ML20215H389

Submits Addl Questions for Westinghouse Re Modules 2 & 3 of RESAR-SP/90 Preliminary Design Approval Application on Design Features to Reduce Sabotage Vulnerability

ML20215H389
Person / Time
Site:	05000601
Issue date:	06/18/1987
From:	Randy Erickson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Berkow H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-29, REF-GTECI-SA, TASK-A-29, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8706240088
Download: ML20215H389 (3)

Text

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Docket No. 50-601 MEMORANDUM FOR: Herbert N. Berkow Director Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V )

and Special Projects l FROM: Robert A. Ericksor Chief Reactor Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON RESAR-SP/90 j SABOTAGE PROTECTION FEATURES '

We have reviewed Module 2 (November 1983) and Module 3 (Revision 1, December 1984) of the RESAR-SP/90 Preliminary Design Approval application relative to physical protection requirements of current regulations, as well as with respect to the following portions of the Commission's Severe Accident Policy 1 Statement [FR50:32141, August 1985):

"The Commission also recognizes the importance of such potential contributors to severe accident risk as human performance and sabotage. The issues of both insider and outsider sabotage threats will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be emphasized in the design and in the operating procedures developed for new plants."

Besides finding out for us what Westinghouse's response was to the NRC's August 27, 1984 request for additional Module 2 information concerning design features to reduce sabotage vulnerability, the following are additional questions for Westinghouse about Modules 2 and 3.

1) The discussion in Section 5.1 of Module 2, on Generic Issue A-29, includes the statement:

"The WAPWR design will incorporate several features which should provide improved protection against industrial sabotage. These features include safeguards fluid system designs with reduced or eliminated interconnections, reduced or eliminated normal operation functions, improved redundancy and diversity, and improved plant layout. Also, the WAPWR plant layout provides improved physical  ;

separation between safeguards trains A and B as well as between the '

Fafeguards trains and the control systems. This layout allows improved control of access to vital areas and also allows free access to most normally operating equipment."

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Herbert N. Berkow 2 ggg y p a) Does the claim of improved protection provided by the layout depend upon controlling access in a way that restricts persons with author-ized access to safeguards train A from having authorized access to safeguards train B, or persons with authorized access to the control systems from having authorized access to the safeguards systems? If so, are there any emergency conditions, or situations that could lead to emergency conditions, for which this could result in interference with rapid ingress or egress of personnel?

b) biscuss if and how the layout would benefit protection against outsider sabotage threats.

2) What assumptions about saboteurs' capabilities will be used in the sabotage assessment indicated in Section 5.1 of Module 2 7

3) Section 6.1 of Module 2 states clearly that:

" Plant physical protection plans (including access controls to nuclear power plant vital areas) are the responsibility of each utility using the WAPWR design."

While it is reasonable that physical orotection equipment and organi-zation be utility specific, it would simplify licensing of sites if the identification of equipment to be protected as vital within the nuclear power block, which is within the W scope, was standard, rather than utility specific. Please identify the systems and components (including piping runs and valve motor control centers), and their locations, within your scope that should be considered vital in the sense of 10CFR73.2(i).

It would suffice to limit the list of components to those outside of containment. Also address what systems not within your scope, such as the service water system, should be vital. (This response should be protected as Safeguards Information in accordance with 10CFR73.21.)

4) As some equipment within the nuclear power block will be vital, con-sideration of the needs of vital barriers during building design could be beneficial. Consideration could be given in Section 6.2.3 of Module 2 to the regulatory position on physical barriers in Regulatory Guide 5.65, which could impact on design of some ducts and penetrations.

5) Clarify whether the plot plan of Figure 1.2-1 of Module 3 is simply illustrative or intended to be a standard plot plan or, for physical protection purposes, a " bounding" plot plan,

6) There are inconsistencies between the areas cross-hatched in that figure as areas of the nuclear power block and the NPB scope specified in Section 1.2.3. For example, the figure shows the Turbine Building and Guard House are in the NPB, but they are not. Please clarify.

7) Discuss how many decay heat removal systems would have to be defeated to prevent mitigation of a loss of offsite power transient. Etw would this be affected by loss of cooling water to the diesel generators, or other loss of the service water system?

r o .. . RESAR-SP/90 SAFEGUARDS Herbert N. Berkow JUN 101987

8) Discuss the protection afforded the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks and Emergency Water Storage Tanks by their locations inside the Reactor Building.

9) Page 1.9-1 of Module 3 states that:

" Table 1.9-2 provides a listing of programs and analyses to be developed on a site specific basis that must interface with programs initiated during the design of the NPB. This table identifies the PDA module where the interface requirements are described."

That table identifies Module 16 for " Industrial Security." Where are interface requirements for physical protection identified in Module 16?

Unless you disagree, we will not be reviewing the PDA further until you have received responses to these and the 1984 questions.

Robert A. Erickson, Chief Reactor Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards cc: T. J. Kenyon DISTRIBUTION:

RSGB rf Sec subj file:

Advance Reactor Licensing JPartlow BGrimes RErickson RDube BMendelsohn LBush Docket' File 50-601' NRC PDR Local PDR 1

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..... ........_______________.............. I NAME:BMend 1sohn:RJDube :RAEr son: -

DATE: 6/hf/87  : 6/If/87 6/ 3/87 - -

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