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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247A4841989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 121 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0121989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Extension of Surveillance Intervals ML20247E6551989-07-20020 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License DPR-61 ML20247E6841989-07-18018 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-61 ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20246A8541989-06-23023 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment at Plant Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features After Accident.Requirements of 10CFR50.44 Met ML20244C4451989-06-0101 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License DPR-61 ML20248B3001989-05-31031 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20245E8941989-04-21021 April 1989 Safeguards Evaluation Rept Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-61 ML20235Z0881989-03-0707 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-61 ML20196D8641988-12-0606 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-61 ML20205M5731988-10-26026 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,25,134 & 26 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20204G8641988-10-18018 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Analysis of Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident at Facility Followed by Minimization of Water in Affected Steam Generator After Tube Rupture ML20155G4801988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,23,132 & 24 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-24,respectively ML20151T7641988-08-0909 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-61 ML20150A9551988-07-0101 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-61 ML20155F9811988-06-0101 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-13 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20210P8721997-08-31031 August 1997 Post Decommissioning Activities Rept, for Aug 1997 ML20217Q3171997-08-31031 August 1997 Addl Changes to Proposed Rev 1 to QA Program ML20210U9301997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant CY-97-082, Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys1997-08-14014 August 1997 Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys ML20210L0521997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1997 for HNP ML20149E4451997-06-30030 June 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141A0041997-05-31031 May 1997 Independent Assessment of Radiological Controls Program at Cyap Haddam Neck Plant Final Rept May 1997 ML20140H5241997-05-31031 May 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20141D4141997-04-30030 April 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1997 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck ML20138G5901997-04-25025 April 1997 Proposed Rev 1 to Cyap QA Program for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137W8051997-03-31031 March 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137H3031997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 2 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137C6281997-03-14014 March 1997 Redacted Version of Rev 1 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137A0801997-02-28028 February 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20135C5101997-02-26026 February 1997 1996 Refuel Outage ISI Summary Rept for CT Yankee Atomic Power Co B16268, Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor1997-02-19019 February 1997 Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor ML20135E3221997-02-13013 February 1997 Independent Review Team Rept 1996 MP -1 Lout NRC Exam Failures ML20134L2751997-02-0303 February 1997 Draft Rev to GPRI-30, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Licensing Basis/Design Basis ML20138K5721997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant.W/ ML20134L2791997-01-10010 January 1997 Rev 0 to QA Program Grpi ML20134L2911997-01-0808 January 1997 Rev 0 to UFSAR Rev Grpi ML20134L2721996-12-31031 December 1996 Commitment Mgt Grpi 1999-04-28
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. y y 3.'f j. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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', f W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g . . ' . . . ,,e SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION FACILITY OPERATION LICENSE NO. DPR-61 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY i HADDAM NECK PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-213 INTRODUCTION l
By letter deted April 26, 1989, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0/ Licensee) requested a schedular exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Sections III.A.6.(b), " Additional Requirements-Type A Test,"
III.D.2(a), " Type B test" and III.D.3. " Type C test." CYAPC0 has proposed to extend the test. period for the Type A, B and C test till the refueling outage scheduled to begin September 5, 1989. This would be approximately a 6 month extension for the Type A test and approximately a 2 month extension for the Type B and C tests. These exemptions are necessary to prevent a midcycle ,
shutdown to perform the Type A, B and C test, j DISCUSSION I) Section III.A.6.(b) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requires that:
"If two consecutive periodic Type A tests fail to meet the applicable !
ecceptance criteria in III.A.S.(b), notwithstanding the periodic retest schedule of III.D., a Type A test shall be performed at each plant shutdown for refueling or approximately every 18 months, whichever occurs ;
first, until two consecutive Type A tests meet the acceptance criteria in III.A.5(b), after which time the retest schedule specified in III.D. may I be resumed."
Because of two consecutive failures of the Type A test, CYAPCO conducted a Type A penalty test on September 27, 1987, and failed the "as-found" acceptance criteria. According to the provisions of Section III.A.6.(b),
the next scheduled test should occur on April 27, 1989. CYAPCO's next refueling outage is scheduled for September 5,1989, and the integrated leak rate test (ILRT) itself will not start until October 1989. The start date for the outage is due to the extension of the 1937 refueling outage ,
into April of 1988 to repair the core barrel and thermal shield. The 1989 l ILRT retest date would exceed Appendix J's 18-month requirement by j approximately 6 months. 1 8908170423 g999y4 DR ADOCK 03000213 FDC
4 A review of the 1987 Type A test results indicates that the "as-left" condition of the containment satisfactorily met the requirements of Appendix J. However, as in 1986, the 1987 "as-found" ILRT did not meet the acceptance requirements and was deemed a failure. The cause for the 1986 and 1987 "as-found" ILRT failures was due to excessive Type C leakages.
- 2) Section III.D.2.(a) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requires that:
" Type B tests, except tests for air locks, shall be performed during reactor shutdown for refueling or other convenient intervals but in no case at intervals greater than 2 years."
CYAPCO's Type B local leak rate test (LLRT) leakage has historically not been a source of significant "as-found" leakage (less than 50 lbm/ day).
The exemption is necessary to prevent a midcycle shutdown and allow the test to be performed during the 1989 refueling outage.
- 3) Section III.D.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requires that:
" Type C tests shall be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling but in no case at intervals greater than 2 years."
CYAPC0 requests a schedular exemption be granted because the next scheduled refueling outage will exceed the provision of this requirement by approximately 2 months. Currently this testing would be required by July 18, 1989. '
CYAPCO's Type C LLRT test program continues to undergo significant changes and improvements. CYAPCO contends that these efforts to reduce Type C leakage are sufficient to allow the 2-year test interval to be exceeded by approximately 2 months and still meet the intent of Appendix J.
EVALUATION By letter dated April 26, 1989 CYAPCO requested a schedular exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Type A, B and C test, so as to extend the testing period for these tests to the next refueling outage. This request for exemption, if granted, would exceed the Type A test period by approximately 6 months and the Type B and C period by approximately 2 months. The evaluation of the Type A, B and C test are provided below:
Type A Test The Haddam Neck Plant has failed three consecutive "as found" integrated leak rate tests. After the second failure in 1986, CYAPC0 was required by Appendix J to increase the testing frequency for the ILRT from three times in 10 years to once per outage until two consecutive "as found" tests are acceptable. Therefore, this will be Haddam Neck's fifth ILRT since 1980. In addition CYAPCO perfomed e full pressure ILRT during the 1987 outage for the first time since the preoperational test in 1968. CYAPC0 has agreed to continue the full pressurc ILRTs. The NRC staff believes the full pressure ILRTs will provide more accurate leak rate data than the previous lower pressure ILRTs which required the leak rates to be extrapolated to the full pressure.
4 CYAPCD has stated that the cause for the "as found" ILRT failures has been due
- exclusively to Type C leakages. As such CYAPC0 has increased its efforts to minimize Type C leakage. These efforts have included:
1). Improving test procedures and methods,
- 2) Making modifications to penetrations of poor performers,
- 3) Making modifications to Service Water System to limit silt, 4)- Conducting supplemental Type C test, and
- 5) Pursuing an enhanced testing and maintenance program to identify, test, repair and reduce containment leakage.
CYAPC0 in their submittal dated April 26, 1989 provided a list of the corrective actions performed to date.
The NRC staff has reviewed CYAPCO's submittal and concluded that it would be acceptable to extend the Type A test period for approximately 6 months. The NRC staff's conclusion is based on the following:
- 1) The "as found" failure of the ILRT has been due to excessive Type C leakage. As such CYAPC0 has taken aggressive actions to improve the Type C leakages. The NRC staff has reviewed these actions and agrees these actions should improve leakage through historically poor penetrations and provide CYAPC0 a method to detect and focus its attention on future bad performers.
- 2) During the last refueling outage unexpected core barrel and thermal
! shield repairs extended the outage several months. During this time of approximately 6 months plent components were not exposed to the normal operating temperature, pressure and radiation conditions. The time interval of 18 months specified in Appendix J was based, in part, on the expected degradation of components exposed to the environment resulting from a full 18 months of nonnal pltat operations. The total exposure time for the containment to normal plant operation environment at Haddam Neck Plant will be about 15 months.
Therefore, the staff would expect that the containment integrity will be
- maintained during the extension of the test period.
Type B and C Test 1
- j. The staff has reviewed the information provided in CYAPCO's letter dated April 26, 1989 and has concluded that it would be acceptable to extend the required Type B and C test approximately 2 months. The NRC staff's conclusion that the Type B and C test for Haddam Neck Plant can be extended for approximately 2 months without presenting a significant safety concern is based on the following:
.- , 3 4
l
- 1) During the last refueling outage unexpected core barrel and thermal shield repairs extended the outage several months. During this time of approximately j six months plant components were not exposed to the nomal operatino ~
temperature, pressure, and radiation conditions. The time interval of 24 months specified in Appendix.J for Type B and C. tests was based, in part, on the expected degradation of components exposed to the environment resulting from a full 24 months of normal plant operations. The total exposure time for the containment penetrations to the normal plant operating environment at Haddam Neck will be about 20 months, including the time period involved in the extension.
- 2) CYAPC0 has taken aggressive actions to improve Type C leakage. Type B leakege has historically not been a problem at the Haddam Neck site. ' As noted above,.these actions should decrease leakage through historically poor penetrations and provide CYAPC0 a method to detect and focus its attention on future bad performers.
- 3) The 24 month interval requirement for Type B and C penetrations is intended to be often enough to prevent significant deterioration from occurring and long enough to permit the LLRTs to be performed during plant outages. Leak testing of the penetrations during plant shutdown is preferable because of_ the lower radiation exposures to plant personnel.
Moreover, some penetrations, because of their intended functions, cannot be tested at power operation. For penetrations that cannot be tested during power operation or those that, if tested during plant operation would cause a degradation in the overall safety (e.g., the closing of a redundant line in a safety system), the increase in confidence of containment integrity fcilowing a successful test is not significant enough to justify a plant shutdown specifically to perform the LLRTs within a 24 montt time period.
Based on the above review, the staff concludes that extending the surveillance intervals as described is acceptable.
Dated: August 1.4,19B9 Principal Contributor: A. Wang
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