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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20057F2261993-09-30030 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Exemption Request from Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q) for License NPF-82 ML20056C7181993-07-14014 July 1993 SE Supporting Amend 10 to License NPF-82 ML20056A2001990-07-31031 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 6 to License NPF-82 ML20055E3911990-06-25025 June 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 5 to License NPF-82 ML20235M1941989-02-0808 February 1989 SER Accepting Util Response to NRC Bulletin 88-005 Re Identifying,Locating & Testing Nonconforming Flanges & Fittings Supplied by Piping Supplies,Inc,West Jersey Mfg Co & Chews Landing Mfgs ML20196E5961988-11-30030 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 10 to License NPF-36 ML20196B6831988-11-30030 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 9 to License NPF-36 ML20155F3531988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870414 Request for Authorization to Increase Power to 25% of Full Rated Power W/Listed Conditions.Licensee Evaluation of Operation & Proposal for Inspecting Components Must Be Augmented ML20155F3431988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request to Operate Facility at 25% Power Re Accident Evaluation ML20155F3381988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request for Authorization to Operate Facility at 25% Power Re Sys & Procedures for Accident Mitigation ML20154K0101988-09-19019 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 840309,850621 & 860606 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implication of Salem ATWS Events, Items 3.1.1, 3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 ML20154F4031988-09-14014 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request to Operate Facility at 25% Power Re Safety of Prolonged Operation at 25% Power ML20154F3951988-09-14014 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request to Operate Facility at 25% Power Re Accident Evaluation ML20154F3921988-09-14014 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request to Operate Facility at 25% Power Re Sys & Procedures for Accident Mitigation ML20154R9391988-05-31031 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Plant Primary Property Damage Insurance Exemption ML20236F7141987-10-19019 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 8 to License NPF-36 ML20234B8201987-09-14014 September 1987 SER on Util 830414,851023 & 860227 Responses to Generic Ltr 82-33 Re post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation Meeting Requirements of Reg Guide 1.97 as Applied to Emergency Response Facility ML20237G4701987-08-14014 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 7 to License NPF-36 ML20214K3961987-05-18018 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 6 to License NPF-36 ML20215M4181987-05-0404 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 5 to License NPF-36 ML20211N5921986-12-0909 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 4 to License NPF-36 ML20213D5001986-11-0303 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 3 to License NPF-36 ML20205E0601986-08-0101 August 1986 SER of Tdi Owners Group Program to Validate & Upgrade Quality of Tdi Diesel Generators for Nuclear Emergency Standby Svc.Technical Solution Available to Address Problem ML20154L9801986-03-0404 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 2 to License NPF-36 ML20138N6701985-12-0606 December 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 1 to License NPF-36 ML20058E1851982-07-15015 July 1982 Safety Evaluation Supporting Order Extending Const Completion Date to 830331 1993-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20140G4481997-05-0101 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Recommends That Springs Be Inspected on Periodic Basis,Such as During Refueling Outages ML20135D8011996-11-26026 November 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Two Safety Related Valves Supplied by Velan Valve Corp Were Not in Compliance W/Originally Supplied QA Documentation.Returned Valves to Velan in May 1996 & on 961120 Velan Advised That Valves Had Been Misplaced ML20080G4691995-01-26026 January 1995 Record of Telcon W/Nrc & Licensees 950126 to Clarify Position Re Dispositioning of Exempt Sources Listed in Section 6.3.3 of Shoreham Termination Survey Final Rept Dtd Oct 1994 ML20069F0001994-01-24024 January 1994 Vols 1-4 to Shoreham Decommissioning Project Termination Survey Final Rept ML20058K3841993-12-0909 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys,Regarding Potential Problem W/ Subcover Assembled Atop Power Head ML20057F2261993-09-30030 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Exemption Request from Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q) for License NPF-82 ML20056C7181993-07-14014 July 1993 SE Supporting Amend 10 to License NPF-82 ML20045B3551993-06-11011 June 1993 LER 93-001-00:on 930429,refueling Jib Crane Moved in Vicinity of Spent Fuel Pool Using vendor-supplied Lifting Eye in Violation of NUREG-0612.Caused by Failure to Identify Crane as Heavy Load.Meetings held.W/930611 Ltr ML20045C8881993-06-0808 June 1993 Vols 1 & 2 to Refueling Jib Crane 1T31-CRN-008A Incident Root Cause Analysis. W/One Oversize Encl ML20044C1181993-02-28028 February 1993 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Updated Decommissioning Plan. ML20128P6451993-02-28028 February 1993 Snps Decommissioning Project Termination Survey Final Rept for Steam Turbine Sys (N31) ML20128P7431993-02-19019 February 1993 Rev 3 to 93X027, Nuclear QA Surveillance Rept ML20127H2301993-01-15015 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defeat in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys.Starting Air Distributor Housing Assemblies Installed as Replacement Parts at Listed Sites ML20126B0421992-12-17017 December 1992 Final Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Steel Cylinder Heads.Initially Reported on 921125.Caused by Inadequate Cast Wall Thickness at 3/4-inch-10 Bolt Hole.Stud at Location Indicated on Encl Sketch Should Be Removed ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20128B9641992-10-31031 October 1992 Rev 0 to Shoreham Decommissioning Project Termination Survey Plan ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option ML20099H5781992-07-31031 July 1992 Rev 4 to Shoreham Defueled Sar ML20114A6311992-07-28028 July 1992 Shoreham Decommissioning Plan ML20101K5791992-06-25025 June 1992 Long Island Power Authority Shoreham Decommissioning Project,Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,Technical Rept on Water Processing & Water Mgt Activities for Reactor Pressure Vessel & Wet Cutting Station ML20094L1271992-03-13013 March 1992 Amend 1 to Part 21 Rept 159 Re Potential Defect in Power Cylinder Liner.Initially Reported on 920115.Caused by Liner/ Block Fit & Localized Matl Microstructure.All Drawings & Specs Revised to Address Matl Design Requirements ML20082M5081991-08-26026 August 1991 Rev 3 to Shoreham Defueled Sar PM-91-125, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-07-31031 July 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station PM-91-112, Monthly Operating Rept for Jun 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-06-30030 June 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Jun 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station PM-91-075, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-04-30030 April 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ML20024G7171991-04-22022 April 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910324,RB Normal Ventilation Sys (Rbnvs) Outboard Exhaust Valve Closed for No Apparent Reason.Cause Inconclusive.Sys Restored to Normal Lineup & Rbnvs Outboard Valve Will Be Stroked on Routine basis.W/910422 Ltr SNRC-1806, Revised Pages 2 & 6 to Encl a of 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for 19901991-04-15015 April 1991 Revised Pages 2 & 6 to Encl a of 10CFR50.59 Annual Rept for 1990 PM-91-058, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-03-31031 March 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station PM-91-037, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-02-28028 February 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station PM-91-016, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1991-01-31031 January 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1991 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station SNRC-1797, 10CFR 50.59 Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Procedure Changes,Tests & Experiments for Jan-Dec 19901990-12-31031 December 1990 10CFR 50.59 Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Procedure Changes,Tests & Experiments for Jan-Dec 1990 SNRC-1794, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Annual Operating Rept,19901990-12-31031 December 1990 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Annual Operating Rept,1990 SNRC-1799, Lilco 1990 Annual Rept1990-12-31031 December 1990 Lilco 1990 Annual Rept ML20069Q3901990-12-31031 December 1990 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Decommissioning Plan. (Filed in Category P) ML20028H0231990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 900907,unplanned Actuation of ESF Sys Occurred During I&C Surveillance Test.Caused by Inadequate procedure.SP44.650.16 Revised to Require That Leads Lifted & Individually separated.W/900928 Ltr ML20056A2001990-07-31031 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 6 to License NPF-82 PM-90-097, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1990-06-30030 June 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ML20055E3911990-06-25025 June 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 5 to License NPF-82 PM-90-083, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1990 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station1990-05-31031 May 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1990 for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 05000322/LER-1987-0351990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 87-035-02:on 871221,880106 & 0330,high Energy Line Break Logic Isolations of RWCU & Main Steam Line Drain Valves Occurred.Caused by Problems W/Temp Monitoring Units. Grounding Scheme Changed & Transformers Rewired 05000322/LER-1986-0321990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 86-032-01:on 860728,RWCU Isolated on High Differential Flow Sensed by Steam Leak Detection Sys While Placing Filter Demineralizers in Operation.Cause Not Determined. Operating Procedures Revised to Monitor RWCU Sys 05000322/LER-1987-0091990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 87-009-01:on 870203,full Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Perturbation in Ref Leg.Caused by Spurious Low Level Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Signal.Existing Level & Pressure Transmitters Replaced W/Newer Models 05000322/LER-1989-0031990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 89-003-01:on 890310,emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 Manually Shutdown During 18-month Surveillance Test Due to Failure of EDG Output Breaker.Cause Not Determined. Replacement Breaker Installed in Cubicle 102-8 05000322/LER-1985-0591990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 85-059-01:on 851219,half Reactor Trip,Full NSSS Shutoff Sys Isolation & Reactor Bldg Standby Ventilation Sys Initiation Occurred Due to Loss of Power to Reactor Protection Sys Bus B.Assembly Breaker Reset 05000322/LER-1988-0151990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 88-015-02:on 880916,seismic Monitoring Instrumentation, Including Peak Acceleration Recorders,Removed from Svc for More than 30 Days Due to Corrosion on Scratch Plates.Cover Gasket Replaced & Thermal Barrier Mount to Be Installed 05000322/LER-1988-0031990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 88-003-01:on 880322,unplanned Automatic Initiation of Reactor Bldg Standby Ventilation Sys Side a Occurred During Deenergization of Relay.Caused by Close Placement of Relay Terminals.Wiring Inside Electrical Panels Reworked 05000322/LER-1986-0141990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 86-014-01:on 860305,full Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Momentary False Low Vessel Level Signal,Causing Hydraulic Pressure Spike in Ref Leg A.Bourton Tube Type Pressure Transmitter Replaced W/Rosemount Model 1153 05000322/LER-1987-0121990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 87-012-01:on 870504,uplanned Actuation of ESF Occurred. Caused by Technician Loosing Footing & Accidently Hitting Outside Cover of Level Switch.Permanent Ladders & Platforms Installed at Head Tank Level Switches 05000322/LER-1988-0171990-05-16016 May 1990 LER 88-017-01:on 881025,discovered That Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Returned to Svc Prior to Verifying Sys Operability & Special Rept Not Written.Caused by Personnel Error.Surveillance Engineer Reassigned 1997-05-01
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+ o, UNITED STATES E* % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
WASHING TO N, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOP REGULATION ,
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, SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 6 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-36 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY l SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION I
DOCKET NO. 50-322 ,
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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By letter dated February 4, 1987 as supplemented by letter dated April 10, i 1987, Long Island Lighting Company (the licensee) reouested an amendment '
to Facility Operating License No. NPF-36 for the Shoreham Nuclear Power .
Station. LILCO letter SNRC-1205, dated October 10, 1985. stated that two-pump injection was the preferred method of compliance with ATWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4), subject to the results of a test. The two-pump injection test was performed in September 1986 under cold shutdown conditions; the results of the test showed that two-pump operation would not be viable at Shoreham for compliance with the rule. Hence, another method of compliance was necessary. For Shoreham, Rornn enrichment was chosen.
In Reference 1, the licensee for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1, requested changes to the Technical S Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)pecifications with regard to theThe prop licensee's plan to enrich the boron in the sodium pentaborate in the SLCS tank to eighty-five (85) atom percent Boron-10. This increase in Boron-10 enrichment is proposed to satisfy the reouf rements of 10 CFR 50.62.C.(4).
In Reference 2, the licensen supplemented its request by the addition of ;
a Surveillance Reouirementi S.R.4.1.5.e., to the proposed chances. ;
2.0 EVALHATION l LILC0 is participating in the BWR Owner's Group ATWS implementation alternatives program. BWR Owner's Group submitted NEDE-31096-P
" Anticipated Transients without Scram, Response to NPC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62 " (Ref. 3) for staff review. The staff accepted the licensing topical report NEDE-31096-P in Reference 4 LILC0 selected the third option
, dEnriched Boron Solution" to satisfy the 86 gpm equivalency requirement.
This design alternative maintains the current design of only one-pump operation.
{- In order to satisfy the equivalent control capacity requirements of 10 i
l CFR 50.62, the Shoreham 218 inch (internal diameter) reactor pressure vessel would require a Boron-10 sodium pentaborate enrichment of 1
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P ADOCK 05000322 l PDR
- S approximately forty (40) atom percent. As part of the effort to find a suitable alternative to two-pump operation, a study was performed to determine the effect of greater sodium pentaborate enrichment on the magnitude of the ATWS core melt frequency estinate presented in -the- -
Shoreham Probabilistic Risk Assessment which was submitted by letter dated June 24, 1983. The use of higher enrichmert allows additional time for Standby Liquid Control initiation because less time is required for injection of the amount (weight) of sodium pentaborate necessary to achieve a hot shutdown condition. This results in a decrease in the human error probability estimate for Standby Liquid Control System in,iection, and to a lesser extent, a reduction in the ATWS core melt frequency.
LILCO has proposed the use of eighty-five atom percent B-10 enriched *
- sodium pentaborate for Shoreham. At the minimum technical specification required injection flow rate of 41.2 GPM, the time required to bring the reactor to hot shutdown will be reduced. This will allow increased time for operator action and result in a higher probability that the SLC system will be initiated in a timely manner. Additionally, the use of enriched pentaborate does not require substantial modification of the SLC system.
Pump redundancy will be maintained. The SLC tank level instrumentation setpoints are chanaed to accomodate the smaller liould poison volume associated with the use of eighty-five percent enriched pentaborate.
Since the chosen sodium pentaborate enrichment exceeds the requirements of 10CFR50.62, we find that the LILCO proposal is acceptable.
After the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCSI two-pump test yielded higher than anticipated discharge line losses, the derivation of the pump discharge surveillance pressure was reviewed. The actual two-pump test results were used to develop a calculated discharge line pressure drop for one-pump operation fat 43 gpm). The maximum pump discharge pressure (for one-pump operation) is the sum of the discharge line losses plus the maximum vessel injection pressure. These maximum values are assumed to occur during a postulated full power ATWS with MSIV closure. The maximum vessel injection pressure is the sum of the lowest setpoint of Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) (1115 psig) and the pressure due to the head of the water in the reactor vessel. The derivation of the pressure at the SLCS sparger based upon the lowest SRY setpoint and a water filled reactor vessel is acceptable.
As a result of this calculation, the pump discharge surveillance pressure of the system was increased from 1190 psig to 1220 psig. This value is still well below the system design pressure and the relief valve setpnint.
The capability of the relief valve to prevent system overpressure and maintain system integrity remains intact. The margin between the relief valve setpoint and the proposed pump discharge surveillance pressure is sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that flow diversion through the relief valves will not occur and will also be verified during the pump surveillance. Thus, the SLCS pump discharge pressure chance from 1190 psig to 1220 psig is acceptable.
The alloweble range of concentrations of the sodium pontaborate solution was changed from 9.8-13% to 9.8-12%. The upper value of allowed concentration was lowered to reduce the probability of equipment failures caused by pentaborate crystallization. The minimum required solution temperature was also changed from 75"F to 65*F to reflect the lower saturation temperature associated with a maximum concentration of 1?
percent. These changes are acceptable.
As reeuested by the staff, LILCO provided additional information (Ref. 2) regarding monitorinn of the Baron-10 enrichment level. LILCO inforred the staff that appropriate portions of the LILCO Ouality Assurance Program, as described in USAR section 17.2 will be used to ensure that the sodium pentaborate procured for use in the SLCS will have a minimum Boron-10 enrichment of eighty-five aton percent. This is acceptable.
LILCO is planning to buy the enriched sodium pentaborate from a chemical i
vendor, rather than mixing at the plant. Hence LILCO's proposal to i analyze the sodium pentaborate solution sample for Boron enrichment at every refueling outage is acceptable.
The bases to Technical Specification 3/4.1.5 were revised to reflect the proposed changes. The revised bases are acceptable since it adequately explains the beses for the current requirements in the Technical Specifications.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the i installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted l
' area as defined in 10 CFR Part P0 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has detennined that the amendment involves no i significant increase in the amounts, and no significant chance in the types, j
of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no signifi- l I
cant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public l l
coment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant
! to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statenont nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
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The changes proposed by the Ifeensen have been reviewed by the staff against the requirements of the ATWS rule (10 CFR 50.62), and Generic Letter 85-03 " Clarification of Equivalent Control Capacity for Standby Liquid level Control Systems" dated January 28, 1985. The licensee's j l
proposed increase to 85 atom percent boron enrichment with a minimum sodium pentaborate concentration of 9.8% in conjunction with a flow rate .
,'l 1
I ,1 l
4 of 41.2 ;pm will provide a boron content equivalent in control capacity of 86 gpm of 13 weight percent sodium pentaborate for a 251 inch inside diameter vessel. Actually, the minimum system parameters (41.2 gpm, 9.8%
conctntration of 85 atem percent Baron-10 enrichment) wil! ensure an -
equiphntinjectioncapacitythat is POO% of the ATWS rule reouirement for Shoreham. Notwithstanding the above analysis, which considered the smaller reactor vessel diameter of 218-inches for the Shoreham Station, an alternative analysis can be perforced by not taking credit for the smaller reactor vessel diameter. For that alternative analysis, we find that the proposed system still meets the boror delivery capability reouire-ment of the ATWS Rule and would ensure an equivalent injection capacity that is over 150% of the ATWS Rule fl0 CFR 50.62(c)(4)). This is ir compliance with 10 CFR 50.62 and is therefore acceptable.
l The Technical Specification changes proposed by the licensee in T/S sections 4.1.5.a.2, 4.1.5.b.2, 4.1.5.c 4.1.5.e, Figure 3.1.5-2 and bases section 3/4.1.5 are acceptable because they are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. Furthermoro, we have concluded, based on l the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the preposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the commor defense and security l or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: G. Thomas Dated: May 18, 1987 l
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REFERENCES
- 1. LILCO letter SNRC-1310 from John D. Leonard, Jr. ILILCO) to U.S.NRC, February a, 1987. - - -=
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- 2. LILCO letter SNRC-1323 from John D. Leonard, Jr. (LILCO) to U.S.NRC, dated April 10, 1987.
- 3. NEDE-31096-P " Anticipated Transients Without Scram; Response to NRC ATWS Pule 10 CFR 50.62." December 1985.
4 Staff SER on GE Topical Report NEDE-31096-P. Letter from Gus Lainas (NRC) to Terry A. Pickens (BWR Owner's Group 1 dated October 21, 1986. , ,
S. Minutes of BWR Owner's Group informal meetino with NRC to discuss ATWS technical specification bases, Rethesda, MD, April 1,1987.
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