Text

Marked-up & Type Written Proposed TS Pages,Revising TSs 1.0, 3.6,Bases 3.0,Bases 3.6 & 5.5,to Adopt Implementation Requirements of 10CFR50,App J,Option B for Performance of Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Rate Testing
	ML20217C796
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	10/06/1999
From:	; NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20217C792	List: ML20217C787; ML20217C796;
References
	NUDOCS 9910140054
	Download: ML20217C796 (63)
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I Attachment 4 NLS990082 l

Page 1 of 31 l

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Affected CNS Technical Specification Pages In l Marked-un Form i l

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l 9910140054 991006 PDR ADOCK 05000290 F PDR

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Definitions

[, 1.1

.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The (continued) DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration is calculated as follows: DOSE EQUIVALENT .I-131 - (I-J31) +

0.0096-(I-132) + 0.18 (I-133) + 0.0025 (I-134) +

0.037 (1-135). m;- -

The mnvin., m n11 nwnbl o nr4mmry enntn4nmant lantenga.

4 esta i chn11 kn n A1CW af nr4msru can+s4nman+

EIUeI'htia-d dSy At th h bel $5dd pE U i caat=iamaat a*ersure (P,}.

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is I captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or ,

i

2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from -

sources that.are both specifically located O and known either not to interferb with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE ,

All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE l

Sum of the identified and un' identified LEAKAGE; -

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d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a .

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, '

pipe wall, or vessel wall.

l LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all required logic components (i.e., all l required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic elements, etc.) of a lopM circuit, O (continued) ,

fi.;ndii.ent h. 170 Cooper 1.1-3 a

Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 5 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations ~ and = ------

leakage rate testing except for primary _P 3.0 ? is act containment air lock tes ing, in

_pp14c=hle l accordance with .. .F .0, .pp _n_ P 2, --------------- '

_p.. r ., 2_ .. _i'ied by appreved exemptient. In accord nce

. th __ _F __,

The 10 E:;c -ite acceptance reitarian 4e ^

..ppendir J,

.f. l

-1 1.0 L . "=::ver, dur'ag the fir:t unit np+4nn a, ne I i etartup fe!!ewia; tart 4aa peer e r-ad in medified by accerdsnce "ith 10 CFD 50, ^.ppendiv J, l"2"preved Optien ^., :: redi#ied by tppreved exemption:, the 10:k:;c r:te cceptance criteri: Orc < 0.5 '., fer the Type " :nd

"^-"tions

\'\

! -Typ: 0 to:t:, :nd < 0.75 L, fer the Type ^ )

4ee+.

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber 18 months

,- bypass leakage is equivalent to a hole

< 1.0 inch in diameter. MLD

NOTE------

Only required after t$fo consecutive -

i tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass 9 months

+Le. Pairmey CourAioHeoT LEAKAGE PATE Tasriar PROGRAM -

tO .

Cooper 3.6-2 '

.c;;d:ent N;. 178

Primary Containment Air Lock

(- 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.6.1.2.1 ------------------NOTES------------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not . I invalidate the previous successful .

"- performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

2. Results shall .be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to !

SR 3.6.1.1.1.

Perform required primary containment air '

,-----N M ----- ,

l lock leaka e rate testin in accordance So ?.0.2 it "et I

wi t h 4. .. . . . . , ^.p p e n. n . , .p . i e r ^. ,- applic 2'e

-medi#ied by appreved exemptient. ---------------

T'.c acceptance crite-in fer ti" leck In accordanc i

-testia; tre- i . . . . 5.,

^ppend!" 2,-

Optier A, 2:

O :. Over:1'

!* 'ack 'e hge -ste it

/ .19 c e. f. h uh.n.n

,_ . . + n. c. +. n. d. s. +. ux 0. . . m..n. A. 4. # 4. n.h.,u 2ppreved d.

i'

-b . Over:1' air lecP 'c h ;c rate i:-

ne4n exe-"ti^": h

/. n. 11 e. r. f. b ..ek. a. n. + n. e. +. n. A .%+.

. A. S. r-'s* j

_h A A A A.

SR 3.6.1.2.2- Verify only one door in the primary months 2 )

containment air lock can be opened at a time. N f.he. kiHARY CORTAINNEDt bEAKA6E NATE TESTiO6 R10& RAM

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l f - -

s..

Cooper 3.6-7 ^nnda.ent No. 17"

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 --------NOTE ----

I hl Isolation high radiation devices areas in may be verified by use of administrative means.

7 .....................

l Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path for isolation is isolated. devices outside primary i containment l E

I I,2. Tsoi.nTioo devicesilAt- AND (y AQ.E Locked, SeaLe.cl oR Prior to l oilertuise. Sec.u Red entering MODE 2 1 MAY bc VER'tStk.o by Use. or 3 from of AdHiO[SERIQtiVE MEAMS r ary l l containment was l de-inerted while i in MODE 4, if l not performed l l within the !

previous ~

92 days, for isolation

. devices inside X primary containment (continued)-

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l Cooper 3.6-9 .t;nizat "c. 178

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l B. ---------NOTE--------- B.1 Isolate the affected I hour Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use.of at least with two PCIVs. one closed and

de-activated automatic valve, i One or more closed manual valve, ;

penetration flow paths or blind flange.

with two PCIVs inoperable except for i MSIV leakage not !

within limit. 1 1

l C. ---------NOTE--------- C.I Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except Only applicable to penetration flow path for excess flow penetration flow paths by use of at least check valves with only one PCIV. one closed and (EFCVs)

, ........... ,......... de-activated iO One or more e#te etic veive.

closed manual valve,

^"o penetration flow paths or blind flange. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for with one PCIV EFCVs inoperable. AND G i l

C.2 --------NOTE --------

[

Isolation devices in I. high radiation areas may be verified by l use of administrative l means.

..................... 2.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.

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2. _Lsolntiou deVictS Nt Age. loc.ked,Se4Utd. OR (continued)

. onerwis,e SECURED NAV be VeRded hY Oie. crf ~

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/klHiUIStGAtivE HEADS.

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Cooper 3.6-10 ^mendment "c. 173 i

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PCIVs 3.6.1.3 l R SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3 ------------------NOTES-------------e---- -

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that i l

are.open under administrative i control s. 1 Verify each primary containment manual Prior to isolation valve and blind flange that is entering MODE 2 -

located inside primary containment and or 3 from not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured MODE 4 if i and is required to be closed during primary.

accident conditions is closed. containment was I de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed q within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing 31 days _

incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

p .

SR 3.6.1.3.5 VerJfy.t In Of:r:E,Q;r., q::..,on timePCIV, automatic of eache::c:

except d. -

accordance I

~for BSlVs, iii wlthi'n limits. with the Inservice .

Testing Potoeg OPERATED

~

Program 3

(continued)

A U .

Cooper 3.6-13 fc:.d:s t S . 170

T- ]

j PCIVs 3.6.1.3

(

\

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

l SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In-accordance l 1 3 seconds and s 5 seconds. with the Ins 6rvice l

j Testing ,

Program i

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV actuates to 18 months the isolation position on an actual or i simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line 18 months EFCV actuates to the isolation position ;

on an actual or simulated instrument line break.

o SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from 18 months on a each shear isolation valve of the TIP STAGGERED TEST System. BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is -- MOTE ----

5 11.5 scfh when tested at 1 29 psig. S". 3. 0. 2-

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is aat 1 applicabl.a.

In accordance wt

.0 CF". 50, A n n a-,8 4 v 1 h hd5IdA, 2, i at ed!<!ed ;

(by:pprc'!cd-ovo.n+<nn+

i j

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"""*d)

(O uE. ainaav couraroseet knxnse Rats TesticsPRosRnN l'

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Cooper 3.6-14 ' ^=end::nt Mc.178 !

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SCIVs 3.6.4.2

() SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1 -----------.------NOTES------------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high ..

' radiation areas may be verified by .

use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each secondary containment 31 days isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during ,

accident conditions is closed.

SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power In accordance r- withinl(imitsoperated 261 ajjj) automatic SCIV isthe with i Inservice (m3) Testing .

Program SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to 18 months the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

([')-

s . .--

I Cooper 3.6-37 ^

..= nd:ent 40. !??

Pr: grams and Manuals

s 5.5 0.5 5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) (continued)

For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may~~

exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

1. A required system redundant to systec(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

2. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn ,

supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

3. A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems b.1 and b.2 above is also i.ioperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this )rogram, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the _C0 in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

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Cooper 5.0-16 .,:::d;;nt N . 170 1

3 5.5 Programs cnd Manurls 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram

a. A program shall establish the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September,1995, as modified by the following exceptions:

1. Exemption from Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50 to allow reverse direction local leak rate testing of four containment isolation valves at Cooper Nuclear Station (TAC NO. M89769) (July 22,1994). ,

2. Exemption from Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50 to allow MSIV )

testing at 29 psig and expansion bellows testing at 5 psig between i the plies (Sept. 16,1977). i i

b. The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P., is 58.0 psig. The containment design pressure is 56.0 psig.

c. The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L., at P., shall be ;

0.635 % of containment air weight per day.

O d. Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1. Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L.. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are , <0.60 L. for the Type B and C tests and s 0.75 L. for Type A tests.

2. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

a. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 La when tested at 2 P..

b. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.23 scfh when tested at 2 3.0 psig.

e. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

O 6.0-17

SR Applicability

, B 3.0 ASES SR 3.0.2 The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the (continued). reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance l being performed is the verification of conformance -with the )

SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surye111ances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the -

Frequency does not apply. These exce ti s re sta ed in the in iv dual Spe i a ons. 1. e..- ,.: Of " .e. e _. 3.0. s de:: ne. app 1f is : Servei . inca vith a c requaacy of "in- y

rd:::: e'th 10 CF9 " ^- :-d'" J :: cd' #' - '"

. {'

;reved exer-tj::;." he r uir m t o re 1to ake e e ence over the TS.

S ' ::_ an_ ef the re!"a ex aa_ ^ __ aterva. raarified ia tha ra;clattent. 2 ;

Ther:fere, th:r: i: 1 Mete *- the crequency stating, !

l "E" 3.0.2 i: ::t :;plic hle."

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the . initial portion of a periodic Com)1etion Time that SR3.o.2 Toseeri requires performance on a "once per..." 3 asis. The 25%

extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required O Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a i single Completion TintF. One reason for not allowing the 25% i extension to this Completion Time is that such an action.

usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse compon'ents or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not int. ended to be used

.. repeatedly merely as' an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those 4:onsistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals <

beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring -

affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been O (continued)

(

,Ovi: ten 0 Cooper B 3.0-12

l

_ BASES

.]

SR 3.0.2 Insert 1 The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program specifically states the frequencies to perform Surveillances to meet the requirements of the regulations. 3 The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. SR 3.0.2 does not apply to any requirements in Ssction 5,

Programs and Manuals, uniess otherwise stated.

1 1

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Primary Containment

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B 3.6.1.1 O

D B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment BASES , _

BACKGROUND The function of the primary containment is to' isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary -

System following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material.

The primary containment consists of a steel pressure vessel in the shape of an inverted light bulb with a torus-shaped suppression chamber located below and encircling the drywell, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary. are a part of the containment leak tight ~ barrier. To maintain this-leak tight barrier:

~

n a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident v conditions are either:

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or

2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in _

LC0 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";-

~

b. The primary containment air loc'k is 0PERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2,' "Pr.imary. Containment Air Lock"; and

c. All manways and equipment hatches are closed. -

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. St 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requi ts are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Opti 1 (Ref. 3), _ as modified by approved exemptions.

O'

%)-

t (continued)- ,

Cooper B 3.6-1 M isica 0

Primary Containment

(, B 3.6.1.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the de. sign leaka_qe rate.

l The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. -In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to'the environment is controlled by the rate of l primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures ,

that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not l exceeded. l

~

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L.) is 0.635% by weight of the containment air l per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at theTmaximum ea co a me t re (P 1 d a m basa, g.r .....

.. .J ._y =1;..t e. the cent:Prent air per

-. h: red =d pr== or e (2e p:ig) (P.cr.1) . a LOCA Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 4).

LCO Primary containment OPERABILITY is ma'intained by limiting pe reing equ M5.3.35N[r d_ 3 X [? L,'. M "dd55foi,~tiie Teika[e i ba l55 )

W the suppression chamber must be limited to ensure -

the pressure suppression function is accomplished and the .

suppression chamber pressure does not exceed design limits.

Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches that is 0 Otr. A90LICAble .keAk.nbt Sirfitz HOST be. HLY o kiHAAY btAIuHd EAht.kateTeseso&knH (co,tino,g) A, M A . -

Cooper B 3.6-2 e. vister 9

Prjmary Containment

, B 3.6.1.1 OBASES

.LCO structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those (continued) leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

fnAto4 Jus 1 1ambsna estae enne4f4aA fne the ne4mNv.

ihhiE5.55t55A'T5ck'55555555d554- LCO315.1.25 1 I

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment.' In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS Ad In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary ..

containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a period of O- time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where prima ~ry containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If primary containment cannot be.ristored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be

~

brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating ~

experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

s Tcontinued)-

Cooper B 3.6-3 "seisica 0

Primary Centainment

~

, , B 3.6.1.1 O a^ses (c atiaued)

SURVEILtANCE SR 3 . 6.1,_1_d REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the vp"minatior's_and Imakaae rate test ranairaments of_... .. . 5 , ?.;;:S ii 2,'0;T1:; C

~

aBot u .. -oa m Ad hv =aa*auad ava= g

?4aat. ,a ure to M air TocKWTmit (sn s.m.T.I] or the main steam isolation valve leakage limit (SR 3.6.1.3.10) does not SR 3.6.l.l.1 Lseat i necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of h .the failure to meet these SRs must be ev u e a ainst the d e .0 CF 5.,

dt.. J, Optier :: --df# -d 5" saare"ad ev"-atieae 2

.$::f.'".

(

As left leakate p""rl od he firs.t Startuo after performing r: required L" C" f.;5 " leakage test is l3 required to be <N,L,ioM.d'h I,10pijf[ei ined Ty and C leakage, 05 andiR90.75 L, for overall Type A leakage. At all other tiliief between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance l4 criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of 5 1.0 L . At s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are ..

bounded by the assumptions of the safet ana sis. The Fre en is r utred b _0, ^.; pen _ n: , _ ,.10.. ^

O-3.":.. .) , = = . . i .; :;;r:ved := ;t t e= . Th= , 5 eo , , , , u .n .. c ...... .,+._.

, _ . _ . , . . . . _ . .._.s a_o__,

oo+ . , .

.m.- .. .

SR 3.6.l.l.1 Lseet 2 A SR 3.6.1.1.2 p

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting tne leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the ste'an would be directed through the downconers into the suppression pool. This SR is a leak test that confirms thit the bypass. area between the drywell and the su>pression chamber is less than a one inch diameter hole. Tsis ensures that the leakage paths.

that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable-limits. )

i Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieted by !

establishing a known differential pressure between the ,

drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the l pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell Q (continued)

Cooper B 3.6-4 . " vist= 0

l:

l L

q L U. BASES l: SR 3.6.1.1.1 Insert '1 l' ..the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.1.1 Insert 2 Regulatory Guide 1.163 and NEl 94-01 include acceptance criteria for as-left and i

as-found Type A leakage rates and combined Type B and C leakage rates, which may be reflected in the Bases.

1 i

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l Prjmary Centainment l g , B 3.6.1.1 O

l U BASES l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued) i REQUIREMENTS l does not change by more than the calc.ulated amou.at per minute over a 10 minute period. ~he leakage test is perfomed every 18 months. The lo month Frequency was developed considering it is. prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate -

unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, l

as the Nate indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section V-2.4.

2. USAR, Section XIV-6.3.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, t, h [

4. 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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Cooper B 3.6-5 ":v i s ica-4--

Primary Centainment Air Leck

(, B 3.6.1.2 O BASES ACTIONS D.1 and 0.2 (continued) required plant conditions from full power condit4cns in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. - ,

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS .

Maintaining the primary containment air lock OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirement

, :: ;;difi;d by b [

frwry/mkad- of 10 CFR i;;ra"ed ex-50, A;;;;This

tient. dix J,SR Optic A (" f.the reflects i) leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage g Ygae (Type B leakage tests . The acceptance criteria were g'I#b3 established as a smal fraction of the total allowable reg ram primary containment leakage ~=ad ="a date-ihad ia q

=w Ref:rence 5. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not ' exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by 10 CF" 50, A;;:ndix J, Optic" ^ (Paf 4', !! the. 3 Ther, SR ?.0.2 ("hief

%.med4('edby:ppre*/edexr;t'ent.

O :ller c re; ency Orteariant) daar =^t saaly-The neteneu enntm4nmant s4e 1nek chall ha taetad in_

' adEsdanciHth SP ? _6.1 ?_1.= (at i test pressure i P.)-at a Frece--ey ef 6 =aatkr. Hey-ver. +his testie; ==y be I :: tented te the next raf"e!!n; ^"ti;e 'aat te " Mea-d ?4 r^-ths) previdad that the ari=a*y cea+2ia==a+ $4* 1aak h*e net heen 0;ened t' ace tha Ittt!"cra~f"!tartitiP. a Ir Jka muant tha nesenew cantner---t m4r 1nek 4e nat ananaA i be +eeted is i'ch6*d tace 9 55t"555 c?".i!I5; 5"h355Ut z'th SR 2.51.2.1.5 E6a",i== 2 ? ae!0) =t =

(at a ta't a*arr' F=^;"ency ef S =anths. != eddi+4ah, i' tha a*i==*y l l cent ' :::nt '.r tech 't :;:: d d"r'r; "ETi 2, er 2,

( withi: 72 h::r: ef the 0;::*-a (er e"ary ?? 'a"ar d"*ia"4*

r :r sed: er f.ezeent epe an ;}, th- -rim.-y ennt 4 = -+

I I::t:h:11 i: tt:ted '- treedece "'th S":nt! ? 51 ? 1.5 (et ! l

( 1 t::t ;re:: r: 1 ?

-en--t'ent te 10 do

'-1 Sera re "'c ------ent

b. ^=pendir 4;. Op+iaa8 . =pa*av^d da-i

":f:r:::: 5. -

.v The SR has'been modified by two Hotes. Note 1 states that i~

an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous l

i 1 continued),

B 3.6-12 "^"' ':: 0 Cooper

l Primary Cont _ainment Air Leck 3 , B 3.6.1.2 l

l ASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 (continued) successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

I This is considere' reasonable since either air lock door is l capable of provic. .ng a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria -

which are applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage rate.

l l

SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed l to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will su) port primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlocc feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the ...

air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is not normally challenged when primary containment is used for entry and exit ~(procedures require strict adherence to I

singledooropening),thistest only required to be -

performed everyf4Wmonths. The NWmonth Frequency is b u d l}

on the need tf piiirform this Surv l ance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage, and the l 24- potential for loss of primary containment OPERABILITY if the The g@urveillance were performed with the reactor at power.onth l2 considered adequate given that the interlock is not "

challenged during use of the airlock.

l 1

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section V-2.3.4.5.

2. USAR, Section V-2.5.

3. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ,

(, continued) ,,

Cooper B 3.6-13 Rc'/iste: 0 l

l I

1 Primary Containm:nt Air Leck y

r. ' -

B 3.6.1.2 t'

BASES REFERENCES 4 '. 10CFR50,AppendixJ, Option (h[f (3 i i

(continued)

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1 B 3.6-14 " visier. O Cooper

.. PCIVs i s B 3.6.1.3 O BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) occur. This Required Action does not require any-testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of po^tentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.' The Completiin Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the davices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

l Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, ..

Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

I 2 Erres. Osre1. i app Required Action A.2 is modified byisolation devices and located in high rY allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. !

c . .. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered i acceptable, since access to these areas is typically 7mpgy i restricted. (Therefore, the probability of misalignment, l2 once they have been verified to be in the proper position, ,

is low.

B.d

- i l

! With one or more penetention flow paths with two PCIVs l inoperable, except due to MSIV lea (age not within a limit, I either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be -

l isolated within-I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.

Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and l

'de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a l

blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with l

the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

\

O (, continued) a.eet d:: 0 Cooper 8 3.6-20 1

L

.i.

O. BASES 1

.O B 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Insert 1 l

1 i Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or othetwise secured

.in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative .

means. Allowing verification' by administrative means is considered accep, table, l since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that .

these devices are r,ot inadvertently repositioned. l l

1 j

1 l

l i

1 ,

l I

I'

i

. PCIVs 3 s B 3.6.1.3 ASES- l ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that-this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with c only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

2.L)oTes. NoTc1 .

applies to li RequiredActionC.2ismodifiedby-Mateth+itionareasand valves and blind flanges located in Eigh radT allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. 1 Allowing verification by administrative means is censidered M acceptable, since access to these areas is typically Tose.gT i, restricted.4 Therefore, the probability of misalignment, lg once they have been verified to be in the proper positicn, is low.

D.d With any MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions -

of the safety analysis may not be met. There. fore, the

-leakage must be restored to within limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . '--

Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage i rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the If two actual pathway . leakage through the isolation devic ~e.

isolation devices are used to' isolate the penet' ration, the -

leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway i leakage of the two devices. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is !

reasonable considering the time required.to restore the {

leakage by isolating the penetration, the fact thet MSIV closure will result in isolation,of-the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown,. and the, relative 4 importance of MSIV leakage to the overall containment i function.

~

E.1 and E.2 -

1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to I (, continued)

Cooper B 3.6-22 5/!s!^a 0

p l

BASES

l. B 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS C.1 and 0.2 Insert 1 Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured l in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ens,ufe that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned.

l 4

l lO ;

l l

1 l

O . .

l

PCIVs 3 , B 3.6.1.3 ;

tO V BASES !

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3- (continued)

REQUIREMENTS controls consist of stationing a dedicated operater at the ;

controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

i

'SR 3.6.1.3.4 4

The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive j charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will '

actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

- . ' SR 3.6.1.3.5 .

> Verifying the isolation time of each power operated -d e-9 i automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demons ra e OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be' excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR.3.6.1.3.6.

i 2 *. !

The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are.in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program. ,

.. ~ ..

SR 3.6.1.,3.6 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the'

-saecified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

Tse isolation time test casures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA and transient analyses. This ensures that the 2

( (continued),,

B 3.6-26 t'11:i= 0 Cooper

PCIVs

- , B 3.6.1.3 BASES

-SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.9 REQUIREMENTS The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive (continued) charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and t'ested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib -

shall be from' the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequancy of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The analyses in References 8 and 9 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through e h MSIV must be < 11.5 scfh when tested at 2 P3 29 psig).

^ ^'" '-

.hO ^" I^

,. I n PE*D En A nnane 4v .1 An+4an A T6sn MCTV lankann rata snnet EEUhEdibdIE'Ebin'5:5EU5ce'M'+ Ethal^^+'^- ^=kaaa~+^+ 1

".aa"ir:- ::t! s.o af 10 #FP. 50, ---+

.^.;;0nd'Y ' ^ (a:f_. 1"',

,u s4.a ient .Mncyl s-f a re" d "" N J,'0; 9 : n ^'"

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b Q,,M N AM renulf@d c :=pt' ::; the:, SP ?.0.2 (9tch 21'.ce Fre';"cacy J :pp::": 7 M Mo wayt M- : ':::i:::) d::: ::t 1;;lj.

7ArtTestlos b6RAN

^

SR 3.6.1.3.11

. Verifying each inboard 24 inch pr'.mahy containment purge and vent valve (PC-230 MV, PC-231 MV, PC-232.MV, and PC-233 MV) is blocked to restrict the maximum cpening" angle to 60' is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analysis of References 7 and 8. If a LOCA cecurs, the purge and vent valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the e values assumed in' the accident analysis. At other times, pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The 18 month Frequency is

. appropriate because the blocking devices may be removed during a refueling outage.

tO '(continued [

Cooper B 3.6-28 9. "i:10r 0 l

j

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES (continued) l l

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter XIV.

2. Amendment 25 to the FSAR.

3. NEDC 96-006," Estimate of Steam Tunnel's HELB," dated ,

March 30,1996. l

4. USAR Section IV-4.9. l

5. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), j

6. USAR, Table Vil-3-1.

7. USAR, Bums and Roe Drawing 4259, Sheets 1 and 1 A, and Bums and Roe Drawing 4260, Sheets 2A and 2B (incorporated by

Reference).

. l

8. USAR, Section V-2.0. )

l

9. USAR, Section XIV-6.3.

O. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option 1 c n ;

U Cooper B 3.6-29 Ane 40,1999 l 1

J

n i

. SCIVs

,- B 3.6.4.2 (BASESj

. APPLICABLE that leakage from the primary containment is processed by ;

SAFETY' ANALYSES. the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released

.(continued) to the environment. l Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within

,- limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped l inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by -

l the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

i SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)

(Ref.5). .

1 LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary.

The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operate @ isolation valves are considered OPERABLE i when their isolation times are within limits and the valves i actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves .

covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke ,

times, are listed in Reference 6. l The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are ;

considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in ;

accordance with appropriate administrative controls, .

4 autmatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed po:W an, and blind flanges are in place. These passive isoRtion valves or devices are listed in Reference 6.

i APPLICABILITY in MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could 1.eal to a fission product release to the. primary containment that leaks to the .

secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature -

1 limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs -

OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for nther situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE O- (caatia d>

Cooper B 3.6-73 hvisier,O

. SCIVs j i s B 3.6.4.2 ]

' A V BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual l i

isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be I closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radiohetive fluids ,

or gases outside of the secondary containmen't boundary is l within design limits. This SR does not require any testing i or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their )osition is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was closen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and bline flanges located in high j radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of ...

administrative controls. Allowing verification by p administrative controls is considered acceptable, since

( access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for,.ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is

~~~~

low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that-are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the' penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

SR 3.6.4.2.2 ing that the isolation time of each power operatedh {

automatic SCIV is within limits is required to emonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued) 1 Cooper 8 3.6-77 Rev4sion_D-NLS990082 Page 1 of 33 Affected CNS Technical Specification Pages In Type-Written Form l

l i

)

Q e p

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Defnii;)ns ,

l

' DOSE EQUIVALENT l-131 1-133,1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The DOSE i (continued) , EQUIVALENT l-131 concentration is calculated as follows

DOSE EQUIVALENT l-131 = (1-131) + 0.0096 (1-132) + 0.18 (1-133) + 0.0025 (1-134) + 0.037 (1-135).

l LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE ,

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such a s that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and -

conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or

2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from -

sources that are both specifically located -

and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. _,!pidentified l LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;

d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all required logic components (i.e., all required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic elements, etc.) of a logic circuit, l

(continued)

Cooper ; 1.1-3

)

Primiry ContainmI;nt 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY t

l SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and leakage in accordance rate testing except for primary containment air lock with the Primary testing, in accordance with the Primary Containment Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber bypass 18 months leakage is equivalent to a hole < 1.0 inch in l . diameter. AND i -

NOTE-l Only required after two consecutive tests l fail and continues until two l consecutive tests pass 9 months l l

1 l

Cooper 3.6-2 i

l J

1 i

Primiry Containmtnt Air Lock 3.6.1.2 ,

)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -

SURVEILLANCE. FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1 - -NOTES -

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

I

2. Results shall be evaluated against

{

acceptance criteria applicable to- ;

SR 3.6.1.1.1. 1 Perform required primary containment air lock in accordance leakage rate testing in accordance with the with the Primary Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Containment Program.- Leakage Rate -

Testing Program SR 3.6.1.2.2 Verify only one door in the primary containment air 24 months l lock can be opened at a time, i

l l !

i-i' l Cooper 3.6-7

[ .,

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS

' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 -

NOTES 1, Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days for penetration flow path is isciation devices isolated. outside primary containment 6N.D Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4,if not performed within the previous 92 days, for l isolation devices inside primary 1 containment (continued) l Cooper 3.6-9

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. NOTE -

B.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one closed two PCIVs. and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

One or more penetration -

flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for MSIV leakage not within limit..

~ C. NOTE -

C.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for Only applicable to penetration flow path by excess flow check penetration flow paths with use of at least one closed valves (EFCVs) only one PCIV. and de-activated automatic valve, cr blind flange. AND One or more penetration N 6N.Q 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for :

flow paths with one PCIV EFCVs inoperable. C.2 -NOTES

1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. l

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.

(continued) l-Cooper 3.6-10

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3 --

NOTES

1. Valves and blind fianges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

(

2. Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

t Verify each primary containment manual isolrtion 1 Prior to entering i valve and blind flange that is located inside primary MODE 2 or 3 from f containment and not locked, seated, or otherwise MODE 4 if primary !

secured and is required to be closed during containment was accident conditions is closed, de-inerted while in i MODE 4, if not l performed within 4 the previous 92 days

]

SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe 31 days (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

SR ).6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, in l automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is within limits. accordance with the ;

Inservice Testing ;

Program '

(continued)

Cooper 3.6-13

l l PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is in accordance l 2 3 seconds and 5 5 seconds. with the l Inservice Testing Program l

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV actuates to the 18 months isolation position on an actual or simulated ,

isolation signal.

l l

l SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV 18 months actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated instrument line break.

SR - 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each 18 months on a shear isolation valve of the TIP System. STAGGERED lEST BASIS l

SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is in accordance l 511.5 scfh when tested at 2 29 psig. with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program l

1 (continued) l l

l l

Cooper 3.6-14 i

i i

SCIVs I 3.6.4.2

' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1 - ---

NOTES -

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

1 Verify each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be 31 days closed during accident conditions is closed.

SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power operated in accordance automatic SCIV is within limits, with the l Inservice Testing Program

' SR 3.6.4.2.3 - Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the 18 months l Isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Cooper 3.6-37

Programs and Manuals 4

.F 5.5 '

5.5 ' Programs and Manuals i l 5.5.11 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) (continued)

For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:-

.1. ' A required system redundant to system (s) supported by the inoperable I

. support system is also inoperable; or

2. . A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

3. ~ A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems b.1 and b.2 above is also inoperable. {

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is 3 determined to exist by this program, the appropriate. Conditions and Required Actions of '

the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

' 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leekeee Rate'Testina Proaram

. a. . A program shall establish the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September,1995, as modified by the following exceptions:

1. Exemption from Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50 to allow reverse direction !

' local leak rate testing of four containment isolation valves at Cooper

)

Nuclear Station (TAC NO. M89769) (July 22,1994). l

2. Exemption from Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50 to allow MSIV testing at 29 psig and expansion bellowr; testing at 5 psig between the plies

' (Sept.16,1977),

b .' The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of J

' coolant accident, P., is 58.0 psig. The containment design pressure is 56.0 psig.

c. . The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L., at P., shall be 0.635% of containment air weight per day.

L Cooper ' 5.0-16

, Programs and Manuals

5.5 .

5.5 Programs and Manuals .

5.5.12 Primarv Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram (continued)

d. Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are: !

1. Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L,. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage i rate acceptance criteria are, <0.60 L, for the Type B and C tests and 1 s 0.75 L, for Type _ A tests.

I 2; Air lock testing acceptance critena are ;

a. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P .

b. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.23 scfh when tested at 2 3.0 psig. j

e. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage ;

Rate Testing Program. l i

l l

l' 1

[ Cooper 5.0-17 i

i R: porting Requirsmants )

5.6

' 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

)

5.6 Reporting Requirements i

The following reports shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4. l 5.6.1- ' Occuoational Radiation Exoosure Report ;

- A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station, utility, and other personnel (including contractors) receiving exposures > 100 mrem /yr and their associated man rem exposure according to work and job functions (e.g., reactor operations and g surveillance, inservice inspection, routine maintenance, special maintenance (describe maintenance), waste processing, and refueling). This tabulation supplements the i requirements of 10 CFR 20.2206. The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on electronic or pocket dosimeter, thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), or film badge measurements. - Small exposures totalling < 20% of the individual I total dose need not be accounted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total

whou body dose received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions. The report shall be submitted by April 30 of each year.

5.6.2 Annual Radioloaical Environmental Reoort The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report covering the operation of th.i i unit during the previous calendar year shall be submitted by May 15 of each year. The.

report shallinclude summaries,' interpretations, and analyses of trends of the results of the radiological environmental monitoring program for the reporting period. The material provided shall be consistent with the objectives outlined in the Offsite Dose Assessment Manual (ODAM), and in 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1, Sections IV.B.2, IV.B.3, and IV.C.

The Annual Radiological Environmer" 1 Operating Report shall include the results of analyses of all radiological environmeotal samples and of all environmental radiation measurements taken during the period pursuant to the locations specified in the table and figures in the ODAM, as well as summarized and tabulated results of these analyses and measurements in the format of the table in Regulatory Guide 4.8, December 1975. In the event that some individual results are not available for inclusion with the report, the report shall be submitted noting and explaining the reasons for the missing results. The missing data shall be submitted in a supplementary report as soon as possible.

(continued)

Cooper. 5.0-18 l

R: porting R:quiremsnts !

5.6 )

j 5.6 Reporting Requirements-(continued)-

1 5.6.3 Radioedive Effluent Release Reoort .

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The R.idioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the unit shall be sub-

mku in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36a. The report shallinclude a summary of the j

a quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the unit. The material provided shall be consistent with the objectives outlined in the ODAM ,

and the Process Control Program and in conformance with 10 CFR 50.36a and . !

10 CFR 50, Appendix 1,Section IV.B.1.

5.6.4 : Monthlv Operatina Rooorts

' Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience,-including

' documentation of all challenges to the safety / relief valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month

. covered by the report.

l ~ 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to 1.- - any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR

j. . for the following:

1. The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rates for Specification 3.2.1,

2. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.7.7.

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3. The three Rod Block Monitor Upscale Allowable Values for i- Specification 3.3.2.1.

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4. The power / flow map defining the Stability Exclusion Region for Specification 3.4.1.

b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:

1. NEDE-24011-P-A, '.' General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel" (Revision specified in the COLR). ,

(continued)

Cooper- 5.0-19 l

L Rsporting Rtquirem:nts

!~

5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.5 ' CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) (continued) u 2. . NEDE-23785-1-P-A, "The GESTR-LOCA and SAFER Models for the Evaluation of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident", Volume Ill, Revision 1, l October 1984.

3. NEDO-31960 and NEDO-31960 Supplement 1, "BWR Owner's Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology" (the ' approved Revision at the time the reload analysis is performed).

i. c. . The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g.,

fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) limits, nuclear limits such as SDM, transie : analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

d. The COLR, including any midcycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

5.6.6 - Post Accident Monitorina (PAM) Instrumentation Report

.When a report is required by Condition B or F of LCO 3.3.3.1, " Post Accident Monitoring l (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The L . report shall outline the preplanned attemate method of monitoring, the cause of the

! inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

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(continued)

Cooper 5.0 l l

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1 High Radittion Area 5.7 i'

5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE' CONTROLS 5.7 High Radiation Area 5.7.1 In lieu of the " control device" or " alarm signal". required by paragraph 20.1601 of 10 CFR

Part 20, each high radiation area in which the deep dose equivalent in excess of 100 mrem but less than 1000 mrem in one hour (measurement made at 12 inches from l source of radiation) shall be barricaded (barricade will impede physical movement across the entrance or access to the high radiation area; i.e., doors, yellow and magenta rope, turnstile) and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Special Work Permit (SWP). Radiation protection personnel or personnel escorted by radiation protection personnel shall be exempt from the SWP issuance reqdrement during the performance of their assigned duties, provided they are otherwise following plant radiaticn protection procedures for entry into high radiation areas. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

a. A monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.

b. A monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose in the area

and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rates in the area have been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them.

. c. A radiation protection qualified individual (i.e., qualified in radiation protection

procedures), with a dose rate monitoring device, who it responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic dose rate monitoring at the frequency specified by Health Physics supervision.

5.7.2 in addition to the requirements of Specification 5.7.1, areas accessible to personnel with dose rates such that a major portion of the body could receive in i hour a deep dose equivalent in excess of 1000 mrem (measurement made at 12 inches from source of radiation) shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by parsonnel under an approved SWP which shall specify the dose rates in the immediate work area. For individual high j

. radiation areas accessible to personnel that are located within large areas, such as the containment, or areas where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking and no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual areas, then that area i shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted. Area radiation monitors that have been

- set to alarm if radiation levels increase, i (continued)

Cooper - 5.0-21 l

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High Radiation Arca 5.7 l

5.7 High Radiation Area '

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5.7.2 (continued) provide both a visual and an audible signal to alert personnelin the area of the increase. )

These monitors may be used to meet Specification 5.7.1.a provided that the dose rates and alarms have been established by radiation protection personnel. Stay times or continuous surveillance, direct or remote (such as use of closed circuit TV cameras),

may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide additional positive exposure control over the activities within the area.

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(continued) i Cooper 5.0-22 l

l l SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES ,

SR 3.0.2 The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that ;

(continued) results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular i Surveillance being performed is the varification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.

These exceptions are stated in tM individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program specifically states the frequencies to perform Surveillances to meet the requirements of the regulations. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. SR 3.0.2 does not apply to any requirements in Section 5, Programs and Manuals, unless otherwise stated.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance I after the initia! performance. The initial performance of the Required i Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial I action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One !

reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that ,

such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by '

checking the status of redundant or diverse . components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intendH to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend durveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable (4 an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less, applies frorn the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been (continued)

Cooper B 3.0-12

Primary Contilnmtnt B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment BASES .

BACKGROUND- The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consiste of a steel pressure vessel in the shape of an inverted light bulb w.th a torus-shaped suppression chamber located below and encircling the drywell, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier;

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or

2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated -l automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation

' Valves (PCIVs)";

b. The primary containment air iock is OPERABLE, except as l provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air Lock"; and

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c. All manways and equipment hatches are closed.

. This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2.

SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), as modified by approved l exemptions.

(continued)

Cooper. B 3.6-1

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Primary Containm:nt l B 3.6.1.1 i BASES .(continued) -

1 APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must !

SAFETY ANALYSES withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. l The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material (within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary-containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based ca an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment.

OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L ) is 0.635% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P.) of 58.0 psig. :

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)

(Ref. 4). ]

LCO Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to 1

< 1.0 L,,~ except prior to the first startup after performing a required

_ i Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test. At !

this time, the applicable leakage limits must be met. In addition, the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber must be limited to ensure the pressure suppression function is accomplished and the suppression chamber pressure does not exceed design limits.

Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is I

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(continued)

Cooper B 3.6-2

Primary Contiinmsnt B 3.6.1.1 l

BASES LCO. .

structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates (continued) . assumed in the safety analyses.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS A.L1 -

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1,2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probabilRy of an accident (requiring primary containraent OPERABILITY) occurring

. during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the reauirad plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

Cooper B 3.6-3 l

Primiry Containm:nt i

! B 3.6.1.1

~ BASES (continued)

L

' SURVEILLAi4CE - SR 3.671.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance

' .with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the

- Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet the air lock leakage limit (SR 3.6.1.2.1) or the main steam isolation valve leakage limit (SR 3.6.1.3.10) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary

, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L, for combined Type B and C leakage, and s 0.75 L, for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance critoria is based on an overall Type A L

leakage limit of 51.0 L,. At s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. j Regulatory Guide 1.163 and NEl 94-01 include acceptance criteria for as-left and as-found Type A leakage rates and combined Type B and 0 j leakage rates, which may be reflected in the Bases. '

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the' pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, ;

the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR is a leak test that confirms that the bypass area between the drywell and the suppression chamber is less than a one inch diameter hole. This ensures that the leakage paths that would ,

bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits. ;

i Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression l chamber or the drywell (continued)

" Cooper _ B 3.6-4

Primtry Containment B 3.6.1.1

~ BASES (continued)-

. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS-does not change by more than the calculated amount per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced ny passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section V-2.4.

' 2. USAR, Section XIV-6.3.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

4. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ;

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Cooper B 3.6-5 I

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E Primtry Containmtnt Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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- SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1

. REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment air lock OPERABLE requires compliance with the leckage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Progrant This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable primary containment leakage. The l periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not

. exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage ,

rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage !

Rate Testing Program. .

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous I

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(continued)

Cooper B 3.6-12

Primary Containm:nt Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES I SURVElLLANCE SR '3.6.1.2.1 (continued) successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a

fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance l criteria which are applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage rate.

SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feFJre supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is not normally challenged when primary containment is used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door opening), this test is only required to be performed every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is based on the l need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage, and the potential for loss of primary containment OPERABILITY if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgement and l Is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during use of the airlock.

REFERENCES 1.. USAR, Section V-2.3.4.5.

2. USAR, Section V-2.5.

3. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued) l Cooper - B 3.6-13

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Primiry Containm:nt Air Lock :

B 3.6.1.2 BASES i

REFERENCES 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l (continued)

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Cocper B 3.6-14

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if J primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed j within the previous 92 days"is based on engineering judgment and is i considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and j other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only anolicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For

%etration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by 2 Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation l devMes located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by

..A of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative mesns is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise seco ed in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use or administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be, in the proper position, is low. ,

l D I

'With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable, except due to MSIV leakage not within a limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this (continued)

Cooper B 3.6-20

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

. BASES r

ACTIONS Bd. (continued)~~

criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

- Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow

. paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

- C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV Inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1,2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is ren.sonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of p&3tration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying l each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the devices i are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

(continued) i Cooper B 3.6-21 l

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by 2 Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and l blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position ano allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

Q:1 With any MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the

- penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the

. penetration, the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown, and the relative importanca of MSIV leakage to the overall containment function.

E.1 and E.2

'If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1,2, or 3, the plant must be brought to (continued!

Cooper B 3 G-22

l PCIVs t B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (centinued)

REQUIREMENTS controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary

. containment isolation is indicated.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on

< ' operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated automatic PCIV is l within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA and transient analyses. This ensures that the (continued)

Cooper B 3.6-26

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PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.9 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The analyses in References 8 and 9 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be 511.5 scfh when tested at 2 Pi (29 psig). The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verifying each inboard 24 inch primary ccatainment purge and vent vPs (PC-230 MV, PC-231 MV, PC-232 MV, and PC-233 MV) is blocked to restrict the maximum opening angle to 60' is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analysis of References 7 and 8. If a LOCA occurs, the purge and vent valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times, pressurization concems are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices mcy be removed during a refueling outage.

(continued)

Cooper B 3.6-28

" - . ~,

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 l

i BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter XIV.

2. Amendment 25 to the FSAR.

3. NEDC 96-006, " Estimate of Steam Tunnel's HELB," dated March 30,1996.

4. USAR Section IV-4.9. !

5. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).-

6. USAR, Table Vll-3-1. l

7. USAR, Burns and Roe Drawing 4259, Sheets 1 and 1 A, and Burns and Roe Drawing 4260, Sheets 2A and 2B (incorporated by Reference). ,

8. USAR, Section V-2.0.

9. USAR, Section XIV-6.3.

10. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

=

l l

I Cooper B 3.6-29 L

c:

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby SAFETY ANALYSES Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

(continued)

' Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 5).

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated automatic isolation valves are considered l OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference 6.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place.

These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 6.

APPLICABILITY in MODES 1,2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to '

the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment.

Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required. I In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs),'during CORE l

l (continued)

Cooper B 3.6-73

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2

~

BASES (continued)'

' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS '

This SR verifies tnat each secondary containment manual isolation valve l and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is I closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive I fluids or gases outside of the' secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

- Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. '

'Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions. i

~ Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valvea !

and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1,2, and 3 for ALARA ..

reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarJy that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapid!y isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is -

indicated. 4 SR 3.6.4.2.2.

. Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated automatic SCIV l Is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, The isolation 1 time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or i equal to that a'ssumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

4 l

t (continued) 1

&. l Cooper- ,

B 3.6-77 Ri

ML20217C796

Text

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