -- then the docu-ment graphically demonstrates that Parks was contemplating " going public" on at least this charge before the polar crane comments cited in his affidavit, and raises the question of the motivation behind the " mystery man" allegations in his affidavit.
GPUN is similarly uncertain who prepared the " Draft for Mys-tery Man Affidavit" (Exhibit A), which raises the same types of issues. Though from appearances one would surmise that the 1/ With regard to Parks' mystery man allegation, Lake Barrett, the former Deputy Director of the NRC's TMI Project Office who was familiar with TMI-2 events and circumstances, ob-served in his sworn statement to OI, " Parks may have had a grudge against Kunder because PORC (the Plant Operations Re-view Committee) (Kunder) sometimes rejected Parks' proce- ,
dures." September 1983 O! Report, 5 D-9 at 20. j l
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document was prepared by Parks, Ronald Meeks in his March 3, 1987 affidavit,E/ states that a statement concerning Mr. Parks' mys-tery man allegations "resulted" from OI's interviews conducted on April 27 and May 2 and 3 and "was submitted to Parks, who added 1 to it and returned it to Meeks in draft form." The NRC Staff has not informed GPUN whether the " Draft for Mystery Man Affidavit" is one of the statements to which Mr. Meeks is referring. The draft could be either the statement submitted to Parks or the statement that Parks returned to Meeks. The Staff merely indi-cates that the document " represents the views of Richard Parks."
NRC Response at 18.
The " views" that this draft represent are obviously an at-tempt to defend against a claim that the mystery man allegations were malicious and baseless. The draft asserts that Parks did i "not wish Kunder ill," and that the incident between Kunder and Parks at Christmas was minor and "was soon forgotten." The draft affidavit also contains a discussion attempting to discredit an analysis performed by EDS Nuclear, Inc., which concluded that HPI pumps did not actuate on the morning of the accident (and there-I fore were not later turned off). This discussion of the EDS analysis was transmitted by the October 28, 1983 memorandum (Exhibit C) which is the third document subject to GPUN's Second S/ Affidavit of Ronald A. Meeks (March 3, 1987), attached to NRC Staff Response in Opposition to Issuance of Subpoenas (March 3, 1987).
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Set of Interrogatories. Members of the NRC Staff (NRR) appar-ently interviewed Parks on this subject and apparently rejected Parks' views (see NRC Staff Motion for Protective order at 5),
but OI's investigation of Parks' " mystery man" allegation van-ished into obscurity.
GPUN's discovery requests seek the evidence gathered by the
- OI during consideration of the documents above and of Parks' mys-tery man allegations in general. A transcript of a January 10,
- 1984 Commission meeting produced during discovery indicates that the OI intended to interview four persons in conjunction with Parks' and Gischel's allegations,5# and a January 4, 1984 Memo-randum from Keith Christopher to Ben Hayes 2 ! identifies two of
, the four individuals as Chwastyk and Kunder, suggesting that the mystery man allegations were to be a subject of the interviews.
No results of these interviews have been identified or produced.
, The NRC has indicated that at some unspecified point OI's investigation terminated. GPUN has also inquired concerning the reasons for termination of the investigation, not out of desire to attack the NRC's investigatory process, but to determine whether the investigation terminated because of findings that Parks' allegations were incorrect and maliciously motivated.
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6/ Exhibit 10 to GPUN's Memorandum Concerning Pending Discovery Motions (April 6, 1987).
2/ Exhibit 18 to GPUN's Memorandum Concerning Pending Discovery Motions (April 6, 1987).
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Such a conclusion, and the basic facts which led to it, are un-questionably relevant.
B. GPUN's Discovery is Necessary to a Proper Decision and Not Reasonably Obtained From Another Source As shown in GPUN's Memorandum Concerning Pending Discovery Disputes, Parks' credibility is an important issue in this pro-ceeding, and full discovery into Parks' " mystery man" allegations is required for a complete assessment of his credibility. It ac-cordingly is "necessary to a proper decision" in this proceeding.
The Staff further opposes this discovery on the grounds that GPUN has information available to it from its own investigations and sources. NRC Response at 3-4, 8, 10. The NRC, however, has had repeated interviews with Parks and was provided the documents which are the subject of GPUN's discovery requests. GPUN has not had the similar opportunity to obtain information from Parks; nor at the time of its earlier investigations was GPUN aware of the documents that the Staff produced in this proceeding. The in-formation GPUN seeks is not already known to GPUN.E!
The Staff also suggests that GPUN's discovery should be dis-allowed because the information GPUN seeks is obtainable from l 8/ The Staff also asserts that it has already provided in-formation and documents. NRC Response at 3, 7, 8, 9, 10. j The information and documents previously provided do not '
provide responses to the specific interrogatories at issue.
The Staff also claims that GPUN's interrogatories are bur-densome. GPUN submits that the importance of these issues justifies the effort to uncover and review the pertinent ev-idence and information.
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5 Parks. See NRC Response at 5. Parks is not a GPUN employee and cannot be expected to cooperate with GPUN. While GPUN does intend to depose Parks, there are serious questions about his credibility. The information GPUN seeks from the Staff will in fact be necessary to assess and challenge deposition statements by Parks that differ from information which he previously pro-vided to the Staff. In addition, after four years, Parks may not remember everything. In such case, the relatively contemporane-ous information in the Staff's possession will be necessary to refresh Parks' recollection or to evidence facts about which he can no longer testify.
! In sum, the opportunity to depose Parks is no substitute for l- discovery of the information in the Staff's possession. The issues are material, and full disclosure of the facts and evi-dence is necessary to a proper decision in this proceeding.
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III. Conc lu's'i on ,
For these reasons, GPUN requests that the NRC Staff's Motion for Protective Order be denied and that the Staff be compelled to respond fully to GPU Nuclear Corporation's Second Set of Inter-1, rogatories to the NRC Staf f and Fourt'rt'hequest for Production of Doct:ments .
- Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE a.EA RA/a J. Patrick Hickey, P.\d.
David R. Lewis s
Counsel for GPUN 1
Dated: April 6, 1987 i
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, Exhibit A DRAFT FOR MYSTERY MAN AFFIDAVIT
. On pages 36-37 of my affidavit I expressed reservations at George Kunder's role as Plant Operations Review Committee ("PORC")
and Safety Review Group ("SRG") chairman, in light of the significant _
nature of those jobs and Kunder's performance during the TMI accident.
I also disclosed that Kunder had been identified in discussions at Site Operations ("SO") offices as the man who shut off the High ,
Pressure Injection ("HPI") pumps.
This portion of my affidavit was an extremely condensed introduction to iay concerns, both about Kunder's role in the cleanup and the events surrounding the damage to Unit II during the accident.
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Since investigators Meeks'and Vorah are investigating the issue this statement will fully disclose my concerns. I am available for further interviews with the NRC on the relevant underlying analysis.
Initially, certain statements from my affidavit must be clari-fled and presented in their proper context. General Public Utilities Nuclear ("GPUN") - in congressional testimony summarizing the pre-1 liminary findings of the Stier investigation for which it contracted -- I attempted to rebut my disclosure by dissecting the literal meaning of individual phrases examined in isolation. By expanding my dis-closure through this statement, this confusion should be eliminated.
For instance, Bernie Smith discussed Kunder's activities at the accident in much more general terms than Joe Chwastyk, who identified the safety injection pumps. Further, the discussions about Kunder I
and the pumps involvo! leveral different actions -- shutting down the Reactor Coolant Pumps ("RCP") and the HPI, or safety injection pumps._ (The HPI pumps are also known as the makeup pumps).
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The time frame that I recall Kunder being identified as the man who shut off the safety injection pumps was during March 1983.
Earlier conversations involved his actioni turning off the RCP's.
To the best of my recollection, the specific language from OHWASTYK in March involved a statement that George " shut off the safety injection pumps." I am not sure whether he also used the
- words " mystery man" in reference to Kunder. My affidavit should not be read as a quotation in this respect. I did intend to dis-close the meaning of what I had heard, however. It meant that, if true, Kunder was the " mystery man" written about in the press 408ad d ob
'"- the GPU - Babcock and Wilcox ("B&W") trial. The trial and news accounts naturally were discussed on site, and the term had come up dn discussions at the So office area.
In addition to clarifying the details, I wish to remove any lack of clarity about my motives in raising the issue. I do not and did not harbor any dislike toward Mr. Kunder. We have'had a l professional working relationship since 1980 and only had hard feelings once.
That occasion was around last Christmas and 2['
apologized to him within a few minutes. My grumbling at the time was soon forgotten.
While I do not wish Kunder ill, I felt that his unique position in the TMI cleanup raised a serious question about management competence and/or integrity. The PORC committee which Kunder led had the responsibility to review procedures, although final approval was through Larry King as SG Director. In this role Kunder and PORC still reported to the SO Director and was one of the resources for the department in TMI's checks and balances. While I was sometimes irritated at delays, it was part of the job.
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When Kunder began to serve as SRG Chairman, however, his qualifications assumed increased importance. SRG would have more legitimacy than PORC, because the members #would work full time.
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Most significant, in my opinion and detailed in another statement, SRG represented an illegal attempt to bypass So without Nuclear Regulatory Commission appraval. The new committee would report ,
1 to Mr. Kanga. It could now be a resource to rebut the So position, which simultaneously was stripped of the review base PORC rmerly )
represented.
This organizational switch to SRG occurred around the time 1
pressure was building on So to approve the polar crane and headlif t j g procedures before our concerns and comments were properly addressed.
Due to SRG's questionable legality and role motivation, the cleanup could be significantly compr'Ised if the chairman were not sufficient]
objective and invulnerable to management pressure j in order to provide an independent review. In these respects, Mr. Kunder's record, 1 especially at the accident, made me doubt whether management had good faith motives to place him in charge of the SRG.
To illustrate, Mr. Kunder did not appear objective. He acopeted procedures from Recovery Programs ("RP") with cursory reviews but subjected the 50 efforts to unnecessary scrutiny on occasions, sugh as with procedures that I prepared and were eventual 2 approved for draining the "A" Steam Generator. I felt that Kunder's quick approvals of inadequate headlift procedures could lead to safety hazards, while his meticulous reviews of other procedures created unnecessary burdens on well-controlled programs within the cleanup.
I questioned management appointing Kunder to this position in light of his record at the accident. My concerns about his i
appointment go beyond whether Mr. Kunder was the "Mys tery Man. "
At the accident he also followed procedures literally and shut off the Reactor Coolant Pumps, although there were conflicting signals and indications that literal procedural compliance could be a mistake at the wrong time. In short, I was concerned that during l I
the accident Kunder did not see the forest t'hrough the trees, and {
now he would continue that approach as SRG Chairman. I sincerely believed that the role of SRG and the qualifications of its chairman were issues about the cleanup that needed to be raised. -
I also questioned Kunder's independence from management pressure, due to the events during the accident. - '- '" - - '-
4 I was concerned' that Kunde'r would not feel sufficiently independent to challenge the management pressure surrounding the headlift. He is vulnerable if he indeed was responsible for significant damage. If Kunder is also the
" mystery man" he would be even more vulnerable.
My concerns about Kunder's indepenclence were not just hypo-ppAC thetical. I have disclosed specific questionable
- approval practices in my other statements.
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I knew that at the trial an analysis from EDS Nuclear, Inc.
was introduced to conclude that the HPI pumps were not turned on at 5: 41 A.M. (the approximate time at issue in my affidavit) . I knew that this analysis was introduced *just before operators Zewe and Fredericks, who were among those reponsible for the HPI I pumps, switched their testimony in conformance with the EDS'calcula-z rad ruar rM Al tked Sente:C tions.' Operator Faust did not, however. OIhe EDS ana had de### /y/.
unproven, incomplete and inaccurate assumptions, which make it
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of 7tW especially questionable as a basis to effectively rewrite the fffugf f) 7p history or Sequence of EventsQoA already published by GPU and not yet Ad4cY!/l*
amended, to my -knowledge. Finally, the trial was settled abruptly and unexpectedly-shortly after the EDS report was introduced.
I knew of these developments and the mystery man, because as dis-cussed earlier the trial and its settlement was a common topic on site. All of these events convinced me that the " mystery man" issue should be investigated thoroughly.
My own review of the EDS report suggests that its conclusions are premature. Access to the relevant supporting data is necessary for more definitive conclusions. My evaluation of the EDS report is based on the adequacy of its premise. The analysis basically rests on the premise that the level of the makeup tank also deter-mined whether the second HPI pump, makeup pump "C", was initiated at 5:41. EDS analy and prepared graphs for the makeup tank
tt4RC covese surrounding two times that it concluded HPI pumps were initiated, at 4:02 and 7:20, as well as for 5:41. The graph for 5:41 did not exhibit the same characteristics. Although the EDS analysis is reasonable, it's significance is limited due to the use-ef selective use of data and unjustified assumptions, ,
all biased in favor of the EDS premise.
There are a series of questionable factors with re'spect to the EDS claim that turning on- the HPI pumps at 4:02 accounts for the graph in its report. In some instances the facts as reported are suspect. For example, EDS asserts thdt an operator started MUP l-A and opened MU-VI6b at the time of the reactor trip. But the Sequence -of Events HMNS reports that the evolution did not occur until 41 seconds af ter the reactor trip jor 4:01:31 A.M.
Similarly EDS offers no citation for its claim that the BWST suction valve, DH-VSA, opened at 4:02:13. This assumption also is not verified in the SOE.
i In fact, the Emergency Core Colling System (ECCS), which includes the HPI pumps, did not have to be turned on at all at 4:02 in order to produce the characteristics on the EDS graph. Alternate sources better explain the increase in pressure. EDS did not ==-1v%3E ADAk aa whether the increase in pressure at 4:02 could have 'come from oepning the MUT Level Control valve (MU-V-9) to refill the tank from the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBT), .instead of from the HPI pumps. This explanation would be consistant with the require-ments in emergency procedure 2202-1.3 for operators. In other words, EDS failed to consider the possibility that the operators
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I followed the procedures at 4:02. Similarly, EDS failed to I consider whether at 4:02 water was drawn automatically through 1 a
the makeup level control valve,. again as an alternative to the HPI -
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assumption.
These alternative explanations are even more persuasive when the EDS assumptions are compared with the capacity of the HPI pumps and the data provided by EDS. The ED'S graph discloses a four inch rise (approximately 280 grams per minute) in the makeup tank during the 26 seconds from 4:02:13 - 4:02:39. That is a sub-stantially higher rise than is achievable ' solely from HPI pump recirculation -flow.
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! Finally, even if EDS' assumptions and facts were accurate, the results demonstrate that conditions were not analogous at 4:02 and 5:41. For instance, 41fferent pumps would have been involved. At 4:02 the A&B pumps would have been used. At 5:41 the A&C pumps would have been running. The C pump can only draw from the BWST. Even more revealing, the 4:02 incident would have involved e?
switching 1two pumps. The 5:41 event would only have involved switching al on the C pump.
The EDS analysis of events at 5:41 is no more definitive. To illustrate, in some cases the analysis is incomplete, on page 12 of its report EDS states that upon ECCS actuation' DH-V5A was opened. I On page 13 EDS states that the injection valves MU-V-16A and. B also opened. Unfortunately, Ehe report failed to identify when l l
they were shut af ter 4:02 and plot the ef fectr on* 4graph.
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The EDS analysis concerning 5:41 concludes that the HPI pumps could not have been turned on at 5:41, since the makeup tank level was only at 59.' However, EDS. failed to analyse the special circumstances then in effect, such as increased letdown ,
flow, lowered reactor coolant system pressure, and higher tempera- ,
tures than normal.
Most persuasive, EDS' conclusions about 5:41 contradict other data in its report. On page 16 of the report EDS stated I that a makeup tank pressure of 39 NT would have been necessary to achieve the 59" level. But figure 14 in the same report indicates that the 59" la' vel was achievable with 31.5 O/8.
Finally, the EDS analysis of conditions at 7:20 assumes an initialmakeuptankpressureof27[(S , only nominally higher than normal. This assumption fails to analy a the severe effects of the accident; which between 5:30 and 7:20 had led to superheated steam and significant portions of the reactor coolant system in a :
steam-void condition by 6:00 A.M., to.two-thirds of the reactor core uncovered by around 6:20, to hydrogen generation and half the reactor coolant system free vclume in a steam hydrogen mixture by l around 7:00 A.M. These conditions could well have led to abnormal 1 overpressurization due to steam and/or hydrogen in the top of the makeup tank, a possibility not considered by EDS.
I will cooperate fully with the NRC in answering specific questions in more detail about my assessment. I am confident that my analysis can be expanded significantly if I can examine the underlying data relied on by EDS.
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A?w.: ar.u7 +l Inter Offlee Memorandum a-
- ==> EI3 Nuclear DOE FWDDG OF RX BUILDDG FURGE EEFA F11TER CgANCEDUT Subsect tagg y THI-2 Licensing To M. K. Fastor At the present time we plan to change out the profilters on the Rx Building purge as soon as possible and the EZFA filters following the Decen Experiment.
(The NRC is pushing us to change. outprofilter The and test replacements of these EEFA filters by March 1. 1982).is loaded loaded to 60-80 mR/hr.
NRC (Dr. R. Belissy) had previously indicated an interest in funding all or part of the EEFA filter removal a::d replacement in exchange for being alloved to azamine the filters. However. NRC bas run into some roadblocks in getting funds and have suggested that, because of, time considerations, we pursue f.he potescisi of funding these activities by DOE.
Dr. Bellsey has discussed this with J. Riley o.f DOE and be would be very Flesse f ecerested in funding both the pre and HIFA filter activities.Because af contact DOE and pursue their funding these activities.
timin8 considerations, this should be done as seca as possible.
Information on anticipated schedule canorganization be providad canby N provide organization. Please call if you have any further information on the filter loading.
questions.
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TECHNICAL PLANNING -
MEETD:G MINUTES:
1 Particioants: Conference Note No.: CON /T-001 Technical Planning Date: January 5,1983 R. S. Daniels Location: TMI-2 Administration Buildin-J. C. DeVine Toom 201 G. R. Eidan ((T-V. R. Fricke R. L. Gardner G. R. Skiltman Site coerations K. J. Hofs'.etter Radiologi:P1 Controls P. E. Ruhter H. K. Peterson EG&G N. W. Spang Recovery Programs W. E. Austin J. Boldt W. J. Engel T. Fritz C. M. Hansen W. Hopkins C. W. Hultman R. P. Hetzger N. Osgcod C. L. Reid J. Rodabaugh SL'9]ECT: Underhead Radiation Conditions PURPOSE: To review the results of the Quick Scen measurements, the analytical work done to assess likely dose levels, and the leadscrew examination data, in order to determine the necessary changes in plans for Underhead Characterization and head lift.
CON /T-001 l Conference Note No.:
Technical Planning January 5, 1983 Page 2 i
DISCUSSION _: f gama The Quick Scan measurements provided peaki readings of 6
- 1. radiation, in water, under the reactor head. (Ref.1) h effort was mounted, to infer the likely source distributions h s ,
could account for the observed dose profil people would have to work during head lift.
2.
Nancy Osgood Shesumarized indicated the the analyses observed performed dose profiles could be by D in Gaithersburg.
accounted for zby a combination on top of the plenum cover.
Thisof 4 uC1/cc results of 25,000 to 50,000 uCf/cain dose levels (unshielded) of 1 --
above the center of the plantan mor. Making different Henry Peterson described his analysis using ISOSHLD. i1ar
- 3. assumptions based on the leadscrew data and R/hr 0 fuel conpo to that found in the makeup filters, he estimated 1,000 t dose rate at the same 1ocation. ndations on an -
4.
By camparison. the Head lift Task Force based it rewesUsino a differen -
dose rate at the_ gee analysit made hefnre anv data was availakb.att eotton location. _
As a result of these analyses, it was the consensus 0 to / of ]'t
- 5. the likely dose rate levels when the head is . lifted will be 1 5,000 R/hr, which is significantly higher Clearlv 1"+ than sene- was pre
- a present plans to lift the head +hadry
~- were far head developed.
+ a1=a=
chances will a d to ha made +a-a di a ti an 1 ===1 =
take into acenunt these Mah
- 6. Because of the geometry These include:
of the detector many complex sources and surfaces.
a.
Material deposited on the inside surface of the head l b. Material deposited on Leadscrews c.
Material deposited on Leadscrew support tubes -
d.
e.
Material deposited on control rod guide tubesM f.
Material deposited on the plenum cover
- g. Material suspended or dissolved in the water.
t l
t The a, b andQuick Scan which measurements I
- 7. h hes c above), and remain behind and are exp l is removed (items d, e, f and g).
Technical Planning Conference Note No.: CON /T-001 January 5, 1983 .
Page 3 t
^
i how loosely adherent the contamination is, merely from the Quick Sean measurements. However, the leadscrew decontamination tests recently completed by Ken Hofstetter (Ref. 2) indicate that there is a high probability that the simple underhead flush presently contemplated will not be able to reduce the dose levels by a factor of 30 (or more).
- 8. The provisions of the Technical Plan for " Radiation Characterization Under the Reactor Head" (Ref. 3) were then reviewed item by item, to see if they needed to be modified.. The consensus was as follows:
- a. Radiation measurements, using the water as a differential shield are still necessary to separate the plenum source from the head source.
- b. Video inspections and sample taking are still necessary to detennine the degree of adherence and composition of loose material, so that the adequacy of flushing provisions can be defined.
- c. The scrape samples on the undersurface of the head should be deleted, because the tool for doing this is not designed, the head surface seems to be quite clean based on dose readings, and any surface contamination is not likely to Le easily dislodged based on leadscrew flushing tests.
- d. The choice between pulling a CROM and cutting a leadscrew .
support tube should be deleted from the plan. It is preferable l
to remcVe the CROM, for the following reasons:
- 1. The support tube cutting tool did not work well when tested.
- 2. The tube can be cut by plasma arc, but this raises too many licensing and safety concerns to be resolved, so that it could not be available in time.
- 3. The solar crane should become available for limited weicit lif ts in time to support the underhead me-acterization.
4 CRMD's will have to be removed anyway to use an under-head flushing tool. '
- 5. CROM removal allows improved access for inspection devices.
For example, the Task 8 camera positioner can be used for the video inspection if the CRDM is removed.
- e. A sample of the leadscrew support tube should be cut from the CRDM that is removed, for radiochemical and metallurgical analysis.
This is in substitution for the scrape sample.
Technical Planning Conference Note No.: CON /T-001 January 5, 1983 Page 4 i
ACTION ITEMS: g Analytical J A.
l 1. Model the head structure as a source to deterinine the dese levels at points near the head after it is removed. (H. Peterson action) ;
- 2. Finalize these preliminary calculations.(W. Hopkins action)
- 3. Calculate scattered dose off the walls.of the refueling canal, due to plenum source. (W. Hopkins action)
- 4. Calculate dose effect of parking leadscrews. (H.Petersonaction)
- 5. Prepare a Data report, sisenarizing the assumptions, methods used, and results of the above analyses, to serve as the new design basis for dose rate estimates. (V. Fricke action)
- 8. Hardware Chances
- 1. Inject decision to pull CRDM instead of cutting leadscrew support tube into head lift /underhead characterization program.
(R. Metzger/C. Hultman action)
- 2. Change design requirements for Quadrex Flushing tool (C. Reid action
- 3. Discontinue work on development of scraper tool. (C. Reid action)
C. Procedural Chances
- 1. Issue Rev.1 of Tech Plan for Radiation Characterization Under the Reactor Head, including the agreed-upon changes. (V. Fricke action) i
- 2. Give priority as nececsary to be able to remove CRDM. (R. Metzger action)
- 3. Select CRDM to be pulled for the Underhead Characterization.
(V. Fricke, to coordinate with W. Engel .and G. Ski 11 man)
REFERENCES:
. 1. Memo, V. R. Fricke to Distribution, 4550-82-067, dated 12/17/82
! 2. Memo, f. E. Ruhter to J. E. Hildebrand, 9240-1324, dated 12/22/82
- 3. TP0/TNI-030. Technical Plan, Radiation Characterization Under the Reactor Head, Rev. 0 l
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Bechtel Northern Corporation ,
interoffice Memorandum To D. M. Lake cate January 12, 1983
\s Subiect Three Mile Island Unit 2 Frorn R. L. Rider [
Bechtel Job No. 15737
' N 3 Boron Dilution of the of Design Engineering Containment Sump C:pias Duo-0046 At Caithersburg File: 0290/8420 The purpose of this letter is to apprise you of the potential for boren dilution in the containment susp in *.l.a event of a heavy load drop.
The proposed loa! paths for the movement of heavy loads carry the loads over several systems. which, if daeased by a load drop, would lask unbor-ated water irto the containment sung causing dilution of the boren ec.neentiation in the sump. The systems which are currently filled with unborated water include the Desinstalized Water Systes, the Reactor Euilding Normal Cooling Water Systes. Reactor Buildiny Fuelear Services Closed Cooling Water Systen. Reactor Building Intermediate Closed Cooling Water System and the Fire Service System.
The eptions to ritigate leakage of unborated water into the centsinment sump are:
o increase the boron concentiation in the containeent sump no that the boron concentration does not decrease below the present concentration (1700 ppm),
o remove the 9 :urces of unberated watar or o drain and cleen the containment susp. ,
1 Ue rseosmend that the sources of unberated water be' removed prior to the '
movement of any heavy loads. However, yeu may utilize any of the above options in order to satisfy operational and time constraints. He advised )
that as long as the question of potential criticality in the containtent suep exists, the concern with the pnrential for boren dilution in the containnent sump will exist and appropriate seasures nust be taken.
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,* r i ION ta Mr. Lcke DERO.0046 F:39 2 J:nuary 12, 1983 l It should be noted that the secondary side of the steam generators and feedvater piping also contain unborated water; however, Design Engineering will determine the disposition of this systen prior to the moveseut of heavy loads over that system.
You are requested to sdvise us of how you resolve the probles of potential ,
baron dilution in the containment sump. This information is requested by February 1, 1983 in order that we can notify the NRc.
Should yeu have any questions, please costset me.
R. L. Rider Manager Design Engineering l
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- UNif te STafts ps treg*\ NUCLEAn nEGULATOnY coMMisstON
- gvASHINSToN. D. C. 39533 h%
l j N.- .
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- NRC/TH1 83-010 /
i February 7,1983 h
gD Ir. 3. K. Kanga
! 11 rector, THI-2 .
i IPU Nuclear Corp. *
! 3 O. Box 480
! 41ddletown, PA 17057 ;
4 i
i 3 ear Mr. Kanga:
In response to your letter, 4410-83-L-0024, dated January 28,1983, the NRC has reviewed your proposal to maintain the doors in ene or both reactor buildingWe airlocks open while rca: tor building recovery activities are in progress l'
concur that unimpeded transit through the air 1ccks will expedim the reactor building cleanup and reduce worker exposure without substantiay increasing the risk to the environment. In our assesiment us concluded that the potential and consequences of an airborne release through the open airlocks are minimal and the overall effect of opening the airlocks is beneficial. Th(refore.
subject to our review ar.d approval of implementing procedures, we appro-e the l
proposed action. l l As stated in your letter of January 28,1983, there is a reduction in worker .*:
l exposure during transit through personnel airlock #2 when both airlock doors are open. Air' cck f2 is currently used during each reactor building entry, and an imediate man-rem savings can be effected by keeping the airlock open when reactor building work is in progress. Airlock #1, the equipment hatch airlock, i has net been used routinely for reactor building entries. However, the
> advantage of using this airlock to expedite future reactor building cleanup i operations has been identified. It is anticipated that airlock #1 will be used routinely for reactor building ingress wttle airlock #2 will normally serve as i the egress route.
Environmental safeguards associated with opening the airlocks for short periods of time have been addressed in SPU submittals LL2-81-0192, dated August 20, 1981, and 4410-82.L-0023, dated September 16,1982; and in the NRC Modification j of Order, dated September 23,1981, and Recovery Operations Plan Change, dated i October 7,1982. Based ori data obta' ned during . periods @cs airlock doors wars i ;
opened for eart t4ma nard o(3, the Nls concluded that, aivan acorneriata l
l crocedural enetrols, the doort of both airineks can remaTn open during work ,
- activities inside the reactor building without sionificantly decreasing the j maroin of safety to the general public or workers. -
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February 7.,1983 l
- fir". 5. K. Kanga .
,\ -
! (1) a continuous -
GPU procedural controls shall address the requirement for: .
reactor building purge to ensure air flow into the reactor butiding through the airlocks after the doors are opened. (2) radiation monitoring equipment in
' place at each airlock and (3) personnel continuously stationed at each openProvis1ons will be made airiock to close the doors expedttiomsly if required.to minimize dust content in the ai open airlocks. GPU procedures shall also specify that: (1) radiological conditions inside the reactor buildfag will be evaluated artor to opentog the airlocks. (2) daily reactor butidtog work schedules ~will w revleued to
- - determine whether the scheduled activities fall into the scope of the existing airlock safety evaluations, and (3) ff scheduled activities have a potential l for increasing airtiorne radfonctivity or changing air flow in the reactor building, the reactor butiding atriocks will be closed while thiese activities are in , progress.
Lake H. Barrett W '*/-
I Deputy Program Director ,
! 1MI Program Office i
l E: ., . . '
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pg.W# Inter Offlos Memorandum Ene: February 17, 1983 M4
,,,,e,,,
,o1ar Cr... m.d T..-
Safety Evaluation MNuglear M
Te: J. W. Thiesing. Racovery Programs Location: TMI-2 Plant M 6
REFERENCE:
(1) 6 memorandum 6 N dated February 10. 1983 (2) R. L. Fteemarman memorandum 6 6 dated February
- 17. 1983 The curpose of this memorandum is to suus:iarize the status of M N review of the Polar Craue Load Test Safety Evaluation and document closeout of6 Engineering's comments which were the sub-jact of Peferences 1 and 2.
N comments. other than those of Reference 1. have been resolved. We assume that ca.'.T.11ations are available to support the load drep analysis sentioned in the SER.
The ccm Snts of Reference 1 were discussed extensively at the morning meeting on February 11. 1983 with Mr. Kanga in attendance, during ta afternoon meeting on February 11. 1983 with Mr. Kanga on the afternoon of February 15, 1983 with Mr. Barton and again on the afternoon of February 16, 1983 with Messrs. Barton, Kanga. Thiesing.
Freemerman Rider and Jackson.
As a result of discussions at these meetings. M Engineering agreed to close out the comments of Reference 1 on the basis of over-riding progrannatic concerns which, in the opinion of program manage-ment. overshadowed the technical concerns of Plant Engineering.
It is our understanding that a management position has been taken to turn the polar crane over af ter the load test.
Although 6 has voiced a fundamenta1 disagraceant with the Polar Crane Retest Program, we do not challenge the authority of the Office of the Director to proceed with the program as written.
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' psonscoq'o
. Exhibit C i
E h ,. [,}, UNITED STATES
/ ,
gg g; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasmNGTON, D. C. 20555
(, d
. \ y 4, October 28, 1983
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'l MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director A' Reag Q w b tion FROM: Be d7,Yi Office f Investigations
SUBJECT:
EDS NUCLEAR INC. ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH PRESSURE INdECTION PUMPS Laurence P. King, former Site Operations Director at Three Mile Island, allegations that the analysis presented in the GPUN/B&W on the THI-2 High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pumps activity is not correct.
Messrs. King and Parks have stated that they would be willing to explain to NRC the weaknesses in the EDS analysis and show from the analysis that the HP were turned on and subsequently turned off at critical time periods.
Mr. King did not provide further infomation or details on an attachment to this memo.
Per the suggestion of. Mrt William T. Russell, '
Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors Safety, this memo and its attachme are being sent to you so that it can be pa's' sed to your group considering the ED matter.
Contact point in my office is Ronald A. Meeks, 492-7246.
The OI investigation on the " mystery man" issue is ongoing; therefore, the i
contents know basis amongof thisthose memo andtothe assigned the attachment EDS review. should
- be dissemina.ted on a
/ Attachment as st+ted ,
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a i
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RICHARD D. PARKS' OVERVIEW OF THE EDS NUCLEAR INC. ANALYSIS OF
,THE HIGH PRE 55URE INJELi10N ACTIVITY DURING THE TMl-2 ACCIDENT Richard D. Parks raised the " mystery man" issue, in part, because he was con-cerned that the causes of a key event during the accident may not have been fully disclosed to the public, the NRC, and later in the GPUN/B&W trial.
l Mr. Parks knew that at the trial an anlaysis from EDS Nuclear, Inc. was intro-duced to conclude that the HPI pumps were not turned on at 5:41 A.M. According l
to Mr. Parks, the EDS analysis had unproven, incomplete and inaccurate assumptions, which make it especially questionable as a basis to effectively rewrite the history of Sequence of Events (SOE) already published by GPU and, to Parks' knowledge, not yet amended. i 1
Mr. Parks' own review of the EDS report suggests that its conclusions are pre-mature but access to the relevant supporting data is necessary for more definitive conclusions. Mr. Parks' evaluation of the EDS report is based on the adequacy of !
its premise. The analysis basically rests on the premise that the level of the makeup tank also detennined whether the second HPI pump, makeup pump "c",
was initiated at 5:41. EDS analyzed and prepared graphs for the makeup tank l
1evels surrounding two times that it concluded HPI pumps were initiated, at 4:02 and 7:20 as well as for 5:41. The graph for 5:41 did not exhibit the
- ' same characteristics. Although the EDS analysis is reasonable, it's signifi-cance is limited due to the selective use of data and unjustified assumptions, all biased in favor of the EDS premise.
According to Mr. Parks there are a series of questionable factors with respect l to the EDS claim that turning on the HPI puds at 4:02 accounts for the graph in its report. I In some intstances the facts as reported are suspect. For !
example, EDS' asserts that an operator- started MUP 1-A and opened MU-VI6b at the .
1 . time of the reactor trip. But the SOE reports that the evolution did not occur ,s
- until 41 seconds after the reactor ~ trip, or 4:01:31 A.M. Similarly EDS offers no citation for its claim that the BWST suction valve, Dti-VSA, opened at 4:02:13., This assumption also is not verified in the SOE.
. v .- t o p-In fgt, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), which' includes the HPI pumps', did not have to be turned on at'all at 4:02 in order to produce the
' ? characteAstics on the EDS graph. Alternate sources better explain the increase in. pressure. 4 /s EDS did not analyze whether the increase in press _ure at 4:03 could have come from opening the MUT Level Control Value (MU-V-1) to refill the tank from the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBT), instead of from I the HPI pumps. This explanation would be consistent with the requirements in 1 i emergency. procedure 2202-1.3 for operators.' In other words, EDS failed to consider the possibility that the operators followed the procedures at 4:02.
Similarly. EDS failed to consider whether at 4:02 water was drawn automatically through the makeup level control valve, again as an alternative to the HPI assumption.
These alternative explanations are even more persuasive when the EDS assumptions are compared with the capacity of the HPI pumps and the data provided by EDS.
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The in 'theEDS graph makeup tankdiscloses a four during the 26 inchfrom seconds rise (approximately 280 grams per minut
- 4:02:13 - 4:02-39. That is a substantially higaer rise than is achievable solely from HPI pump recirculation flow.
'4 s' l Finally, even if EDS' assumptions and facts were accurate, the results demon-strate that conditions were not analogous at 4:02 and 5:41. For instance, !
different pumps would have been involved.
been used. At 5:41 the A&C pumps would have been running.At 4:02 the A&B draw from the BWST.
switching on two pumps. Even more revealing, the 4:02 incident would have involve the C pump. The 5:41 event would only have involved switching on
, 7,- l Mr. Parks relates that the EDS analysis of events at 5:41 is no more definitive To illustrate, in some cases the analysis is incomplete. .
report, EDS states thatiupon ECCS actuation DH-VSA was opened.On On page page 13, EDS12 of its states that the injection valves MU-V-16a and B also opened.
the report effects on afailed graph.to identify when they were shut after" 4:02 and plot theUnfortunatel In addition, the EDS analysis concerning 5:41 concludes that the HPI pumps could not have been turned on at 5:41, since the makeup tank level was only at 59".
such as increased letdown flow, lowered reactor coolant higher temperatures than normal. i Most report. persuasive, EDS' conclusions about 5:41 contradict other data in its '
PSIG would have been necessary to achieve the 59" leve1.On pag same report indicates that the 59" level as pchievable with 31.5 PSIG.But figure 14 in Finally, the EDS analysis of conditions at 7:20 assumes an initial makeup tank pressure of 27 PSIG only nominally higher than normal. This assumption fails.
to analyze the severe effects of the accident; which between 5:30 and 7:20 had led to superheated steam and significant portions of the reactor coolant syste in a steam-void condition by 6:00 A.M., to two-thirds of.the reactor core
- uncovered by around 6:20, to hydrogen generation and half the reactor coolant 5' system fre.e volume in a steam hydrogen mixture by around 7:00 A.M. These condiltjpns could well have led to abnormal overpressurization due to steam and/or hygrogen in the top of the makeup tank EDS. t possiblity not considered by l
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3
. Exhibit D II UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CASE NO. 79-SDWA-1 ,.
3 1
In the Matter of
- HERBERT J. BAUCH
- Complainant
- DECISION vs.
- OF THE JOSEPH W. LANDERS, JR.
- SECRETARY Secretary and Agents,
- STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
- OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
- Respondents
- This is a proceeding und&r the Safe Drinking Water Act (88 Stat. 1660, et seq., 42 U.S.C. 300f, et seq.). Herbert J.
Bauch filed a complaint alleging that he was removed from a position and reassigned to another in violation of Section 1450(i) of that Act (88 Stat. 1692; 42 U.S.C. 300j-9 (i) .
That section prohibits discrimination against an employee because of activities to carry out the purposes of the Act.
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge.
\
_.2 -
l 4
1 Thereafter the Judge \
issued a recommended decision, dated April 13, 1979, in which he found that the respondents did not vio-late the Act and he recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
The Administrative Law Judge stated his findings and con-clusions with respect to the basic question as follows (on pages 12 and 13 of his decision):
- * * [T]he central issue to be determined is whether a decision by Respondent to assign an employee to another position.[under the cir-cumstances of this case] constitutes a violation of the Act. Although not free from doubt, I am constrained to conclude that the action taken by management herein did not run afoul of the
- prohibitive language of Section 1450 (i) (1) .
While the statute is apparently designed to protect employees who attempt to enforce the safe drinking C water regulations, I do not believe it restricts an employer in its operational decisions. It does not, and should not, preclude management from taking steps to assure and maintain effective-ness by its staff in enforcing the water system' requirements. To this extent, Respondent and others similarly invested with enforcement duties, must be able to transfer employees or adjust employ-ment situations so as to accomplish such effective enforcement.
1 i
In the case at bar the record is replete j
with instances where, despite the competence and expertise of Bauch as a technical Engineer, his attitude and behavior have provoked continual criticisms from other individuals. Not only did this exist while he was employed with Carol City Utilities and Roy Hart & Associates prior to his current employment, but complaints re his aggres-siveness and lack of tact persisted during his 1
- tenure with Respondent. Straham discussed these difficulties with Bauch several months after he was employed by Respondent. Moreover, each per-formance review.of Bauch's supervisors referred to his difficulties in relating to consultants and others, his emotional involvement, and his overbearing attitude during the performance of his duties.
i
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4 p-In addition to the foregoing, com-
' plaints within'the agency had been made in' respect
- to Bauch's utilizing weak data to support his recommendations or advocating strong action in dealing with an applicant which was not warranted.
Bauch had been cautioned in this regard as well' as in his drawin~g conclusions without sufficient data to support them. These tendencies, together 3
with the foregoing behavioral difficulties, hampered communications between Bauch and many applicants.
After careful consideration of the entire record, I thus am of the opinion that Respondent's action in respect to Bauch was not imposed because this individual sought to " carry out the purposes" of the Act. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that DER opposed enforcement water systems.'
of the regulations on safe drinking 4 Nor does it appear that Respon-i dent attempted its employees. Rather to restrict such enforcement by does it appear to the undersigned that the Employer was desirous of-eliminating, from its vantage point, a source 3
of friction between Complainant and MDWSA as well as other applicants. It attempted to accomplish j -
1 this end by transferring Bauch to the position of Air Engineer where he would interact with certain different individuals. Such action on the part 4
- of Respondent does not, in my opinion, constitute discrimination, but represents an effort to pursue 4
- enforcement of the regulations and rules concerning
}
the safe drinking water system in the most effective manner. An employer should not be' faulted if it requires an interchange or reassignment of 1
4 employees to achieve this action. Moreover, I conclude the Act herein was not intended to
' reach a situation as prevailed in the instant case, but rather was it expected to embrace instances when an employer resists adherence to
- the regulatory provisions and takes action to frustrate it.
Accordingly, and in view of the fore-going, I conclude that Respondent did not discrim-inate against Herbert J. Bauch when it transferred him on August 14, 1978 from the position of Water 1 Engineer to Air Engineer; and that by such action l
1
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r Respondent did not violate Section 1450 (i) (1) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (Public Law 93-523).
A study of the record persuades me that the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Adminis-trative Law Judge's recommended decision dated April 13, 1979 are supported by the evidence in the record, are in accordance with applicable law, and are proper, and I adopt such decision as my own. Accordingly, I. conclude that the respondents did not violate the Safe Drinking Water Act as alleged, and the complaint of Herbert J. Bauch is dismissed.
Dated at Washington, D.C.
( this inthday of May. , 1979.
Secdtary of Labor l
l l
l l
Oxnuu.
USNRC 17 MR -7 P2 :39 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0FRG ci un un y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKETING a, '5f vict I BRANCH Before the Administrative Law Judge In the Matter of )
)
, GPU Nuclear Corporation ) Docket No. 50-320 I
l
) License No. DPR-73
) EA-84-137 (Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the "GPUN's Memorandum Con-q cerning Pending Discovery Motions" and "GPUN's Response to NRC Staff's Motion for Protective Order," both dated April 6, 1987, were served by deposit in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, or where indicated by an asterisk by hand deliv-ery, this 6th day of April, 1987, to the following persons:
- Ivan Smith, Esquire Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Branch Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- George E. Johnson, Esquire Office of the General Counsel 9604 MNBB U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
<Y \'
David R. Lewis Dated: April 6, 1987
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