ML20104B209

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Proposed TS 3.1.1 Re Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation Requirements & TS Table 3.2.D Re Radiation Monitoring Sys That Initiate &/Or Isolate Sys
ML20104B209
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/1992
From:
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20104B207 List:
References
NUDOCS 9209150136
Download: ML20104B209 (15)
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Text

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REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PACES --

9209150136 920909 PDR ADOCK 05000299 P PDR l

4 TABLE OF CONTENTE (cont'd)

Pave No.

SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION R.EOUIREMENTS 3.12 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANT CAPABILITIES- 4.12 215 -.215f A. Control Room-Emergency Filter System A 215a l' B. Reactor Equipment Cooling System -B 215b C. Service Water System C. 215c D. Battery Room Vent D 215c 3.13 RIVER LEVEL 4.13 216 3.14 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM 4.14 216b t

3.15 FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM 4.15 216b 3,16 SPRAY AND/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEM (FIRE PROTECTION) 4.16 216e 3.17 CARBON DIOXIDE AND HALON SYSTEMS 4.17 216f 3.18 FIRE HOSE STATIONS 4.18 216g 3.19I FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION FIRE SEALS 4.19- -216h 3.20 DELETED 216 3.21 ENVIRONMENTAL / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS- 4.21 216n A. Instrumentation 216n B. Liquid Effluents 216x C. Gaseous Effluents- 216a4 D. Effluent 90se Liquid / Gaseous 216all E. Solid Radroactive Waste 216al2 F. Monitoring Program 216al3 G. Interlaboratory Comparison Program 216a20 3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS 4.22 216bl 1 A. Shutdown Margi'.. Demonstration- 216bl B. Training Startup 216b2 C. Physics Tests. 216b3 D. Startup Test Program 216b3 g 5.0 MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Site Features 217 5.2 Reactor 217

5.3 Reactor

Vessel 217

.5.4 Containment 217 5.5 Fuel Storage 218

-5.6 Seismic Design 218

-5.7 Barge Traffic 218 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.1 Organization -219 6.1.1 Responsibility _ 219 i 6.1.2 offsite 219 6.1.3 Plant Staff - Shift Complement 219 6.1.4 Plant-Staff - Qualifications 219a

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. COOPER NUCLEAR STATION .

TABLE 3.1.1 (Page 2)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Minimum Number . Action Required Acolicability Conditions of Operable- L' hen Equipment Mode Switch Position Trip Level Channels Per Operability is Reacror Protection Run Settine Trio Systems (1) Not Assured (1).

System Trio Function' Shutdown Startuo Re fuel Main Steam Line High 2 A or D X(9) X s 3 Times normal Radiation full power back RMP-RM-251, A,B,C, & D ground Main Steam Line $ 10% of valve 4 A or C Isolation Valve Closure - X(6)

" closure 4 A or C MS-1MS-86.A,B,C,'& D:

MS-LMS '80 A,B,C, 6 D 2 1000 psig turbine 2- A or B Turbine Control Valve X(4) control : fluid

@ Fast Closure TGF-63/0PC-1,2,3,'4 Turbine Stop Valve 2 A or B  ;

X(4) s 10% of valve Closure Closure j

SVOS-1(1),.SVOS-1(2)'

Sv0S-2(1), Sv0S-2(2)-

Turbine First Stage A'or B

. Permissive MS-PS-14 -X(9) X' s 30% first 2 stage press.

'A,B,C, & D l

1 LIMITING FONDIT10NS FOR OPERATION SUkV21~.1ANCE REOUIREMENTS J 3.2 (cont'd.) 4.2 (cont'd.)

D. Radiation Monitoring Systems - D. Radiation Monitorine Systems -

Isolation & Initiation Functions Jsolation & Initiation Functions j

Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas System

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1. Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas System 1.
a. Operability of the Steam Jet Instrumentation surveillance j Air Ej ector Off-Gas System requirements are given on monitor is d : fined in Table 4.2.D.

Table 3.21.A.2.

b. The time delay setting for closure of the steam jet air ej ector isolation valves

. shall not exceed 15 minutes. -

4 c, Other limiting conditions for operation are given on Table 3.2,D and Specifications 3.21.A.2 and 3.21.C.6.

2. Reactor Building Isolation and 2. Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Gas Treatment Initiation Standby Gas Treatment Initiation na mmenta n suneHlaue The limiting conditions for requirements are given on operation are given on Table 3.2.D. Table 4.2.D.

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3. Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation 3. Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation i The limiting conditions for nstamentation- sunemance
    • 9" * * " * "#* E "" "

I operation are given on Table 3.2.D Table 4.e.D.

and Specification 3.21.B.

4. Centrol Room Emergency Filter System 4. Control Room Emergency Filter System l The limiting conditions for i 8i operation are given on Table 3.2.D and the Section entitled " Additional (*be42D*

a i

Safety Related Plant Capabilities."

I i 5. Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation 5. Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation

a. The mechanical vacuum -pump The instrument surveillance shall be capable of being requirements are given on Tables l automatically isolated and- 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.2.D.

j secured by a signal of high l

radiation in the main steam line tunnel whenever the main steam isolation valves are open,

b. If the limits of 3.2.D.S.a are not met, the vacuum pump shall be isolated.

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.D RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS THAT INITIATE AND/OR ISOIATE SYSTEMS Number of Sensor

} Channels Provided Instrument Setting Action System I. D. No. Limit by Desien (1)

RMP-RM-150 A & B (3) 2 A f , Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas System RMP-RM-452'A, B, < 100 mr/hr 4 8

' Reactor. Building' Isolation and Standby-. Gas Treatment C&D

+

Initiation RMP-RM-1 (2) 1 C Liquid Radwast'e' Discharge Isolation

- RMV-RM-1 4x10 CPM 1 D Control Room Emergency Filter Mechanical Vacuum Pump ' RMP-RM-251 A, B, 3 times normal full power 4 E

-h C&D background. Alarm at-Isolation'(4) 1.5 times normal full 4

. power background 1

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  • COOPER NUCLEAR STATION h TABLE 4.2.D

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MINIMUM TEST AND CALIBRATION FRE1QUENCIES FOR RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS .l i

! Instrument Instrument -!

System I.D. No. ,

Functional Test Freo. Calibration Frec. Check l '

Instrument Channels' .;

4 -

Steam Jet Air. Ejector Off Cas System EliP-RM-150 A & B (12) (12) (12)

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Reactor Building Isolatitn and RMP-RM-452 A, B, C & D (12)- (12) (12)

Standoy Gas Treatment InAtiation c

.Liqu'id Radwaste Di.scharge Isolation RMP-PR-1 (11), (11) (11) l )

Once/3 Months once/ Day l

!, Control Room Emergency RMV-RM-1 Once/ Month (1) . 'l

} Filte r --

t'- l 4

. Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation RMP-PE-251 A, B, C & D See Tables t

l.  : *

.w -

I 4.1.1 & E.1.2

( ..

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s ..

Lonic Svstems

-. SJAE Off-Cas Isolation Once/18 Months f  ; Standby Gas Treatment Initiation' Once/18 Lonths I '-

Once/18 Months Reactor' Building Isolation t ..

{- Liquid Radwaste Disch.- Isolation Once/6 Months l

j Control Room Emergency Filter. .. Once/6 Months Mechhnical' Vacuum Pump Isolation Once/Operatin? (.

' Cycle '

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I j 3.2 BASES (cont'd) I i

j B. Core and Containment Cooline. Systems Initiation and Control i

j The instrumentation which initiates Core Standby Cooling _ System (CSCS) action is j c anged in a dual bus system. As for other vital instrumentation arranged in this

!- fashion, the Specification preserves the effectiveness of the system even during

periods when maintenance or testing is being performed. An excepcion to this is when
logic functional testing is being performed.

, CORI. SPRAY l Initiation and control instrumentation settings ensure that the Core Spray system i operates to ensure fuel cladding temperatutes do not exceed 2200'F during a design basis thCA. The basis for the settings is discussed in USAR Section Vll 4.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (LPCI MODE) ,

)

i Initiation and control it e nunentation settings ensure that the LPCI wide.of-the

{. Residual Heat Removal systea operates to ensure fuel cladding temperatures do not

exceed 2200*F during a design basis IACA. High drywell pressure and reactor water i level instrumentation also allow injection water to be diverted for containment j spray. The basis fer the settings is discussed in USAR Section VII-4.

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j HPCI  :

l The HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are f:ovided to detect a break in '

the HPCI steam piping including the RitR Condensing- Mode Steam. Tripping of- this

! instrumentation results in actuation of HPCI isolation valves. Tripping logic for  :

j de high flow is a 1 out of 2 logic.

l Temperature is monitored at twelve-(12) locations with four'(4). temperature sensors I at each location. Two (2) sensors at each location are powered by "A" direct current control bus and two (2) by "B" direct current control bus. Each pair of sensors, e.g., "A" or *'B" , at each location are physically separated and the tripping-of either "A" or "B" bus sensor will actuate HPCI isolation-valves.

l The trip cettings of s 300% ~ of design flow for high flow and s 200*F for high j temperature are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is l

within limits, j.

! =RCIC The RCIC high flow and temperature instrumentation are arranged the same as that for

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the HPCI, The trip setting of 5 300% for high flow and s 200'F for temperature are

. based on the same. criteria as the HPCI.

ADS

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l The effective emergency core cooling for smal'1 pipe breaks,_the HPCI system, must

. function sis
e reactor pressure does not-decrease rapid enough to allow either core i

spray.or LPC1. to operate in time. LThe automatic pressure relief function is provided

i. as a backup to the HPCI in the event the-HPCI does not operata. The arrangernent of
_ the tripping contacts is such as to provide _ this function when necessary and minimize
'. spurious operation. The trip settings givet in the specification are adequate to

_ assure the above criteria are met. The specification preserves the effectiveness of

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. the system during periods of maintenance, testing, or calibration, and also mini nizes?

4 the risk of inadvertent operation; i.e. , only one instrument channel' out of service.

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3.2 PASES (Cont'd) 3oth instruments are required for trip but the inst +tuents are so designed tnat any it.3trument failure gives a downscale trip. The trip setting of 1.0 ci/sec (prior to 30 min, delay) provides an improved capability to detect fuel pin cladding failures to allow prevention of serious degradation of fuel pin cladding integrity which inight result fron plant operation with a misoriented or snisloaded fuel assembly. This limit is tnore restrictive than 0.39 ci/sec noble gas release rate at the air ejectors (after 30 tain, delay) which was used as the source term for an accident analysis of the augmented off gas system. Using the .39 ci/sec source term, the maximum off-site total body dose would be less than the .5 rem 11: nit.

. Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Cas Treatment Initiation Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation is provided in a 1 out-of-2 taken twice logic design via four radiation sensors located on the Reactor Building ventilation exhaust plentun. Each trip system (division) consists of two channels with a 1 out of ' .ogic for upscale trips, and a 2 outeo f-2 logic for downscale trips. . This trip function .s provided to limit the ' release of radioactivity resulting from a refueling ~(fuel handling) accident.

Trip settingn of (100 mr/hr for the rnonitors in the ventilation exhaust ducts are based upon intriating normal ventilation-isolation :nd standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released dur ag the refueling accident ) eaves the Reactor Building via-the normal ventilation path but rather all the activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system.

3. Liquid Radsaste Discharge Isolation The liquid radwaste monitor assures that all liquid discharged to the dischargo canal does not exceed the '.imits of Specification 3.21.B. Upon rensing a high discharge level, an isolation signal Is generated which closes the radwaste discharge valve. The set point is adjustable to compensate for variable isotopic discharges and dilution flow rat %.
4. Control Room Emergency Pilter Systein The snain control room ventilation isolati n is provided by- a detector monitoring the intake of the control room ventilation system. . Automatic. isolation of the normal supply and exhaust and the activation of the emergency filter system is provided by the radiation detector trip function at the predetermined trip level.
5. Mechanical Vacuum Pump The mechanical vacuum pump isolation prevents the exhausting of radioactive gas thru the 1 minute holdup line upon receipt of a main steam line high radiation signal.

E. Drswell Lenk Det4ction Flow transmitters are used to record the flow of liquid from the drywell~ sumps. An air sampling system is also provided to detect leakage inside tho ; primary

. containment.

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E l,' LING CONDITIONS FOR OPlRATION $URVEILIANCE REOUIREMENTS

) .10 (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)

G. ,Q3qntrol Room Emerrency Filter System 11. Snent Fuel Cask Handling From and after the date that the 1. Prior to fuel cask handling Control Room Emergency Filter system operations, the redundant crane is made or found to be inoperabic including the rope, books, slings, for any reason, refueling operations shackles and other operathig

, are permissible only during the mechanisme will be incroctod.

) succeeding seven days unless the f l system is sooner made operable. If The rope will be replaced if any of 8

these conditions cannot be met, the following conditions exist:

refueling operations shall be terminated in an ordarly mannet. a. Twelve (12) randomly distributed broken wires in H. Epent Fuel Cask Handlint one lay or_ four (4) broken vires in one strand of one

1. Fuel cask handling above the 931' rope lay.

? evel nf the Reactor Building will be done in the RESTRICTSD H0DE only b. Wear of one third the original except as specified in 3.10.H.2. diameter of outside individual wire.

2. Fuel cask handling in other than the RESTRICTED MODE will be permitted in c. Kinking, crushing, or any emergency or equipment failure other damage resulting in situations only to the extent t!stortion of the rope.

necessary to get the cask to the closest acceptable stable location. d. Evidence of any type of heat damage.

e. Reductions from nominal diameter of more than 1/16 inch for a rope diameter from
3. Operation with a failed controlled-7/8" to 1 1/4" inclusive.

area limit switch is permissible for 2. Prior to operations in the 48_ hours providing an operator is on RESTRICTED MODE the refueling floor to assure the crane is operated within the a. the controlled area limit restricted zone painted on the switches will be tested; floor.

b. the "two-block" limit switches
4. Spent fuel casks weighing in excess will be tested; of 140,000 lbs. shall not be handled. c. the " inching hoist" controls will be tested.
3. The empty spent - fuel cask will be lifted free _ of all . support by a maximum of I foot and-left hanging for 5 minuus prior to any series of fuel cask handling operations.

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  1. 8 8 3.10 laslg (cont'd) 1 D. Time Limitation The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident are based upon the accident occurring at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

E. Standby Cas Treatment System only one of the two Standby Gas Treatment subsystems is needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation. If one subsystem is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and refueling operation may continue while reptir, are being made.

If both subsystems are-inoperable, the plant is brought to a condition where the Standby cas Treatment System is not required.  ;

F. Care Standby Cooline Systems During refueling, the systern cannot be pressurized, ao only the potential need for core flooding exists and the specified combination of the Core Spray. or--

LPCI subsystems can provide _ this. A more detailed discussion is contained-in-the bases for 3.5.F.

G. Cont rol Rool,J;gerrency Filter System j If the system is found to be inoperable. there is no immediate threat tm _the l control room and refueling operation may continue for a limited period c time l whilo repairs are ~being made. If the . system cannot be repaired within seven days, refueling operations will be terminated.

H. Scent Fuel Cask 11gndline 4 The operation of the redundant crane in the Restricted Mode during fuel cash handling operations assures that the cask remains within the controlled area

once it has been removed from its transport vehicle (i.e. , once it is above the 931' elevation).- Handling of : the cask . on the Refueling Floor in--the Unrestricted Mode _ is' allowed only . in the . cas.. . of equipment failures or emergency conditiona when the cask is slready suspended. The Unrestricted Mode

,. of operation is allowed only to the extent necessary to get the cask to a - ,

suitable stationary position so the required repairs can be made. Operation with a tailed controlled area microswitch will be allowed for a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period providing an Operator is on the floor in addition - to the crane operator to i assure that the cask handling is limiced to the controlled ares as marked on the floor. This will allow adequate tine to make repairs but still will not restrict cask handling operations unduly.  ;

4.10 Etag.E A. Refueline Interlqqhg Complete functional-testing of all' refueling interlocks before any refueling outage will L provide positive indication that the interlocks operate in'the situations for which they were designed. By loading each hoist .with a weight equal to the fuel assembly, positioning.the refueling platform 'and withdrawing control - rods, t.he interlocks can be subjected to valid. operational tests. <

Where redundancy _ is provided -in the logic- circuitry,. tests can be performd to assure- that each redundant logic element can independently-- perform its

!- -functions.

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I s, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILIANCE REOUIREMENTS ,

I

3.12 Additional Safety Related Plant 4.12 fuist,ilional Safe ty Related Plant l' l Canabilitig.g Capabilities Apollegbility* Anp,licabilig

f Applies to the operating status of Applies to the curveillanco the Control Room Emergency Filter requirements for the Control Roorn the Reactor Emergency Filtor System, the Reactor system, Equipment j Cooling system and the Service Water Equipment Cnoling systeta and the

)'

system. Service Water system which are required by the corresponding Obiective: Lirnititig Conditions for Operation.

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, To assure the availability of the obiective:

l Control Rootn Emergency Filter .

System, the Reactor Equipmert To verify that operability or i l Cooling system and the Service Water availability under conditions for a system upon the conditionu for which which these capabilities are an '

the capability is an essential essential ~ response to station 4

response to station abnorinalities, abnormalities.

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! L1HTTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEIL 1 ANCE REOUIREMENTS  !

i f 3.12.A (cont'd) 4.12.A (cont'd) l l A. Cont rol Room Emergency Filter SysLem A. Control Room Emergency Filter System l l 1. Except as specified in Specification 1. At least once per operating cycle, t

[ 3.12.A.3 below, the Control Room the pressure drop across the Emergency Filter system, the diesel combined llEPA filters and charcoal generators requited for operation of absorber banks shall be demonstrated i this system and the main control to be less than 6 inches of water at

} room air radiation monitor shall be system design flow rate.

! operable at all times when j containment integrity is required, t ';

i 2.a. The results of the in place cold DOP 2.a. The teste and sample analysis of

leak tests on the llEPA filters shall Specification 3.12.A.2 shall be j show 2 99%.DOP removal, The results performed at 1 cast.. once every

.- of the halogenated hydrocarbon leak 18 months . for standby service or i t-sts on the charcoal adsorbers after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system i shall show 299% halogenated operation and following significant. i

[ hydrocarbon removal. The DOP and painting, fire or chemical release I halogenated hydrocarbon tests shall in any ventilation zone

be performed at a flowrate of s 341 communicating with the rystem. ,

CFM.

{

b. The results of. Icboratory carbon b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed l sample analysis shall show 299% after each complete or partial .;
radioactive methyl iodide removal replacement of the llEPA filter bank  ;
with inlet conditions of
velocity or af ter any ' structural maintenance
222 FPM, 21.75 mg/m 3 inlet iodide on the uystem housing. ,

j' concentration, h 95% R.H, and $30'C.

I c. The emergency bypass fan shall be 'c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing I

-shown to provide 341 CFM *10%. shall be- performed efter each complete or partial replacement of.

l the charcoal absorber bank or after l any structural maintenance on the system housing.

d.-The system shall be - operated at

(. least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month.

3. From and af ter . the date that . the 3. At.least once per operating' cycle -

j Control Room Emergency Filter system. automatic initiation of the system l is made or found to be inoperable shall be demonstrated. .

i for any reason, reactor operations are permissible only during the 9 t - succeeding - seven days unless the l -system-.is sooner. made ' operable.

! Refueling requirements are as specified in Specification 3.10.G.

4. If these conditions cannot be met, '

reactor shutdown shall= be initiated and the reactor ' shall be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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3,12 F.AS E.S l l

l A. .Crntrol. Room Emergency Filter System I

l The Control Room Emergency Filter system is designed to filter the control room l I

j atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control room isolation conditions. The system is designed to automatically start upon control room .

+

ist.lation end to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure l so that all leakage should be out leakage.

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liigh officiency particulate absolute (llEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal .;
adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the control room. The in-l place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent 1 bypass leakage for the charcoal adscrbers and llEPA filters. The laboratory carbon .
sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency.

! of at least 99 percent for expected accident conditions. If the performance of the llEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria ,

for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

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! If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation may continne for a limited period of time while repairs t

are being made. If the rystem cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is i shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

B. - EfActor Eautoment Coolinn (REC) Syjgiga The Reactor Equipment Cooling System consists _ of two, distinct subsystems, each containing two pumps and one heat exchanger. Each subsystem-is espable of supplying the cooling requirements of the essential services following design accident

conditions with only one pump in either subsystem. .

l .

The REC System has additional flexibility provided by the capability of .

. interconnection of the two subsystems and the backup water supply to the critical cooling loop by the Service Water System. This-flexibility and the need for only one p* imp in one critical cooling loop to meet the design accident requirements justifies '

the-30 day repair time during. normal operation and the reduced requirements during head-off operations requiring the availability of the LPCI or Core Spray systems.

C. Service Water System The Service Water System consiscs of two, distinct subsystems, each containing_two .'

- vertical Service Water pumps located in the intake structure, and associated strainera, . piping, valving _and instrumentation. The pumps- discharge to a common

! header from which independent piping supplies two Seismic Class I cooling water loops l and one turbine building loop. Automatic valving is provided to shutoff all-supply j

to the turbine building loop on drop.in header pressure thus assuring supply _to the Seismic Class I' loops each of which feeds ono diesel-generator, two RHR Service Water booster pumps, bne control room basement fan coil unit and one REC heat-exchanger,-

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Valves are included in the common' discharge header _to permit the Seismic Class 1 Service - Water System to be operated . as two independent subsystems. The heat exchangers are valved such that they can be individually b'ackwashed without-interrupting system operation.

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3.12 ' MSM (cont'd)

During normal operation two or three pumps will be required. Three pumps are used for a normal shutdown.

The loss of all a-c power will trip all operating Service Water pumps. The automatic emergency diesel generstor start system and emergency equipment starting sequence will then start one selected Service Water pump in 30-40 seconds. In the meantime, the drop in Service Water header pressure vill close the turbine building cooling water isolation valve guaranteeing supply to the reactor building, the control rootn -

basement, and the diesel generators from the one Service Water pump.

Due to the redundance of pumps and the requirement of only one to ineet the accident requirements, the 30 day repair time is justified.

D. Batterv Room Ventilation The temperature rise and hydrogen buildup . in the battery rooms without adequate ventilation is such that continuous safe operation of equipment in these rooms cannot be assured.

4.12 BASES A. fmL ,1 Room Emergency Filtg.r System Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 6 inches of water at tho system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure - drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance '

capability.

Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated' hydrocarbon. refrigerant should be performed in accordance with ANSI H510 1980.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that - the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. The test canisters that are installed with the adsorber trays should be_used for the charcoal adsorber efficiency _

{ test. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to

-the thickness of the bed. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent-in the system shall be' replacsd'with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 5.1 of ANSI N509 1980 The replacement tray for the absorber tray removed for the test should.-

meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N510-1980. Any HEPA filters found defectivo shall be replaced with filters qualified pursua*.t to. Regulatory Position C.3 d of-Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorber system and remove excessive moisture built up on the adsorber.

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! 4.12 PASES (cont'd)

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign l-material, the same tests and sample analysis _shall be performed as required for i operational use. The determination of significance shall be made by the operator on l duty at the tiine of the incident. Knowledgeable staff members shot .d be consulted
prior te making this determination. I Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system  !

j performance capability. I B. Reactor Eauipment Cpoline System'  ;

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Normal plant operation requires one heat exchanger and three pumps. Therefore, normal equipment rotation will demonstrate pump operability.

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Pump rates will be demonstrated every three months as an . ind%atiot$ of the pump

condition.

1 C. Service Water System The Service Water pumps shall be proven operable by their use during normal station operations. Since three pumps are continuously operating during normal operation and only one pump is required during accidents, the normal ~ equipment rotation shall prove the pump operability. >

Pump discharge head tests will be run every three months to verify the pumping ability.

Any silting problems caused by the Service Water system will' ba analyzed during and l following the Prooperational Test Program. Any required changes in operating-procedures,- technical specifications or surveillance requirements will be inade prior =

to CNS commercial operation.

D. Batterv Room Ventilatis.n i

The ventilation fans will be rotated on a weekly basis to demonstrate operability.

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