ML20216G576
| ML20216G576 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216G564 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-98-09, 50-482-98-9, NUDOCS 9803200036 | |
| Download: ML20216G576 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1998009
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ENCLOSURE 2
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket No.: 50-482
License No.: NPF-42
Report No.: 50-482/98-09
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station !
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Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE
Burlington, Kansas i
Dates: February 23-27,1998
Inspectors: L. T. Ricketson, P.E., Senior Radiation Specialist, i
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Plant Support Branch
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M. C. Hay, Radiation Specialist l
Plant Support Branch
Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Attachment : Supplemental Information
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PDR ADOCK 00000482
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-09
This routine, announced inspection focused on the radiation protection program. Specific
program areas reviewed were the program to maintain occupational radiation exposure as low
as is reasonably achievable (ALARA), external exposure controls, training and qualifications,
organization and administration, and quality assurance in radiatio'1 protection activities. Overall,
good performance was observed in the radiation protection program despite isolated problems
in various program areas.
Plant Sucoort
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An adequate ALARA program was implemented. Largely because of the effects of the
axially offset anomaly, the rolling, 3-year person-rem average increased in 1997 and the
1995-1997 3-year person-rem average will probably exceed the national average for
pressurized water reactors. ALARA committee activities were supported well by most site
departments. Most common industry ALARA practices were incorporated as ALARA
program elements. Some elements, such as ALARA initiatives, functioned well while
others, such as ALARA improvement reports and hot spot tracking and removal, needed
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additional attention (Section R1.1).
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A noncited violation was identified involving ALARA improvement report reviews and
evaluations that did not follow procedural guidance and were not timely. (Section R 1.1).
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Good external radiation exposure controls were implemented. High radiation area
controls, radiological area postings, radiological area access controls, and dosimetry use
were consistently good, however pre-job briefings could be improved (Section R1.2).
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A noncited violation was identified involving an unqualified individual that wore
respiratory protection equipment. (Section R1.2).
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The radioactive materials control program generally functioned appropriately. However,
a violation was identified involving an item contaminated with radioactive material that
was unconditionally released from the radiological controlled area. (Section R1.3).
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Most radiation detection instruments were calibrated and used properly. However, the
detection efficiency of a type of radiation detection instrument had not been determined
for a predominate airborne radionuclide, leaving the appropriateness of some airborne
area postings undetermined. This matter is considered an unresolved item, pending
review of the licensee's calibration data. (Section R1.4).
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( . Good training programs were implemented for radiation protection technicians,
supervisors, and professionals. Participation was complete, topics were appropriate,
instructors were experienced, and facilities were sufficient. Efforts to promote the
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professional advancement of radiation protection technicians were minimally successful
(Section RS).
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Overall, quality assurance oversight of radiation protection activities was good. An
insightful audit and numerous observations of radiation protection field activities were
performed (Section R7).
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Corrective actions improved from January 1997 through February 1998. Early examples
of performance improvement requests sometimes did not address the root causes of
issues, and suggested corrective actions were vague and ineffective. Later examples of
performance improvement requests corrected most of the previous shortcomings but the
documentation of proposed corrective actions was unclear, occasionally. (Section R7).
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Reoort Details
IV. Plant Suonort
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R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 ALARA
a. Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following:
. ALARA Committee activities
a ALARA program elements
. ALARA results
b. Observations and Findinos
ALARA Committee Activities
The inspectors reviewed the minutes of the ALARA committee and concluded that the
committee met procedural guidance for meeting frequency. The inspectors reviewed the
attendance of ALARA committee meetings and noted that most site departments
attended. The ALARA committee membership consisted of department managers. The
plant manager became involved if a committee initiative necessitated the approval of
expenditures.
In addition to the ALARA Committee, the licensee also utilized the Site ALARA Working :
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Group to perform pre-job and post-job ALARA reviews and to review ALARA
improvement Reports. The Site ALARA Working Group was composed of supervisors
from different site departments. The use of a second committee was viewed by the
inspectors as an enhancement to the typical ALARA program because it increased the
number of individuals and site departments directly involved in the planning and the
review of dose saving measures.
ALARA Procram Elements
Chemistry representatives were actively involved in analyzing information gathered
during the reactor shutdown before the most recent refueling outage. Licensee
representatives worked with industry experts to identify shutdown chemistry practices
that could minimize the effects of the axial offset anomaly. Additionally, the licensee
l reconfigured fuel elements in the reactor core during the refueling outage to reduce the
l axial offset.
. A stellite reduction program was maintained as part of the overall source term reduction
I program. Valves containing stellite had been identified. The stellite reduction program
required that valves containing stellite be evaluated when serviced to determine if valves
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containing non-stellite material could be substituted with no adverse impact on the valves
function. Enhanced filtration was used in the seal water and reactor coolant systems.
One micrometer filters were used. Temporary shielding was used extensively during -
refueling outages and occasionally during routine operations. Lessons leamed from
post-job reviews were captured and perpetuated well through easily retrievable -
documentation.
The licensee implemented the following noteworthy dose saving initiatives during the
. past year:
. A weekly dose tracking program was initiated to heighten worker awareness.
Licensee representatives felt workers related better to weekly or job specific
goals.
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System filter changes were performed by a "Fix it Now" team. - This approach
used the same individuals repetitively and ensured the task was performed by-
individuals familiar with dose saving techniques.
. Technologies such as remote radiation monitoring and video equipment were
used to reduce personnel occupancy in high dose areas. A device called a
gamma camera was used during the refueling outage to identify localized hot
spots prior to flushing, mechanically removing, or posting the hot spots.
The licensee's ALARA program did not include a formal hot spot tracking and removal
program. Hot spot flushing and removal were conducted on a case by case basis.
An ALARA suggestion program was implemented. The licensee used the term "ALARA
improvement Reports" to identify suggestions or recommendations for dose saving
measures submitted by workers. According to the ALARA improvement Report Master
Log, twelve suggestions for reducing radiation dose were submitted in 1997. The master !
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log also indicated that no action had been taken by the licensee to evaluate the viability -
of the suggestions.
The inspectors noted the first ALARA improvement report of 1997 was submitted l
February 2,1997. The rest were submitted throughout 1997. The inspectors then - ;
reviewed the minutes of 16 Site ALARA Work Group meetings conducted April 16,1997, l
through February 3,1998, and determined that ALARA improvement reports were not
reviewed and evaluated until the February 3,1998, meeting.
Technical Specification 5.4.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, ,
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implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33,
Appendix A. Section 7.e.9, recommends procedures for implementation of the ALARA
program.- Procedure AP 25A-400, "ALARA Program, " Revision 3, Section 6.6.4,
requires that the ALARA health physics supervisor bring the ALARA improvement report i
to the next Site ALARA Work Group meeting for review and evaluation.
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The inspectors determined that the failure to review and evaluate the ALARA
improvement reports as required by Procedure AP 25A-400 constitutes a violation of
minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with
Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-482/9809-01).
ALARA Results
The licensee's person-rem totals were as follows:
,Mif,piM,
% .<. m?jM?MQ"Wh
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A9,/6.99.6*#f.w . U9tl@A$
Licehese Tdtal@s!MR[N 14 171 265
, , m - . m . m . # 2 w ,$7.f
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Licensee.3-YearAverageMi 144 140 150
i .PWR'Nitidil30ershQ@M3 170 131 *
- Not yet available
c. Conclusions
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An adequate ALARA program was implemented. Largely because of the effects of the !
axially offset anomaly, the rolling,3-year person-rem average increased in 1997 and the l
1995-1997 3-year person-rem average will probably exceed the national average for
pressurized water reactors. ALARA committee activities were supported well by most
site departments. Most common industry ALARA practices were incorporated as ALARA
program elements. Some elements, such as specific ALARA initiatives, functioned well I
while others, such as ALARA improvement reports and hot spot tracking and removal !
needed additional attention.
A noncited violation was identified involving ALARA improvement report reviews and
evaluations that did not follow procedural guidance and were not timely.
R1.2 Exoosure Controls
a. lnsoection Scooe (83750)
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. Radiological controlled area access controls
. Pre-job briefing
. Respiratory protection equipment issue
b. Observations and Findinos
Tours of the Radioloaical Controlled Area !
The inspectors conducted tours of the radiological controlled area and noted that high ;
radiation area controls were properly implemented. The inspectors along with licensee
representatives conducted independent measurements and confirmed that radiological
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area postings were correct. Housekeeping within the radiological controlled area was l
generally very good. Radiological controlled area access controls were effective. I
Pre-iob Briefina
The inspectors attended a pre-job briefing conducted by radiation protection personnel
prior to personnel entering the reactor containment building at power. The pre-job l
briefing was conducted to inform workers of the potential radiological hazards and I
measures to minimize risks and radiation doses. l
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Overall, the briefing was adequate in communicating information necessary for the
individuals to work safely, however, enhancements could be made for maintaining i
workers exposures ALARA. The inspectors noted that no visual aids were used during
the briefing to familiarize the workers with the area in which they were to enter. The
inspectors determined through interviews that some of the workers had not been in the
containment building previously. Radiation dose rates were discussed but no maps or
drawings were used to orient the workers with the location of the dose rates. Instead, the
workers were told the radiation protection technician providing coverage would indicate
to the workers the areas in which to stand when not working. The licensee stated that
they would review the inspectors' observations.
Acronyms used by the individual providing the briefing confused one worker. Because of
the confusion, the worker did not, at first, participate in a discussion of tasks to be
performed while in the containment building. This could have led to inadequate radiation
protection coverage or the need for an additional entry into the containment building to
compensate for work not performed during the first entry.
Neutron dose monitoring forms were distributed to the workers, but no instructions were
provided to the workers on what was to be done with the forms.
Resoiratorv Protection
Licensee representatives informed the inspectors that a radiation protection technician
issued respiratory protection equipment to himself nine times during January 22 through
February 2,1998, without verifying that he met respirator-user qualification requirements.
Subsequently, it was determined that the individual had not had a respirator fit test since
September 8,1994. Procedure RPP 03-305," Issuance of Respiratory Protective
Equipment," Revision 11, Section 9.1.1 requires, in part, that personnel have a valid
respirator fit, performed within the last 12 months, before being issued respiratory
protection equipment. The licensee initiated Performance improvement Request 98-329
to document the problem and implemented corrective actions. Corrective actions
included counseling the individual and revising the respirator issue log to require the
entering of a training date, medical examination date, and a fit testing date for each
individual requesting respiratory protection equipment. Additionally, the individual was
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internally because of a poor respirator fit. The findings of the whole-body count were
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negative. The inspectors concluded that the actions taken by the licensee should
prevent recurrence of the violation. !
Technical Specification 5.4.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established,
implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33,
Appendix A, Section 7.e.5, recommends procedures for respiratory protection.
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Procedure RPP 03-305, " Issuance of Respiratory Protective Equipment," Revision 11, !
Section 9.1.1 requires, in part, that personnel have a valid respirator fit, performed within
the last 12 months, before being issued respiratory protection equipment.
The inspectors determined that the failure to properly issue respiratory protection !
equipment in accordance with Procedure RPP 03-305 constitutes a violation of Technical
Specification 5.4.1. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is
being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC i
Enforcement Policy (50-482/9809-02).
c. Conclusions
Good radiation exposure controls were implemented.. High radiation area controls,
radiological area postings, radiological area access controls, and dosimetry use were
consistently good, however pre-job briefings could be improved
A noncited violation was identified involving an unqualified individual that wore
respiratory protection equipment.
R1.3 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination
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a. Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the circumstances involved in
the release ofitems from the radiological controlled area
b. Observations and Findinos
During the inspection, the radiation protection manager notified the regional inspectors
and the resident inspector that Fermi Plant personnel identified radioactive contamination
on a remote monitor detector head on loan to Wolf Creek from Fermi for use during the
last refueling outage. The item was released from the radioiogical controlled area on
December 8,1997, and rhipped to Fermi on February 18,1998. Receipt surveys
performed by Fermi on February 23,1998, identified removable contamination levels of
600-1500 disintegrations per minute pcr 100 centimeters squared, and a fixed
contamination level of approximately 15,000 disintegrations per minute per
100 centimeters squared. A root cause analysis regarding the release of the detector
from the radiological controlled area had not completed by the licensee at the time of this
inspection.
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Technical Specification 5.4.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established,
implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33,
Appendix A, Section 7.e.4, recommends procedures for radiation surveys.
Procedure RPP 02-515, " Release of Material From the RCA," Revision 9, Section 6.1,
states, " Thorough surveys must be performed to prevent the unconditional release of
materials greater than the release criteria." Section 4.5 establishes the release criteria.
The first criterion states, " Beta-gamma shall be non-detectable for loose (smear /100crd)
and fixed plus loose as measured with RM-14 with HP-260 or equivalent."
This event was reported by the licensee, however it was not identified by the licensee
and corrective actions had not been developed. The failure to perform proper surveys to
prevent the unconditional release of materials greater than the release criteria, as
required by Procedure RPP 02-515, is considered a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(50-482/9809-03).
The inspectors reviewed selected performance improvement requests and identified no
other cases of contaminated material being improperly free released from the
radiological controlled area.
c. Conclusions
The radioactive materials control program generally functioned appropriately. However,
a violation was identified involving an item contaminated with radioactive material that
was unconditionally released from the radiological controlled area.
R1.4 Surveyino and Monitorino
a. Insoection scooe (83750)
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The inspectors reviewed the calibration program for selected radiation detection
instruments. I
b. Observations and Findinos
The inspectors noted that reactor containment air sampling for particulate, iodine, and
noble gasses was conducted by radiation protection personnel for reactor containment
entries at power. The inspectors observed that particulate air filter samples were
counted by using a frisker (HP-210 detector) connected to a scaler. The net counts
obtained were conveded to a derived air concentration (DAC) value using the cobalt-60
DAC value found in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B (E-8 microcuries/ milliliter) .
The inspectors asked why the Co-60 value was used. The licensee representative
responded that they had conducted a study and determined that cobalt-60 was a
predominate radionuclide in airborne radioactivity samples and it had one of the most
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conservative DAC values.The inspectors reviewed a steam generator air sample in
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limiting DAC value present of all identified isotopes for that particular sample.
- The inspectors observed a health physics technician perform a calibration of the same
l type of detector and scaler used for analysis of the particulate air samples. The
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calibration was performed appropriately, in accordance with Procedure RPP 06-805,
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"MS-3 Mini Scaler Calibration," Revision 2. During the calibration the inspectors noted
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licensee established that cobalt-60 was the predominate radionuclide in air samples and
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this radionuclide's DAC value was used to calculate the airbome particulate
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establish the efficiency of the detector. The technician stated that there was no cobalt-60
source on site with the same geometry as the cesium-137 source. Therefore, no ;
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comparison could be made. However, the technician had information from the
instrument manufacturer that stated the expected detector efficiency was 22 percent for
cesium-137, and 16 percent for cobalt-60. The licensee had measured efficiencies of l
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11.8 - 17.6 percent for cesium-137. Based on the manufacturer's information, the I
l inspectors concluded that the licensee would likely measure a lower efficiency for
cobalt-60 than for cesium-137.
- Procedure RPP 06-805 requires that an efficiency of 10 percent be achieved before the l
MS-3 Mini Scaler could be considered calibrated. Since the lowest efficiency measured '
l by the licensee using cesium-137 was 11.8 percent , the inspectors concluded the use a
cobalt-60 might result in an efficiency of less than 10 percent. If this were true, the
instrumente may not have been calibrated properly, and the licensee may have been in ;
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violation of Procedure RPP 06-805. ;
Another concern expressed by the inspectors involved the validity of airborne
radioactivity area postings that could be based on the measurements determined with
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improperly calibrated instruments. The inspectors noted that the licensee used the
results of the airborne radioactivity sampling and DAC calculations for cietermining the
need for posting airborne radioactivity areas. RPP 02-210, " Radiation Survey Methods,"
Revision 13, Section 9.4.7 states, in part, "If the particulate activity is equal to or greater
than 30 percent DAC, then submit the particulate filter for isotopic analysis and post the
area as per RPP 02-215." RPP 02-215, " Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas,"
l Revision 12, requires that posting of an airborne radiation area will be performed at a
level of greater than or equal to 0.3 DAC.
At the time of inspection the licensee was not able to determine the efficiency of the
MS-3 Mini Scalers using an HP-210 detector for measuring cobalt-60 beta / gamma
emissions. At the exit meeting, licensee representatives stated they would procure a
i cobalt-60 calibration source of the correct geometry and determine the instrument
efficiency. The issue of whether the licensee was in compliance with the requirements in
Procedures RPP 06-805 and RPP 02-215 is considered an unresolved item, pending
review of the licensee's calibration data (50-482/9809-04).
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c. Conclusions
Most radiation detection instruments were calibrated and used properly. However, the -
detection efficiency of a type of radiation detection instrument had not been determined
for a predominate airborne radionuclide, leaving the appropriateness of some airbome
area postings undetermined. This is being considered an unresolved item, pending
review of the licensee's calibration data.
R5 Staff Training and Qualification
a. Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspectors interviewed training personnel and reviewed the following:
. Training for supervisors and professionals
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Radiation protection continuing training topics and selected lesson plans i
. Instructor qualifications and evaluations ;
- Professional staff qualifications '
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Radiation protection technician qualifications
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Resumes for new senior radiation protection technicians 1
b. Observations and Findinos
Trainina
As part of their continuing training in their fields of expertise, radiation protection
supervisors and professionals attended professional meetings, participated in peer visits,
or attended offsite training. All eligible individuals participated. The inspectors
concluded that management support in this area was good.
Topics presented in continuing radiation protection technician training were appropriate.
A training review group provided guidance for training topic selection. Radiation
protection technicians were able to submit suggested training topics. The training
included sessions dealing with reactor systems and industry events. Appropriate
feedback mechanisms were used to solicit radiation protection technicians' critiques of
the instructors presentations and training contents. Appropriate facilities were available
to provide continuing radiation protection training. Instructors had practical experience
as radiation protection technicians. Instructor evaluations were performed as required by
responsible supervisors or designated training representatives.
Qualifications
j The radiation protection manager was certified as a health physicist by the American
Board of Health Physicists.
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Within the radiation protection department,11 of 37 individuals were registered by the
National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists. Five of six supervisors were
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registered but within the radiation protection operations group, only 2 of 17 technicians
were registered. The inspectors noted that the latter was a low percentage of the group.
Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors comment but pointed out that
three registered individuals now in the professional staff had recently been promoted
from the operations group.
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c. Conclusions
Good training programs were implemented for radiation protection technicians,
supervisors, and professionals. Participation was complete, topics were appropriate,
instructors were experienced, and facilities were sufficient. Efforts to promote the
j professional advancement of radiation protection technicians were minimally successful.
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R6 Radiation Protection and chemistry Organization and Administration
The radiation protection and chemistry departments were combined under the !
supervision of one individualin August 1997, i
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R7 Quality Assurance in Radiation Protection and chemistry Activities !
a. Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspectors reviewed the following:
. Quality assurance observations
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Performance improvement requests
. Corrective action performance indicators.
b. Observations and Findinas
One audit was performed during the assessment period. The audit results were
reviewed during inspection 50-482/98-06 and found to provide good insight into the
performance of the radiation protection program. The inspectors noted that, during the
previous year, documented observations of radiation worker practices and health physics
technician practices by quality assurance personnel were plentiful. Performance
improvement requests were initiated when problems were identified during quality
assurance observations.
Performance improvement Request 97-213 was initiated January 24,1997, to document
a declining trend in performance related to radiation protection activities. In response to
the performance improvement request, the radiation protection department developed a
program improvement plan. Part of the plan to correct the declining trend was the
development and implementation of policy statements concerning selected radiation
protection activities, in order to verify the implementation of the corrective actions, the
inspectors asked for copies of the policies. The radiation protection manager stated that
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plan, initisted by her predecessor, would not address the problems of the radiation I
protection department effectively.
In another example, the inspectors found that radiation proteciion personnel did not
address the specific problem or the cause of the problem. Performance improvement l
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Request 97-314 was initiated January 31,1997, because the Site ALARA Work Group
failed to meet management expectations for meeting frequency, and it failed to document
the reasons meetings were not conducted. The performance improvement request did
not identify the cause of the failure or the immediate corrective action, documentation
within the request addressed the problem. The dispositioner described the immediate
corrective actions by stating, "INPO had been contacted for suggestions of other plants
that have good ALARA committees . . ." The dispositioner did not address the failure to
document reasons for not holding Site ALARA Work Group meetings. Radiation
protection representatives acknowledged the shortcomings identified with Performance
improvement Request 97-314.
In examples initiated later in 1997, root causes analyses or cause determinations
improved, and proposed corrective actions addressed root causes directly and
appropriately. However, documentation within some performance improvement requests
continued to be unclear. An example of this is Performance improvement
Request 97-3384, initiated October 24,1997, to address an NRC-identified violation.
The root cause analysis was conducted well, but the corrective actions outlined to
address the second contributing cause were not stated clearly. After reading the
performance improvement request, the inspectors were unsure whether the licensee had
taken specific actions or merely evaluated actions that might be appropriate. The
radiation protection manager confirmed that corrective actions were taken, in this
example, and acknowledged the documentation weakness within Performance
improvement Request 97-3384.
In addition to the review of specific examples of performance improvement requests, the
inspectors reviewed corrective action performance indicators provided by the
performance improvement and assessment group and determined that the radiation
protection department dispositioned performance improvement requests in a timely
manner, relative to other site departments.
c. Conclusions
Overall, quality assurance oversight of radiation protection activities was good. An
insightful audit and numerous observations of radiation protection field activities were
performed.
Corrective actions improved from January 1997 through February 1998. Early examples
of performance improvement requests sometimes did not address the root causes of
issues, and suggested corrective actions were vague and ineffective. Later examples of
performance improvement requests corrected most of the previous shortcomings but the
documentation of proposed corrective actions was unclear, occasionally.
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R8 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and chemistry issues
(Closed) Violation 482/9720-03: Failure to Post a Contaminated Area
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter,
dated December 12,1997, were implemented. No similar problems were identified.
V.. Management Meetings
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at an exit
meeting on February 27,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietay
information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
M. Blow, Manager Chemistry / Radiation Protection
S. Burkdoll, Supervising Instructor
D. Gibson, Health Physics Technician
R. Hammond, Health Physics Operations Supervisor
B. McKinney, Plant Manager.
W. Norton, Performance improvement and Assessment Manager
D. Parks, Acting Training Manager
J. Schepers, Health Physics Operations Supervisor ,
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R. Stumbaugh, ALARA Supervisor
C. Reekie, Licensing .
HRG
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B. Smalldridge, Resident inspector
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-482/9809-01 NCV Failure to review ALARA improvement reports
50 482/9809-02 NCV issuance of respiratory protection equipment to an unqualified
user
50-482/9809-03 VIO Failure to control radioactive material
50-482/9809-04 URI MS-3 Mini Scaler with HP-210 detector counting efficiency
Closed
50-482/9720-03 VIO Failure to follow procedural requirements with regard to
posting a contaminated area
50-482/9809-01 NCV Failure to review ALARA improvement reports
50-482/9809-02 NCV issuance of respiratory protection equipment to an unqualified
user
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As low as is reasonably achievable
DAC Derived air concentration
DPM Disintegrations per minute
PWR Pressurized water reactor
RCA Radiological controlled area
TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Wolf Creek Technical Specifications
Wolf Creed Final Safety Analysis Report
ALARA Committee meeting minutes 8/26/97 - 10/31/97
Site ALARA Work Group meeting minutes '.I16/97 - 2/3/98
ALARA Improvement Report Log
. Temporary Shielding Leg
Wolf Creek RF Vill ALARA Report
c Performance improvement Requests
, 97-0213
97-2411
97-0314
97-3384
97-3378
97-2014
97-2666
98-0329
98-0437
98-0504
Corrective Action Performance Indicators 2/27/98
Procedures
AP 25A-400 ALARA Program, Revision 3
AP 25A-410 ALARA Committee Charter, Revision 2
AP 25A-600 Site ALARA Work Group, Revision 1
AP 25A-700 Use of Temporary Lead Shielding, Revision 2
RPP 02-210 Radiation Survey Methods
RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
RPP 02-515 Release of Material from the RCA, Revision 9
RPP 03-305 issuance of Respiratory Protection Equipment, Revision 11
RPP 06-805 MS-3 Scaler Calibration
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