ML20196G905
| ML20196G905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1988 |
| From: | Lewis S, Woodhead C NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196G786 | List: |
| References | |
| 87-554-OLA, OLA, NUDOCS 8807060053 | |
| Download: ML20196G905 (40) | |
Text
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I June 23, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA flVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR CORPORATION, ET AL.
)
Docket No. 50-320 OLA
)
ASLBP No. 87-554-OLA (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
(Disposal of Accident-Station, Unit 2)
)
Generated Water)
NRC STAFF RESP 0fiSE IN SUPPORT OF THE LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION I.
INTRODUCTION By motions dated May 9 and 16, 1988, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (the Licensee) moved for sumary disposition of the seven contentions admitted to this license amendrrent proceeding concern-ing the proposed evaporative disposal of the accident-generated water (AGW) at Three Mile -Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2).
The NRC staff supports summary disposition of all the contentions based on the applicable law, and the attached affidavit of Linda F. Munson II which supports the Licensee's statement of material facts, as discussed below.
II.
BACKGROUND The Technical Specifications for TMI-2 prohibit the disposal of the AGW without prior Comission approval.
Technical Specifications 3.9.13.
1/
The affidavit is being submitted unexecuted due to time and
~
geographic constraints.
The signature / notarization page will be transmitted to the board and parties by June 24, 1988.
8807060053 080623 DR ADOCK 050 o
R
In July 1986, the Licensee proposed a plan to evaporate the AGW by forced heating at the TMI site over a period of about two and one half years.
In February 1987, the Licensee submitted a request for an amendment of the TMI-2 license to authorize the disposal of the AGW.
In June 1987, the NRC staff issued Supplement No. 2 to the "Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement related to decontamination and disposal of radioactive wcstes resulting from March 28, 1979, accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2,"
(NUREG-0683, Supplement No. 2, hereafter, "PEIS").
Therein, the Staff concluded that the Licensee's proposed disposal method was acceptable under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 4321, et seq., (NEPA) in that it would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and any adverse impacts of the proposed disposal are outweighed by its benefits.
PEIS, p. viii.
The Staff also analyzed eight alternatives to the Licensee's proposed method of disposal and concluded that none of the alternatives was "clearly preferable" to the Licensee's proposal.
I_d.,
- p. vi.
On July 31, 1987, the Comission gave notice of this proposed i
amendment and afforded an opportunity for a prior hearing.
52 Fed. Reg.
28,626.
Timely petitions for hearing were filed by Three Mile Island Alert, Inc. and Susquehanna Valley Alliance (hereaf ter, "SVA/TMIA") and by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
TMIA and SVA supplemented their petitions with proposed contentions and a prehearing conference was held in December 1987.
By Memorandum and Order dated January 5, 1987, the l
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted SVA/TMIA as joint intervenors in the proceeding, granted the petition of the Commonwealth to partici-pate as an "interested state" under 10 C.F.R.
Section 2.714a, and
~
. i admitted seven contentions sponsored by SVA/TMIA for litigation.
The order also established a schedule for discovery and for the filing of motions for summary disposition.
On May 9 and 16, 1988, the Licensee filed four motions for summary disposition.
These motions cover all seven admitted contentions.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.749(a) and the Board's Memorandum (Memo-rializing Conference Call) of May 11, 1988, and the Order (Granting Staff's and Joint Intervenors' Request for Time Extension), dated June 17, 1988, the Staff files the following response to the Licensee's motions.
III.
DISCUSSION A.
Legal Standards for Summary Disposition The Commission's Rules of Practice provide for sumary disposition of contentions where the statements of the parties in affidavits and other filings in the proceeding show there is no genuine issue of materi-al fact.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(d).
This rule is analagous to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Alabama Power Company (JosephM.
Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217 (1974).
Thus, decisions concerning Rule 56 may be applied to construction of the Commission's rule.
l It is well established that there is no right to trial except where l
there are genuine issues of fact to be determined.
E parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920). Use of sumary disposition has been encouraged by the Conr.11ssion to resolve contentions where the intervenor has failed to establish that a genuine issue exists.
Statement of Policy on Conduct l
of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981); Northern l
States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973) aff'd sub nom BPI v. Atomic Energy Comission, 502 F. 2d 424 (D.C. Cir.1974).
In Federal practice, Rule 56 authorizes summary judgment only where it is quite clear what the truth is and where no genuine issues remain for trial., Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation, 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944).
The record will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962).
In addition, the burden of proof lies upon the movant who must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
Adickes v. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
Where no evidence exists to support a claim asserted, it is appro-priate to promptly dispose of a case witbout a formal hearing.
The Commission has made clear that intervenors must show that a genuine issue exists prior to hearing, and if none is shown to exist, the Board may sumarily dispose of the contentions on the basis of the pleadings.
Prairie Island, supra, at 242.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Precedure does not permit plaintiffs to get to a trial on the basis of the allegations in the complaints coupled with the hope that something can be developed at trial to support the allegations.
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company, 391 U.S.
253, 289-90 (1968),
rehearing den., 393 U.S. 901 (1968). The party opposing sumary disposi-tion must come forth with evidentiary facts to show that there is an outstanding unresolved material issue to be tried.
Stansifer v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 487 F. 2d 59, 63 (9th Cir.1973); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company et al. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2),
ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 754 (1977).
Moreover, if the statement of material
facts required by 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(a) is unopposed, the uncontroverted facts are deemed to be admitted.
In this proceed-ing the Staff believes the Licensee has demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute for the reasons which follow.
B.
The Contentions (1) Contentions Regarding Alternatives (1, 2, 3 and 8) U Contention 1 states as follows:
Neither the Licensee nor the Nuclear Regulatory Comis-sion has shown that the disposal of the accident-generated water by an evaporation method complies with the A.L. A.R. A. principle (as low as reasonably achiev-able).
Other methods of water disposal discussed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (NUREG 0683 Supple-ment #2, June 1987) would not release all the tritium and a quantity of radionuclides into the environment as the evaporation method would.
As noted by the Licensee ("Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition on Alternatives (Contentions 1, 2, 3, and 8)" at 3 (hereafter, Motion 1),
the Board admitted this contention as one raising the issue of whether other methods of disposal of the AGW are superior to the Licensee's 1
proposal because under the Licensee's method all of the tritium and some of the radionuclides would be released, whereas other methods would not release all of the radioactivity.
Memorandum and Order (Memorializing Special Prehearing Conference:
Rulitig on Contentions; Scheduling),
January 5,1988 at 7.
The Board further stated that under Contention 4 it must be established that the cost / benefit analysis for the evaporator
-2/
For ease of reference the Staff has addressed the contentions in the same grouping used in the Licensee's motions even thcugh the Staff believes Contentions 1 and 4 concern only ALARA standards and l
Contentions 2, 3, and 8 concern NEPA.
l
. 4 design meets the ALARA Standard.
Memorandum and Order (Granting Joint Intervenors' Motion to Compel), April 6, 1988 at 3.
As admitted, Contention 2 states:
The EIS fails to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 USCS 4332, n.29).
The NRC failed to conduct conclusive risk / benefit analy-sis of the "No Action Alternative."
.The Board admitted the contention as asserting that the Staff had failed to provide an adequate risk / benefit analysis of the "no action j
alternative" and took note of SVA/TMIA's position that "the PEIS shows that there is no radioactive impact from storing the AGW on the island, and the finacial cost of storing it would be almost zero."
January 5, 1988 Memorandum and Order at 5, citing Tr. 18.
SVA/ THIA provided clari-fication of their understanding of the "no action alternative" by their explanation that this alternative "supposes that eventually the water will be disposed of."
Tr. 65.
Further, SVA/TMIA stated in response to an interrogatory that:
"It is expected that the water may remain on-site at least until Unit 1 is decomissioned and for as long as Unit 2 remains in Post-Defueling Monitored Storage."
SVA/TMIA's Responses to NRC's Interrogatories, dated February 22, 1988 (Interrogatory Sb).
On the basis of this answer, the Licensee used a storage period of 30 years in its motion for summary disposition of Contention 2.
Motion 1 at 5.
Admitted Contention 3 states:
The EIS fails to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act.
The EIS has not dem-onstrated that the benefits of the evaporation process will exceed the costs and risks to the public.
The bene-fits are unclear whereas the risks include the following:
a.
The release of radioactivity into the air will enter l
the water, food chain, human organisms and the en-tire ecosystem.
. e b.
A solidified waste of possibly 88,000 cubic feet will be created. This waste will have to be trucked to a low level waste site.
Contention 8 states:
The NRC failed to give reasonable and due consideration to evaporation in a closed cycle with the bottoms and condensate being solidified and shipped to a Low Level Waste Site.
They also failed to give reasonable consid-eration to dispsing the water in tanks and storing it inside Unit 2.
The Staff submits that there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the minimal radioactive releases from the evaporation of the AGW; that these releases are within the numerical design objectives set out in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I; that the PEIS complies with NEPA; that the proposed evaporation of the AGW complies with the Commission's regulations and would impose no significant environmental impact; and that as a matter of law the contentions must be dismissed, as explained below.
(b) Compliance with Appendix I is Compliance with the ALAPA Standard The Comission's regulation 10 C.F.R. 5 20.1(c) states that NRC licensees should maintain radiation exposures and releases as low as reasonably achievable.
The term "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALAPA) means as low as is reasonably achievable taking into account the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socio-economic considerations, and in relation to the utilization of atomic
-3/
The last sentence of Contention 8 repeats the "no action" alterna-tive raised in Contention 2, since it describes the same long term onsite storage.
energy in the public interest.
10 C.F.R. !20.1(c).
ALARA is not a precise regulatory requirement but rather a regulatory goal which may lesd to more conservative actions than those required by NRC regulations in Part 20.
See:
Gener:1 Electric Company (Wilmington, North Carolina Facility) 00-86-11, 24 NRC 325, 340 (1986); Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 56 (1978).
Both 10 C.F.R.
QS 50.34a and 50.36a state that the numerical guidance in Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 is to be used for release of radioactive material in effluents in compliance with ALARA.
10 C.F.R. 5 50.34a(a); 950.36a(b).
Most significantly, Appendix I states that design objectives and limiting conditions for operation which conform to Appendix I guidelines "shall be deemed a conclusive showing of compliance with the [ALARA] requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.34a and 50.36a."
The radioactive material to be released in the evaporation of the AGW results in conservatively calculated doses (0.7 mrem total body /4 mrem thyroid) well within the guidelines of Appendix I (5 mrem total body /15 mrem to any organ).
See PEIS, Supplement 2 at p. 3.7; 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, 6 II.B.-C.
The cost-tenefit evaluation required by i
Appendix I 5 11.0, was applied specifically to tritium releases in i
another proceeding.
Lillian McNally (Petition for Rulemaking) DPRM-86-6, l
74 NRC 671, 677 (1986). There, it is explained that under the provisions l
l of f II.D of Appendix I, additional equipment for effluent reduction and L
control must be added if the reduction in the collective (population) dose (person-rem) afforded by the control equipment multiplied by the i
worth of exposure reduction ($1000 per person-rem reduced) would exceed the cost of adding this technology.
In ' applying this criteria to the fifty year population dose of 3 person-rem (whole body) for evaporation i
-g.
of the AGW (PEIS, Supplement 2, p. 3.7), the total justifiable cost for additional equipment would be $3000 (3 X 1000).
For the fifty year population dose of 6 person-rem for organs, the total justifiable cost would be $6000 (6 X 1000).
However, as indicated in Lillian McNally, supra, there is no known equipment which would further reduce the releases of tritium.
Additionally, there is no "reasonably demonstrated technology" which could further reduce, on a cost beneficial basis, the emissions of tritium and radionuclides from the evaporator. Affidavit of Linda F. Munson, 5 32.
See also:
Affiday1t of David R. Buchanan, 1 23
[ attached to Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Contention 4(b)
(in part) (c) and (d)]. Moreover, the calculations in Appendix I are based on annual doses whereas the PEIS calculates a fifty year person-rem dose, resulting in extremely conservative estimates.
If calculated on an annual basis, the total population dose would result in much less than the
$3000/$6000 justifiable cost described previously.
Consequently, the proposed releases clearly comply with the guidelines in Appendix I,
and are ALARA, as a matter of law.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, 6 I.
The ALARA standard is not a comparative standard but guidance, (as distinguished from a regulation) for limiting or reducing releases, clearly defined in the regulations cited above, as that which is reasonably achievable, takino all factors into consideration.
- However, Contentions 1 and 4 attempt to establish a comparative or absolute standard for ALARA by asserting that alternative actions which result in less or no releases are preferable without regard to other factors.
Contentions 1 and 4 essentially assert that ALARA means "as low as
possible," rather than "as low as reasonably achieveable".
Thus, the contentions are based on a faulty interpretation of the ALARA standard and do not dispute the fact that the releases from evaporation of the AGW are within Appendix I limits, and thus, are by definition, ALARA.
Consequently, the allegations in Contentions 1 and 4, that radioactive emissions must be further reduced without regard to any other considerations has no legal
- support, in either the Commission's regulations or the guidance in Appendix I, since it is clear that the en:'ssions are as low as reasonably achievable.
In sum, even when apply-ing the most restrictive criteric in the Comission's regulations as contained in Appendix I to the evaporation of the AGW, the proposed releases clearly comply with ALARA, and no significant design irrprovement to the evaporator is required.
Consequently, there is no genuine factual dispute to be decided and there is no legal basis to Contentions 1 or 4.
Therefore, they must be sumarily dismissed.
(d) The Environmental Impact Statement Concerning The Disposal of the Accident Generated Water Complies with the National Environmental Policy Act The purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act is to insure that agencies of the United States give appropriate consideration to environmental values in the decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations, so that environmental costs and benefits will assume their proper place along with other considerations.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and
- 2) CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 528, affirmed sub nom., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978), citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir 1971).
In
Seabrook, the Commission adopted a standard of "obvious superiority" for evaluating alternatives, on the basis that the cost / benefit analysis is inherently imprecise and it is probable that more adverse information has been developed concerning the proposal than any alternative.
I_d. at 528-29.
The litmus test concerning an adequate ':onsideration of alternatives which the courts apply is whether the environmental consequences of each reasonable alternative have been accorded a "hard look".
Boston Edison Company (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-479, 7 NRC 774, 779 (1978), citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, fn. 21 (1976).
To satisfy NEPA, an agency must provide a detailed, thoughtful analysis drawn from adequate data so that a reviewing body can decide on an objective basis whether the agency fairly assessed other courses of action which might realistically be substituted for the one proposed.
M.
Thus, in considering whether the Staff adequately considered the alternative of "no action" in comparison to the prcposed evaporation of the AGW, as alleged in Contention 2, one must determine whether the alternative of no action was given a "hard look" and whether no action is "obviously superior" to the proposed evaporation.
The same tests apply to the Contention 3 issue of the cost / benefit balance discussed in the PEIS, and the alternative of closed cycle evaporation raised in Contention 8.
The PEIS consideration of the no action alternative is set out at pp. 3.32-3.34.
There, it is explained that on-site storage of the AGW for 150 years would significantly reduce only the tritium levels in the water so that the environmental impact of long term storage of the water would not be significantly different from near term evaporation of the water.
PEIS, p.3.33.
The Staff "fairly assessed" the no action
alternative by providing the analysis of the change in radioisotopes over a long term, the financial cost of construction of additional tanks for water storage, the impact of an accidental tank rupture, and the impact of ultimate disposal of the water.
Consequently, the Staff gave the no action alternative the "hard look" required by NEPA.
Although it is not clear what the phrase "conclusive risk / benefit analysis" means in Conten-tion 2, nevertheless, the Staff submits that the PEIS analysis of the no action alternative meets the requirement of NEPA.
Since the impacts of ro action for 150 years are nearly identical to the impacts of near term evaporation of the water, it is obvious that the no action alternative cannot be considered "obviously superior" and thus does not provide a basis for rejecting the proposed action, in accord with Seabrook, supra.
Therefore, since the no action alternative has been given a thoughtful detailed analysis, there is no factual or legal basis for the assertion in Contention 2.
Consequently, the Contention must be dismissed.
The assertion in Contention 3 that the benefits of evaporation have not been shown to exceed the risks of gaseous releases and solid wastes simply has no legal basis and mischaracterizes NEPA.
NEPA re-quires an assessment of environmental impacts associated with proposed actions, and a balancino of environmental costs with the benefit of the action including technical and economic factors.
It does not require a showing that the benefit to the public of the proposed action exceeds the environmental cost, but, as stated, an assessment of environmental impacts which does not indicate excessive impacts but a reasonable balance between the benefit and the environmental cost. Seabrook, supra.
As stated in the PEIS, there is little difference in the environmental impact of present evaporation or long term storage of the AGW and, as i
shown in the PEIS, there will be minimal environmental impact from the evaporation.
Similarly, and contrary to the assertion in Contention 8, the. closed cycle evaporation alternative was considered and given a "hard look" in the PEIS at pp. 3.15-3.18.
This alternative is not shown to be "obviously superior," given the greater financial expense of closed cycle distillation of the water compared to the minimal radiation dose resulting from forced evaporation.
PEIS, p. 5.2.
In summary, as explained above, the PEIS has complied with NEPA requirements to assess the benefit of the disposal of the AGW as part of the THI-2 site-cleanup in comparison to the minimal environmental impact of the water disposal, giving due regard to all pertinent factors. There is no genuine issue in dispute which would support a finding that an alternative to the proposed evaporation of the AGW is "obviously superi-or."
Accordingly, the PEIS has clearly met the requirenent of NEfA to assess environmental impacts of proposed actions in conjunction with technical and economic considerations in order to give appropriate con-sideration to environmental values in decisionmaking by balancing the benefit of the proposed action with the environmental impact.
Conse-quently, there is neither legal nor factual basis for joint intervenors' Contentions 2, 3 and 8 and they must be dismissed.
Contention 4 states:
(b) Sufficient evidence has not been provided to ensure that the evaporator can filter out transuranics, other radionuclides as well as chemicals to prctect the public health and safety.
I (c) The evaporator's monitoring and safety systems have not been shown to provide the safeguards needed to protect the public health and safety when the evaporator operates in an open cycle mode.
(d) It has not been demonstrated that the influent to the evaporator may be varied from 3 gallon / minute without the health and safety of the public being jeopardized.
I
Contention 4 essentially challenges the proper functioning of the evaporator.
However, as pointed out in the Licensee's motion, joint intervenors have provided no specific reason as to why they challenge the evaporator itself. SI On the other hand, the Licensee's affiants Buchanan, Harner, and Baker have explained in detail the design and structure of the evaporator and have demonstrated that the pre-treatment of the AGW, and the filtering, monitoring and safeguards within the evaporator will ensure proper functioning of the evaporator and limita-tion of the radiontclides and chemicals released. EI In addition, Mr.
Buchanan has explained that the influent rate to the evaporator has no impact on public health ard safety.
The attached affidavit of Linda F.
Funson confirms the testimony of the Licensee's affiants by agreeing that the design of the evaporator is such that there is no reason to believe that it will function so as to release more radionuclides and chemicals than those estimated in the PEIS.
Munson affidavit, 11 26-28, 31.
In short, Contentior 4 simply has no factual basis since there is no fact in dispute which would suggest that the evaporator will not function pro-perly.
Beyond this, as previously explained, the releases from the evaporator are within the guidelines of Appendix ! and, even considering the cost per person-rem analysis in Section II.B of Appendix I, there is no improvement available or necessary for the evaporator.
Consequently,
-4/
"Licensee's Motion for Sumary Disposition of Contentions 4b (In Part), 4c and 4d, May 9, 1988, at 4
-5/
Affidavits of David R. Buchanan, Kerry L. Harner, and Gary G. Baker attached to Licensee's motions for sumary ) disposition of Conten-tions 4(b) in part, 4(c), and 4(d), and 4(b in part and 6, dated May 9 and 16, 1988.
the evaporator meets the guidelines of Appendix I and the ALARA Standard.
Therefore, Contention 4(b),(c),and (d) does not raise a genuine issue of fact which could be decided and must be summarily dismissed.
Contention 5(d) states:
They have underestimated the effects of tritium and alpha emitting radionuclides on human beings.
The alpha emitters such as plutonium 238 and other transuranic elements which are present in the water were virtually ignored in the 1987 EIS.
They were not examined for their chemical and biological characteristics in spite of their well-known toxicity.
Section 2 of the PEIS sets cut the Staff's analysis of contaminants in the AGW including tritium and transuranics.
Table 2.2 of the PEIS lists three uranium isotopes and six transuranium isotopes, as well as 16 isotopes at or below detectable limits.
As clearly stated in the PEIS, the transuranics listed in Table 2.2 were conservatively assumed to exist in the water even though not positively identified.
PEIS, p. 2.2.
Even with this conservative estimate of water contaminants, the health effect for the general population from evaporation of the AGW is calculated to be a 4 in 10,000 chance of a single fatal cancer in the exposed population.
PEIS, p. 5.6.
This minimal health effect is substantiated by a study of the effect of the tritium releases performed by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.
PEIS, p.
A.13-23.
The Council estimated the health effect from tritium releases to be one chance in a million of a lifetime cancer plus severe genetic risk.
PEIS, p. A.20.
The calculations of health effects in the PEIS are based on commonly used methods, and conservative assumptions.
The 50-year dose comitment from the radionuclides listed in Table 2.2 to the maximally exposed member of the public was calculated using the ISOSHLD-II computer
code.
PEIS,p.3.7,n.(a). Appendix C of the PEIS describes the method-ologies, assumptions, and parameters used in the calculation of the radiation exposure to the public.
In sum, the PEIS contains a conserva-tive and sound estimate of the effects of tritium and transuranics which will or might be released from the AGW.
Thus, contrary to the assertion in Contention 5, the transuranic elements were not ignored, but rather, were assumed to be present in the AGW releases even though not detectable after SDS/EPICOR II treatment.
The Licensee has calculated a higher dose to the maximally exposed individual than that in the PEIS. The estimates are 2.0 mrem for whole body and 3.6 mren to the bone. 5/
The Licensee's calculation is based on different modeling than that used by the Staff.
Munson affi-davit i 35.
Using both the Licensee's and the Staff's calculations, the risk of a single fatal cancer in the population within 50 miles of TMI-2 i
l from the evaporation of the AGW ranges from 0.0003 to 0.005.1/
There-fore, while there is no fact in dispute which indicates that the health effects of the radioactive emissions are underestimated in the PEIS, even the Licensee's more conservative calculations do not show a significant health effect from the AGW releases.
Thus, there is no issue raised by the mere allegation that the PEIS underestimated the health effects of tritium and transuranics since even the Licensee's calculations of higher doses are not significant to health effects.
Finally, as demonstrated above, there is no basis to the assertion that the PEIS failed to assess 6/
Affidavit of Gary G. Baker 5 14, attached to Licensee's motion for
~
summary disposition of Contention 5, May 16,1988.
Z/
Affidavit of Dr. Hans Behling, 1 88, Id.
u
. the health effects of transuranics.
Thus, there is no genuine issue to be decided underlying Centention 5(d) and it should be dismissed.
Contention 6 states:
An amendment to the license is premature because this water is presently covering the melted fuel, which melted at 5100 degrees Fahrenheit, and will be used in decontamination activities with the potential for the addition of more chemicals.
The Licensee has added more chemicals since the submittal of its proposal in July, 1986. The effects of these chemicals on the capabilities af the Epicor
'I, SDS and evaporator systems mu:t be evaluated.
The most significant evidence to demonstate that the chemicals in the AGW pose no risk to the equipment for AGW processing is the consistent performance of the equipment at TMI-? over the past several years.
Funson affidavit, if 21, 23.
Moreover, since the SDS and EPICOR-II systems are ion exchange systems, the levels of chemicals in the processed AGW to be evaporated are low.
Munson affidavit, f 22.
In Staff's view, the Licensee has demonstrated that the chemicels in the AGW will not have an adverse effect on the performance of EPICOR-II, SDS, or the evaporator.
Munson Affidavit, 11 23-26.
For this reason, the Staff I
believes there is no issue of material fact underlying Contention 6 and urges that it be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUS_I_0]!
l As fully explained in the Licensee's motions for sumnary disposition and as further discussed here in the Staff's response to the motions, there are no genuine issues to be decided in any of the SVA/TMIA conten-tions. There being no genuine issues of fact before the Licensing Board, there is no issue te be litigated, and the Licensee's motions for summary disposition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, i
Stephen H.. Lewis Counsel for NRC Staff lbDi l W
t /W Colleen P. Woodhead Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland p
this 23rd day of June, 1988 l
l-i UNITED STATE OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In-the Matter of
)
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES Do s. No. 50-320 OLA NUCLEAR CORPORATION, ET AL.
)
ASLBP No. 87-554-OLA
)
(Disposal of Accident-(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Generated Water)
Station, Unit 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA F. MUNSOH I,
Linda F.
Munson, having first been duly sworn, do depose and state:
1.
My business address is Evergreen Innovations, Inc.,
23233 Snohomish, Richland, Washington.
During preparation of Supplement 2 to i
the "Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement related to decontamination and disposal of radio-active waste resulting from March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (NUREG-0683), hereinafter referred to as "the Supplement," I was employed by Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
I managed the project to assist the NRC in the preparation of the Supplement and was also a principal contributor to the Supplement.
I have a Bachelors and Masters degree in Chemistry and have worked in environmental protection and personnel safety related to the I
ruclear industry since 1973.
A statement of my professional qualifications is attached.
2.
I make this affidavit in support of tha NRC staff response of the licensee's motions for sumary Jisposition filed t n May 9 ind 16, 1988.
For the convenience of the Atomic Safe' arc' Lictnsing Board and l
parties, this affidavit addresses specifically the licensee's statements l
of material facts filed in support of its motions.
(The number in parenthesis is the number of the paragraph of the statement of material facts that I am addressing).
Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 8.
3.
This part of my affidavit responds to "Licensee's Statement of Material facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard (Contention I, 2, 3 and 8).
4.
(1)
This fact is not in issue.
The licensee's proposal to dispose of the accident generated water in this manner was made to the NRC in submissions dated July 31 and October 21, 1986.
The proposal is the subject of the Supplement.
Further details of the proposed system have been provided in a Preliminary System Design, dated Febrary 16, 1988.
5.
(2)
I do not consider there to be any genuine dispute that the i
radiological releases from the proposed evaporation process would result in doses that are well within the numerical design objectives of 10 C.F.R.
l l
Part 50, Appendix 1.
These design objectives are requirements on the operation of TMI-2 by virtue of their inclusion in the facility's Appendix B Technical Specification Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
For gaseous releases the applicable criteria of Appendix I are that:
the quantity of material release should not be such that the air dose due to gaseous effluents would be likely to exceed 10 millirad /yr.
l for gamma radiation or 20 millirad /yr. for beta radiation (II.B(1));
l the annual external dose from gaseous effluent to any individual in an unrestricted area should not exceed 5 mrem to the total body
e-.
(II.B(2)(a); and the calculated annual total quantity of radioactive iodine and radioactive material in particulate form above background should not be such as to result in an annual dose or dose commitment to any person in an unrestricted area from all applicable pathways of exposure in excess of 15 millirem to any organ.
(II.C.).
The radiological releases during routine operation of the evaporator and from accidents that might occur as a result of operation of the evaporator were evaluated in Section 3.1.1 of the Supplemant.
The 50 year dose commitment that would be received by the maximally exposed individual in unrestricted areas from evaporation were calculated to be 0.7 millirem total body and less than 4 millirem to the thyroid.
Supplement 3.1.1.
The 50 year dose commitment reflects contributions in addition to the air dose referenced in Appendix I,
5 II.B.1.
Since the 50 year dose commitment is less than the annual numerical objectives in Appendix I Sections II.B(2)(a) and II.C this analysis demonstrates that the releases from the proposed eyeporation process will be within the Appendix I design objectives.
6.
(3) The Staff's assessment of population doses from operation of the evaporator supports the reasonableness of the licensee's statement.
In the Supplement (p. 3.7) the Staff estimated the radiation dose to the public within 50 miles of the facility from licensee's proposed evaporation method to be 3 person-rem total body and less that 6 person-rem to the thyroid.
The population within 50 miles of the facility was estimated to be 2.2 taillion persons. Id.
The average radiation dose to a person within the 50 mile radius would, therefore, be 0.0013 mrem total body and less than 0.0026 mrem thyroid. These estimates are even
lower than those made by the licensee because of differences in the calculation methods employed.
I, thereby, concur that the licensee's estimate of average radiation dose from evaporation represents a
reasonable upper bound of the expected dose.
The licensee has used a value of about 300 mrem for the annual radiation dose from natural background.
Although the Supplement (p. 5.1) used a lower value (87 mrem /yr.), recent evaluations of background radiation dose tend to be in the range of the 300 mrem /yr value.
The contribution that evaporation of accident generated water would make to the total radiation dose received by the surrounding poplation would be extremely small.
7.
(4)
The licensee's proposal would certainly remove the water from the site.
Disposal of the accident generated water 1:; an integral part of cleanup of the radioactive waste from the accident and is, therefore, in furtherance of the clesnup.
The Commission considers that the public interest would be served by safe and expeditious cleanup of THI-2, including the removal of radioactive waste from the site (Supplement, Section 3.5.1.4) and the Staff has concluded that the licensee's proposal constitutes a safe and environmentally acceptable means of accomplishing this objective.
Id., p. viii.
There is a small risk associated with a potential rupture of tanks in which the water would be stored onsite undcr the "no action citernative."
A radiation dose of 140 persun-rem to the bone and 4 person-rem to the total-body to the offsite 50 mile population was calculated if the entire volume of the accident generated water were to he released to the Susquehanna Riser without further treatment. Supplement, p. 5.9.
1
8.
(5)
The Supplement included an estimate of occupational radiation dose from evaporation of the accident generated water.
Between 12 and 20 person-rem were expected to be required to perform the evaporotion and packaging of the residue.
Supplement, p.
3.7.
The Supplement did not include the occupational exposure reouf red to perform ion exchange treatment of any portion of the water prior to evaporation.
The figures used by the licensee, 2,000 to 8,000 person-rem for the entire cleanup, are the same as those given in the original 1981 PEIS and do not reflect the reevaluation made in Supplement 1 to the PEIS (1984).
That supplement estimated that completion of cleanup would require between 13,000 and 46,000 person-rem.
However, it is likely that the total occupational dose through the end of cleanup will be less than 8,000 per son-rem.
This value is less than the range given in Supplement I and is within the range of the original PEIS es+imate.
The licensee's statenent that the occupational exposure required to perform the evaporation process and package the residue is on the order of 23 person-rem is reasonable and constitutes a very small pcetion of the dose required te complete cleanup.
9.
(6)
The Staff estimated in the Supplement (p. 3.8) that the volume of waste from evaporation would be 27,000 to 88,00') cubic feet.
This was based on the licensee's original plan to solidify in concrete the waste slurry from the evaporator.
Since then, the licensee has moved forward with preliminary design of an evaporator system and stated that it j
will use one of three options for packaging of the evaporator bottoms, none of which involves solidification in concrete.
See Section 2.3.7 of l
Preliminary System Description.
Substitution of these packaging methods t
k.
would result in significantly less burial volume and less risk of traffic accidents and fatalities than estimated in the Supplement. The 4,425 cubic foot waste volume would have to contain essentially all of the boric acid and sodium hydroxide (the principal materials that would be contained in the bottoms) from the water.
Based on the date provided in Section 2 of the Supplement, the water contains approximately 150 tons of boric acid and 11 tons of sodium hydroxide.
Therefore, for the final waste volume to be 4,425 cubic feet, I calculate that it would have a density of at least 1.17 grams per cubic centimeter.
Since this density is a reasonable value, I conclude that the estimate of 4,425 cubic feet of waste should be achievable.
10.
(7)
The alternative of onsite solidification of the water and offsite burial was evaluated in Section 3.3.2 of the Supplement.
Use of that alternative was estimated to generate 390,000 to 460,000 cubic feet of waste, in addition to the resin required to retreat 40% of the accident generated water.
The Staff further estimated that shipment of this waste would require 1,300 to 1,600 trips, which would result in approximately 10 to 12 traffic accidents and 0.6 to 0.8 fatalities. Therefore, licensce's estimates are in close agreement with the Staff's.
Further, the Staff accepts the licensee's lower estimates for traffic accidents as reasonable, since the licensee presumed that the route would be selected to minimize risk, whereas the figures given in the Supplement assumed that most direct route would be used.
Joint Affidavit of Baker, et,al.
(Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 8), p. 17.
As discussed on page 2.20 of the 5upplement, the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 provides for up to 800,000 s
e.
cubic feet of waste burial capacity for unusual or unexpected activities.
467,000 cubic feet (licensee's estimate for this alternative) would use up a very substantial portion (58%) of this national allocation.
The cost of onsite solidification followed by offsite burial (exclusive of the cost to retreat any of the accident generated water) was estimated by the Staff to be between $34 and $41 million. Supplement Table 3.11.
This is in close agreement with the licensee's estimate of $40.7 million which include the costs associated with ion-exchange processing.
11.
(8)
The Staff evaluated in the Supplement the alternative
.f bulk shipment to Nevada of the accident generated water and estimated that 420 truck shipments would be required, in adoition to the shipments required for the resins from water retreatment.
Supplement, p. 3.19.
The Staff further estimated that the water shipments would be expected to result in 3.0 traffic accidents, 2.6 injuries and 0.2 fatalities.
Id., p.
3.21.
Again, I accept as reasonable the lower accident frequency used by the licensee because they selected the route in order to minimize risk.
Affidavit of Baker, et al. (Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 8), p. 28.
12.
(9) The alternative of distillation followed by onsite solidification and burial of the captured distillate and offsite burial of the evaporator bottoms was not specifically evaluated in the Supplement.
However, the alternative of direct solidification of the water without distillation was evaluated in Section 3.3.1.
Space limitations within the 100 year floodplain were not considered to preclude this alterative, but regulatory approvals and potential obstacles were identified that made approval of this alternative far from certain.
Supplement, Section 3.3.1.4.
The cort of this alternative was estimated to be between $5.4
i
~
and $6 million (exclusive of the cost of retreating 40% of the water).
!_d., Ta ble 3.10.
The cost of distillation, as given in Section 3.1.3 of the Supplement, was estimated to be between $3.6 and $4,0 million.
The cost of this alternative, using figures from the Supplement, would, therefore, be approximately $9 to $10 million, whereas the evaporation method proposed by the licensee was anticipated by the Staff to cost between $6.2 and $12 million.
The licensee's changes in its waste packaging methodology would, however, result in considerable reduction from the cost estimated in the Supplement.
I agree that the alternative of distillation and onsite burial of the distillate would be more costly than the licensee's proposal, but I do not have sufficient infonnation to estimate the cost differential.
13.
(10) I concur in the licensee's assessment that removing the solidified distillate from the TMI site would har-similar negative transportation impacts as those identified for solloification of the entire water volume.
14.
(11) The licensee's statement is almost identical to one of the Staff's conclusions in Section 6 of the Supplement, which reads:
Because of the relatively long radiological half-life and relatively small quantity of contaminants in the water, the environmental impacts of disposal following even a relatively long storage period would not be significantly different from impacts associated with near-term disposal.
This conclusion is based upon the analysis in Section 3.5.1 of the Supplement.
.g.
15.
(12)The Supplement estimates the cost of the no action alternative (onsite storage in tanks for an indefinite period) to be $0.1 to $1.3 million, plus the cost of ultimate disposal.
Supplement, Table 3.14.
The significant range of this estimate reflected the indefinite term of the onsite storage and the inability to calculate with precision the cost of additional and replacement tanks.
16.
(13) Supplement 2,
Section 3.5.1, acknowledges that ensite storage as liquid poses a potential for accident discharge. The Staff has calculated that the maximally exposed member of the general public would receive a bone dose of 3 mrem and a total-body dose of 0.4 mrem from the prompt rupture of all of the tanks and discharge of all of the accident generated water stored therein. Supplement, p. 3.34.
Such a discharge would result in a 50 year dose commitment to the exposed population of 140 person-ren to the bone and 4 person-rem to the total body.
Id.
17.
(14)The Staff did not consider in the Supplement the alternative of permanent storage cf the accident generated water in tanks inside the TMI-2 Reactor Building (containment).
I have reviewed the licensee's analysis of the occupational exposure that wonld be required to construct tanks for this alternative.
While I have not vertified these specific estimates, based upon my familiarity with the radioactivity levels within the Reactor Building I concur that significant occupational doses would be incurred if this alternative were implemented.
I also agree that because of the construction difficulties associated with this alternative, the alternative would be much more costly than storage elsewhere on the site.
The licensee has not provided a total cost
estimate for this alternative and I do not have a basis for comparing it against the cost of the licensee's proposal.
18.
(15) Supplement, Table 5.1 shows that there are alternatives considered by the Staff that would result in lower doses to the maximally exposed member of the general public and lower cumulative population doses than would the licensee's proposal.
The Staff did not, however, consider the doses from any of these alternatives to be significant when measured against doses from background radiation.
Supplement, pp. 5.1.-5.2.
19.
(16) No alternative evaluated by the Staff was found to be "clearly preferable" (which could also be stated as "obviously superior")
to the licensee's proposal.
Supplement, p. vi.
I also do not consider the additional options raised by SVA/TMIA
((1) distillation, solidification of distillate, and dispesal on or offsite and (2) permanent storace in tanks within containment) to be obviously superior to the licensee's proposal.
Contentions 4b, in part, and 6 on Chemicals 20.
This section of my affidavit responds to "Licensee's Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard (Contentions 4b in part and 6 on Chemicals)."
Pl.
(1, 2 and 3)
The licensee has described a chemical control system that should adequately protect the SDS and EPICOR-II ion exchange systems from chemicals that would significantly degrade their performance.
Affidavit of Harter,Section II.
Further, the only likely effect of chemical addition on the SDS and EPICOR-II systems would be reduction of
resin' life and, therefore increase in number of resin liners requiring disposal.
Radionuclide content of the evaporator effluent would not be affected because batch-cycle evaporation can be used to reduce the radionuclide content so as to meet the licensee's effluent criteria.
See discussion below.
The only chemicals that might be released in a signficant cuantity from a properly designed evaporator are volatile (low boiling point) ones. Most volatile chemicals are likely to be used in extremely small quantities, if at all, in the accident generated water because they I'
are of limited usefulness in maintenance and decontamination operations.
Some potentially useful decontamination chemicals, such as freon compounds, have been administratively rejected or their use severely curtailed by the licensee because of waste management considerations.
22.
(4)
I agree that past the successful operation of the SDS and EPICOR-II systems in treating the accident generated water is a strong indication of the compatibility of the water's chemistry with the two systems.
23.
(5) The SDS and EPICOR-II systems at TMI-2 are ion exchange systems and are expected to remove most ionic species.
Affidavit of Harner, f 9.
In addition, these systems will remove small quantities of oils, some flocculating agents and other chemicals.
They will not, however, remove much of the borate and sodium ions.
Id., 11 21, 25.
I agree, therefore, that the levels of chemicals, other than boron and sodium, in the processed accident generated water will be low.
24.
(6) The licensee has demonstrated that the centinuing use of some of the accident generated water in the cleanup program has not
changed the chemical characteristics of the processed water to any significant extent. Harner Affidavit, 1 26 and Tables 3 and 4.
I have no reason to doubt that the licensee will continue to treat this water to the extent necessary with the EPICOR-II and/or SDS systems, id_.,126.
25.
(7) The application of evaporator and vaporizer inilvent criteria described by the licensee should assure that the radionuclide concentration in releases from the vaporizer are well within THI-2 Technical Specification
- limits, both for particulates and tritium.
Affidavit of Buchanan,Section I.
The application of these criteria should also assure that concentrctions of baron and sodium in the effluent are limited to acceptable levels, ld., Exhibit B, Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
26.
(8) Repeated processing of water by ion exchange may be used to reduce the concentration of chemicals and/or radienuclides.
- However, typically the effectiveness of such reprocessing is limited after two or three passes through the system.
The "achievable" radionuclide concentrations described in the Supplement (Table 2.2) are approximately the levels at which further processing through the SDS and/or EPICOR-II systems cease to reduce concentrations significantly.
The licensee has described e method to achieve the influent criteria to the evaporator that it has established.
Multiple processing of the accident generated water by batch-cycle evaporation could be used to reduce the concentration of chemicals and radionuclides almost without limitation because each cycle will result in less than 0.1% carry-over. Supplement, 6 3.1.3.1.
Therefore, multiple distillations in a closed-cycle mode should be very effective in reducing radionuclides other than tritium.
This nrocess should also be effective
in reducing concentrations of borate, sodium and other non-volatile chemicals.
27.
(9 and 10)
The construction of evaporators to operate with water chemistry similar to that found in the 1MI-2 accident generated water (i.e., high boric acid concentrations) is a ccmmon requirement in the nuclear industry because pressurized water reactors typically use boric acid in their primary coolant.
The licensee states that the evaporator proposed to be used at THI-2 will be specifically designed to be compatible with the accident generated water and that this compatibility will be demonstrated by preoperational testing making use of a surrogate solution chemically similar to the accident generated water.
Affidavit of Buchanan,1 10.
I am not aware of any technical impediment to constructing an evaporator that would be compatible with the accident generated water and believe that performance of preoperational testing would be an effective means to verify its compatibility.
In addition, the licensee has identified aspects of the accident generated water evaporation design (Buchanan Affidavit, t 12) that, in my opinion, should avoid potential operatienal difficulties.
28.
(11)
The evaporator design, as presented by the licensee, includes conductivity monitors and a radiation detector.
Buchanan Affidavit, 5 13. Evaporator upsets that could increase the radionuclide l
l concentration in the effluent from the evaporator are likely to result in droplet carry-over.
Carry-over of droplets containing sodium, borate and hydrogen ions would result in an increase in the conductivity of the condensate, which would be detected.
I agree that the radiation monitor l
1 l
provides an additional safeguard to assure that effluents are not released in excess of the licensee's limits.
29.
(12) A 0.1% carry-over fraction (reduction by a factor of 1,000 in' the concentration of the chemicals and radionuclides in the effluent release to the atmosphere was described by the Staff as routinely achievable.
Supplement, p.
3.6.
In an evaporator with this design specification, the only chemicals that could be released in greater quantity than 0.1% would be volatile chemicals (those with boiling points near or below that of water, such as acetone or alcohol).
However, I concur in the licensee's statement that chemicals, other than boron and sodium, are already at trace levels.
Harner Affidavit, 1 18; Baker Affidevit,14. Hence, all chemical releases would be minimal.
30.
(13)The characteristics, interactions, and environmental concentrations of boron and sodium are described in Sections 2.2.6 and-2.2.7 of the supplement.
To the best of my knowledge, no environmental impacts are expected from the release of these chemicals in the vaporizer effluent.
All other chemicals in the accident generated water would be reduced to trace levels before release in vaporizer effluent and should not, therefore, result in any environmental impacts.
Cor.tentions 4b, in part, 4c and d.
- 31. This part of my affidcvit is in response to "Licensee's Statement Of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard (Contentions 4b In Part, 4c and 4d)."
32.
(1-12)
The statements presented by the licensee provide additivnal details of evaporator design that were not available when l
. Supplement 2 was issued. There is nothing in these statements, nor in the other design information submitted by the licensee, that causes me to doubt that the evaporator that is being designed for the licensee will meet the 9erformance specifications that are included in Supplement 2 Table s 3.1.1, 33.
In addition to the facts asserted by the licensee in support of its motion, I have also considered whether, pursuant to Section II.D of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 there is any item of "reasonably demonstrated technology" that can be added to the evaporator for a favorable cost-benefit ratio to reduce the population dose anticipated from operation of the evaporator.
In accordance with Section II.D I have used the. lues of $1,000 per total-body person-rem and $1,000 per thyroid person-rem, as applied to the population within 50 miles of the THI 2 facility.
The Staff calculated less than 6 person-rem to the thyroid and less than 3 person-rem total body as the collective 50-year dose commitment to this population from the operation of the evaporator.
Supplement, p. 3.7.
I am not aware of any item of reasonably demonstrated technology that can, for $1,000 per total-body or thyroid person-rem, reduce the population doses estimated i
from operation of the evaporator.
l Contention 5d 1
- 34. This part of my affidavit responds to "Licensee's Statement of l
Material Facts As to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard (Contention 5d).
l I
. 4 35.
(1-4, 7, 9 and 10)
To the best of my knowledge all of these statements are correct and the Staff has nothing it wishes to add with respect _to them, 36.
(5 and 8) While the licensee and Staff did not derive precisely the same calculated values for the dose to the maximally exposed member of the general public from operation of the evaporator, in my professional judgement this is not surprising.
The computer codes that are used in making such calculations are complex and the Staff and the licensee employed different codes.
In my judgement, the calculated dose from tritium specifically from the proposed evaporation of the accident generated water derived by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) indicates that the licensee's estimated dose from tritium is likely to be high.
The NCRP calculated the total-body tritium dose to be 0.6 mrem, whereas the licensee estimated 1.4 mrem.
Supplement, Appendix A, p. A.13 and Table 8.2 on p. A.21.
37.
(6) The evaluation conducted by the Staff confirms the licensee's conclusion.
Table 2.2 of the Supplement lists three uranium isotcpes and six transuranics, none of which are among the "principal contaminants presented and assumed to be present in the accident-generated water."
Supplement, p. 2.4.
Strontium-90 is one of the six principal contaminants identified by the Staff. M., The Staff concluded:
The environmental impact of the from radionuclides other than the principal ones was determined to be insignificant (i.e.,
L less than 1%) relative to the principal radionuclides.
M.
I 38.
(11) The Supplement confirms the accuracy of this statement with respect to the Staff's calculation of the risk of a cancer fatality as a I
t
. 1 result of the proposed evaporation.
The Staff estimated 0.0004 cancer deaths among the 2.2 million people within 50 miles of the TMI site as a result of.the proposed evaporation.
Supplement, p. 5.6.
This can be more easily understood as 4 chances in 10,000 that a single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of the proposed evaporation.
39.
(12) I believe it is overly simplistic to compare the risks of genetic effects against the risks of cancer fatalities that might result from the proposed evaporation.
This is principally because the cancer risks occur to only the population living at the time of the radiation exposure, whereas genetic effects would occur in future generations.
The Staff estimates 0.002 potential genetic disorders (i.e.,
2 chances in 1,000 of a single genetic disorder) in all future generations of the exposed public, both workers and the general public, as a result of the proposed evaporation.
Supplement, p. 5.6. For comparison, 1.2 million genetic abnormalities would be expected to the same population over the same period from causes unrelated to the TMI-2 cleanup. Id.
Although the staff estimates a higher probability of a genetic defect than a fatal cancer, for the reasons stated above and the fact that there is only a remote probability cf either effect, the comparison does not appear appropriate.
40.
(13) I agree with this statement.
The risk from transuranics is principally from their radicactivity and the Staff concluded that transuranics were not among the "principal contaminants" in the accident generated water and that the environmental in. pact of the trensuranics assumed to be in the water was insignificant compared to the principal contaminants.
Supplement, p.
2.4.
The chemical toxicity of the i
L-
transuranics was questioned during the comment period on the Draft Supplement No. 2 and the Staff responded that:
"Chemical toxicity of the transuranics is negligible at the environmental concentrations expected."
Supplement, p.
7.6.
This statement is based upon the extremely small amount of transuranics considered to be released in the proposed evapora-tion.
The total quantities assumed to be present in the water is 2.6 milligrams in the 2.3 million gallons of accident generated water.
(Calculated from the curie quantities given in Table 2.2.)
Only 0.1%
(Supplement, p. 3.6), or 0.0026 milligrams, is assumed to be released to the atmosphere in the proposed evaporation process.
The environmental concentrations of any non-radioactive chemical released in this manner and in this quantity would be negligible.
For purposes of comparison, permissible exposure levels, even to known carcinogens, are likely to be 0.005 milligrams per cubic meter of air, or greater.
See "Threshold Limit Values and Biological Exposure Indeces For 1986-1987," American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.
The foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Linda F. Munson Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, 1988 hotary Public My connission expires:
Linda F. Munson, President Evergreen Innovations, Inc.
2323 Snohomish Richland, Washington 9935?.
M.S. Analytical Chemistry, Iowa State University 1968 B.A. Chemistry, United States Ir ternational University 1968 January 1981 to January 1938. Senior Research Scientist, Project manager and Associate Section Manager of the Oosimetry Technology Section of Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, P.O. Box 999, Richland, Washington 99352.
August 1972 to January 1981 United Nuclear Industries as Environmental Engineer, Senior Environmental Engineer, Project Manager and Manager, Industrial Safety.
Prior experience at the University of Minnesota, College of Veterinary Medicine as a research assistant and laboratory instructor, and as a teaching assistant at Iowa State University.
In my current capacity I'am a consultant in health physics and radioactive waste management to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and others.
In my position at Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
I managed the project to assist the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in regulation of the cleanup of TMI-2.
I was project manager and an author of Draft and Final Supplement No. 1 and Draft and Final Supplement No. 2 to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement governing cleanup of the TMI-2 reactor.
In this capacity I participated in public hearings, made presentations to the Advisory Panel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Cleanup of THI-2, and to a Subcommittee of the Associated Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
I also participated in three multi-disciplinary-team Technical Safety Appraisals for DOE HQ.
I served as the Industrial Hygiene appraiser for two uranium enrichment facilities and the radiation protection practices appraiser at a liquid metal breeder reactor.
I participated in a major contract to improve radiation protection practices at a major fuel fabrication facility.
I also managed a contract to upgrade radiation and environmental protection at a uranium extrusion facility.
4
I was the principal author of a study of chemical decontamination of accident-damaged reactors (such as THI) for the Electric Power Research Institute.
I assisted DOE Headquarters in an evaluation of emergency preparedness at one of their major sites and served as an observer for the NRC on numerous emerger.cy preparedness exercises at commercial power reactors.
I managed and contributed to, a study to provide guidance in decontamination planning for the US NRC.
I participated in an NRC program to )erform in-depth team appraisals of radiation protection'at all of tie NRC licensed uranium mills.
In a previous position with UNC Nuclear Industries I, with the help industrial hygiene of an able staff, was responsible for industrial safety, brication facilities and fire protection for a nuclear reactor and the fuel fa that supported it.
I managed and contributed to a study of decommission alternatives for the West Valley Fuel Reprocessing Plant under contract with Argonne National Laboratory.
For several years I working with a commercial enterprise of UNC, preparing licensee environmental reports and license applications for several 7
different clients in uranium mining, uranium milling, and nuclear fuel.
fabrication.
I also team taught a course, "Radiation Protection in Uranium Mining and Milling", tested and selected mine water treatment processes.
During my initial assignment at the reactor I assisted in operation of a pilot plant to treat reactor effluents using various ton exchange I also assisted in the classification and sampling of processes.
environmental release points and increased my knowledge of health physics through courses and self study.
e 6
DOC KE ii:0 NM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION pggg BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD h' r F M u F.64 I A 2 '
0CKEim A 'MKI In the Matter of BRN GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES HUCLEAR CORPORATION, ET AL.
Docket No. 50-320 OLA
~~
ASLBP No. 87-554-OLA (Three Mile Island Nuclear (Disposal of Accident-Station, Unit 2)
)
Generated Water)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF THE LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION" and "MOTION OF NRC STAFF FOR LEAVE TO FILE RESPONSE OUT OF TIME" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or as indicated by one asterisk -express mail to Ms. Skolnick two asterisks -hand-delivery to messenger employed by licensee three asterisks -deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's internal mail system this 23rd day of June,1988:
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Administrative Judge Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555***
Washington, D.C.
20037**
Dr. Oscar H. Paris John R. McKinstry Administrative Judge Assistant Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Comonwealth of Pennsylvania U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 505 Executive House Washington, D.C.
20555***
P. O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panei U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555***
Washington, D.C.
20555***
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Docketing and Service Section Board Panel Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555***
Washington, D.C.
20555***
. 4 Susquehanna Valley Alliance Three Mile Island Alert c/o Ms. Frances Skolnick 315 Peffer Street 2079 New Danville Pike Harrisburg, PA 17102 Lancaster, PA 17603*
Mr. Robert E. Rogan Richard P. Mather Director, Licensing &
Department of Environmental Nuclear Safety, TMI-2 Resources GPU Nuclear Corporation 505 Ex2cutive House P.O. Box 480 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Middletown, PA 17057-0191 Adjudicatory File Jay Gutierrez Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Regional Counsel Panel Docket USNRC, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission 475 Allendale Road Washington, D.C.
20555***
King of Prussia, PA 19406***
.Y Steph(n H. Lewis Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney l
l 1
L