ML20215M126
| ML20215M126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000601 |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1987 |
| From: | Randy Erickson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Berkow H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706260283 | |
| Download: ML20215M126 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
..T NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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J(g g 3 gg Docket No. 'i MEMORANDUM FOR:
Herbert N. Berkow, Director Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects FROM:
Robert A. Erickson, Chief Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection &
Safeguards
SUBJECT:
DRAFT SANDIA REPORT:
"0BSERVATIONS ON THE SABOTAGE PROTECTION CAPABILITIES OF THE ADVANCED PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR " NOVEMBER 1983 We have reviewed the subject report that was being prepared for ACRS and do-not recommend contracting for continuation of their SAFE effort as part of the staff review of RESAR-SP/90.
The SAFE methodology used by Sandia fo'cuses on time delays caused by plant layout, doors and locking mechanisms, and on the alarm sensor locations and detection probabilities.
10 CFR 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires i: licensee's security response force to " interpose themselves between vital areas and...
any adversary attemptfog entry." SAFE could be useful in assessing this capability. However, unless Westinghouse proposes to identify physical protection features (e.g., protected area fences, intrusion detection systems, security response posts) as a bounding, envelope, these features will be largely within the utility's site specific scope rather than the. nuclear power block scope of the Westinghouse Preliminary Design Application (PDA) being reviewed.
That is one of the reasons we requested in our previous memorandum to you that Westinghouse identify the areas in the nuclear power block that they propose be vital areas.
Your Project Manager asked whether the suggestion that protection could be enhanced by redesign / reconfiguration of access at several locations is still germane. The design that Sandia looked at was the version prior to the change to a spherical containment.
One of Sandia's concerns was grade level exterior doors. The present design appears to have only two normal access points into
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the nuclear power block, and no grade level access. This could enhance physical protection if the security response force is located close to those locations. Another of Sandia's comments dealt with access between electrical trains A and B potentially compromising the advantage gained by physical separation of trains. This appears to remain a possibility, although the plant layout drawings in Module 2 may not be sufficiently detailed for this conclusion. We suggest asking Westinghouse whether they intend to have access between trains blocked in their more detailed design phase; however, there are no current safeguards requirements prohibiting access between trains.
8706260283 870622" PDR ADOCK 0500060.1 F
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SANDIA OBSERVATIONS ON WAPWR Herbert N. Berkow.RAN 2 2198/
We might also ask them to address the sabotage protection design choices the i
ACRS mentioned in their January 15, 1987 letter to Chairman Zech, "ACRS Recommendations on Improved Safety for Future Light Water Reactor Plant Design."
In requesting this information we should note that these too are not current safeguards regulatory requirements.
Your staff also asked whether we should perform "a complete fault tree vital analysis" at the Final Design Application stage. We would prefer that the applicant perform this analysis and submit it for our review. Westinghouse has stated that it intends to perform a risk based sabotage analysis, which would require a fault tree or similar approach. We encourage the use of relative risk techniques, avoiding establishing the probabilities of a sabo-tage attempt and its success, to determine if the design has any sabotage
" weak links" which additional redundancy or hardening could overcome.
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Robert A. Erickson, Chief Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection i
and Safeguards l
cc:
T. J. Kenyon, NRR DISTRIBUTION RSGB rf
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6/k/87 DATE: 6////87 6/us/87 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY